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This research develops and analyses a new set of agent-based models for pricing
European options and option portfolios in the context of double auctions. After
the financial crisis of 2008, it became obvious that the banking industry had
been over-reliant on mathematical models such as Black-Scholes in pricing
financial derivatives despite their major assumptions such as the efficiency of
markets, the homogeneity and the risk-neutrality of traders, and the limitations
in evaluating the risk itself. Although the Black-Scholes framework is regarded
as the cornerstone of arbitrage-free pricing of financial derivatives, it does not
involve market microstructure in forming option prices.
In this research, I add a simulated market component to the existing option
pricing methodology through modelling automated option traders and run-
ning them on various auction-based mechanisms. My simulation model con-
sists of three consecutive steps: asset pricing, automated traders, and market
mechanisms. Firstly, I simulate asset prices beyond Black and Scholes’ ini-
tial assumption which also involve fat-tailed distributions and mean-reverting
aspects of risk-free interest rates that are common in most underlying markets.
Secondly, I design option traders according to my extended version of Information-
Inventory-Knowledge-Behaviour (IIKB) framework. While the information
and knowledge layers of the framework involve gathering and computing ba-
sic statistical parameters of the market, the behavioural layer is designed us-
ing three sublayers which are responsible for determining the option price,
the quantity to bid/ask and the proxy trading algorithm. I also use Zero-
Intelligence (ZI) and indifference pricing techniques along with the Black-
Scholes formula to generate heterogeneous option prices. For proxy trading
algorithms, I re-purposed well-known inventory- and information-based trad-
ing models to deal with options. I also use popular ZIP and GD trading
algorithms to model the behaviour of speculative option traders.
Finally, in the third step, I feed the orders generated from automated traders to
different mechanisms and analyse the obtained option prices. First, I consider
direct double auction which has the Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibil-
ity (DSIC) property, so that traders submit only truthful orders. I develop
a multi-unit, revealed and simultaneous versions of a direct double auction
and run different option pricing methods on them to evaluate the aggregated
option prices. I also analyse the allocative efficiency and budget-balance of
the mechanism. Then, I run trading agents with proxy trading algorithms
in an online double auction. I evaluate the obtained option prices and the
performance of each proxy trading algorithm used.
Another important aspect of the research is the new perspective on pricing of
compound financial contracts such as option portfolios using a combinatorial
exchange. I explain the substitutability and complementarity of options in
given option portfolios, and apply these concepts to the design of the com-
binatorial exchange for option portfolios. I also illustrate the expressiveness
and flexibility of using combinatorial exchanges through a Tree-Based Bidding
Language.
The main contributions of this research are the design and implementation of
a direct double auction for multi-unit and atomic orders, revealed mechanisms
for forecasting traders, inventory- and information-based option traders, Loga-
rithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) option pricing based on option portfolios,
and the application of combinatorial exchanges to the realm of option pricing.
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We have seen, in Financial Crash of 2008, the damages brought to large fi-
nancial institutions like Lehman Brothers leaving the company in bankruptcy
with more than $600 billion debt [109], the acquisition of Merrill Lynch &
Co. by Bank of America for $50 billion saving it from potential bankruptcy
[151], the sales of the most of Washington Mutual’s assets to JPMorgan Chase
& Co for $1.9 billion [101] and so forth. Along with the core reasons of the
inflation of housing bubble and its ultimate burst such as subprime lending,
overleveraging, easier conditions for mortgage and government deregulations
[32], the key factor for its emergence was the creation of new financial instru-
ments such as Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Collateral Debt Obligations
(CDO) and a financial derivative called Credit Default Swaps (CDS). These
financial instruments were the flesh and bones of a securitization process which
involved packaging bonds, mortgages and other interest generating assets of
different credit ratings into, so called, Asset-Backed Securities (ABS). These
securities used waterfall method to prioritise the returns of different layers of
the portfolio, called tranches. While the Senior tranches generally had AAA
rating as they almost guaranteed to pay the interest and preserve the princi-
pal, the Junior tranches were mostly retained by the seller and absorbed the
potential defaults within the portfolio of interest generating assets. The pop-
ularity of these securities in the market created more relaxed environment for
mortgages, as banks can always sell out these obligations in the form of MBSs
and thus transfer the risk to the market participants. Another motivation for
subprime lending was the increased demand for housing due to more accessi-
ble mortgages, and thus the rise in house prices. Banks introduced the teaser
rates like 6% for the first 3-4 years to even increase the number of applicants
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for mortgages to drive their profits up. However in 3-4 years when the teaser
rates ended, many started to default, and the foreclosure returned the houses
to the housing market. This caused a sharp decline in housing market and
eventually led to complete collapse of the U.S. housing market. The main cat-
alyst of the crisis was borrowers relationship with the lenders which replicated
an American put option contract. Technically, borrowers had the right to sell
the house to the lender at the principal amount they owed. And when the
house prices went down, so they became less than the principal money owed,
the borrowers had an incentive to sell the house at much higher price to the
lender, and push this house into the market dragging the prices even lower
[89]. American put option contract allows one to sell an underlying asset at
an agreed price in future, and the above described situation with the housing
market collapse was exactly the same process.
Nowadays it is not a secret that the financial markets are booming with fast
algorithmic traders and automated markets which have already outpaced hu-
man traders in several magnitudes in their efficiency and speed. However
these technological advantages bring with them more complexity and volatil-
ity which are hard to manage and predict. The increased complexity of the
high-frequency trading mechanisms caused a glitch in Knight Capital Group
in 2012 which costed the company about $440 million loss due to the use of
an obsolete trading algorithm [137].
From above mentioned 2 crashes, one may conclude that options and algo-
rithmic trading are crucial components of today’s financial markets, and they
require a particular attention in preventing such cases in future. For the for-
mer case, traders need to evaluate the risk of dealing with options correctly,
so they take into account the heterogeneity of risk perception in markets, and
combine all possible scenarios that may occur in the market while pricing op-
tions. Continuous asset prices that exclude potential jumps caused by market
participants cannot be a valid way of assessing the risk involved with trading
these assets. This, of course, involves taking into account the heterogeneous
option pricing methods used by multiple traders. The simulation of these op-
tion pricing methods in a controlled environment and using the aggregated
outcomes in making better trading decisions could be one way of dealing with
the problem in future. The latter case would require the development of such
mechanisms where traders does not employ complex trading algorithms that
maximise the total gain, but truthfully reveal their valuations to the mech-
anism to achieve the same objective. This requires a re-engineering on the
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mechanism’s side, because although current markets are highly efficient, they
are not always direct and incentive compatible. In direct mechanisms, traders
do not need to employ any trading strategy, as they can safely reveal their true
type to the mechanism and still maximise their utility.
In this research, I propose a multi-agent system that can be used for pricing
financial options through simulating a direct double auction. I use heteroge-
neous option pricing techniques to mimic the population of traders with diverse
risk perception. I also test these trading agents in a continuous double auction
mechanism which is widely used by established financial markets. Moreover,
I propose some perspectives in the generalisation of the double auctions to a
combinatorial exchange mechanism where the financial instruments such as op-
tions can be combined into more complex structures such as option portfolios,
and can be priced truthfully as compound financial instruments.
1.1 Options And Markets
Financial derivatives are formal agreements that give certain rights and impose
certain obligations to concerned parties in future depending on the situation
in the market. The major role of such contracts is to provide some level of
security from uncertainties associated with the future state of the underlying
market. Traders can freely enter into such contracts and take the advantage
of their guaranteed benefits. One of such contracts is option contract, which
is the right of selling or buying some asset at future price. It is issued by
market participants for an additional premium. Option is referred as a financial
product that has its own price and can be traded in the market equally as good
as, say, orange juice. However unlike orange juice, its value is derived from the
value of some other asset. Therefore option market is closely connected to its
underlying market.
Standard financial theory provides a number of methods for calculating option
price based on the market performance of its underlying asset. But there are
few models that take into account microstructural aspects of option market
itself, and their role in forming the prices. It is commonly assumed that
because option is a derivative product, its value is associated with the risk of
buying or selling its underlying asset, and there is no impact of the option
market itself to the evolution of the prices. Also, standard models do not take
into account heterogeneity of risk evaluation methods, as most of the market
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participants use different sources to assess risk. It is commonly accepted that
risk is measured by the volatility of asset price, and this is the key factor in
calculating option prices. But in reality, traders may take other factors which
affect their decision in evaluating option prices, and these factors ultimately
determine their corresponding quotes.
In order to combine these heterogeneous approaches into one place, and use
them to obtain option prices, we need to consider the actual computer sim-
ulation of the marketplaces with these traders. There have been multiple
approaches proposed in designing market mechanisms, and one of them is
the Double Auction (DA). However DAs are also further classified based on
the overall protocol for trading, the types of orders submitted by traders, the
matching and pricing rules, etc. For example, single/multi-unit DAs, multi-
attribute DAs, Continuous Double Auction (CDA)s, prediction markets, mar-
kets without money, etc. Current financial markets, including option markets
use CDA for facilitating the trade among participants. There are also addi-
tional market rules such as ’margin calls’ that prevent traders from becoming
default. However these mechanisms were actually used to clear the matching
orders of the traders, but not used to price the actual traded goods.
1.2 Motivation
The financial crashes recently caused by misrepresenting the risk and sophis-
ticated trading algorithms arise a need to review the existing methods and
to provide viable solutions that could prevent such events in future. In fact,
the option pricing that hardly relies on Black-Scholes formula also requires
more careful attention as the mathematical models usually used to describe
the markets are not sufficient to represent the heterogeneity of different be-
liefs. Professor of Mathematics at Warwick University, Ian Stewart said in his
article for Guardian[153]:
“Any mathematical model of reality relies on simplifications and
assumptions. The Black-Scholes equation was based on arbitrage
pricing theory, in which both drift and volatility are constant. This
assumption is common in financial theory, but it is often false for
real markets.”
...
“Despite its supposed expertise, the financial sector performs no
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better than random guesswork. The stock market has spent 20
years going nowhere. The system is too complex to be run on
error-strewn hunches and gut feelings, but current mathematical
models don’t represent reality adequately. The entire system is
poorly understood and dangerously unstable. The world economy
desperately needs a radical overhaul and that requires more math-
ematics, not less. It may be rocket science, but magic it’s not.”
In my view, multi-agent simulation of financial markets can provide a better
outlook for option pricing and help prevent financial crashes in future. This
also aligns with the further thought of Professor Ian Stewart:
“At the forefront of these efforts is complexity science, a new branch
of mathematics that models the market as a collection of individu-
als interacting according to specified rules. These models reveal the
damaging effects of the herd instinct: market traders copy other
market traders. Virtually every financial crisis in the last century
has been pushed over the edge by the herd instinct. It makes ev-
erything go belly-up at the same time.”
One of the main reasons of doing this research is my quest in understanding
important factors governing the markets, the ways of improving, simplifying
and harnessing them in computing the option prices. As a fundamental mech-
anism of any market, option prices also emerge from the strategic interaction
of traders. Unlike in spot markets where demand emerges from consumption,
and supply from production, in derivatives market supply and demand emerge
from the ratio of the risk and reward expected by different traders. However
the trader beliefs about the risk can be different and therefore there is a possi-
bility of trade that we usually see in financial markets. Hence there is a need
for modelling option traders that use various option pricing techniques. This
naturally leads to designing platforms for testing and running experiments on
them to obtain valuable information about competitive option prices.
There are several reasons for the implementation of a simulation platform
which could output option prices from heterogeneous trading behaviour. Firstly,
we cannot control the real markets and cannot impose our own rules on them.
We can pull the live data using APIs, or push our own bids and asks to the
existing mechanisms, but we cannot control the behaviour of other agents.
Hence it is impossible to set up a certain scenario in the underlying market
in real world and measur the corresponding impact in option market. More-
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over, live execution of trading agents in real markets is too expensive, and
may cause losses. Backtesting subjects to historical bias, and lacks real-time
interaction with the mechanism itself. This requires a testbed for the trading
agents to perform their actions on various situations in given market envi-
ronment. Secondly, we have no knowledge of real option traders, as we do
not know what their returns are, which option trading strategies they are us-
ing, how they are evaluating options, what forecasting mechanism they use to
predict underlying prices and other behavioural parameters that affect their
decision making process. This information is hidden, and almost impossible to
characterize. This would require us to encompass all possible types of trading
behaviour in the market in order to achieve better results. Thirdly, most of
today’s financial markets are automated and involve less human interaction.
For example, high-frequency trading is accomplished by software agents that
are programmed to respond market changes in milliseconds and make valid
decisions within such bounded context. This encourages us to use already
adopted trading algorithms in simulating such markets to better understand
what outcomes they can generate. Finally, the forth and the most important
reason is the experimental curiosity in modifying the existing markets such as
turning them into strategy-proof mechanisms to analyse resulted option prices
emerging from the simulation heterogeneous traders.
Another motivation that drives us forward in developing this idea further is
the use of combinatorial exchanges as generalised mechanism for mixing and
matching different financial instruments and pricing them as a whole. It is im-
portant to note that modern financial markets lack the capability of expressing
combinatorial preferences. Financial products such as MBSs and CDOs are,
indeed, compound products consisting of a stack of several bonds linked to
different riskiness profiles. Combinatorial exchanges would create such mech-
anism where such compound products can be truthfully priced in a market
environment by clear interpretation of their content and valuation through the
use of bidding languages. In the context of options, this idea would translate to
option portfolios. This, as stated above, requires the design of a combinatorial




I state the key assumptions of this research in this section. I explain the main
reasons why I decided to use European-style options and why such options
are assumed on an underlying asset which does not yield any dividend. These
factors directly affect the option price and therefore an appropriate justification
is needed regarding their omission.
1.3.1 Why European-style Options?
Almost all exchange traded stocks, commodities, currencies and some indices
have their American-style options. Quick summary from Options Clearing
Corporation (OCC)1 shows that more than 4 billion shares have been sold
through American options in 2015. In comparison with European options
which are mostly issued on some market indices such as SPX-500, NDX-100,
FTSE-100, etc, American options are more popular and are commonly used
by market participants. However, in this thesis, I will use the example of
European options in every given model or simulation. I exclude other types
of options including popular American options and more exotic Asian options,
Binary options, Barrier options etc from the scope of this research. Besides
narrowing down the scope of this research, there are other important elements
associated with European options to be the best candidate for my research. I
listed them below:
• European option is one of the most primitive option types. Similarly,
there are other primitive options too, such as Arrow-Debreu contract
[6], which pays $1 if the expected event happens. By saying primitive
option type, I mean the mathematical simplicity of computation of its
value given enough information about its terms and conditions. There-
fore European or any other primitive option is mostly the starting point
for any new methodology in pricing options. Many papers proposing a
new approach in pricing options, besides the Black-Scholes solution, also
use European options as an example [114, 80, 42, 24]. One of the key
reasons for that is to isolate the important characteristics of the options
in general and to focus on the key aspects of the proposed methodology
itself dismissing the unnecessary complexity. I chose to use European
1http://www.optionsclearing.com/
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option as an example for my model mainly because of a concrete formula
for computing its final payoff on its known exercise date. In American
option, for example, although the payoff formula is the same as European
option, its exercise date is usually unknown and depends on the evalu-
ation of optimality of its executing on a given date before its maturity.
This adds additional complexity to the model, and distracts the reader
from the main idea of my methodology which is mostly about including
double auctions into the pricing process of options.
• Other pricing methodologies can be derived from pricing European op-
tions. We know that the Black-Scholes’ framework suggests using risk-
neutral probability measure in evaluating the expected payoff for given
financial contract, and an option in particular. This was the key aspect
of the framework, so it could be applied to nearly all financial deriva-
tives no matter what their intrinsic payoffs are. Also, in Cox et al. [35],
this approach has been discretised into a binomial lattice evolving into
chain of probable events that may happen in the underlying market in
future. By moving backward from the leaves of the constructed lattice
tree, one can compute the expected value of the given financial contract,
and continue this cycle until he reaches the origin. This proves that
the methodology is universal, and is not restricted to European options
only. Similarly, although I only use European option as an example in
my model, it can further be extended to any other financial derivative
given that the traders are equipped with the knowledge on the intrinsic
value of the contract they are trading with.
• American call on an asset with no dividends costs same as European call.
This is because by shorting asset at any time t before the expiry of held
European call option, we can simulate the payoff model of an American
call [87]. In simulations provided in this thesis, I use European call op-
tion whose value is equivalent to American call if the underlying asset
does not yield any dividends. I also disregarded dividends in my asset
pricing model due to their uncertainty. This is because it is never optimal
to exercise such American option before its maturity, which effectively
simulates the European call. However this is not true for an American
put whether the asset yields dividend or not. Depending on the situa-
tion in the underlying market, trader might be better off exercising an
American put earlier and make such option worth more than its Euro-
pean alternative. Although my simulation results are not symmetrical
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to American put options, we can still read the valuations obtained for
European calls as the potential valuations for equivalent American calls.
• Put-call parity holds exactly in European options [89]. As it was men-
tioned earlier, this relationship holds exactly for European options, so
the price of the put option can be computed exactly if one knows the
price of its call equivalent. However this relationship does not hold for
American options, and it only tells that the put price should greater or
equal to computed value. For example, it is easier to evaluate the price of
an option portfolio which includes both calls and puts by only knowing
the price of its calls. This significantly simplifies the process of pricing
an option portfolio. Also from my simulation results for call options, one
can infer the put price too.
• European option has a closed-form solution for the risk-neutral values
of both call and put, but there is no such closed-form solution for an
American option. However there are some approximation models such
as Roll-Geske-Whaley method [67] which constructs an American option
using European compound options (i.e. options on option itself). This
involves additional uncertainty in determining the expiration time (i.e.
optimal execution time for American option) of compound option besides
the parameters of the underlying option. I used Black-Scholes formula to
obtain a benchmark price for the simulated option prices to analyse the
discrepancies that arise from certain situations in the market, because
it is a straightforward process to do. In fact, I even use risk-neutral
benchmark to measure if the option is overpriced or underpriced, and
based on this criteria determine the quantity the trading agent would
require for particular option. In case of American options, the compu-
tation of the benchmark price would not be a straightforward task, as
it would require additional assumptions on the optimal exercise time for
the American option.
• Implied volatility can be solved given the price of a European option
using the closed-form solution given by Black-Scholes. European op-
tion is monotonically increasing with respect to its implied volatility
which makes the unknown implied volatility easily solvable using numer-
ical schemes. Finding the price of an American option would employ
numerical methods such as binomial trees. Numerically solving for an
implied volatility using a function which by itself numerically computes
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the American option is computationally intensive task when it is done
for thousands of historic option prices. I had to use the prices of histori-
cal European option on NDX-100 to compute the implied volatility and
construct a volatility surface per each moneyness and time-to-expiry pa-
rameter of the option. Volatility surface is then used by volatility-based
traders (referred with prefix VOL- in the thesis) to generate the risk-
neutral prices for given option types [64].
• European options have applications outside financial derivatives domain.
There are many cases in computer science and other relevant fields where
European options were used as an intermediary instrument to evaluate
the cost of uncertainties associated with future events. In auction theory,
option-based mechanism is used to build an incentive compatible sequen-
tial auction for bidders with combinatorial preferences [93]. In market
microstructure theory, the straddle option portfolio made of European
put and call can be used to evaluate the expected loss from informed
traders [33]. Options are also used in taking strategic decisions on in-
vestment projects, business opportunities, negotiations and resource al-
location tasks in management. In fact, this type of options are called real
options. Despite not being a financial derivative, similar techniques used
to price a European option are also applied to evaluating real options
[2].
1.3.2 Why No Dividends?
Computing European option prices on an underlying asset which yields divi-
dends means simply decreasing the risk-free interest rate by the dividend rate
and using the resulted rate as a risk-neutral rate. There is no other implica-
tion of introducing dividends into the model in the case of European options.
Therefore given any pricing model for European options, it is a trivial task to
adjust it to a corresponding dividend yielding underlying asset. Due to this
triviality, I dropped this parameter from my model and denoted this fact with a
single parameter r which may or may not represent the dividend adjusted risk-
free investment rate depending on the value it is set to. Empirically speaking,
this also introduces additional uncertainty into the model, because estimating
the future dividends from all 100 companies included in chosen NASDAQ-100
index would require more effort on either fundamental analysis of the perfor-
mance of these companies or chartist forecasting models that could reasonably
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replicate the behaviour of dividend yields based on historic data. Instead, I
used either constant value taken from www.treasury.gov to set parameter r
or modelled it as a mean-reverting stochastic process. Moreover, including
dividends into my simulation model would also involve the implementation of
a process monitoring the dividend payouts to each agent for each stock on a
specified date, consequently changing the risk-neutral rate r and thus imposing
additional complexity in analysing the resulted option prices.
Once again, the key assumption was that no matter what the dividend rates
would be from the underlying stocks, at the end of the day they are subtracted
from risk-free investment rate and would either be equal to some constant
value or would follow a stochastic process with dividend adjusted mean. Of
course, in case of American options, the inclusion of dividends into the model
would arise an opportunity for the holders to exercise the option earlier and
thus introduce significant changes into the model. I mentioned about this fact
earlier too. However, in case of European options, the role of dividends is
negligible, because it can be represented as part of risk-neutral rate.
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives
I draw the main questions and objectives of the research based on the moti-
vating aspects of my work. There are several major goals that I will address
in this research. Once of the main aspects of the research is to characterize a
potential market-based framework which could be used for pricing options and
option portfolios. This involves determining its main functional components,
the way they interact with each other, and the details of their implementation.
This can be summarised into following research questions:
1. Can European options be priced via double auctions?
2. What are the important components involved in pricing European option
via double auctions?
3. What categories of trading agents are involved in option market and how
are they designed for double auctions?
4. How is the direct double auction designed for trading options, and what
is learned from its simulation?
5. How is the online double auction designed for trading options, and what
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is learned from its simulation?
6. What are the benefits of using combinatorial exchanges for pricing option
portfolios?
The answers to above stated questions will be limited to the proposed model
and its core assumptions. The lessons learned from particular simulation case
may not encompass the general behaviour of the model, and represents the
knowledge obtained only under specific conditions.
Now let me draw research objectives that I aim to fulfil in this work. The
research objectives are the tasks that should be accomplished in order to answer
the posed questions:
1. To study the constituent components of the option market. This involves
the extensive study of the option market as an interconnected complex
system which identifies its constituent elements and the relationship be-
tween them. First, I should review how the underlying market is mod-
elled in practice and what key parameters are used to define them. Sec-
ond, I should consider the option traders and the methods they use to
price options and submit their orders to the market. This also involves
linking the data coming from the underlying market to the behavioural
model of the traders. Third, I should review the economical aspects of
the markets in general, and in particular, study the current mechanisms
that are implemented in common option exchanges, and derive important
properties of such mechanisms.
2. To propose an abstract simulation model that includes all the constituent
components of the option market. I should define the main functionality
and features of the simulation components, and the ways they interact
with each other. I need to determine the mathematical models that
can be used to describe different scenarios in underlying markets and
the key parameters involved in controlling them. For trading agents,
I need define an abstract framework which identifies the main aspects
involved in implementing option trading agents in general. And finally,
for the option market, I have to determine the protocol for running double
auctions.
3. To develop and test option trading agents. Based on the framework pro-
posed in simulation model, I need to determine the concrete possible
implementations of the option trading agents. The traders should be
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developed in a modular architecture so functional components can be
replaced to change the behaviour of the trader. I should also run them
under specific conditions to review their orders and compare them with
analytical option prices.
4. To develop and simulate direct double auction. I need to determine the
key properties of the direct mechanisms (i.e. a mechanism which runs
one time and achieves the maximisation of its objective function, so the
participants can truthfully reveal their types.) along with the require-
ments of option markets, and based on that knowledge develop the direct
double auction which is suitable for option trading. I should run series of
experimental cases with different option pricing methods to obtain the
option prices and analyse their sensitivity to different market parameters.
5. To develop and simulate online double auction. I need to develop or
use existing continuous double auction to experiment trading algorithms
associated with options. CDA is the current implementation of modern
financial markets, and it is important to evaluate the performance of
proposed trading algorithms in this environment. The simulation should
produce series of option prices and plots that analyse their sensitivity to
different market parameters.
6. To suggest perspectives in combinatorial exchange for option portfolios.
I should explain why combinatorial exchanges is the next step in pricing
financial products (in the example of options) via double auctions and
how they can be applied for trading compound financial products such as
option portfolios. This provides my forward thoughts and future research
objectives in the generalisation of financial markets into combinatorial
exchanges.
I will address each of the objectives stated above in consecutive chapters and
stress the importance of each chapter’s outcome to continue to the next one.
1.5 Contributions
There are several contributions that can be drawn from the accomplished work.
There have been a number of new ideas proposed, implemented and simulated
throughout the course of the research. Most of my proposals can be considered
as an extension, adaptation and revision of existing models. I also provided
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completely new perspectives of looking at pricing options and option portfolios.
I summarised the main contributions of the research in the list below:
1. Simulation model for pricing options via double auctions. I provided
high level simulation model addressing the research objective (2) which
consists of the implementations of common asset pricing models such as
GBM and jump-diffusion model. For the simulation of risk-free rates, I
used Vasicek and Vasicek-Jump processes. For the option traders, I pro-
vided an abstract framework breaking down the relevant concepts into
corresponding layers. I extended the existing Information-Knowledge-
Behaviour (IKB) framework[160] with new Inventory layer into new Information-
Inventory-Knowledge-Behaviour (IIKB) framework and adapted its func-
tional components to option trading. Third, I provided the general sim-
ulation flow for direct and online double auctions, and explained the
overall interaction of the mechanism with traders and the underlying
market.
2. Option Trading Agents. I provided the implementation and the analy-
sis of a range of different option trading agents built based on proposed
IIKB framework and thus addressed the objective (3). I proposed mod-
ular architecture for designing the trader’s behaviour which consists of
three important modules: option pricing, choosing the quantities and
proxy trading strategies. During the implementation of these modules, I
developed new option pricing methods and proxy trading algorithms for
options based on the recent literature. I listed these novelties below:
• Volatility-based option pricing. Although this methodology has been
previously described in financial engineering textbooks[64], my con-
tribution can be seen as the agent-based approach to this concept.
I separated the construction of volatility surface and pricing the ac-
tual option into two independent layers: knowledge and behaviour
layers in proposed IIKB, and linked them through the feedback the
trader gets from the market and uses it to update his knowledge
base. The trader continuously adapts his volatility to the market’s
implied volatility and uses the resulted volatility surface to price
different options.
• Risk-averse option pricing. Using indifference pricing methods such
as modelling the risk-averseness through exponential function. It is
a comparatively new idea [24] in option pricing in contrary to stan-
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dard Black-Scholes risk-neutral framework. In my model, I defined
an agent-based architecture that uses this option pricing method
to interact with the option market, and obtained simulation results
from its execution in direct double auction.
• LMSR option pricing. This way of option pricing emerges from re-
cently proposed design of prediction markets [26, 42]. It defines one
of the cutting-edge approaches in looking at options as predictions
and rewarding their owners according to the market scoring rule.
I integrated this methodology into proposed IIKB framework and
linked it to the option portfolios that agents may already hold while
pricing the options. I obtained the LMSR option prices of agents
holding common portfolios through simulating them in a direct dou-
ble auction environment.
• Inventory-based option dealers. I adapted the algorithm proposed
by Garman [63] to trading options based on the inventory levels
of cash and options, and simulated it in an online double auction.
I linked this algorithm with the option pricing modules and the
inventory accounts within IIKB framework. Also I computed the
probability of inventory-based option dealer’s failure through mod-
elling the intensity of order arrivals as linear functions.
• Information-based option dealers. I adapted the algorithm proposed
by Copeland-Galai [33] to trading options based on the information
available about informed traders. Taking advantage of the fact that
Copeland-Galai’s algorithm replicates the straddle option portfolio,
I used Geske’s [66] formulas to construct the straddle portfolio us-
ing compound options and used it to evaluate the expected loss
from informed traders. I also proposed Bayesian updating method
for learning about the proportion of informed traders in the mar-
ket. The proposed algorithm’s expected payoff has been analysed
through the example of linear intensity of order arrivals. I also
simulated this algorithm in online double auction environment, and
closely observed the payoffs it generated along with the prices it
submitted.
• Option adapted ZIP and GD algorithms. I used the ZIP algorithm
in the context of proposed IIKB framework where options prices
are computed continuously and used by the algorithm as the pri-
16
vate price. For GD algorithm, I proposed the use of the ratio of
evaluated option price and theoretical price (instead of raw option
prices, because their values change with the time) in determining
the probability of the success of the bid or ask. These algorithms
have been used in online double auction environment to simulate
the speculative trading behaviour.
3. Direct multi-unit double auction with atomic orders. I designed new
multi-unit double auction which holds Dominant Strategy Incentive Com-
patible (DSIC), efficiency and individual rationality properties at the
cost of uncontrolled budget-deficiency. This mechanism is used to simu-
late various option pricing methods in a market environment where the
traders have no incentive in modifying their true valuations. I obtained
the equilibrium option prices, and computed their sensitivity on differ-
ent factors by simulating different populations of option traders. Besides
that, I also proposed the use of revealed mechanisms for certain types of
traders who can reveal their private forecasts about future asset prices. I
ran them to collect their aggregated forecasts resulting from the changes
in supply and demand of the market. This addressed the objective (4).
4. Online double auction for option traders. I implemented an instance of
a continuous double auction and used it for running option traders with
proxy trading algorithms. I implemented the LOB using binary trees to
accept continuous orders from trading agents. The option prices obtained
from the simulation of newly proposed inventory- and information-based
dealers have been analysed along with ZIP and GD traders. Besides that
I also reviewed the performance of each type of trading agent in terms
of its overall payoff and the way how its inventories change according to
their bid-ask spread. This addressed the objective (5).
5. New perspectives on pricing option portfolios using combinatorial ex-
change. I provided several scenarios where the options can be considered
as substitutes/complements for the trader wishing to take an option port-
folio, and emphasised the need for pricing them as bundles in a combina-
torial exchange. I applied the proposed design of combinatorial exchange
for trading option portfolios and interpreted the option portfolios using
Tree-based Bidding Language (TBBL). I also presented how the mech-
anism solves the Winner Determination Problem (WDP) and computes
budget-balanced payments. I also provided a possible extension of TBBL
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language for trading option portfolios, and presented a generic class of
TBBL that can be reused to interpret different option portfolios. This
provided simplification for the mechanism and the trader in communi-
cating the preferences in a complete and succinct way. This addressed
the final objective (6) of the research.
The outcome of the research helps us to understand how different option pricing
methods when put into a market environment generate different option prices,
how these prices are sensitive to the external factors and how the changes in
the rules of markets themselves affect them. It gives an interesting insight
on strategy-proof mechanisms and their role in simplifying the interaction be-
tween traders and the market. Also the proposed architecture is open and
easily extendible, so one can implement his own option pricing, or proxy trad-
ing algorithm and use it to simulate the option market. Also the mechanism’s
allocation and clearing rules can be easily modified to test different experi-
mental cases. This can be useful for the researchers and financial analysts to
evaluate certain situations in option market, test their own trading agents or
market rules in making any trading decision.
I have also published the key aspects of the research in papers listed below:
1. Sarvar Abdullaev, Peter McBurney, and Katarzyna Musial-Gabrys, Di-
rect Exchange Mechanisms for Option Pricings, In Proc. of 12th Euro-
pean Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, Springer LNAI Multi-Agent
Systems, Prague, Czech Republic, December 2014
2. Sarvar Abdullaev, Peter McBurney, and Katarzyna Musial-Gabrys, Market-
based Mechanism for Option Pricing, In Proc. of 16th International
Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agents
Design and Analysis, Paris, France, May 2014
1.6 Research Methodology
I use computer simulation as my main methodology of investigating the role
of market microstructure in forming the option prices. As automated trading
continues to shape modern financial markets by forming a global complex net-
work of software traders, I believe that multi-agent simulation with its ability
to mimic this heterogeneity is the most effective methodology for studying
derivative markets. Most of today’s financial markets are organised as LOB
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with the broker acting as a facilitator in matching buyers and sellers. Op-
tion trading occurs at exchanges such as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
or Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) under highly standardised and regulated
environments. These markets are also hierarchical so that players have to go
through several levels of intermediaries to process their orders. Brokerage firms
or clearinghouses are the ones which are engaged in verifying orders, maintain-
ing investors’ margin accounts, matching and settling the orders. Therefore
it is practically impossible to control or manipulate such exchanges for ex-
perimental reasons to analyses the consequences of certain market policies or
trading behaviour on option prices. It is impossible to model the mindset of
each market participant and develop an algorithm which could replicate their
decision making process. Neither can we control the information flow between
market participants, nor can we isolate or fix some factors in the market to
undertake ceteris paribus experiments. Option markets are complex systems
not only governed by the intrinsic characteristics of the options traded such
as strike price, expiration date, but also influenced by other factors such as
traders’ subjective beliefs and pricing methodologies applied, and more impor-
tantly by the events happening in underlying market.
Moreover, it is also impossible to fit option market into a universal math-
ematical model because of the extreme complexity and heterogeneity of its
constituent elements. Standard models used for pricing options imply homo-
geneity of risk evaluation techniques, and based on this assumption derive their
values. But in a complex scenario every trader is different in making decisions,
and thus he is different in evaluating the risk. My method uses Monte-Carlo
methodology in simulating the random behaviour of traders and imposing cer-
tain market rules on them to obtain simulated option prices. Monte-Carlo
method is a handy technique which relies on the law of large numbers, and
avoids complex combinatorial analysis through generating random numbers
and inputting them into given model. Unlike traditional Monte-Carlo option
pricing technique which simulates the possible paths of the asset prices with
given stochastic model and then finds the expected value of the derivative, I
design adaptive and heterogeneous option pricing and trading algorithms on
top of it and use them to generate bids and asks for proposed mechanisms
which could be controlled and modified for the experiment. Multi-agent sim-
ulation of financial markets provides conditions for a controlled experiment,
and thus allows us to build cause and effect relationship between different fac-
tors. There have been many studies accomplished in past using multi-agent
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simulation of financial markets, and LeBaron provides a comprehensive review
of the researches undertaken in this field [99].
I have planned the research lifecycle using an iterative methodology which
involves gradual evolution of the research outcomes from continuous design,
implementation and simulation of experiments loops. This methodology which
takes its roots from agile software development proved to be a productive
way of conducting a simulation-based research, because one could realise the
technical issues and model’s fundamental pitfalls during the implementation
of automated traders and mechanisms.
I list the steps that I have undertaken to accomplish this research. Iterative
approach involves standard steps which are common to most of the software
development processes, and mostly used by agile methodologies [111]. Also
it has been suggested as one of the key approaches of conducting a doctorate
research [163]. It consists of initial stages such as posing research questions
and objectives, literature review and theoretical model, and then proceeds
to iterative development of experiments and analysis of obtained data. This
approach proved to be very useful for our research because it enabled us to
identify and correct technical issues while running the simulations. Especially,
with the popularity of IPython console 2 in scientific community, it became
very easy to modify the code, change specific parameters of the simulation
and render comprehensive visualisations of the data right on the spot without
major changes to the main code. The availability of fast and accurate libraries
of Python’s scientific stack such as NumPy3, SciPy 4 and Pandas 5 enabled
the minimisation of the amount of code required to build proposed simulation
models. Tools such as MatPlotLib 6 and Seaborn 7 helped me to visualise the
obtained data in no time in much comprehensive and effective way. To sum
up, above technologies came hand in hand with the iterative research approach
I have chosen, due to the short time and little effort required to build, run and
modify the experiments.
Below diagram 1.1 highlights the key stages of my research. The downward
arrows in the diagram indicate the material resulted from given stage, and the








Figure 1.1: Research Lifecycle
provide description of each stage:
• Research Questions and Research Objectives: At this stage, I formulated
my research questions and specify the list of research objectives that I
have to accomplish.
• Literature Review: This stage involved the research of the published ma-
terial on relevant aspects of the work. I reviewed works in areas such as
option pricing, microeconomics and market microstructure, automated
trading, mechanism design and auction theory.
• Theoretical Model: In this stage, I designed a conceptual model for trad-
ing agents, mechanisms and their mutual interactions. It involved the
design of the trading agents framework, and definition of mechanisms
used for pricing options.
• Experimental Design: In this state, I defined experiments necessary to
conduct in order to reach the research objectives stated. I determined
what is planned to test, what the control factors are, what factors are
fixed and what they are respective values, what outcome I am expecting
to get from the experiments. For example, in order to observe the impact
of different traders and mechanisms on option prices, I have to use the
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same path of asset prices every time. Hence I decided to fix underlying
market, and set traders and mechanisms as control factors.
• Simulation Design: This stage determined how I organised the simulation
to conduct the experiment. Here I decided how different components of
the simulation interact together in terms of data they generate and what
functionality each component must have. I also made sure that the sim-
ulation model conforms to proposed theoretical model while having the
specifics determined for each simulation. I also designed the simulations
to be reusable for multiple experiments at the same time.
• Implementation: In this stage, I decided which technology to use in
order to implement the simulation model. Most of the simulation has
been implemented using Python and its scientific stack. But I also used
MATLAB for analysing certain aspects of trading agents. This is because
MATLAB had good integration with computationally efficient mixed-
integer programming tool Gurobi8.
• Validation and Testing: Validation and testing of the simulation model
has been interactively accomplished using IPython console where I tried
different ranges of values for certain parameters, having other parame-
ters fixed, and observed the results generated from them. I tested triv-
ial cases such as if Monte Carlo pricing roughly approximates Black-
Schole’s method, and if the mechanism populated solely with Black-
Scholes traders output the same Black-Scholes result, etc.
• Simulation Runs: This stage executes the scripts written for each simu-
lation and save the output in CSV and Excel files. It tests wider range
of parameters compared to Validation and Testing stage. Also there are
non-trivial hybrid cases involved which are set by the experiment design.
• Analyse Results: This stage aggregates and interprets results using data
visualisation tools such as Matplotlib and Seaborn. It also involves
measuring the performance of the mechanisms through their allocative
efficiency, traded volumes, trader participation and budget-balance. I
analysed the option prices through Greeks.
• Lessons Learned: In this stage, I summarised findings drawing conclu-
sions about the experiments I conducted based on the analysis of the
results. Also I identified the limitations of proposed model in simulating
8http://www.gurobi.com/
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the markets. These limitations may involve computational limitations as
well. For example, I have also noticed that Monte Carlo option pricing
with jump-diffusion models take more time than with standard Brownian
model. Therefore I had to reduce the number of trials for jump-diffusion
model. Also another limitation I observed is the complexity of solving
certain problems such as mixed-integer problem.
• Publication: In this final stage, I published new findings from exper-
imental study and bound them together into one thesis. Taking into
account the limitations I encountered, I propose possible improvements
and future plans to develop this research further.
I would also like to stress the backward moving nature of my research method-
ology. In the initial stages of the research, I have made repetitive modifications
to stated research questions and goals based on new findings in literature re-
view. Once covering enough material on topic, I devised a simulation model
of trading agents and mechanisms. I went backward to literature review stage
several times to justify the validity of the simulation model with published
works of other authors. In the iterative experimental phase, I encountered
difficulties in attaining certain objectives, so I had to go back to simulation
model to adjust the initial architecture. For example, I realised that there is
no continuous historical record of option prices for certain type of option, due
to big variety of available option contracts in the market, and hence simply
lack of open interest on each of them in a continuous time span. Hence I had
to adopt historical volatility surface in order to approximate the continuous
option prices for given option time.
1.7 Thesis Structure
This section briefly describes each chapter of the thesis.
• Chapter 2: In this chapter, I review relevant topics from financial and
economical aspects of the research. In Section 2.1, I look into the def-
inition of options, how they are priced, what are the factors that af-
fect option price and some mathematical methods used for analysing
their performance. I also illustrate various option trading strategies,
and their corresponding profit functions. In Section 2.2, I review what
an agent-based economics is and its outstanding implementations until
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today. Then I focus on the auction theory from the perspective of a
computer scientist and discuss the works recently accomplished in this
field. I also characterise them based on their basic properties.
• Chapter 3: In this chapter, I describe the abstract simulation model
consisting of three layers: underlying market, trading agents and mech-
anisms. In Section 3.2, I describe different stochastic models used to
simulate asset prices and interest rates. Section 3.3 proposes a multi-
layered framework for designing option trading agents. Section 3.4 talks
about the overall flow of the simulation for both direct and online double
auctions.
• Chapter 4: This chapter proposes the implementation of various option
trading agents based on the proposed multi-layered IIKB framework.
In Section 4.2, I describe the implementation of the Knowledge layer
through 2 cases: calibrating the volatility surface and learning about
the informed traders in the market. Section 4.3 implements various op-
tion pricing methods and reviews their valuations for predefined con-
figurations. In Section 4.4, I propose the methods used for choosing
the quantities for bids and asks. In Section 4.5, I develop proxy trad-
ing algorithms for dealers and traders. I also evaluate their results in
per-configured setup.
• Chapter 5: This chapter presents the design, implementation and simu-
lation results for a direct double auction. In Section 5.2, I determine the
key properties of direct mechanisms, and make some assumptions used
throughout the chapter. Section 5.3 proposes the new design of a multi-
unit double auction, and then extends it for revealed and simultaneous
mechanisms for particular types of traders. Section 5.4 determines the
instances of traders, options, asset prices and mechanisms to be used in
the experiments. In Section 5.5, I verify the results from simulating a
hypothetical scenario that has to generate Black-Scholes prices. In Sec-
tion 5.6, I present the simulation results for various experimental cases
and highlight the important aspects of the obtained results.
• Chapter 6: This chapter presents the design, implementation and sim-
ulation results for an online double auction. Section 6.2 provides the
details of the design and implementation of continuous double auction
for trading options. In Section 6.3, I define the instances of traders,
options, asset prices and mechanisms that are used in different experi-
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mental scenarios. Section 6.4 tests the option prices in a hypothetical
scenario which must generate Black-Scholes prices. Finally, Section 6.5
provides experimental results with different trader populations, and a
close look at each type of trader’s performance.
• Chapter 7: In this chapter, I suggest further generalisations in pricing
option portfolios via combinatorial exchanges. In Section 7.2, I present
few examples for potential scenarios where options can be considered as
substitutes or complements. Then in Section 7.3, I propose the design of
the combinatorial exchange for trading option portfolios. I use TBBL to
represent the option portfolios. In Section 7.4, I suggest some improve-
ments to TBBL that could facilitate the communication between traders
and mechanism, and create more flexibility in trading option portfolios.
• Chapter 8: This chapter draws conclusion to the thesis by emphasising
the key findings of the research. I also talk about the current limitations
and drawbacks encountered throughout the research, and propose ideas




In this chapter, I review relevant literature starting from the concepts described
in textbooks to recent researches written in academic papers. I organized this
chapter into three major parts: Options Market, Microeconomical Aspects of
Markets and Agent-Based Economics. In Section 2.1, I review basic notions
about financial derivatives, and their particular type - options. I define types
of options, main parameters associated with options, and the ways how they
are priced. I also discuss the stochastic models that are commonly used to
simulate asset prices and interest rates. This Section also covers the key aspects
of options such as option Greeks that used to measure the performance of the
option, and the option portfolios that are commonly taken by the traders in
market to cut the losses and at the same time express bullish, bearish or neutral
outlook to the market. In Section ??, I cover the microeconomical principles
of markets that are crucial in understanding the competitive behaviour among
traders. I cover quasi-linear utility, demand and supply laws, and competitive
equilibrium. Section 2.2 provides background and review on recent works in
agent-based economics, and particular auctions and double auctions.
2.1 Option Market
In this section, I discuss about financial derivatives, particularly I focus on
options, their main attributes, ways how they are priced, trading strategies
involving them and tools used to analyse them.
Derivatives are financial instruments the value of which is associated with the
value of another asset. Arnoldi [5] defines derivatives as virtual assets the
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value of which is calculated from the price volatility of its underlying asset.
The marketplace where such derivative contracts are traded is called an ex-
change. Derivatives traded in the exchanges such as Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT)1 and Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)2 are highly standardized
and regulated. Futures contract is one kind of derivatives traded in exchanges
and it obliges concerning parties to sell or buy underlying assets at agreed
future price. The exchanges strictly specify the terms and conditions of fu-
tures contracts traded. Typical futures contract should include exact amount,
category or quality of an asset to be delivered, the agreed future price and de-
livery place [87]. Because both are taking the equal risk of losing from market
fluctuations, it is free to enter a futures contract for both sides.
Financial derivatives are used mostly by three categories of traders. Firstly,
these are hedgers who should mitigate the risk that they are exposed in future.
Hedgers secure themselves with futures and options from possible losses that
may happen due to future price movements in an underlying market. For
example, if the company produces grain then it would like to freeze the next
year price of the grain in order to secure itself from sharp price drops. Because
the company must invest into the production of grain now, it is in company’s
interest to justify the costs associated with it. Futures or option contracts
are good tools to lock the price in future, therefore company may enter such
contract to secure itself from potential loss.
Second category of traders are speculators who take the risk of betting on price
movements and make profit. Speculators are driven in the pursuit of profit, and
they use derivatives in order to monetise their future predictions. For example,
consider the case when speculator has private information that quotes for oil
will increase next year. Speculator may take long position in futures contract
and if his expectations are right next year, he can benefit from buying oil for
less price. Economists Keynes and Hicks noticed that hedgers are likely to
accept deals below the expected future price, if they tend to maintain their
short position and speculators on the other hand try to keep their long position
[94, 81]. This phenomenon occurs because speculators do not participate in
futures agreement if there is no foreseen gain, however hedgers are subjected
to risk and in order to minimize it, they agree to accept less profitable deals.




look for an arbitrage opportunity by getting involved in two or more markets
simultaneously. For example, asset is going to be sold at $120 next year, and
its current spot price is $100. If interest rate is 10% annual, then arbitrager
can borrow $100 and buy a unit of the asset. Further he can take short position
in futures market for this asset and sell it for $120. Returning the bank loan
and interest together as $110, arbitrager makes risk-free profit of $10 [87].
2.1.1 Options
I provide more background on European options only, as this is the only type
of option used in the scope of this work. I use European option because of
its comparatively simple definition and its benchmark role in option pricing
theory. When I use the word ’option’, I mean European option unless otherwise
is stated. Also I mean the underlying asset, when I use the word ’asset’
Option is the type of financial derivative that enables its holder (i.e. owner) to
buy or sell specified assets at certain future price to writer (i.e. issuer) of the
option. Holder of the option buys or takes long position for an additional cost
(i.e. option premium) determined by the market or the writer of the option.
On the other hand, the writer of the option sells or takes short position by
taking future obligation to trade assets if holder chooses to exercise his right
to buy or sell. Option contract must specify the underlying asset to be traded,
its volume, exercise price (i.e. strike price or future price) and expiration time
of the contract. European options can be exercised only on their maturity date,
while American options on any date until expiration. Options are classified to
Put and Call options depending on rights and obligations that they bear. Put
option gives its holder the right to sell underlying assets at agreed strike price
whereas the writer has the liability to buy them when holder exercises his right.
Call option gives its holder the right to buy at agreed strike price where the
writer has the liability to sell. Options value depends on several parameters
of the underlying market and the conditions written in the contract:
S0 Asset’s initial spot price
St Asset’s spot price at time t
K Option’s strike price
T Option’s Time to maturity
r Risk-free interest rate
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OTM ATM ITM
CALL K > St K = St K < St
PUT K < St K = St K > St
Table 2.1: Options by Moneyness
σ Asset price volatility
The other parameter of the asset (if it is a company stock) is the dividend it
yields annually. This is normally subtracted from the overall return the asset
is likely to make, and in risk-neutral setting, the dividends are subtracted from
the risk-free rate. The omission of dividends from the scope of this research
has been discussed in Section 1.3.
Option belongs to differentmoneyness range depending on if its strike is greater
or less than the current asset price. Put option is said to be if its strike price is
below the market’s price, In-The-Money (ITM) if it is above the market price
and At-The-Money (ATM) if it is equal to the market price. Call option is
said to be Out-of-The-Money (OTM) if its strike price is above the market’s
price, ITM if it is below the market price and ATM if it is equal to the market
price. Table 2.1 summarises the options by moneyness.
I use continuous compound interest to discount or find the future value of the
asset. Below is the asset price future value at time T is set to option’s strike
(2.1):
K = S0erT (2.1)
In fact, (2.1) determines the strike price K for ATM calls and ATM puts [97].
Because holder has the right, not an obligation to exercise option, and writer
has a potential obligation to fulfil his liabilities once option gets exercised,
holder has to pay the premium to the writer. Writer’s risk is normally asso-
ciated with the option’s expected payoff. If the option is ATM which means
that its strike price K is equal to S0erT and its intrinsic payoff is zero, there
is a possibility that the option can end up ITM and yield positive payoff. It
is for this reason, the expected price of the ATM option can be greater than
zero.
The option holder’s gain is the difference between underlying asset’s spot price
and strike price minus the option premium paid to the option writer. On the
other hand, writer’s gain is fixed in terms of option premium received. The call
option holder makes profit if the spot price exceeds the strike price. Similarly,
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the holder of put option makes profit if the strike price is higher than spot price.
It is known that the estimated future price of an underlying asset converges to
the spot price, as option approaches its maturity. The further is the maturity
date of the option, the greater is the uncertainty about the future price of its
underlying asset. Thus it is good for options to have longer period to expire,
as the strike price can significantly deviate from spot price and there is greater
room for variation.
From this point onwards, I will use the words option price and option premium
interchangeably. Option price can vary within its upper and lower bounds.
Upper bound cannot be greater than the asset’s spot price and lower bound is
not less than the option’s intrinsic value. Below formulas (2.2) (2.3) illustrate
the intrinsic values for call c and put p options at time t = 0.
c = max(S0 −Ke−rT , 0) (2.2)
p = max(Ke−rT − S0, 0) (2.3)
Hence, we can determine the valid range for the option price as follows:
max(S0 −Ke−rT , 0) ≤c ≤ S0 (2.4)
max(Ke−rT − S0, 0) ≤p ≤ Ke−rT (2.5)
There is an established relationship between put and call options with the same
strike price and maturity date. This relationship results from the possibility
of buying the one and selling the other. Consider a case, when trader buys a
call option at K strike price, and at the same time sells a put option with K
strike price, and both have the same maturity T . In some sense, it seems that
trader can compensate the cost of a call option he bought for with the premium
he received for selling put. So on maturity date, ST turns out to be higher
than strike price K, so the trader can benefit profit as a difference of ST −K.
However if ST appears to be less than K, then trader has a liability to fulfil the
put option that he sold, so he incurs a loss of K − ST . This market position
actually simulates a forward contract which could be obtained for free. This
type of contract is free because it involves future possible liability or profit
at the same time, so the risk for both parties is even. Once the combination
of put and call options can replicate the liabilities of a forward contract, the
prices for put and call options must hold the put-call parity relationship given
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in (2.6). Using the put-call parity relationship, we can easily convert call prices
to put prices, and vice versa [82].
c(K,T )− p(K,T ) = ST −Ke−rT (2.6)
2.1.2 Option Exchanges
In this section, I provide brief overview of real-life option exchanges, the way
how they are organised and run. Then I stress out the differences of my
simulation model from the existing real-life exchanges. I also provide some
insights on the main advantages and disadvantages of both systems.
Option market is strictly regulated by exchanges and clearinghouses which
apply robust mechanisms to enable the successful fulfilment of liabilities that
arise from trading options. Trader playing in any exchange must open amargin
account with the broker in order to leverage his initial investment. Margin
account is an account used by a broker as a collateral to provide short-term
loans to the trader to participate in the market. The funds in this account
are normally used to cover potential losses that the trader may incur during
the loan’s term. After depositing the initial investment (also referred as initial
margin), trader can submit orders the total value of which does not exceed the
rate determined by corresponding clearinghouse. For example, if the initial
margin is 20% of the requested loan, then trader has to deposit $20 for each
$100 requested.
Margin account is necessary for the trader who issues the option, because he
should maintain sufficient funds to cover his potentially unlimited liability in
front of buyer of that option. As the prices fluctuate, so they fall below agreed
strike price, the funds from option issuer’s margin account are transferred to
buyer’s margin account. This is also referred as marking to the market. If the
funds in margin account decrease below certain maintenance threshold, option
issuer receives a maintenance call from the broker requesting him to top it up
to an agreed initial margin. If trader defies the maintenance call, broker has
the right to close the outstanding liability of the trader at the cost of funds
remaining in the margin account. This may involve buying out an equivalent
option which has been issued by the trader.
Traders may short naked or covered options. The former is an option that is
not supported with an underlying asset bought beforehand to guarantee the
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delivery of the asset once option gets exercised. The latter is an option whose
underlying asset is owned by the writer at the moment of sales. Trader is
allowed to write a naked option if his initial margin is greater than the option
premium received plus 20% of the underlying asset’s price. If the price of
an underlying asset is less volatile, then the option premium overhead can be
decrease to 15%. With regard to covered call options, writer does not have to
maintain the margin, as he can always sell owned assets for the price stated in
the option. Similarly, margin account is also not generally applied to buyers
of the options limiting their ability to leverage. Option buyer has to pay the
full price of the option to be purchased beforehand.
There are three ways of closing positions in the option exchange. First way is
the actual delivery of the asset at an agreed strike price. The second method
is that the option issuer pays the positive difference between the spot price
and the strike price at the maturity of the option contract. The last method
is that the trader takes an opposite position in the market which eventually
offsets his current open position. For example, the issuer of call option can
buy an equivalent call option at any point before option’s maturity to close
his position for the sold option.
Above I briefly described the inner workings of real option exchanges, although
most of these details will be ignored in my proposed model due to their irrel-
evance in a computer simulated environment. Instead, I will focus on more
integral components of an option market such as the underlying market, the
traders and their pricing and bidding strategies and the market itself. My
model does not involve brokers or clearinghouses which stay in between traders
and the market, and ascertain that the mutual liabilities are honoured. The
proposed mechanism involves one agent who plays the role of a market-maker
and matches the orders in a specified way. Below I summarises the key differ-
ences between the real option market and my proposed simulation model:
• Brokers: Unlike in real option exchanges, in my proposed model there
are no brokers who would maintain traders’ accounts and place orders
on their behalf. However there is a mechanism which accepts the orders
and matches them resulting in an efficient trade between participating
traders. Traders can directly interact with the mechanism and get their
orders cleared in the process. Also mechanism does not bear any respon-
sibility in mitigating the potential losses that may occur due to unpaid
liabilities. In fact, I assume that the traders always honour their liabil-
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ities, so the mechanism does not undertake any action upon preventing
the trader’s default and simply exercises the outstanding options on their
maturity date by transferring required amounts between corresponding
traders’ accounts. Mechanism also provides basic functionality to submit
or withdraw orders from the order book.
• Margin Accounts: The mechanism who partially plays the role of a clear-
inghouse does not maintain any accounts of the traders in my simulation
model. The accounts are directly managed by the traders themselves.
Also there is no opportunity for leverage for the traders, as they have to
use their endowed cash fully for both buying options and paying the lia-
bilities on sold options. This important distinction between real exchange
and the simulated model is made due to my assumption that none of the
automated traders will default, although most are assumed to have ac-
cess to unlimited funds, some automated traders such as inventory-based
trader should be restricted to the amounts in his inventory accounts.
• Options: As I mentioned already, the simulation model deals only with
European options. Moreover, all European options traded in my simu-
lation model will have the same maturity date and will be on the same
underlying asset. This narrows down my simulation model only to the
set of European options differing in strike price and option type. Of
course, in real-life option exchanges there are myriad of different options
varying in their maturity date, style, strike price, underlying asset and
type, and they are all traded simultaneously on the same platform.
• Underlying Market: In contrast to real option exchange where traders
can get involved in the underlying market to cover their outstanding
liabilities in sold options, in my simulation model traders have no ac-
cess to such market. In practice, the underlying market is by itself a
real marketplace where the asset prices result from the ongoing trades.
However in my simulation model, the underlying market is a stochastic
model which simulates the price movements in the underlying market.
Traders cannot be directly involved in buying or selling assets from the
underlying market, because this would impose additional complexity on
their corresponding impact on the formation of asset prices in the un-
derlying market. Therefore, I assume that the option traders are simply
price-taker towards the underlying market. I will discuss more about
how I model the trajectory of the asset prices more in Section 2.1.4.
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• Risk-Free Market: Similar to underlying market, the risk-free market
is also another class of marketplace where the risk-free assets such as
Treasury bills are traded. Their corresponding prices also result from the
ongoing transactions in this market. However, in my simulation model
this is either a constant value or a stochastic process which replicates
the movements in this market. Similar to underlying assets, the option
traders are price-takers towards this market, and simply use the emerged
rates in computing their risk-neutral valuation of options. I will discuss
about this process more in Section 2.1.4.
• Market Frictions: Unlike in real exchanges where every transaction bears
some cost in the form of broker’s commission, borrowing cost, taxes, in-
surance, etc, the simulation model does not involve such costs in the
trading process. Also I assume that there are no frictions in the informa-
tion flow across the marketplace. All of the information which is publicly
available is set to be known to every agent. I talk about this fact more
in Chapter 3.
• Traders: The simulation model involves only automated traders whereas
the real option exchanges may involve both human and automated traders.
The automated traders generally base their pricing and trading decisions
on certain historic data and private beliefs embedded into the agent’s
internal structure, while human traders may also involve fundamental
analysis of the markets through digesting news and forming subjective
opinion from the performance of markets, companies and governments. I
describe the formal methods that are commonly used in pricing options
by both humans and automated traders in Section 2.1.5. The trading
algorithms that are used in my model are described in Chapter 4.
2.1.3 Competitive Markets
In this section, I discuss about the basic economic principles of markets in
general, the forces that form them and the way how economists study them.
In some sense, it may contradict with options market, because options are
virtual assets, and anyone can issue them in unlimited amounts. Also the
demand and supply rules are different in financial markets, as the drop in
price does necessarily increase demand, but can further push down the prices,
or vice versa. In order to determine the demand or supply for option, I accept
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using the ratio of the market option price to its risk-neutral price. In this way,
it is intuitive to suggest that when the option is overpriced (its ratio is more
than one), then there is less demand for such option, and vice versa. Despite
being a virtual asset, an option can also be considered as a limited resource,
because it involves risk for the trader who issues it, and due to this risk there
can be a scarcity of options in the market. Moreover multiplicity of variations
of options in the market scatters the overall demand and supply across each
causing some options being popular over others.
I describe how the clearing prices are achieved in competitive markets. Traders
can both buy or sell options in any quantities, and in my simulation model,
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply of the options ultimately affect
the price of the option traded in the marketplace. For example, if trader needs
to buy certain type of option to hedge his risk at some other market, but he
cannot find that particular option in sufficient quantities, he might be forced
to increase its price above its risk-neutral value to attract more sellers. This
of course results in the rise of the option price. In order to present how the
clearing option price is determined, let me define aggregate demand and supply
functions.





where D is the number of buyers, xDi (p) is demand function for buyer i for
given price p.





where S is the number of sellers, xSi is supply function for seller i for given
price p.
The allocation of the options in the market is xi quantity of options to be
bought by each buyer i and xj quantity of options to be sold by each seller j.
Any allocation is called feasible for given price p if xi and xj satisfy following
conditions:













where D is the number of buyers, S is the number of sellers, uDi = Wi − pxi
utility of buyer i, uSj = pxj utility of seller j, Wi initial wealth of buyers.
I assume that every trader is rational and therefore chooses best quantity for
demand or supply based on given price p. Traders reach competitive market
equilibrium, if there is a feasible allocation for given price p∗ which maximises
both aggregate demand and supply. The well-being of all buyers and sellers
can be measured by the their cumulative utilities referred as Consumer Surplus
(CS) and Producer Surplus (PS) respectively. Similarly the well-being of the
market is measured using Social Surplus (SS) which is the difference between
CS and PS.








where x is the feasible allocation for both buyers and sellers.
The competitive markets maximise SS making the allocation Pareto optimal
for all traders. Pareto optimality implies that items sold and bought are results
of trader’s individual rational decision making towards maximising utility, and
no one is better off from other allocation. If the feasible allocation is Pareto
optimal, it is said to be an efficient allocation. Although the traditional mar-
kets achieve such allocation through Adam Smith’s ’Invisible Hand of The
Market’, my simulation model will find it by solving an Linear Programming
(LP) constrained to the corresponding demand and supply in the market.
2.1.4 Underlying Market
In this section, I review the stochastic models that are commonly used to sim-
ulate the underlying assets market in option pricing. Although the underlying
market itself is the result of the transactions happening inside a competitive
market, classic finance views the asset prices as a random walk process. Unlike
to deterministic functions, stochastic process implies that the current state of
the system may proceed to several possible states with some probability. This
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can be translated to the underlying market where the next price of the asset
is determined by the arrival of the next order to the market. In fact, Bachelier
pioneered the study of stock markets using stochastic processes in 1900 [13].
The key element of a random walk model is that the state of the system become
more and more uncertain as it goes further in time. The models described here
are not the exhaustive list of asset pricing models used by financial analysts,
but the most basic and important ones. I discuss more about specific types of
stochastic processes that can help us to model the changing behaviour of asset
prices and interest rates.
Geometric Brownian Motion Model
GBM is a stochastic process which moves from its current state to the next
state with lognormal probability, and the magnitude of the change in states is
measured by the time interval between the states. The bigger is the interval,
the greater is the probability that the next state would significantly differ from
the current state. Similarly in an infinitesimal timeframe, the changes are also
infinitesimal, but random. The cumulative effect of this infinitesimal changes
in infinitesimal time steps would result in the random walk path which could
follow any direction from any given point, disregarding the previous states.
This complies with the efficient market hypothesis where the next state of the
market cannot be predicted from its previous states, and only depends on the
current state of the market. This is also called the Markov property of the
system. Hence it can be used to model underlying asset markets as an efficient
markets, and simulate the asset prices using the GBM model. It can be written
as follows[89]:
dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dW (t) (2.11)
where
dS(t) infinitesimal change in the asset price
dt infinitesimal change in time
dW (t) is Wiener process, such that W (t) is continuous over t, W (0) = 0
and dW (t) ∼ N (0, dt)
S(t) asset price at t
µ mean drift, µ ∈ R
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σ volatility, σ ∈ R+
.
We can see that the Equation (2.11) has two terms: deterministic term and the
diffusion term. Deterministic term defines the drift of the function over time,
and it is described as an exponential function with regard to drift rate µ. The
diffusion term determines the uncertainty in the next step, and is scaled by
the volatility σ. The greater is the volatility, the greater is the chance that the
asset’s next step can be a significant. Thus it creates room for greater loss on
one hand, or greater profit on the other hand. Thus volatility can be referred
as the measurement of risk in GBM model. This would mean that the option’s
price should be related to the risk of engaging the in the underlying market.
dS(t) represents the absolute changes in the asset price, but if one needs to
find the change in return, the logarithmic change should be computed. It is
given in below formula:
d logS(t) = (µ− 0.5σ2)dt+ σdW (t) (2.12)
where d logS(t) represents the change in return of the asset price.
In this way, the asset price is guaranteed not to fall below zero. This is im-
portant for the simulation of asset prices using GBM model. This way of
modelling the asset prices has been used by Black and Scholes [18] in comput-
ing the risk-neutral option prices of which I shall discuss later in this chapter.
Jump-Diffusion Model
Jump-Diffusion (JD) model has three terms, two of which are the same as in
GBM: drift and diffusion, and the third one is the jump. It models an asset
price which can exhibit discrete jumps the arrival of which is modelled using
Poisson process. The magnitude of the jump itself is modelled using Normal
random variable. This results the distribution of the asset price returns to
be fat-tailed. Merton applied this model to option pricing for the assets that
exhibit sharp shocks [114]. The stochastic model is described below:
dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dW (t) + S(t)dJ(t) (2.13)
where
38
dJ(t) = (YN(t) − 1)dN(t) - jump process with YN(t) ∼ logN (µY , σY ) is
the jump magnitude.
N(t) - Poisson process N(t) of an intensity λdt.
.
We can see in the third term of the Equation (2.13) that the jump process
is modelled as a discrete term which makes dJ(t) take either zero or one de-
pending on the intensity of jumps λ over the period of T . When dJ(t) takes
one, the random variable YN(t) is drawn from lognormal distribution, and used
to determine the discrete change in the asset price. Otherwise when dJ(t) is
zero, the process is the same as GBM. Merton found an analytical solution for
pricing options using this asset pricing model. I dropped this valuation from
the scope of this research.






dt+ σdW (t) + log(YN(t))dN(t) (2.14)
Vasicek Model
The interest rates usually exhibit a mean reverting behaviour in the market.
This is the property when the process returns to a certain constant and fluc-
tuates around it over time. This process involves autoregressive model AR(1)
meaning that the previous state of the system determines the current state.
The effect of the previous state to the current state is determined by a auto-
correlation coefficient |α| < 1. The AR(1) process is defined below:
r(t+ 1) = µ+ αr(t) + σt+1 ⇒ (2.15)
∆r(t+ 1) = (1− α)( µ1− α − r(t)) + σt+1 (2.16)
where α is an autocorrelation coefficient, t+1 ∼ N (0, 1) standard perturbation.
It can be seen in Equation (2.16) that the next value of the interest rate is
partially autocorrelated to the previous state of the interest rate. AR(1) is
defined over discrete t, but if t is set to be continuous, it replicates Vasicek’s
model[158] process with constant coefficients:
dr(t) = α(θ − r(t))dt+ σdW (t) (2.17)
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where α, θ and σ are all positive.
The limitation of the model is that it has positive probability of negative
values, and in order to overcome this the Exponential Vasicek model is used.
This can be reformulated into returns of the interest rate using logarithmic
function:
dr(t) = αr(t)(θ + σ
2
2α − log r(t))dt+ σr(t)dW (t) (2.18)
Vasicek-Jump Model
The Vasicek-Jump model, similar to jump-diffusion model, include a jump
process defined by the Poisson random arrivals. It is used to simulate the
interest rates that exhibit sudden jumps due to sudden changes caused by
important news. It is defined as following stochastic process:
dr(t) = α(θ − r(t))dt+ σdW (t) + dJ(t) (2.19)
where
dJ(t) = YN(t)dN(t) - jump process determined by N(t) Poisson process
with λ intensity and YN(t) ∼ N (µY , σY ) is normally distributed jump
magnitude.
2.1.5 Option Pricing Models
It is an outstanding concern in financial theory to determine the fairest price
for given option such that it could reflect the risk associated with buying
or selling it. Assuming that markets are efficient and martingale [58], which
suggests that every new information gets immediately embedded into the price
of an asset and no previous records can be used to predict asset’s future price,
it is impossible to tell the future price of an asset. This uncertainty emerges
risk which needs to be properly evaluated. The option pricing models discussed
below take following assumptions on the assets market:
• All traders are risk-neutral. It means that the expected return from
trading options is the risk free interest rate r for each trader.
• Risk-free interest rate (r) is constant.
• Risk -free interest rate (r) is the same for lending and borrowing money.
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• Variance (σ2) of the asset price is constant.
• There is no arbitrage opportunity in the market.
• There is no additional transaction cost associated with the trade.
The key assumption that is common for all methods is the absence of any kind
of arbitrage which refers to a profit higher than risk-free profit. This enables us
to tie pricing methods only with risk associated by isolating them from other
factors. In other words, the greater is the risk, the greater will be the price,
and vice versa. Also practice shows that arbitrage opportunity is unlikely to
last long in contemporary markets, where information flow is fast and highly
interconnected. Once investors notice arbitrage opportunity, all of them will
try to gain from it, which eventually result in its dissolution [108].
In this section, first I define what the arbitrage-free assumption means, and
then provide two methods commonly used for option pricing under this as-
sumption. First is binomial option pricing model, which directly applies the
arbitrage-free assumption to option pricing by spanning out a binomial tree
for possible asset price changes, and calculating the expected gain from given
scenarios. This model is the key for Monte-Carlo simulation of option prices.
Secondly, Black-Scholes model which extends this concept further taking into
account all possible cases of asset price changes under lognormal distribution,
and then calculates the expected gain for given option.
No Arbitrage Assumption
The crux of the no-arbitrage assumption means that one cannot make riskless
profit higher than the risk-free interest rate by simultaneously engaging in
different positions in the market. If there is such riskless profit, then one can
take advantage of this arbitrage opportunity. There are 2 types of arbitrage
opportunities that may arise in the market:
• Type A arbitrage: A security or a portfolio that produces immediate
payoff at t = 0, and has non-negative value at t = 1. In other words, v0 <
0 and v1 ≥ 0. This would mean that the trader receives certain positive
payoff for a security now, and in future he, at least, has no obligation to
pay back. In simpler terms, this can be described as someone who found
dollar bill in the street.
• Type B arbitrage: A security or a portfolio that produces at least zero
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payoff at t = 0, and has at least one guaranteed payoff in future. In
other words, v0 ≤ 0 and vt ≥ 0,∀t > 0,∃t′ > 0; vt′ > 0. This would mean
that the trader pays at most zero for the security, but there is a chance
in future that the value of the asset is strictly greater than zero, yielding
a riskless payoff. This can also be described as finding a lottery ticket in
the street.
Let me give an example on how the arbitrage situation can occur in the asset
market. For example, let us assume that the asset price has a positive drift
µ > 0, and the risk-free rate is r > 0, and t = 0. So the asset’s expected return
at time t = 1 is µ + 1. Let the maximum possible decrease in asset price is
measured by return 1 + µ − , for 0 <  < µ + 1, and the maximum possible
increase in asset price is 1+µ+. Then if (1+r) < 1+µ− < 1+µ+, there is
a type B arbitrage for the trader. Trader can borrow money at r, and invest it
in stock. At t = 1, trader sells the stock, and realises more than he has to pay
for the borrowed money in any case. Trader takes the difference between asset
price at t = 1 and the interest payable, and makes profit with no risk. The
opposite situation where (1+r) > 1+µ+ > 1+µ− can also be exploited as
an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore the arbitrage free boundary must set the
asset price drift and volatility into given inequality 1+µ+ > r+1 > 1+µ−.
Binomial Option Pricing Model
This option pricing method uses binomial tree (i.e. tree-like graph which has





paths from root to its kth leaf) for projecting the two
possible cases for the asset prices in discrete time steps, and based on these
projections computes the expected option’s payoff. It has been first proposed
by Cox-Ross-Rubinstein in 1979 [35]. Figure 2.1 illustrates one-step binomial
tree structure. This represents two possible directions for asset price, one when
price goes up by factor u ≥ 1 and the other when price goes down by factor
0 < d ≤ 1. This complies with the assumption of the asset price as a random-
walk process, but in this scenario asset has only 2 directions to follow: S0u or
S0d. Now let us consider a trader who sells a call option for f amount, and
invests this money to buy ∆ shares of an asset. Hence his current portfolio
is S0∆ − f . In order to conform with the arbitrage free argument, we must
ensure that in all two possible cases of an asset price at time t = 1, the trader’s
portfolio should be equal to the risk-free investment of his current portfolio.
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Figure 2.1: One-step Binomial Tree
So:
S0∆− f = (S0u∆− fu)e−rT (2.20)
S0∆− f = (S0d∆− fd)e−rT (2.21)
Solving the above equation for ∆ gives:
∆ = fu − fd
S0u− S0d (2.22)
And if we replace ∆ with corresponding term:
f = fu(1− de
−rT ) + fd(ue−rT − 1)
u− d (2.23)
= e−rT (pfu + (1− p)fd) (2.24)
where p = erT−d
u−d is the risk-neutral probability of upward movement.
Note that the option pricing formula takes into account neither the real drift
of the asset price µ, or the real probability of asset price moving upwards or
downward. So this would mean that even if there the real probability of asset
price moving upwards is q = 0.99999 and downwards is 1 − q = 0.00001, this
would make no difference in pricing the option’s value. This is also referred
as the change of the probability measure of an asset price from historical
probability to risk-neutral probability.
This simple model can be further generalised into multiple steps as shown in
Figure 2.2. In this case, the leaf nodes of the tree are computed as Si,j =
ujdi−jS0 where i denotes the time and j denotes the potential state of an asset





paths to the jth leaf node. This would mean that the asset price is more likely
to end up around the middle leaf nodes, rather than top and bottom nodes.
We can use the binomial distribution of final states j of the asset price, to
iteratively compute the option price f . Below formula summarises the option
43
Figure 2.2: Multi-step Binomial Tree








pj(1− p)n−j max(S0ujdn−j −K, 0) (2.25)
Black-Scholes Model
In 1973, Black and Scholes proposed an analytical solution for pricing the
options with a risk-neutral measure[18]. According to Black-Scholes model
the asset prices are viewed as GBM with a drift µ = r to address arbitrage-
free assumption. We can also see from binomial approximation of the option
price that the asset price drift is not used in projecting the future asset price.
In fact, the Equation (2.25) can be generalised into a Black-Scholes analytical
formula if the number of steps n→∞, and the discrete binomial distribution
converges into continuous normal distribution. However from binomial option
pricing formula, we can see that the upward or the downward movement of
the asset price plays a key role in determining option’s value. This idea is
generalised into standard deviation, or in other words, volatility. Black-Scholes
model also shows how option prices can be calculated based on the volatility
of an asset price. Let f(t, S(t);σ, r) denotes option price function based on the
asset price S(t) and parametrised by its volatility σ and risk-free interest rate
r. The asset price S(t) is GBM function, and t is changing variable, and the
other parameters such as σ and r are assumed constants. Then the derivative
of this function is equal to 2nd order Taylor expansion according to Ito’s lemma
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The solution of Equation (2.26) gives a closed form function f for computing
the option price based on r, σ and t. S(t) is not passed as an argument because
it is actually the function of other given parameters.
Knowing the payoff functions for call max(ST −K, 0) and put max(K−ST , 0),
the analytical solution for f(t, S(t)) can be found by taking the partial deriva-
tives. So the solution for call (c) and put (p) can be computed as follows:
c = (S0)N(d1)−Ke−rTN(d2) (2.27)


















= d1 − σ
√
T
N(·) standard normal distribution
2.1.6 Option Portfolios
In this section, I review different types of option portfolios used in practice.
Traders can take different positions with options of different moneyness and
create option portfolios which can align with their forecast and at same time
limit their loss in case if their forecast is not true. Cohen counts more than
40 trading strategies and classifies them based on their market direction (i.e.
bullishness or bearishness), volatility level, riskiness and gain [31]. I will not
review all of them, but consider only the ones that I use in the scope of this
work.
Option Portfolios with Single Option
Traders can cut their loss or gain fixed amount using one of the following
option portfolios:
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1. Short Call: Trader buys ∆ asset at S0 and shorts call option at c with
strike price K. Long position in asset will cover the trader’s liability if
there is sharp rise in asset price, thus trader makes fixed profit. If asset
price goes down, short call will not be exercised by its holder, however
trader will loose in his long position. Nonetheless there is an interval be-
tween S0 and K which could minimize the risk of loss. Formally trader’s
profit P can be written as follows:
P =
K + c−∆S0 if ST ≥ KST + c−∆S0 if ST < K (2.29)
2. Long Call: Trader takes short position by selling ∆ asset at S0 and buys
call option at c with strike price K. If asset price goes up, trader caps
the risk of loosing infinitely using his call option. If the price goes down,
trader makes profit in his short position without call option. Trader’s
profit P is below:
P =
∆S0 − c−K if ST ≥ K∆S0 − c− ST if ST < K (2.30)
3. Long Put: Trader buys put option at p with strike price K and at the
same time buys ∆ asset at S0. If asset price goes up, trader makes profit
in his long position. If asset price goes down, he can sell asset at K using
his put option, thus saving himself from infinitely loss. Trader’s profit P
is written below:
P =
ST −∆S0 − p if ST ≥ KK −∆S0 − p if ST < K (2.31)
4. Short Put: Trader takes short position by selling ∆ asset at S0 and writes
put option for p with strike price K. If asset price goes up, he looses
infinitely in his short position. If asset price goes down, he wins in his
short position but it will be offset by short position in put option, thus
it makes only fixed profit.
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Figure 2.3: Option Portfolios with Single Option1
P =
∆S0 + p− ST if ST ≥ K∆S0 + p−K if ST < K (2.32)
Figure 2.3 summarizes four main option portfolios using single option discussed
above.
Spreads
A spread is another type of option portfolio which involves taking a position
in two or more options of the same kind, but different moneyness. Below I
summarize important spreads:
1. Bull Spread: Bull trader hopes that the asset price will increase. There-
fore he buys call option at c1 with strike price K1 and sells another call
option c2 with higher strike price K2. Both options have same expira-
tion date. Because K2 is higher than K1, c2 should be lower than c1.
If the asset price becomes less than K1, trader will loose c2 − c1. If the
asset price falls between K1 and K2, then trader’s payoff is the difference
between current price ST and K1 minus the difference in option prices.
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Figure 2.4: Bull Spread with Call Options.1
Bullish trader wants the asset price to go up, so he can make fixed profit
of K2 −K1 minus the difference in option prices. The same bull spread
can be made with put options as well, so the trader buys put with low
strike price and sells another put with high strike price. Payoff for bull
spread with call options is written below (2.33):
P =

c1 − c2 if ST ≤ K1
ST −K1 − (c1 − c2) if K1 < ST < K2
K2 −K1 − (c1 − c2) if ST ≥ K2
(2.33)
where c1 > c2 and K1 < K2
Figure 2.4 illustrates bull spread with call options.
2. Bear Spread: Bearish trader hopes that the asset price will decrease.
Thus he buys call option at c2 with high strike price K2 and sells another
call option at c1 with low strike price K1. Similarly, c1 should be greater
than c2. Both options have same expiration date. If the asset price
turns to be greater than K2, the trader looses fixed amount in his short
position. If the asset price is less than K1 then trader makes fixed profit
as the difference of c1 − c2. If the asset price falls between K1 and K2,
then the profit is the difference of option prices minus the difference of
ST and K1. Traders can enter bear spread with put options too. Below
is the formula (2.34) that shows the profit for bear spread of call options:
P =

c1 − c2 if ST ≤ K1
(c1 − c2)− (ST −K1) if K1 < ST < K2
(c1 − c2)− (K2 −K1) if ST ≥ K2
(2.34)
1Source: Hull et al, Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, 5th Ed, 2001 [87]
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Figure 2.5: Bear Spread with Call Options.1
where c1 > c2 and K1 < K2
Figure 2.5 illustrates bear spread with call options.
3. Butterfly Spread: This type of spread involves taking positions in options
with three different strike prices. In long butterfly spread trader has an
estimate that the price is not going to change sharply, so he buys 2 call
options: one with low K1 and another one with high K3. At the same
time, he sells 2 call options with K2, where K2 is halfway between the
range of K1 and K3. This spread leads to a profit if the asset price is
deviating around K2. It will incur in fixed loss if the asset price changes
sharply in either direction. Butterfly spread can be used for put options
as well. If trader hopes that the asset price changes sharply, he can
enter short butterfly spread which involves selling 2 options at K1 and
K3, and buying 2 options at K2, where K1 < K2 < K3 condition holds.




2c2 − c1 − c3 if ST ≤ K1
(ST −K1) + 2c2 − c1 − c3 if K1 < ST < K2
(K3 − ST ) + 2c2 − c1 − c3 if K2 < ST < K3
2c2 − c1 − c3 if ST ≥ K3
(2.35)
where c1 > c2 > c3 and K1 < K2 < K3
Figure 2.6 illustrates long butterfly spread with call options.
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Figure 2.6: Butterfly Spread with Call Options.1
Figure 2.7: Long Straddle Combination.1
Combinations
Combination is an option portfolio that makes the use of both calls and puts
of different moneyness. Below I summarize the main types of combinations.
1. Straddle: If the trader is sure that the asset price is going to change
sharply in either directions, he can create straddle combination which
involves buying call c and put p options with the same strike price K.
Below formula (2.36) shows the profit pattern for straddle portfolio:
P =
K − ST − c− p if ST ≤ KST −K − c− p if ST > K (2.36)
where c = p
Figure 2.7 illustrates long straddle combination.
2. Strips and Straps: Trader can change the slope of either side his strad-
dle combination legs based on his estimate about the direction of price
movement. If trader buys one call option and two put options, he expects
asset prices to drop significantly so he can make twice more profit in his
short position. Strips is the combination when trader is more in short
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Figure 2.8: Long Strangles Combination. 1
position, and straps is the combination when trader is more in long po-
sition. The profit pattern for these combinations is the same as straddle
but it is multiplied by the number of corresponding options if the price
follows the expected direction.
3. Strangles: This combination involves put and call options with the same
expiry date, but with different strike prices. Trader buys call option c
with high strike price K2, and put option p with low strike price K1.
It is similar to straddle combination, but the asset price should change
more dramatically than straddle combination expects for the trader to
make profit. On the other hand, trader pays less for acquiring options
in strangle compared to straddle. Formula (2.37) below is the profit
function for strangles combination:
P =

K1 − ST − c− p if ST ≤ K1
−c− p if K1 < ST < K2
ST −K2 − c− p if ST ≥ K2
(2.37)
where c < p and K1 < K2
Figure 2.8 illustrates long strangles combination.
2.1.7 Greeks Analysis
Greeks analysis provides set of measurements for evaluating the sensitivity
of option price on different factors in the market. They have huge role in
hedging portfolios and evaluating the volatility of the asset prices. It also
allows us to create options synthetically using a replicating portfolio described
in binomial pricing model. For example, one can create a portfolio of cash and
stock, where cash has a deterministic risk-free return in future, and stock has
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uncertain return in future. The replicating portfolio would consist of ∆S0+c at
time t = 0, where ∆ is the option’s change in values with respect to the change
in asset price. Further in this section we will discuss more about various ways
of hedging using Greeks analysis. Replicating portfolio simulates the option’s
payoff, and synthetically creates such financial instrument.
1. Delta (∆): It measures the rate of change of the option price with respect
to the change in price of the underlying asset. For example, if the delta
of the call option is 0.4, then it means that if there is small change in the
underlying asset’s price, there will be a change in call options price in
0.4 of that amount. This technique can be used in hedging, as we know
how many assets we have to buy in order to cover our short position
in options. For example, if investor writes off 20 call options that gives
the right to buy 2000 shares, then for the investor it is enough to buy
800 shares to cover losses he may incur in future due to price changes in
shares. Delta is defined as the partial derivative of option’s price function
with respect to underlying asset price [87, 15].
Another meaning of delta is the probability of an option ending up in-
the-money, assumed the price moves under GBM. For example, if the
delta of out-of-the-money call option is 0.2, then it means that there is
20% chance option will expire in-the-money.
Delta’s definition: ∆ = ∂c
∂S
(2.38)
Black-Scholes solution of call delta: ∆c = N(d1) (2.39)
Black-Scholes solution of put delta: ∆p = (N(d1)− 1) (2.40)
2. Gamma Γ: It is the sensitivity of option’s delta to the asset price. It is
defined as the partial derivative of delta with respect to the asset price,
hence it is the second partial derivative of option price to asset price.
Gamma for both call and put options is the same, and it reaches its
peak when the option is ATM. If trader buys the option, it is positive,
and if the trader sells the option it is negative. Trader hedging the
portfolio using the delta-hedging rule is more secure for the wider range
of price movements, if his portfolio’s gamma is neutralised. In this way,
the portfolio is less sensitive to asset price movements. Below is the
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definition of gamma [87, 121]:









3. Theta Θ: It can be defined as the sensitivity of the value of the option to
the passage of time, or ’time decay’. Hence its value is always negative.
In other words, theta is the rate of change in option price with respect to
change in time. Normally theta is calculated in terms of years, but once
divided to 365, it will be the daily rate of change in value of an option.
For example, if the theta of call option is -15, then its daily rate is about
-0.05, so we can assume that everyday our call option will loose its value
by 0.05. Below is the formal definition of theta [87, 121]:
Theta’s definition: Θ = − ∂c
∂τ
(2.43)
Black-Scholes solution of call theta:
Θc = −S0φ(d1)σ2√T − rKe
−rTN(−d2) (2.44)
Black-Scholes solution of put theta:
Θp = −S0φ(d1)σ2√T + rKe
−rTN(−d2) (2.45)
where φ(·) is normal Probability Density Function (PDF)
4. Vega: This parameter measures the change in the option price with
respect to the change in volatility of an underlying asset price. So far
we assumed that the volatility, or in other words, the standard deviation
of underlying asset price is constant, but in fact it is not constant, and
can also change by time. Vega measures how the price of an option is
affected per σ change of its underlying asset’s price volatility. We can
interpret it in percentage by dividing it to 100. For example, if the vega
of call option is 66, then 1% change in underlying asset’s volatility will
result in 0.66 increase in option value. Formally vega can be defined as
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follows [87, 121]:
Vega’s definition: V = ∂c
∂σ
(2.46)




Above I reviewed some of the Greeks that are commonly used in analysing the
sensitivity of the option price to different external factors. However these are
not the all of them. For example there other Greeks indicators such as Rho
which measures the option price’s sensitivity to changes in interest rate, Vanna
which measures the delta’s sensitivity to changes in volatility, or Charm that
measures the delta’s sensitivity to changes in expiration time. Although these
indicators are very important in analysing the option prices, I have to omit
them from the scope of this research in order to reduce its volume.
2.2 Agent-Based Computational Economics
One of the vivid implementations of agent-based models can be found in the
field Economics, particularly in modelling the marketplaces. Tesfatsion coined
the term Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) as a methodology
which is used for studying the behaviour of economic processes modelled in
dynamic systems of interacting agents [157]. One of the important topics
that ACE studies is the way of providing microfoundations in the form of
optimized agent behaviour to explain traditional macroeconomic phenomena.
For example, we cannot directly manipulate supply and demand curve, but we
can engineer the decision making mechanism of an individual agent and observe
emerging macroeconomic patterns in larger scale [139]. Hodgson noted that
not only agent’s individual behaviour but their interactions with each other
should also be studied to understand emerging social phenomena [84]. There
are a number of aspects that should be examined while designing ACE system.
Epstein suggests some of them [53, 54]:
• Heterogeneity: Unlike analytical models which try to reduce the differ-
ences between individuals into universal model, in computational models
the heterogeneity of agents are considered natural and easy to imple-
ment. For example, agent may vary in their preferences, endowments,
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social contacts and abilities in making decisions, and this should be taken
into account. In my simulation model, the agents employ various option
pricing and trading methodologies which make them different in their
preferences and making trading decisions.
• Explicit Space: Individuals often differ in the physical place where they
are located, and they are likely to share the same culture, mindset and
social contacts within this neighbourhood. In this case, agents can be
categorised into explicit groups sharing certain behaviour. In my sim-
ulation model, the groups of agents with similar pricing and trading
behaviour are populated. For example, I employ Monte-Carlo traders
who use the same technique to price options, although their final prices
can be different due to randomization.
• Local interaction: Analytical models usually assume global interactions
happening between entities, but in agent-based models interaction may
happen locally between finite number of agents. This enforces the asym-
metry of information between different agents. Although, in my simu-
lation model, there is no asymmetry in the publicly shared information
such as asset prices, some agents may have better knowledge about the
market in CDA environment, because the time one’s order submitted
differs from other’s giving the last trader an opportunity to learn more
about submitted orders throughout the day.
• Bounded rationality: Analytical models can tell us the optimal behaviour
in given scenario, however in agent-based models make rational decisions
based on the agent’s own beliefs and desires, and the limited information
that is available to them. In my simulation model, especially in CDA
environment, traders have to submit orders continuously which bounds
their rationality to the timeframe and the listed orders in the market.
Also in general traders have to make pricing decisions on options without
knowing what will happen to the underlying asset in the future.
Beinhocker compared ACE with traditional economics and pointed out number
of differences based on its dynamics, agents involved, networks, emergence and
evolution [17]. Table 2.2 summarised these differences.
In the scope of this research, I consider auctions as a main instrument for build-
ing ACE. I review different types of auctions that are used in my simulation
model along with popular trading algorithms.
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ACE Traditional Economics
Dynamics Open; dynamic; non-linear
systems
Closed; static; linear systems
Agents Modelled individually; use
heuristic rules; deal with in-
complete information; prone
to errors and biases; can learn
and adapt automatically
Modelled collectively; use de-
ductive and analytical reason-
ing; deal with complete infor-
mation; no errors, irrational-
ity or bias assumed; no learn-
ing required
Networks Explicit interactions between
agents, form networks that
can change over time
Indirect interaction with the
system; approximated model
for interactions between large
groups
Emergence Fusion of macro- and microe-
conomics; Patterns emerging
on macro level are the direct




Evolution Agents and mechanism can
evolve into new systems
Agents and mechanisms are
not endogenously improved
Table 2.2: ACE and Traditional Economics
2.2.1 Auctions
The ultimate goal of any auction is the allocation of scarce resources to agents
willing to buy it[165]. It is usually done because the resources are scarce,
the agents who would like to have them are many. Auctions are organized
between the auctioneer (also specialist, mechanism) and bidders (also buyer,
seller, trader). The job of an auctioneer is to decide to who the item should be
given and at which price, while the bidders have an incentive in buying the item
at lowest possible price. So one of the most common auctions is considered as
the English auction where the item is given to an agent who values it the most,
and the price paid is the same as the agent’s bid. This allocation mechanism
is also called first-price auction, and it, indeed, maximises the social surplus of
the auction. This is because the seller receives the best price which is offered
from bidders. However the incentive of the bidder is not to tell his truthful
valuation to the seller, but to decrease it just enough to beat the second highest
bidder. However there is a mechanism which results in the same revenue to
the seller, maximises the social surplus and also makes truthful bidding a
dominant strategy for each trader. This is called a second-price auction where
winner is the one with the highest bid, but he pays only the second highest
price. In this mechanism, traders can directly submit their true valuations in
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sealed-bid fashion. It is also referred as Vickrey auction [11], and it simplifies
the auctioning process by making the traders more open to the auctioneer to
achieve the same outcome as in English auction.
Based on the protocol of holding auctions, they can vary in several different
ways. For example, in open cry auctions every bidder has an access to the
bids of others, whereas sealed-bid auctions do not disclose the latest bids until
all bids are collected. Also auctions can be ascending or descending based on
direction of price after bids. English auction is first-price, open cry, ascend-
ing auction. However Vickrey auction is sealed-bid, second-price, ascending
auction. Parsons describes more than 30 variations of auctions based on their
following properties [134]:
• Single- Or Multi-dimensional: In single dimensional auctions, traders bid
only on one parameter of the offered item, which is normally price. In
multi-dimensional auctions, other parameters of the item such as quality,
delivery time, expiration date can be bid as well.
• One- Or Two-sided: In one-sided auction, bidders are either buyers or
seller and the auctioneer decides who is the winner. However in two-sided
auction bidders can be buyers and sellers, and the job of the auctioneer
is to match them together.
• Open-cry or Sealed-bid: As it is mentioned above, in open-cry auctions
bidders know all bids submitted, in sealed-bid no one knows each other’s
bid.
• First- or kth-price: In first-price, winner of the auction pays the price he
bid, in kth price he pays the kth highest price bid.
• Single- or Multi-unit: In single unit auction, bidder can bid on only one
unit of offered item, while in multi-unit auction bidder can bid on several
units.
• Single- or Multi-item: In single item auction, there is only one item is
auctioned, however in multi-item auctions the bundle of different items
can be bid.
Each of these attributes described above add more complexity to the design
of an auction. For example, there is an inherent problem with organising a
multi-unit auctions because the identical goods can be priced differently, even
if the single-item auctions are run in parallel, let alone subsequently. Empirical
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evidence from Sotheby and Ashenfelter [152, 8, 9] shows that the price for the
identical good starts to decline as the number of allocated goods increases.
This can be the reason for bidders to review their bidding strategies, and use
methods such as demand reduction to influence the price of the good. In classic
Vickrey auction demand reduction results in the use of lower bid to clear the
auction if winning bidders reduce their demands. Other mechanisms such as
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions [38] propose a mechanism where goods are
priced in simultaneous auctions through a number of rounds each having the
standing high bidder to win the good. Crampton also introduces an activity
rule to prevent sniping strategy where bidder can submit insignificant bids in
all auctions, and post his significant bid on final round of an auction where
the good is the cheapest. In this activity rule, the bidder cannot increase
his demand as the auction proceeds forward, meaning that it is unlikely to
see demand rise when the price increases. This method borrows its origins
from Walrasian tatonnement process where supply and demand are matched
by adjusting the price.
Besides the characterisation of auctions by the attributes of their protocols,
there are desired properties of auctions which emerge from their actual execu-
tion. These properties are listed below [129]:
• Allocative efficiency: The auction should optimise its allocative objec-
tive function while determining the winners, or matches between sellers
and buyers. The most commonly used objective function is the surplus
maximising objective function which maximises the overall welfare of the
auction. In two-sided auctions, it also leads to a competitive equilibrium
among buyers and sellers. There are many other objective functions
can be used as well, for example, liquidity maximising objective function
maximises the participation of traders in the market. Or else, volume
maximising objective function maximises the quantity of items traded in
the market.
• Budget-Balance: In a strong notion of budget-balance, the mechanism
should neither gain, nor lose from facilitating the trade. While in a weak
notion, the mechanism should never lose from facilitating the trade. This
property may hold in 3 conditions described below:
1. Ex ante: The expected gain of the mechanism is either zero (in
strong budget-balance) or greater than zero (in weak budget-balance).
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2. Interim: The conditional expectation of mechanism’s gain for agent
i is either zero (in strong budget-balance) or greater than zero (in
weak budget-balance).
3. Ex post: The mechanism is always budget-balanced.
• Individual Rationality: The trader is individual rational if participating
in trade is at least as good as not participating in trade. Mechanism is
individual rational if all of its participants are individual rational. Similar
to budget-balance, individual rationality may hold in 3 conditions:
1. Ex ante: The expected utility from participating in the mechanism
is greater or equal to zero.
2. Interim: The conditional expectation of agent i’s utility from par-
ticipating in the mechanism is greater or equal to zero.
3. Ex post: The mechanism is always incentive compatible.
• Incentive Compatibility: The trader is incentive compatible if revealing
his true type maximises his gain while not revealing his true type does
not. Mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if all traders are
incentive compatible. There 2 main types of incentive compatibility:
DSIC and Bayesian-Nash Incentive Compatible (BIC). In the former one,
truthfulness is the dominant strategy for every trader, so every rational
trader truthfully reveals his type to the mechanism. Such mechanism is
also referred as strategyproof mechanism. In the latter case of incentive
compatibility, the trader is ex ante better off with truthful strategy. I
define all 3 conditions of incentive compatibility below:
1. Ex ante: Truthful strategy maximises the expected utility.
2. Interim: Truthful strategy maximises the conditional expectation
of agent i’s utility.
3. Ex post: Truthful strategy always maximises the agent’s utility.
• Tractability: The mechanism is computationally tractable if it can resolve
allocation of orders, and their clearing prices in polynomial time.
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2.2.2 Double Auctions
is the type of a two-sided auction where multiple buyers and sellers submit
their orders to the mechanism which matches and clears them. Double Auc-
tion (DA)s can vary based on their overall protocol of accepting and clearing
orders, the matching rule, and the clearing rule. Myerson et al. was one of
the first researchers to study the bilateral trading relationships between buyers
and sellers [119]. The main results such as the monotonicity of an allocation
rule, and the critical value as the payment rule were established to assure the
strategyproofness of mechanism. Myerson and Satterthwaite also proved the
impossibility of having allocative efficiency, individual rationality and budget-
balance along with BIC which is even weaker condition than DSIC. This theo-
rem is assumed while designing my direct DA which drops the budget-balance
property in favour of incentive compatibility.
The early designs of DAs have been proposed by Satterthwaite and Williams
[146, 145] which involved single-unit DA that is asymptotically incentive com-
patible for buyers given the strategic behaviour of sellers is dismissed. This also
gave an asymptotic efficiency and budget-balance for the mechanism. Then
McAfee proposed a single-item DA where both buyers and sellers were allowed
to exhibit strategic behaviour [113] and still maintain incentive compatibility of
the mechanism. Although mechanism was asymptotically efficient, individual
rational and DSIC, it required the mechanism to absorb the potential gains to
sustain the mechanism’s weak budget-balance. I will use McAfee’s mechanism
as a starting point while designing the direct DA for trading options.
There have been other proposals of double-auction design, particularly the
ones with multi-unit orders. Barbera and Jackson proposed the design of a
multi-unit, strategyproof exchange where every trader could be either buyer
or seller at the same time [16]. However their mechanism was not asymptot-
ically efficient and required an additional agent to specify the clearing prices
beforehand. Also more recently, Huang et al. proposed a new design of a
multi-unit DA which is asymptotically efficient, but this is done at the cost of
spreading the burden of excess demand or supply among other traders [86]. In
other words, the mechanism forces either buyers or sellers to cut their demand
or supply to ensure the balance. This mechanism supports DSIC, individual
rationality, weak budget-balance and asymptotic efficiency. There have been
also further extensions on making multi-unit DA mixed, so the traders can
also simultaneously engage in buying or selling multiple types of items [68].
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In multi-unit DA, demand (supply) reduction can be exploited to obtained
lower (higher) prices for certain goods. However, demand (supply) reduction
cannot significantly affect the prices if the buyer (seller) has insignificant de-
mand (supply) compared to the market volume. It is unlikely that in a highly
competitive market buyer (seller) could set the price, and therefore it is almost
a dominant strategy for the trader to report truthfully [117]. In the context
of option markets, although options are intangible, traders are restricted in
supplying significant volumes of options due to the exposed risk that should
be covered by taking long/short position in underlying market.
I will present an implementation of direct DA for pricing options based on the
techniques used previously to design direct DAs. Although there are certain
similarities in the implementation, the overall properties of my mechanism ver-






























































Capped 1 1 Infinite Infinite
Tractability Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial
Table 2.3: Proposed Direct DA and Other DAs
Vytelingum describes mechanism involving an agent (i.e. auctioneer) who de-
cides how to allocate and price items in order to maximise certain objective
function as a centralised market and the direct DAs described above fall into
this category. However the second type of the market is described as decen-
tralised market where orders are matched as they arrive to the market [161].
These systems are referred as CDAs, so they allow traders continuously submit
their bids and asks to the system. Traders can see and accept any order sub-
mitted to the CDA without the help of an auctioneer. This type of protocol is
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used in financial markets through its LOB implementation. According to this
implementation, there are 2 types orders:
• Market order: This order does not quote the price, but indicates the
quantity the trader wants to buy or sell. The order is cleared at the
current outstanding price in the LOB. For example, if the trader submits
market bid on 10 items, the item is cleared at the lowest ask in the LOB.
If there are multiple asks required to cover the trader’s demand, then
different clearing prices corresponding to asks posted will be used.
• Limit order: This order quotes both the price and quantity to buy or
sell the good. Once it arrives to the market, the specialist checks if it
has a matching order in his LOB, and if yes, he clears it. If not he adds
the limit order to his LOB and retains it until it gets either cancelled or
matched to new orders.
The researches in the field of CDA were basically focused on simulating differ-
ent trading agents and analysing their results. The initial structure of CDA
for simulating these agents has been proposed by Smith [150]. According to
this protocol, agents submit orders for homogeneous goods, and get cleared
as soon as their orders are matched with another order in the market. The
clearing price is computed as a weighting average between matched bid and
ask. Friedman and Rust were among the first who studied the real-world
exchanges in the format of a CDA [60]. The established CDAs were not strat-
egyproof due to the uncertainty about incoming orders, and therefore agents
simulated had a bounded rationality towards the information available to the
traders at the time he makes buying or selling decision. Bounded rationality
of agents emerges from behavioural economics which advocates the irrational-
ity of agents due to the factors such as lack of full information about given
deal, risk-averseness, and other psychological aspects that drive their decision
making process. One of seminal works studying an irrational behaviour of
traders has been accomplished by Gode and Sunders where they put zero-
intelligence traders who submitted random bids and asks to test in CDA, and
observed that the market can still converge to equilibrium prices[74]. It has
been also shown that the human traders perform approximately the same as
zero-intelligence traders constrained with a private value[73]. Gjerstad and
Dickhaut has proposed using agents with Bayesian updating rule to form be-
liefs about the successful bids and asks based on the history of submitted
orders. It has been shown that such traders reach equilibrium prices much
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quicker than zero-intelligence traders[69]. Cliff proposed an adaptive rule for
zero-intelligence traders to modify their private constraints according to the
current bids and asks submitted in the market, and named it as ’ZIP’ traders
[29]. Such automated traders could outperform the human traders in many
settings by employing simple rules such as limiting the losses and continu-
ally converging to a target price uniformly chosen from a finite range around
current price [105, 104].
Since then, automated traders have been significantly improved in their ability
to learn and adapt to dynamic market conditions. Das and Tesauro developed
Modified Gjerstad-Dickhaut (MGD), tested it against ZIP,GD and Kaplan’s
sniping algorithm [142] in CDA environment and showed that it outperformed
these algorithms [39]. Vytelingum et al. proposed an Adaptive-Aggressive
(AA) trading algorithm which splits the agents trading activity into short-
term and long-term goals where in former case learning algorithm regulates
the agents aggressiveness towards making profit, and in latter case the algo-
rithm monitors and controls the overall success of certain aggressive trading
routine based on historic data [161]. In other words, short-term learning algo-
rithm is necessary to make an immediate trading decision based on adaptive
aggressiveness of the agent, while the long-term learning is used to evaluate
the overall profitability of the short-term trading algorithm. Cliff has extended
his original ZIP algorithm which requires 8 parameters to be set to a more ad-
vanced version of the algorithms with 60 parameters to be set using a genetic
algorithm. The ZIP60 algorithm adapts to a new market environment by cal-
ibrating multiple parameters (from 8 to 60 control factors), and choosing the
best set that optimally fits to given mechanism. Moreover genetic algorithms
are involved not only calibrating the parameters of the trading algorithm,
but automatically generating fundamentally new mechanisms that best fit for
given market conditions[30]. One of the other approaches at re-engineering the
CDAs such that they hold certain properties like BIC has been accomplished
by Parkes et al. who proposed the design of a truthful online mechanism with
an asymptotic efficiency[131, 132]. Friedman et al. showed the issues of using
truthful online mechanisms in the example of pricing the Wi-Fi in Starbucks
[61].
I will also present the implementation of a CDA in the scope of this research
which implements standard LOB approach. Although most of the implemen-
tation is similar to previously developed models, my version has couple of
distinctions from previous mechanisms. Below I summarised them:
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• LOB is implemented using red-black binary trees which balances ask and
bid sides of the order book efficiently, and helps to match outstanding
orders in constant time. Most of the standard implementations of LOB
are done using priority queues which when naively implemented takes
O(n) to rearrange the orders after successful match. This is also efficient,
but my implementation slightly improves the data structure for storing
order entries, so as a self-balancing binary tree it takes O(log n) to find
the outstanding orders after successful match.
• Only limit orders are allowed in my CDA because trading algorithms
post option prices resulted from pricing options and other intrinsic trad-
ing behaviour. Trading algorithms I implemented do not have the so-
phistication to decide whether it is optimal to submit a market order and
bear the cost of immediacy resulted from that. In real-life CDAs traders
can submit both limit and market orders, and some of the automated
trading algorithms have the ability to evaluate the costs associated with
posting market orders and their overall benefit in longer terms.
• Order submission is invoked my the mechanism, not by traders. The
mechanism controls who submits orders when in randomized fashion,
instead of traders deciding when to enter the market and when to exit.
Every trader has one call to submit an order per day giving the last
trader full information about the quotes of all traders. However, being
last trader to post order also means missing an opportunity to get best
deals throughout the day. In real-life CDAs, traders should have the
intelligence to detect the signals on when to enter or exit the market by
themselves, but in my simulated version this is done by the mechanism.
• CDA also simulates the underlying market. Traders in CDA obtain daily
updates on the new prices from simulated underlying market and make
corresponding decisions on option prices. This would mean that the
option price will change daily not only due to transactions happening in
the mechanism, but due to changes in the underlying asset. This also
implies that traders withdraw their obsolete orders from the market as
soon as new information about the underlying asset price arrives. The
same is true for risk-free rates when they are simulated as mean-reverting
process. CDAs used in most researches do not support the simulation
of underlying asset market and solely provide a platform for traders to
submit and match orders.
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• Options are cleared on their maturity date. My CDA also takes the
responsibility of clearing the options at the end of their maturity date,
while commonly used CDAs do not have this feature.
• Analytical parameters specific to options are computed. The proposed
CDA provides important characteristics of the options traded such as
Greeks which are discussed in Section 2.1.7. It can run ad-hoc simula-
tions to observe the sensitivity of the options by fixing the other param-
eters of options such as strike price, time-to-maturity, asset price, etc.
Commonly used CDAs do not support this feature, because they are not
specialized in trading options.
2.2.3 Combinatorial Auctions
In combinatorial auctions there are multiple heterogeneous items sold to many
bidders who can buy bundles of these items. The important concern while de-
signing the combinatorial auctions is the relationship among the goods traded
in the combinatorial auction. In Vickrey auction, there is only one item traded
and the rules for finding the allocation and payment are simple. Let us define
Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zm} to be the set of items auctioned. Any agent i has a val-
uation function vi that can tell the value of any single item or the subset of
items from Z. A valuation function is said to be normalized, if vi(∅) = 0, and
if Z1 ⊆ Z2 implies v1(Z1) ≤ v2(Z2).
vi : 2Z → R (2.48)
In this way, traders can see the goods in one of these two perspectives:
• Goods are substitutes: The goods are substitutes to agents if their com-
bined value is not greater than the sum of their separate values. Formally,
it is given as below:
vi({z1, z2}) ≤ vi({z1}) + vi({z2}) ∀i (2.49)
• Goods are complements: The goods are complements to agents if their
combined value is not less than the sum of their separate values. It is
given below:
vi({z1, z2}) ≥ vi({z1}) + vi({z2}) ∀i (2.50)
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In this way, in combinatorial auctions traders might have different valuations
for the bundles of the items traded rather than having them separately. This
emerges two important issues associated with combinatorial auctions. One is
the preference elicitation and second is the winner determination. Both are
explained in more detail below.
Preference Elicitation
In this section, I review the importance of bidding languages in designing
mechanism and their different types suggest by other researchers. I will use a
specific bidding language, TBBL, to describe the implementation of a combi-
natorial exchange for trading option portfolios, and therefore it is worthwhile
to review the basic principles behind designing a bidding language for a combi-
natorial auction or a combinatorial exchange. E In combinatorial mechanisms
there is an issue in expressing trader preferences, as the valuations to different
bundles of goods can be combinatorially large. The possible combinations of
bundles increases at an exponential rate as the number of traded goods in-
creases. If, say, set Z consists of 100 items, then 2Z has 2100 subsets that
should be evaluated. If we assume that we have modern 2 GHz computer
and each evaluation is one computer operation, then it will take roughly 291
seconds, which is billions of times longer than the time past since ’Big Bang’.
Hence this would require succinct and complete way of interpreting the prefer-
ences of the agents without doing all these exponential operations. This is the
problem of preference representation and elicitation where agent need to use
some bidding language to communicate their preferences to the auctioneer.
Because of the exponential complexity of determining bids, traders have to
use a bidding language. Specifying the bidding language for traders, and the
protocol for the mechanism to elicit the preferences to solve the allocation
and payment problems are the core aspects of any combinatorial exchange
design, and they should be addressed by any mechanism designer considering
its implementation. The literature suggests many kinds of bidding languages,
starting from simple atomic bids, OR, XOR to more complex XOR-of-ORs, OR*,
LGB etc [124]. For example, OR bid connects atomic bids in form of tuples
(Si, p) using OR operator where Si is the subset of m goods and p is the corre-
sponding price for it. In this case, valuation for m goods can be described with
an expression consisting of m tuples joined using OR. However, the limitation
is that trader has no choice to state how many of m goods he wants to buy
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at minimum, and maximum. Additionally, it may cause exposure problem if
elements of one bundle are connected in separate atomic bids. XOR language,
on the other hand, allows traders to buy only one specific subset out of many
other subsets submitted. The problem with this is that trader cannot specify
several subsets at the same time that he would like to buy. It will take 2m− 1
tuples to express valuations for all possible possible subsets, which makes this
language highly verbose.
Other languages such as XOR-of-ORs and OR-of-XORs use the combination
of logical operators to express trader preferences. For example, OR-of-XORs
combines subsets of XOR bids with OR operator, so that each trader can submit
arbitrary number of XOR bids. This is good for specifying bids with a downward
slopping valuation, where items to be purchase can be prioritised in form of
a diminishing price quotes for subsequent subsets of goods. However it is
unknown how many bids the trader finally gets. Also in extremal cases, it
may cost 2m/2+1 tuples to interpret certain valuations such as monochromatic
valuation. One of the power languages of this kind is LGB which involves
operators OR, XOR, AND to formulate a bid [22]. In this language individual
bids can be bound together using any of these operators in any hierarchy
while specifying the maximum price for each subsets joint. There has been
WD problem formulated by Boutilier as a mixed-integer problem (MIP) for
LGB [21].
There have been other proposals that extend existing logical operators with
additional parameters. For example OR* language introduces dummy items
for defining specific constraint in bidding. Dummy items will not have any
intrinsic value, but they can also be used in forming bundles [62, 124]. This
language can simulate any of previously mentioned languages. For example,
(S1 ∪ di, p1) ∨ (S2 ∪ di, p2) is equivalent to (S1, p1) ⊕ (S2, p2), where di is a
dummy item of bidder i which is used for marking subsets that are mutually
exclusive. Trader can have as many dummies as needed, and his dummies
are unique to him only, and can be used to identify the special needs of each
trader. Although it can represent any logically structured bidding language,





which is quite big for large m.
Another commonly discussed marriage of logical operator and a parameter is a
k-of-OR bidding language. This language allows bidder to specify how many
tuples at most he would like to have in an OR joined expression. This extends
the notion of XOR where k = 1 and for WD it picks maximum k subsets.
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We can summarise the desirable properties of bidding language in following
way [25]:
• expressiveness: Determines if bidding language is complete, or in other
words if it can specify every possible combination of bids. If it is not
complete, then to what extent it can specify bidder valuations out of all
possibilities.
• compactness: Determines how verbose is the language, and if all valu-
ations can be expressed concisely. It should not require a bid to grow
exponentially.
• simplicity: Determines if it is simple to understand for bidders and the
market-maker.
• computational tractability: Determines if it is possible to formulate a
WD problem using this language, and how complex is the solution to this
problem. It should consider if it is possible to implement computationally
tractable WD algorithm for it.
Winner Determination
In combinatorial auctions, auctioneer faces the problem of finding the surplus
maximising allocation of goods. This problem is also named as WDP in the
context of combinatorial auctions. With regard to auctioneer’s problem of
optimally allocating items, either heuristic methods or linear programming
methods can be used. Andersson et al. describes a linear programming method
for finding the optimal allocation allocation through using the sum of bundle
valuations as an objective function constrained under feasibility conditions [3].
Sandholm et al. proposed greedy allocation rule to assign auctioned bundles to
bidder who value them most until the bundles are fully allocated[144]. There is
also an iterative approach proposed by Ausubel et al. for finding the optimal
allocation and determining the prices of the bundles. It uses multi-round
clock-proxy method for better price discovery process among trading agents
and eliminating the exposure problem[37]. Clock phase is used to determine
the demand of each bidder for particular item in the bundle for given price,
while the proxy phase enables traders to submit their valuations for bundles.
The auctioneer knowing the price and demand for each item in the bundle can
efficiently clear the bundles in proxy phase by assigning them to those who
highly values each individual item. There have been other methods proposed
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by Lehmann[100] and Ausiello[10] to approximate the solution of the winner
determination problem in much tractable way.
Now let us formulate the WDP itself. Let S ⊆ Z be the bundle of goods
wanted by the trader and pi(S) he quoted for that bundle. Also each trader
provides set of bundles he wants in the form of combinatorial bid linked through
XOR, Bi ⊆ 2Z . Then the winner determination problem for this combinatorial
















xi(S) ≤ 1 ∀j (2.53)
xi(S) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i (2.54)
where xi(S) is the mechanism’s decision whether to allocate given bundle S to
trader i.
It can be seen from the LP problem formulation (2.51), set packing problem
can be reduced to WDP[140, 12]. It is well known that set packing problem
belongs to NP-hard class.
Once these 2 major issues, namely preference elicitation and WDP, of the com-
binatorial auctions is sorted, the mechanism has to determine the payments
collected from the winning traders. Let us denote the allocation derived from
the WDP as X, and the allocation derived from the auction where the trader
i does not participate as X−i. Then the payment scheme named after Vick-
rey, Clarke and Groves should be applied in order to get DSIC outcome. In
other words, the monotonicity of WDP is necessary and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) is a sufficient condition to guarantee DSIC property of a mechanism
according to Myerson’s lemma [119]. Also let pi(Bi) be the price vector in-
dicating the prices of each S set of goods included in XOR combinatorial bid,
and xi(Bi) be the mechanisms decision which of sets inside Bi to satisfy. The








In VCG scheme every winning trader pays the social cost that he imposed
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on the mechanism, while the rejected traders do not pay or receive anything
from the mechanism. In this way, VCG scheme generalizes the payment rule of
Vickery auction, where the winning agent pays the second-highest bid. In other
words, the winning bidder in Vickery auction pays the best price that could
have emerged, should he not participate in given auction. VCG uses the same
technique in computing the social cost of a traded bundle. Some limitations of
VCG include that it is susceptible for collusion directed at lowering (increasing
if seller-side) the price of the item traded, and in some cases it may yield a
budget-deficit [148].
2.2.4 Combinatorial Exchanges
The concept of DAs can be further extended to combinatorial exchange. In
fact, combinatorial exchanges can be considered as two-sided combinatorial
auctions where multiple items traded by buyers and sellers. There are several
aspects emerges when the WDP of a combinatorial exchange is defined:
• Sourcing: If mechanism can disassemble and re-assemble bundles of
items, which may involve buy-side aggregation, sell-side aggregation or
both. If bids are not allowed to be disassembled, then each bid should
be matched to exactly one ask.
• Divisibility: If bids can be satisfied partially, or it needs to be all-or-
nothing.
• Homogeneous/Heterogeneous Goods: If goods traded are same, or they
are different. Multiplicity of goods emerges substitutability and comple-
mentarity cases. In this case, bidders can express their possible alter-
native substitutes in their bids and specify them in combination with
different complements.
I will look through WDPs of two specific cases: DA and combinatorial ex-
change. Let us denote x ∈ F as the set of feasible allocations. In former case,
consider set of bids B and set of asks A. Each bid bi ∈ B includes price pi and
quantity qi, and each ask ai ∈ A includes price pj and quantity qj. Bearing in
mind that multi-sourcing is allowed, we can specify for any bi a subset Ai ⊆ A
that satisfies the bid, and the same for any ai ask, there is Bi ⊆ B. Also let
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1 denote the fraction of the demand qi to asked qj. WDP can be
re-formulated for DA as follows:
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Definition 2.2.1. Winner Determination Problem for Double Auction






(pi − pj)qixij (2.56)
subjects to:
1. Each asked item is allocated once:
∑
i∈Bj
qixij ≤ qj,∀j ∈ A (2.57)
2. At most one subset for every trader
∑
j∈Ai
xij ≤ 1,∀i ∈ B (2.58)
3. Multi-sourcing allowed
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1,∀i, j (2.59)
In case if bids are not allowed for multi-sourcing, then xij = {0, 1} needs to
be discrete. This problem is usually referred as matching problem, and can be
solved using LP. However constraint (2.58) makes it an assignment problem
which known to be NP-hard [110].
In case of combinatorial exchange, where bids and asks of heterogeneous items
allowed. Although it is not the case for combinatorial exchange, in this for-
mulation, we define agents to be exclusively either seller or buyer. This is
done to distinguish the subsets wanted from the subsets offered, so the surplus
maximising objective can find optimal allocation. So, let B denote buyers and
A denote sellers. Each seller can submit asks for multiple bundles S ⊆ Z with
price mi(S). Similarly, we allow buyers to submit bids for multiple bundles,
and the price is pi(S). Let agents i ∈ B ∪A, and their corresponding bids de-
fined as Ci ⊆ 2Z . Also xi(S) = 1 would mean that bid on bundle S from buyer
i is accepted, and yi(S) = 1 would indicate that the ask on bundle S from
seller i is accepted. Given above, we can formulate WDP for a combinatorial
exchange:










1. At most one subset for every buyer:
∑
S∈Ci
xi(S) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ B (2.61)
2. At most one subset for every seller
∑
S∈Ci






(yi(S)− xi(S)) ≥ 0,∀j (2.63)
4. Discrete Allocation
xi(S) ∈ {0, 1}, yi(S) ∈ {0, 1}, (2.64)
One way of computing the corresponding payments for both buyers and sellers
is running VCG scheme on both sides separately for each allocation result as
it is done by Duetting et al. [47]. Duetting showed that such mechanism
can achieve DSIC, individual rationality, approximated efficiency and weak
budget-balance given there is a composition rule which accepts buyer-seller
pair if and only if its trade surplus exceeds certain threshold t. However, I
will follow Parkes et al. approach who suggested applying the threshold rule
such that the discount ∆thresh,i minimises the distance between VCG discount
∆vcg,i[133]. Below is given how it works only for buyers side, as the sellers is
symmetric. The VCG payment given in equation (2.55) can also be written as
follows:










Then we can find such ∆thresh,i which solves following LP.
∆∗thresh = arg min
∆thresh
 (2.67)
s.t. ∆vcg,i −∆thresh,i ≤  ∀i (2.68)






The solution ∆∗thresh can be used to compute the budget-balanced payments
for buyers as given in formula below:
ρthresh,i = pi(Bi)ᵀxi(Bi)−∆thresh,i (2.71)
I will use similar payment rule while designing a combinatorial exchange for
trading option portfolios in Chapter 7 and refer to above formula.
2.2.5 Existing Implementations
One of the earliest implementations of market mechanisms is the Santa Fe In-
stitute Artificial Stock Market (SFI-ASM) built in 1989 and outlined by Arthur
et al [7, 99]. It combines well defined market structure and inductive learning
methods. In SFI-ASM framework, myopic agents have to decide on making
their assets portfolio out of risk-free bond and risky stochastic dividend paying
asset. The risk-free bond is in infinite supply and pays a constant interest rate
of r. Also dividend paying asset is in infinite supply, however the dividends are
paid based on the outcome of a stochastic process. Traders use risk aversion
utility function which makes them more reluctant to take risk if the payoff is
uncertain. Agents use Holland’s classifier algorithm [85] to forecast the future
prices and dividends. Agents also apply genetic algorithms to evolve their
portfolio selection mechanism continuously throughout the trading process.
Another, more ’up-to-date’ implementation of auctions is Java Auction Simu-
lation API (JASA)3 developed by Phelps et al. [136]. It allows researchers to
test their trading algorithms in a number of auction protocols. The platform
provides base classes for trading agents that can be further extended with cus-




is used in Trading Agent Competition (TAC) [164, 23]. JCAT is the imple-
mentation of CDA where traders can do both buy and sell simultaneously in
continuous market environment. Another important feature of JCAT is that it
supports multiplicity of specialists, which means that there are many markets
where agents can operate at the same time. Specialist have different policies
for attracting more traders to their market. For example, they may have low
charging policy which takes less fees for registration, transaction, information
etc. They can also attract traders with their efficient matching functions that
pair buyers and sellers together and determine the price at which their orders
should be cleared. JCAT runs on several rounds, and comes with 4 types of
benchmarking trading agents.
There have been several researches done in implementation of auctions for
derivatives market. One of the earliest researches that simulate the trade
of future contracts in auctions is accomplished by deMaza et al. which uses
genetic algorithms to evolve simple trading strategies [41]. It assumes a futures
market that trades future contracts which expire in one day. Agents use prices
coming from previous 10 days to forecast their future price, and based on
this forecasts enter to futures contract. King et al. described multi-agent
model for options market where agents use Black-Scholes model for option
pricing [95]. In this model, there are two types of traders with a requirement
to buy or sell underlying asset in future. They have to generate a list of
actions based on the present and estimated future values of their constrained
portfolios. Streltchenko et al. described a reference architecture for multi-
agent simulation of financial markets [155, 156]. They use Gaia methodology
which views the system as a collection of roles that interact with each other.
In this architecture, there are 3 types of agents: Underlying Market Agent,
Broker Agent and Investor Agent. The role of the first Underlying Market
Agent is to generate price quotes using stochastic processes while the role of the
Broker Agent in derivatives market is to broadcast the quotes obtained from
Underlying Market Agent and also inform Investor Agents about the current
quotes on corresponding derivatives. Broker Agent also registers the orders
submitted by investors and clears them. There is no limit on the quantity of
assets traded on this platform. However, the simulation model developed by
Espinosa imposes a constraint on the number of assets traded, as he uses it
for efficient allocation of resources between agents [56].
The research of particular interest to this topic has been accomplished by Ecca
[50]. She studied the impact of the option market on the underlying stock mar-
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ket using multi-agent simulation. Especially she tested how options affect the
volatility in spot market and proposed a reference architecture for modelling
options market. She also provided simulation results for different kinds exper-
imental setups [51]. Although Ecca’s work shares a lot with my research, my
priorities are somehow different. The main purpose of this research is to price
options using DAs, and it does consider its influence on underlying markets.
There are other types of auctions implemented for testing computer traders
against humans. Luca and Cliff developed a CDA platform named as Open
Exchange (OpEx) for testing the performance of trading agents in comparison
to human traders [104]. The results of the competitions has been published
by UK’s Government Office for Science [106].
There are two common types of combinatorial auction models implemented in
practice: parametric model and abstract process model. The first model is pro-
posed by Wurman et al.[167], the developer of Michigan Internet AuctionBot
[166], who identified a range of parameters that describe variety of auctions.
These parameters are grouped into 3 parts:
1. Common auction characteristics: There are 3 main activities common
to any auction: receiving bids and asks, clearing (i.e. matching bidders)
and revealing information about traders (eg. their quotes, valuation
mechanism etc). Important point here is to identify if the allocations
are discrete or continuous, or in other words, whether traders quote in
indivisible units of money, and buy or sell indivisible units of stock, or
the quotes and amounts are described in continuous variables.
2. Auction parameter space: These parameters specify the rules of trading
in auctions, such as whether traders may bid or asks, or do both, the
bidding language they use (eg. if they can submit OR-bids, XOR-bids
etc), acceptance rules (eg. in ascending auctions only those bids that
beat specified/previous bid can be accepted), activity rules that oblige
traders to participate in the trade constantly and thus avoid last-minute
sniping problem. Another parameter is whether specialists send iden-
tical anonymous quotes to every trader or tailor specific discriminatory
quote for given trader. Auctions may also be configured to reveal the
order book which lists all unsatisfied bids and asks to some or all traders.
Some specialists may reveal information about past trades. Some auc-
tions settings may specify additional costs for obtaining such information
from specialists or even having the right to obtain discriminatory quotes
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Figure 2.9: Auction’s process flow diagram
specially tailored to them.
3. Matching Functions: These are the functions that determine which agents
can trade based on the offers they made. One approach for pairing quotes
can be the minimization of the difference between bid and ask quotes,
and thus matching the highest ask and lowest bid. In contrast, maxi-
mizing this gap between asks and bids leads to better control on price
for specialists. The core outcome of any matching function is the trade
price which is applied for both buyers and sellers. The price is said to
be uniform if it is applied for all traders equally, whereas discriminatory
if it is applied only for specific pair of buyer and seller. Specialists once
they have a control on price, can encourage buyers or sellers by manipu-
lating the price between ask and buy quotes. Below formula shows how
specialist can draw the price:
p = kpbuyer + (1− k)pseller where k ∈ [0, 1] (2.72)
This process can be further extended to all buyers and sellers, where
specialist picks n bids that are above pbuyer and acceptable to at least
one seller, selectm asks below pseller and acceptable to at least one buyer.
Then find l = min(n,m) winning bids and compute a uniform price for
them based on above formula.
The second common auction model, the abstract process model, breaks down
the auction into an order of subprocesses [134]. Figure 2.9 is the action flow
diagram which illustrates the processes involved in any auction with the de-
scription of each process below. The arrows in this diagram represent the
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direction of the action flow.
• Bid/Ask Call: Specialist calls for bids/asks. The call for bid/ask can be
accompanied with reserved price if it is sealed-bid auction, or with the
previous quote if it is an open-cry auction.
• Bid/Ask Collection: Specialist collects and validates orders.
• Bid/Ask Retraction: Specialists may allow traders to cancel their orders
until specified time. If the auction is open-cry, then specialist needs to
repeat call for bids/asks with the next highest/lowest bid/ask. For this
purpose, it is the responsibility of the specialist to keep the track of all
bids/asks.
• Winner Determination: Specialist needs to calculate the price based on
supply and demand, and then match bids and asks together.
• Clearing: Once the winners are identified, specialist needs to notify them
and clear their orders.
• Information Revelation: Specialist can reveal different types of informa-
tion to traders. This may include bids/asks of other traders, winning
bids/asks, overall turnover etc.
• Tie Breaking: Specialist is also responsible for breaking ties if there are
conflicts between two or more buyers against a single seller, or vice versa.
• Round Switch: If the auction is multi-round, then specialist has an-
nounce the round’s end, and switch to the next round which may involve
changing the auction protocol, reserved price for goods etc.
• Closing: Specialist is responsible for closing auction, or indeed postpone





In this chapter, I describe high-level architecture of my simulation model. I
explain three important stages of the simulation, namely: a) Underlying Mar-
ket, b) Option Trading Agents and c) Auctions. The first stage highlights the
ways how I generate uncertain market data such as the asset prices and in-
terest rates. I use stochastic models generating continuous/discontinuous and
stationary/non-stationary time series. Non-stationary time series are used to
simulate asset prices, while stationary time series model is good way of simulat-
ing interest rates in the underlying market. I use historical market prices and
interest rates to calibrate my computer simulated data. In the second stage, I
propose a generic architecture of option trading agents and stress the roles of
each of its constituent components. Namely, I model trading agents through
four layers: Information, Inventory, Knowledge and Behavioural layers. And
finally, I propose overall simulation flow for 2 DAs for pricing options: a) direct
auctions; b) online DAs. Although I do not run simulations with a combinato-
rial exchange in this research, it is still included in the mechanisms list. Figure
3.1 describes these three important aspects of my simulation model.
In underlying market, I simulate two stochastic processes that are relevant for
pricing options. First is the asset pricing models such as Brownian model and
Jump-Diffusion model. These models simulate continuous and discontinuous
paths in asset prices. I use the NASDAQ-100 index for calibrating the parame-
ters of stochastic processes. The second aspect of the simulation of underlying
market is the interest rates. Although they are assumed to be constant in
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Figure 3.1: Simulation Overview
Black-Scholes framework, the practice shows that most of the time they fluc-
tuate around certain mean throughout the year. This is best modelled using
Mean Reverting processes, for that I use standard Vasicek process with an
autoregressive parameter. I also try Vasicek model with jumps to mimic the
scenario when the interest rate sharply decreases or increases. Historic indices
for interest rate are taken from 2-year T-Bill rates.
As for trading agents, I describe the four important layers of its high-level
architecture. I determine for each layer what functional roles it possesses, what
data it stores, inputs and outputs and how the whole architecture fits together
with different categories of traders I developed. I extended Vytelingum’s IKB
model for CDAs described in his PhD thesis [160] with additional Inventory
layer. In this layer, I propose that some of the traders may use their inventory
information in order to generate option prices. I proposed an option pricing
technique called LMSR and a proxy trading algorithm (i.e. trading algorithm
which takes its private value from other source) which directly use inventory
information to set bid-ask spread. Besides the inventory layer, the other layers
such as information, knowledge and behavioural layers have been applied to
option trading scenario. For example, the information layer is devoted to
gathering required data such as asset prices, interest rates, volumes, accepted
orders, etc from the underlying market and the mechanisms. Knowledge layer
is specialised in computing important statistical parameters of the information
received such as mean, standard deviation, implied volatility, jump arrival rates
and their means and volatility, etc. In behavioural layer agents use techniques
specific to their trading behaviour to generate bids and asks.
In the third stage, I run different types of DAs for pricing options. The direct
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auction holds DSIC property making all the traders to submit truthful orders
and everything gets cleared in one round. Although this simplifies the current
CDA type markets where the options are traded continuously throughout the
trading day, in my approach traders disclose their truthful valuations to the
mechanism without engaging into trading algorithms. This, of course, allows
us to mix different option pricing methodologies and obtain a competitive
aggregate outcome. In second simulation approach, I run CDA along with
proxy trading algorithms and compare the prices to theoretical prices.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an insight on the
simulation of underlying market data and the models that are used. Section
3.3 proposes a new framework for option trading agents and explains the role
of each layer in generating option prices. Finally Section 3.4 discusses the
mechanisms used in my simulation models and provides scenarios in which
they can be applied. In Section 3.5, I compare in detail the similarities and
differences of my simulation model to other models proposed as a framework
of an option market.
3.2 Underlying Market
The key component of any derivative pricing is the definition of its underlying
market, because its price directly depends on the performance of its underly-
ing asset or the factors related to its underlying market such as interest rate.
Therefore, one should be able to simulate the dynamics of an underlying mar-
ket in such a way that it mimics historical data. In this section, I first present
my historical data for NASDAQ-100 Index, and provide short analysis of its
parameters. Then I try to fit this data into different asset pricing models. As
a result, I can find the corresponding simulation parameters for given models.
Then I use these parameters to simulate asset prices for my further experi-
ments. In some case, I might alter the parameters of the simulation to stress
test certain experimental scenario.
While simulating the asset prices, I take into account the distribution of the
returns. Using continuous Brownian motion for asset pricing would imply an
assumption that the underlying asset market is highly liquid and efficient, and
the asset price trajectory is smooth. The main reason for this is that the
asset prices are assumed to be the cumulative sum of infinitesimally small
orders submitted to the market. The impact of each order to the asset price
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is deemed to be negligible. This results in a continuous asset price model with
normally distributed returns. Conversely, in a discontinuous model, I pose
an assumption that there could be significant event in the market that may
sharply alter the asset’s value, thus making the asset price trajectory bear
random jumps over some period. This is a plausible assumption because the
asset price may change significantly due to an important news relevant to the
asset. This can also be seen in typical price movements in the real markets.
We should also note that discontinuous prices result in fat-tailed distribution
of returns which differs from what Black and Scholes initially assumed.
Unlike asset prices, the interest rates usually fluctuate around their long-term
mean. No matter where the interest rate is now, it should return back to its
mean after certain time. Mean-reverting processes are commonly used models
to simulate the interest rate fluctuations. The mean reverting processes can
also be continuous or discontinuous depending whether they have sharp jumps
within given period or not.
3.2.1 Historic Asset Prices
Historical data for NASDAQ-100 for one calendar year has been obtained from
Yahoo! Finance 1. The data is freely available on Web, and recorded as daily
aggregate of opening, high, low and closing prices of 100 stocks listed in NAS-
DAQ. I use adjusted closing prices as the main indicator of asset price for the
given day. The reason for using NASDAQ index as an underlying asset price
is that it represents most of the technological companies with volatile stocks
which gives an additional level of stress testing capability in my experimental
models. Dividends are paid for the stocks listed in this index, and one can
calculate the aggregate of the total dividends paid to subtract them from asset
price’s annualised return. However, as it was mentioned in Chapter 1, I shall
assume that there are no dividends paid on index based options like NASDAQ
in the context of this research. Not including dividends in my model relieves
the burden of estimating the uncertain dividends to be yielded per each stock,
managing their payments and immediate adjustment of option prices in my
simulation model. However once the dividends are known, or assumed con-
stant, it is trivial to adjust option prices accordingly by reducing risk-free rate
by the corresponding dividend rate. Table 3.1 displays a snapshot of raw data
1http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=%5ENDX&ql=0
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obtained for calendar year of 2014. The Appendix A lists all of the records
used for NASDAQ index.
Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
02/01/2014 3575.60 3577.03 3553.65 3563.57 1738820000 3563.57
03/01/2014 3564.94 3567.51 3537.61 3538.73 1667480000 3538.73
06/01/2014 3539.02 3542.52 3512.45 3526.96 2292840000 3526.96
07/01/2014 3539.29 3562.99 3535.50 3557.85 2278220000 3557.85
08/01/2014 3558.30 3575.15 3551.12 3567.54 2345220000 3567.54
09/01/2014 3576.33 3579.40 3541.81 3552.58 2214770000 3552.58
10/01/2014 3565.68 3568.47 3536.45 3565.08 2143070000 3565.08
13/01/2014 3559.39 3572.40 3499.37 3512.80 2322240000 3512.80
14/01/2014 3526.20 3581.60 3525.47 3580.65 2034180000 3580.65
Table 3.1: Snapshot of NASDAQ-100 Indices
I further analyse this data in order to compute the key parameters of it for
our further asset price simulations. We have the actual asset price series
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(rt − µˆ)2 (3.2)
This would give us an average of µˆ = 0.0006 daily return and with standard
deviation of σˆ = 0.0089 on NASDAQ-100 over the year 2014. The histogram
in Figure 3.2 also shows that the daily mean return is nearly zero. We can
also see that the returns are skewed to the right indicating that NASDAQ-100
has grown over the year which is obvious from its price at the beginning of the
year $3563.57 and at the end of the year $4236.28. Hence the annual growth
of the index is 0.1888.
Although the histogram resembles the normal distribution, it is not obvious
that it has fatter tails. Figure 3.3 illustrates the plot of the NASDAQ-100
index, its daily returns, Quantile-Quantile (QQ) and the autocorrelation with
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Figure 3.2: NASDAQ-100 daily returns over 2014
different time steps. From the first plot, we can see that the prices had several
sharp jumps over the year. We can also see that the returns exhibit certain
level volatility making the prices fluctuate. The most important plots, QQ and
autocorrelation plots, show how the returns are distributed toward normal dis-
tribution and if there is an autocorrelation with past events. By looking at
QQ plot we can see that the returns does not line up with normal distribution
making the extreme quantiles diverge largely. This would mean that the distri-
bution of the returns has fatter tails compared to normal distribution. Also the
autocorrelation plot shows that there is an insignificant autocorrelation with
past lags. This would suggest that the NASDAQ-100 returns are somewhat
independent from past events. We have discussed two models for simulating
asset prices: GBM and jump-diffusion process, so we will try to calibrate these
models to NASDAQ-100 index trajectory. At the first glance, it seems that the
best model which could simulate NASDAQ-100 index according to the given
data is jump-diffusion process because QQ plot shows fat tails. However, I also
calibrate the parameters of GBM to stress the difference between two models.
While analysing the prices, I have to admit that this particular price trajectory
for NASDAQ-100 in 2014 is just a single instance of some stochastic model.
It is impossible to accurately estimate the parameters of its stochastic model
from observing the only instance of its price trajectory. However we can count
on the estimators such as Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) to guess the
correct values of the parameters of the model. The main principle behind MLE
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Figure 3.3: NASDAQ-100 Indices from 02.01.2014 to 02.01.2015
is finding the most likely set of parameters Θ of the model that would maximise
the likelihood function for given set of data instances x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of
random vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). So we can write the likelihood function
as a PDF or a Probability Mass Function (PMF) with free parameters θ and
with pre-configured event X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xn = xn. This can be written
as following function:
L(θ) = fX1,X2,...,Xn;Θ(x1, x2, . . . , xn;θ) (3.3)
If we are looking at X as the series of asset prices which follow a random walk,
then the probability of asset price changing to particular value depends on
where it is now. This is also referred as the Markov property of the process. For
the likelihood function it can be written as the transition likelihoods between
two adjacent steps:
L(θ) = fX1|X2;Θ(x1|x2;θ) . . . fXn|Xn−1;Θ(xn|xn−1;θ) (3.4)
In case of GBM, where the returns are i.i.d., likelihood function can even be
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We can find the maximal likelihood either analytically, or numerically, but
the latter one is easier due to the ready-made software such as fminsearch
and fzero in MATLAB. After solving the maximisation problem for normal
likelihood on index returns, we can obtain that the mean is µˆ = 0.0007 and
standard deviation σˆ = 0.0088 which are very close to sample mean and stan-
dard deviations calculated earlier. So we can use for simulating the either of
proposed asset pricing models.
To sum up, in order to simulate asset prices that would mimic the historical
trajectory, we should use µ and σ which are estimated to be µˆ = 0.0007 and
σˆ = 0.0088 as daily return and volatility parameter. Further we will see how
well these parameters fit with GBM and jump diffusion models.
3.2.2 Geometric Brownian Motion
We have already defined the GBM in Chapter 2 and specified its main compo-
nents such as drift and diffusion. As it was mentioned earlier, such Stochas-
tic Differential Equation (SDE)s simulate ideal conditions in the asset mar-
ket where the market is highly efficient and liquid with no frictions and the
traders are independently distributed. In such market, prices are supposed to
be continuous and non-stationary. GBM model perfectly simulates this kind of
behaviour. In below simulation, we have pre-set the parameters of the process
as shown in Table 3.2.
Asset price at t = 0 S0 = 100
Annual mean µ = 0.05
Annual standard deviation σ = 0.1
Time interval ∆t = 1/365
Table 3.2: Parameters of the asset price simulation using GBM process
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(a) Virtual asset (b) NASDAQ-100 indices in 2014
Figure 3.4: 5 possible instances of price trajectories generated using GBM
process
I have simulated 10000 instances of asset prices using GBM process and dis-
played 5 instances out of them in Figure 3.4a. It can be seen that price
trajectories do not contain sudden jumps, and the changes are infinitesimally
small which make them continuous. Also we can see that the prices can move
in any direction with no tendency to revert to the mean. Hence there is no ef-
fect of past decisions, and the prices should exhibit very small autocorrelation.
This would make the prices non-stationary too. Figure 3.4a also shows the
5%th and 95%th percentiles of 10000 simulations to illustrate the confidence
boundaries of price trajectories at each time step. It can be seen that as the
time progresses, the uncertainty about the future asset prices grows with it
according to the definition of GBM. The percentiles of the asset prices can be
used to draw the probability distribution of an asset price at given time t.
I also simulated the asset prices using the parameters obtained from NASDAQ-
100. These parameters has been already estimated in previous section using
MLE method for normal i.i.d.log-likelihood (3.6). I provided the settings in
Table 3.3. These settings will be used to simulate prices for the experiments
with trading agents and mechanisms presented in this research. Figure 3.4b
NASDAQ-100 at t = 0 S0 = $3563.57
Daily return mean µ = 0.0006
Daily return standard deviation σ = 0.0089
Time interval ∆t = 1
Table 3.3: Calibrated parameters of GBM process on NASDAQ-100 returns
86
Figure 3.5: GBM: QQ Plot with Historical Returns and Autoregression
illustrates 5 possible trajectories of NASDAQ-100 out of 1000 generated. The
percentiles of all trajectories simulated are also presented here. Due to the
positive daily return, the percentiles move in upward direction asserting that
in most scenarios, NASDAQ-100 index would grow.
To test if GBM model aligns well with actual historical returns, we take any
arbitrary instance of GBM simulation and plot QQ along with historical re-
turns. We can see that GBM diverge from the actual returns at tails. Figure
3.5 illustrates it clearly in the first chart. Second chart shows the autocorre-
lation of GBM returns which are below significance level. This is an expected
outcome because in GBM, as there is no dependence on past returns.
Given accurate µ and σ, the GBM simulation of the whole path can be skipped,
if all trader needs is the asset price ST at time T . This shortcut formula (3.7)









We have talked about jump-diffusion processes in Chapter 2 previously. Mer-
ton has introduced this asset pricing model back in 1976 and has given a
closed form solution for pricing a European option whose underlying asset fol-
lows jump-diffusion process [114]. The model consists of 3 main uncertainties:
GBM’s infinitesimal random shocks, Poisson jumps and normally distributed
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magnitude of the jumps. The SDE of the model can be written as follows:
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt + StdJt (3.8)




(Yj − 1) (3.9)
where Nt follows Poisson process with intensity λ indicating the number of
arrivals per time t. Hence that NT ∼ Poisson(λT ) is distributed according to
Poisson distribution. Yj represents a log-normally distributed random variable
log Yj ∼ N (µY , σ2Y ) which indicates the magnitude of j-th jump with respect
to the current price. In order to avoid negative values for St, I have to convert
the series into logarithmic series like I did for GBM. In this way, extending
the (3.7) with jumps we can obtain following SDE for log-prices (remember
st = logSt):
dst = (µ− 12σ
2)dt+ σdWt + log YNtdNt (3.10)
As I did for GBM, the random end values of asset price at time T including
jumps can be computed analytically. If we solve (3.7) and convert it back to
asset prices, we obtain following formula for asset price ST at time T . Agents
can run this formula without doing the simulation in order to estimate the







I have simulated the jump-diffusion process to illustrate if it exhibits sharp
changes in price due to random Poisson arrivals. This is an example simulation
which does not calibrate to any historic data, and thus the parameters used in
this simulation are arbitrary. Table 3.4 provides the values of the parameters
that I used. Besides standard GBM parameters µ and σ, I have also set the
jump arrival rate or jump intensity equal to 0.01 which would mean that the
jumps must occur every 100 days on average. Also the log magnitude of a
single jump is drawn from N (0.05, 0.002). It can be observed from Figure 3.6a
that there are couple of upward jumps happening on every instance due to the
positive mean of the jump magnitude. Also we can see that the jumps are
uniform all the time which means that only one jump is happening at given
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(a) Virtual asset (b) NASDAQ-100 indices in 2014
Figure 3.6: 5 possible instances of price trajectories generated using jump-
diffusion process
time. If there were several jumps arriving at the same time, the magnitude
of the jumps would be twice or Nt times greater. The percentiles from 10000
simulations show the estimated boundaries of the price trajectories. As in
GBM, the boundaries get wider as the time progresses.
Asset price at t = 0 S0 = 100
Daily mean µ = 0.05/365
Daily standard deviation σ = 0.1/365
Daily jump intensity λ = 0.01
Jump mean µY = 0.05
Jump standard deviation σY = 0.002
Time interval ∆t = 1
Table 3.4: Parameters of the asset price simulation using jump-diffusion pro-
cess
To estimate the parameters of jump-diffusion model θ = (µ, σ, λ, µY , σY ) to
NASDAQ-100 prices, I again use MLE method where the parameters that
maximise the log-likelihood are found. Taking into account that the Poisson
arrivals and the asset price changes are independent events, we can define the
likelihood function for given return xi as the sum of all possible Poisson cases




P (nt = j)fN (xi; (µ− σ2/2)∆t+ jµY , σ2∆t+ jσ2Y ) (3.12)
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If ∆t is very small period, then Poisson random variable is Nt = {0, 1}meaning
that there is either one jump or there is no jump at all within ∆t period. This
should simplify (3.12) to following equation:
fXi;Θ(xi;θ) =λ∆fN (xi; (µ− σ2/2)∆t+ µY , σ2∆t+ σ2Y ) (3.13)
+ (1− λ∆)fN (xi; (µ− σ2/2)∆t, σ2∆t)
Then I can use (3.6) MLE objective function to find maximising parameters of
θ. I used the same optimisation subroutine provided by MATLAB to accom-
plish this task. We found following calibrated parameters for jump-diffusion
process that would match NASDAQ-100 price trajectory. Table 3.5 presents
these parameters: In Tables 3.5 and 3.3, the calibrated parameters show that
NASDAQ-100 at t = 0 S0 = $3563.57
Daily return mean µ = 0.00068
Daily return standard deviation σ = 0.0046
Daily jump intensity λ = 0.8
Jump mean µY = −0.0021
Jump standard deviation σY = 0.0083
Time interval ∆t = 1
Table 3.5: Calibrated parameters of jump-diffusion process on NASDAQ-100
returns
the mean returns µ of both GBM and jump-diffusion models are almost the
same, however the standard deviation σ = 0.0046 for jump-diffusion process is
twice smaller than GBM. This shifts the responsibility for sudden price changes
to jumps introduced in the model, hence the standard deviation of GBM part
of the model is evaluated less that in pure GBM. We can also see that the
intensity of jumps are considerably frequent making an expected jump once
in every 1.25 days. We can also observe from the negative value of mean µY
of jump magnitudes the index was expected to drop by -0.21% on every jump
with standard deviation of 0.83%.
I have simulated the 10000 possible paths of NASDAQ-100 index for 2014 using
the calibrated parameters, and presented 5 instances of them in Figure 3.6b.
Comparing the Figures 3.4b and 3.6b, we can see that the percentiles for both
models cover nearly the same range, thus making the confidence interval for
using either model to be the same. My simulation model uses the unseen asset
price trajectory for agents to compute option prices, although the parameters
of the simulation such as mean of returns, standard deviation of returns, daily
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Figure 3.7: Jump-Diffusion: QQ Plot and Autocorrelation
jump intensity, jump mean, jump standard deviation are assumed to be known
to agents as they can use the above described techniques to calibrate chosen
asset pricing model to historic data. For example, Monte Carlo option trading
agents simulate certain number of asset price paths with given parameters to
estimate the risk-neutral value of the option.
As I did in GBM model, I also test how simulated returns fit with the actual
historical returns in QQ plot. Figure 3.7 shows that historical returns and
simulated returns align along single line. This suggests that historical returns
have the same distribution as jump-diffusion model. We noted that jump-
diffusion models are used to simulate fat-tailed distributions. Also we can
see that there is no significant autocorrelation in returns confirming the index
is somewhat independent from past events. I have mentioned earlier in the
section that NASDAQ-100 prices could be simulated best using jump-diffusion
model, and this confirms this statement.
3.2.4 Mean-Reverting Process
Mean-reverting process, or sometimes referred as stationary process, is good
model for simulating time-series data such as interest rates [88, 92], exchange
rates [14], electricity rates [107, 55] which are supposed to remain stable over
long period of time. For example, US T-bills are traded in stock market with
nominal value of $100 at the time of expiration. Its present value which is
normally less than $100 is determined through the financial market where
traders bid and ask for this security. If its present value is $90, then this would
mean that at the time of T-Bill’s expiration, the investor makes (100−90)/90 ≈
11% return. Because US economy is huge and comparatively stable, there is
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Figure 3.8: Daily returns of US Treasury Bills with different expiration terms
very little risk in US economy going default and not being able to pay back
promised $100 per T-Bill at its expiration. Therefore this 11% return can
be viewed as risk-free investment rate. This overall established trust in US
economy can hardly be influenced in short period of time, and so the traders
in the market submit more or less the same quotes for T-Bills with very little
volatility in day to day trading. There could be temporary rises or falls of
risk-free rates for short period, but because the US economy is not going to
change dramatically overnight, the rates return back to their respective mean
by exhibiting mean-reverting behaviour. This can also be seen in below chart
3.8 showing the daily returns of US T-Bills in 2014. We have included the full
data for this chart in the Appendix A for future references.
Because in Black-Scholes model the risk-free rate is accepted as constant, in
most of our experiments I assume that this assumption is true. However, sim-
ulations can equally assume cases where the interest rate itself is a stochastic
process. Interest rates do change because in practice, it is computed as the
return from T-Bill which is openly traded in the market, and hence subject
to continuous changes in value. In order to simulate the dynamics of risk-free
rates, I use the exponential Vasicek model [158] discussed in Chapter 2. The
reason for choosing exponential Vasicek model is that it simulates only posi-
tive values for risk-free rates in the same way as GBM does for asset prices.
In order to transform standard Vasicek model to exponential form we have to
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Figure 3.9: Simulation of risk-free rates using Vasicek model
define the log-returns st as standard Vasicek process:
dst = θ(µ− st)dt+ σdWt (3.14)
where parameters θ represents speed of reversion, µ long-term mean and σ
volatility.
In this way, we can have the risk-free rates St = est , and by applying Ito’s
lemma [91] (i.e. second-order Taylor expansion with a stochastic term), we
obtain following formulation of exponential Vasicek process:
dSt = θSt(µ+
σ2
2θ − logSt)dt+ σStdWt (3.15)
The main statistical parameters such as mean and standard deviation of US
T-bills can be obtained from given historical data above. Hence for 2-year
T-bill, the mean is µ = 0.46 and the standard deviation is σ = 0.09. I use
these parameters along with setting an arbitrary speed of reversion, such as
θ = 0.1 to simulate Vasicek model. Figure 3.9 illustrates simulation of Vasicek
process with above parameters. It can be seen that Vasicek price even if it
fluctuates, it does not leave the mean risk-free rate. Red lines depict 5% and
95% percentiles of 10000 instances of Vasicek simulation. It can be seen from
these instances that all these simulated paths are not diverging from the mean,
in 90% confidence interval fluctuate between approximately 0.1 and 0.8.
I present the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation graphs in Figure 3.10
to highlight the effect of past prices to the current price. In autocorrelation
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Figure 3.10: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation of Vasicek prices
Figure 3.11: Vasicek model vs 2-year T-bills
graph, we can see that the diminishing influence of past prices on current price
due to the recursion in Vasicek’s model. Partial autocorrelation shows which
lags directly affect the next price. Because the mean-reversion model is the
instance of AR(1) (Autoregressive) model, the partial autocorrelation shows
significant effect of previous value on current value.
We can also look at the QQ-plot in Figure 3.11 between an arbitrary instance
of Vasicek model simulation, and the historical returns of 2-year T-Bills. This
clearly shows that both series are distributed similarly, although Vasicek series
are seen more volatile and covering wider range of possibilities.
3.2.5 Mean-Reverting Jump Process
In this model, I introduce random jumps to mean-reverting model. This in-
corporates a situation when there is an important news which could cause
dramatic changes in US T-Bills market, and hence sharply changes risk-free
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Figure 3.12: Simulation risk-free rates using Vasicek-Jump model
rate for a limited period of time until the process returns back to its mean. We
have observed how jumps can be added into standard GBM in earlier sections.
Now I shall add the jumps to Vasicek model. It can be as straightforward as
adding extra jump term dJt to Vasicek model of log-returns (3.14)
dst = θ(µ− st)dt+ σdWt + dJt (3.16)
where jump process dJt is given by (3.9).
Figure 3.12 illustrates 5 instances of Vasicek-Jump model simulation. I have
used the same parameters as in previous Vasicek model, setting µ = 0.46
and σ = 0.09. I set the jump arrival rate λ = 4, but it can be set to any
arbitrary number depending the experimental scenario. Jump mean µλ = 0.2
and σλ = 0.1 are also arbitrarily set. We can also look at the percentiles of
10000 instances determining the 90% confidence interval. Although we cannot
observe the full convergence of paths to the mean, it is still noticeable that the
trajectories lean towards the mean even after sharp jumps.
We can also check how an instance of a Vasicek-Jump model simulation com-
plies with historic T-bill returns in QQ-plot shown in Figure 3.13. There is a
significant divergence at higher quantile because this particular instance has
sharp jump in its trajectory. This shows that Vasicek-Jump does not per-
fectly fit the T-Bill returns. I do not include the experiments with the use
Vasicek-Jump process simulating the interest rates in the scope of this work.
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Figure 3.13: Vasicek-Jump model vs 2-year T-bills
3.3 Option Trading Agents Framework
This section provides a general framework for trading agents that I designed
and implemented for different environments. I slightly extended Vytelingum’s
IKB model for CDAs described in his PhD thesis [160] and incorporated the
requirements of this research into it. Vytelingum’s framework has minimalis-
tic separation of concepts and it is easily adaptable for variety of applications.
It perfectly fits into scenarios I am going to simulate in this thesis, because
it makes agents independent from the mechanism they are interacting with.
This, of course, helps us to replace and to reuse the modules developed for
each aspect of trader’s behaviour. According to the framework, agent requires
information about itself and the environment first, and it has a limited ca-
pability to extract the knowledge from given raw data. Once it extracts the
knowledge, its behaviour decides how to trade using this knowledge.
I define the structure of generic trading agent using three layers of IKB model
plus one more layer for the Inventory the agent holds. Agent’s inventory, or
also referred as portfolio, in the context of this thesis may also affect his market
behaviour. I refer to this new framework with a new acronym IIKB framework.
Its main aspect is illustrated in Figure 3.14. This is an abstract inclusive model
for any type of trader in this research. This means that not every component
described below may necessarily exist in concrete implementation of the trader.
For example, Zero Intelligence (ZI)traders do not have components responsible
for processing the live information from market, or maintaining an inventory.
Below sections provide detailed explanation of the role of each layer in the
design of option trading agents.
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Figure 3.14: Structure Of the IIKB Model
3.3.1 Information Layer
In this layer, agent collects raw data about the mechanism and its current state.
Although it sounds confusing that the data is referred as an information in the
original framework[160], I shall stick with the same naming convention. So in
order to avoid confusion, further across this thesis, I shall use information layer
as the layer responsible for collecting and storing raw data. The data collected
is mostly the order book, the history of option clearing prices, option types
traded, the depth of the market, and other constants specific to particular
mechanism or underlying market. Depending on a type, agents may drop
information about the certain aspects of the mechanism state such as the
number of participants, because their behavioural model does not require this
information in order to produce option prices. The information is collected
based on the needs of the agent. For example, agent can be myopic and does
not need the full historic trend in an online market. This type of agent has
a limited capability of learning or encompassing the full information about
current state of the orders.
We can classify the information into following categories according to Mas-
Collel [112]:
• Complete/Incomplete: An agent is said to possess complete information if
he knows the complete structure of the market which involves the actions
of other participants, their corresponding utilities and expectations, the
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rules of the mechanism and other data which could completely describe
any phenomenon that happens in the market. Otherwise, agent is said
to possess incomplete information.
• Perfect/Imperfect: An agent is said to possess perfect information if he is
certain of all the information he knows including his own type, market’s
current state and its corresponding history and future. Otherwise, he is
said to have an imperfect information.
Mostly the information the agents will be dealing with is incomplete and im-
perfect because of computational and functional limitations of the agent. Also
it is impractical to assume that trader might have access to the utility func-
tions of other agents. In real markets, traders may not guess the action sets of
other traders, and could not base their decisions on that. The only available
information is publicly posted orders and volumes. Information that agents
use throughout the thesis is also imperfect, because the expectation of future
asset prices bear uncertainty, and even more, the priors that agents use to
model the asset prices bear uncertainty too. Therefore agents cannot fully
predict the future of the asset prices, not only because it is a random process,
but mostly because they have no control over it. Uncertainty that may arise
inside the mechanism can be the behaviour of other market participants, how
they are going to react to a certain event in assets market and what their pre-
dictions are going to be. This all depends on the population and the diversity
of option traders.
Agents deal with both aggregated and generated information while making
buying or selling decisions, however they can collectively influence only the
aggregated one. Talking about the types of information by its source, we can
break it down into two categories:
• Aggregated Information: This information is obtained from the mech-
anism (i.e. option market) as a result of a one-period or continuous
interactions of trading agents with the mechanism. Agents can influence
the flow of this information through the aggregate effect of their actions.
• Generated Information: This is an information that cannot be influenced
by option trading agents. It is assumed that this information is generated
using stochastic process. Its flow is independent of any transactions
happening in the mechanism. We can classify the state of the asset
prices stateS in to this category. Agents take this information as it
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is and calibrate their option pricing models according to its statistical
parameters.
3.3.2 Inventory Layer
There are two reasons for maintaining this layer in proposed framework for
option traders. Firstly this layer imposes certain rules on holding cash and
other liquidities to certain agents such as dealers and portfolio holding agents.
Thus it affects their option preferences and price setting behaviour. Secondly,
it allows to bookkeep the agent’s transactions, and calculate statistics about
his overall performance.
Agents hold different accounts to store the information about these inventories.
There are three kinds of inventories agents may buy, sell and hold: cash,
underlying asset and options.
• Cash Account: Cash is assigned as an initial endowment to the inventory-
based agent before the simulation, and can be further obtained through
trading. Ici (t) is used to denote the amount of cash in cash account
of agent i at time t. Keeping record of available cash is important for
an inventory-based dealer who uses it as a constraint in determining his
bid-ask spread. Also delta hedging strategy involves maintenance of cash
account which bears risk-free interest payments.
• Underlying Asset Account: The underlying asset is bought or sold at
spot market price to the mechanism. Agent i’s asset account at time t
is denoted as ISi (t). This is particularly important if agent is using delta
hedging strategy, because he needs to maintain the delta portion of an
asset to balance his replicating portfolio between risky underlying asset
and risk-free cash.
• Option Accounts: Options are the main commodities that are traded
inside simulated mechanisms, and there can be multiple types of them
traded in the same market. The accounts for holding options are denoted
as Iji (t) which represents agent’s inventory at time t on jth option traded
in the mechanism. This account is crucial for LMSR option pricing
trader, because it uses the existing portfolio of options to value the price
of the option he is going to buy or sell.
I assume that cash is measured in the units of some virtual currency, and
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because I use NASDAQ-100 index which is measured in USDs, I use this
currency to denote cash. Agents use cash to buy or sell assets or options to
the mechanism. Options traded in the mechanism are standard European call
or put options throughout the thesis unless it is clarified otherwise. It has been
discussed in Chapter 2 that European option can be fully defined the number
of parameters. Below I list the parameters that are used in my model:
j A positive integer defining the option type traded in the market where
even j refers to call option, and odd refers to put option. We can find the
intrinsic value of the option using this unified formula: max((−1)j(St −
Kj), 0)
r Risk-free interest rate
T Option maturity date (i.e. the time when option gets exercised if its
value is above zero).
K Strike price
S0 Spot asset price
σ Asset price volatility (i.e. the standard deviation of an asset price)
In my simulation model, all options have the same maturity date T to compare
them with theoretical price. Also options are created on one type of underlying
asset denoted by St, and all agents have full information about everything
related to the content of the option contract. Thus variables such as S0, K,
T and j are regarded as common knowledge. Moreover agents use the same
risk-free interest rate r while pricing option. In some cases, the risk-free rate
is not a constant term, and subject to change over time, but these changes are
also publicly known to traders. One parameter the agents may vary privately
is the implied volatility parameter σ. Because the option pricing methods are
different, the implied volatility of the agent may vary too. Implied volatility is
commonly considered the way how agents perceive risk. In some scenarios, I
deliberately impose perturbed volatility surface to agents pricing options using
the marginal risk-neutral distribution obtained from volatility surface. This
supports the fact that there are different beliefs about the future of the asset
price in the market.
So we can vary options traded in the auction by changing two parameters:
option type and strike price Kj. In this way, we can cover whole spectrum of
moneyness for options. In real markets, options with the same maturity date,
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but different strike prices are displayed as option chains like in Table 3.6:
Strikes Last Put Put Bid Put Ask Last Call Call Bid Call Ask
4300 59.21 53.40 56.50 155.08 155.90 161.30
4325 61.15 60.20 63.20 149.40 137.90 144.00
4335 43.47 63.00 66.30 168.77 130.90 136.80
4340 63.00 64.70 67.50 X X X
4345 62.23 66.00 69.20 X X X
4350 70.12 67.70 70.80 118.78 120.70 125.90
4370 72.30 74.50 77.90 X X X
4375 78.72 76.40 79.60 106.80 104.40 109.20
4385 62.82 79.70 83.20 X X X
Current Underlying Price: $4399.23
4400 91.42 85.50 89.20 85.00 89.10 93.90
4420 95.01 93.00 97.90 X X X
4425 99.30 93.90 100.20 76.80 74.90 79.00
4440 X X X 94.10 67.00 71.10
4445 90.00 102.10 110.40 93.80 64.40 68.00
4450 112.00 105.90 112.40 59.60 62.00 65.50
4460 92.00 110.10 117.60 57.06 57.20 60.70
4475 94.41 118.10 126.20 51.00 50.40 53.80
4480 X X X 72.50 48.20 51.30
4485 X X X 70.50 46.00 49.80
4500 106.28 131.30 141.10 42.00 40.00 43.50
Table 3.6: NASDAQ-100 (NDX) Option chain for options expiring on
17.04.2015. X denotes options with no open interest.2
We can see in Table 3.6 the display of an option chain which represents different
quotes for options with different strike prices and time to maturity. But in my
case, I fix the time-to-maturity part of the option chain. So option chain
is the series of open bids and asks for put and call options with the same
maturity date and underlying asset, but with varying strike price. Table 3.6,
for example, captures the range from $4300 to $4500 for NASDAQ index where
its spot price is $4399.23.
All three types of inventory accounts Ici (t) cash account, ISi (t) underlying asset
account and Iji (t) option accounts belong to statei(t) of agent i. We can denote




i (t) as agent’s total inventory at time t. So Ii(0)
is the agent i’s initial endowment at time 0. We can write the distribution
of agent i’s total endowment into inventories using ratio piji (t) =
Iji (t)
Ii(t) ,∀j ∈
1, 2, . . . , k + 2 where j = 1 and j = 2 stand for cash and asset accounts. This
defines an agent i’s portfolio, or distribution of agent’s total wealth, for different
items in the market at given time. It is written as a vector-valued function of t,
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pii(t) = (pi1i (t), pi2i (t), . . . , pi
j




i (t) = 1,∀t. Note
that piji (t) : R+ → R, so it can return both positive and negative real values
as long as the feasibility constraint is met. The positive amount represents
agent’s long position, and the negative is the short position. The total wealth
can be written as monetary equivalent of inventory multiplied by corresponding
portfolio weights.
We have discussed about well-known option portfolios in Chapter 2. So option
portfolio is a combination of short and long positions in options with different
moneyness and types. Agents use option portfolios to limit the risk of infinite
loss, and for particular agents such as LMSR or Monte-Carlo they play an im-
portant role in pricing other options. Traders holding certain option portfolios
price options differently based on the final payoff they can get from simulating
different asset prices. This is considered as the options inventory of the agent,
and stored in option accounts correspondingly.
3.3.3 Knowledge Layer
Knowledge layer is an intermediate layer which bridges information with the
behaviour of the trader. Its main function is to infer the key statistical pa-
rameters need by the behavioural layer. For example, if the trader is using
Black-Scholes valuation, then it needs to find out the implied volatility of the
asset prices from previously known information.
In knowledge layer, agent performs three types of operations with available
data in information layer. First, it undertakes a statistical analysis of raw
data and computes key parameters such as sample mean and variance of the
obtained data. These parameters are used by the probability distributions
which model random events in the market. For example, by knowing the
sample mean and variance of the asset prices, agent can plug these values into
normal or log-normal Brownian processes and project the possible trajectories
of asset prices at option’s maturity date. This can be used to price options
using Monte Carlo method.
Second, knowledge layer performs the calibration of unknown parameters of
the model to the market data. Sometimes the parameters of the model can
be implicit and cannot be calculated by simply aggregating the collected data.
For example, agent’s using Black-Scholes formula for pricing options have an
unknown parameter, volatility σ. During the calibration process, the best fit-
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ting volatility is found through a root finding subroutine. However, conversely
to Black-Scholes assumption, volatility is not a constant figure, and it changes
for each option with different strike and maturity date. Therefore agent’s job
is not only finding the single value of σ for given strike and maturity date, but
formulating an approximation function or simplified mathematical model for
finding the value of σ for any given strike or maturity date.
Finally, third important aspect of the knowledge layer is the inference of global
information from incoming new market data. Agent’s might need to know the
global information about the market which might not be very obvious due
to the complexity of the interactions between agents. For example, agent’s
pricing rule involves the probability of having a deal with an informed trader
who he thinks is going to outperform him and leave him with loss. In option
market, informed trader can be the one who exactly knows what would be
the asset price at option’s maturity date. Although this assumption is very
impractical, there will be a certain portion of traders who beat the dealer and
correctly guess the asset price at maturity date. In this way, agent can simply
label those traders as informed traders and update his probability parameter
for the likelihood encountering such trader next time. This normally done
using Bayesian inference.
To add up, the knowledge layer is responsible for aggregating the data, fitting
the models to this data and extracting key information from this data. It can
also query the necessary information from information layer, and set up a filter
to ignore unnecessary information. Knowledge layer can be static too. For
example, it may include constant parameters of the probability distributions
of ZI traders. They do not change over time, and therefore knowledge layer
does not query any information from underlying market at all. This would
also make the information layer empty for the ZI trader.
3.3.4 Behavioural Layer
The behavioural layer of the option trading agent is the most important as-
pect of the whole framework because it is responsible for interacting with the
mechanism. It also determines the option prices, other preferences such as
quantities and portfolios, and proxy trading algorithms. Agents use differ-
ent models to price options starting from zero-intelligence pricing and classic
Black-Scholes pricing to new LMSR and exponential pricing rules. Besides op-
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tion pricing, behavioural layer is also responsible for determining the quantity
to be traded. Quantities can be randomly picked, or use some linear relation-
ship with the price. In online auctions, behavioural layer is also responsible for
running proxy trading algorithms that bargain the option price. Proxy trading
algorithm creates a bid-ask spread around computed option prices the breadth
of which changes according to the conditions in the market. Agents use proxy
trading algorithms only in CDA environment, because it allows continuous
trading.
We can classify agents based on their option pricing behaviour, listed below:
• Zero Intelligence Traders: Such agent disregards information about mech-
anism state, current state of the asset market, actions of other agents,
history of the mechanism states up to time t, history of the asset mar-
ket, his own inventory Ii(t) and any other external factors. They obtain
option valuation from the random path of asset price simulation. The
knowledge layer contains the preconfigured parameters of the PDFs that
are used by traders.
• Risk-Neutral Traders: Such agents base their decisions only on the events
happening in assets market. They evaluate the risk associated with buy-
ing or selling certain option from risk-neutral perspective which could be
one of risk-neutral option pricing methods such as Black-Scholes pricing,
Monte-Carlo pricing or Volatility pricing.
• Risk-Averse Traders: Like risk-neutral traders, their decisions are based
only on the events happening in assets market. However, they evaluate
the risk associated with buying or selling certain option from risk-averse
perspective which could be an indifference pricing method using expo-
nential utility function.
• Portfolio Holders: Such traders hold an option portfolio, and price op-
tions based their current portfolio. The pricing method the agent uses
can be LMSR which takes the logarithmic difference of agent’s expected
payoff from his current portfolio and the portfolio he will have after buy-
ing or selling specific option. This approach is described in Section 4.3.
Agents decide buying or selling option by submitting a positive or negative
quantity. This involves another sublayer inside behavioural layer which is
responsible for the implementation of an algorithm that picks required quantity
for the agent to bid or ask. This can be a sophisticated algorithm which takes
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into account private characteristics of the agent such as liabilities in his current
portfolio, budget limit, or some timelined strategy of entry and exit from the
market. However in my simulation model, I consider following methods to
choose the quantities required for the trading agent:
• Random integer : This method uniformly draws a random number from
a range [−q, q]. However the sign of this quantity subject to change if a
corresponding proxy trading algorithm is applied in CDA environment.
• Linear function: This method uses linear function with a positive slope
to determine the supply, and the negative slope to determine the demand
based on the ratio of agent’s evaluated option price and risk-neutral price.
• Option portfolio: This method determines the quantity of the option
needed from the content of an option portfolio assigned to the agent.
Agents use proxy trading algorithms in CDA to adapt their bid-ask spread
around evaluated option price. There are 2 types of trading algorithms involved
in my simulation. First is the dealer algorithms which post both bid and ask on
the option to maintain open market. They change their bid-ask spread based
on the events happening in CDA. Second is the trading algorithms which post
either bid or ask depending on the previous events in the market. Below is the
list of each proxy trading algorithm used in the simulation:
• Garman’s algorithm: This algorithm models a dealer that is endowed
with initial inventory in options and cash. It updates the bid and ask
prices for the option based on the rate of order arrivals. The rate of order
arrivals subject to the law of demand and supply, which means that the
higher is the bid, the lower is the rate of arrival of asks for this bid. The
opposite applies to setting asks. Garman’s algorithm finds such bid and
ask prices which would minimise the probability of trader running short
in his inventories.
• Copeland-Galai’s algorithm: This algorithm models a dealer that believes
that there are informed traders in the market who can correctly guess
the final prices of the asset. Based on that belief he maintains a bid-
ask spread such that it minimises the loss from informed traders, and
maximises the gain from noisy traders.
• ZIP algorithm: This algorithm models a trader that learns from the
previous orders based on their success. This algorithm increases or de-
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creases his bid quote taking into account the learning coefficient versus
momentum parameters. The same applies to submitting asks too.
• GD algorithm: This algorithm models a trader that uses a Bayesian
inference in determining the most successful ask or bid from the history
of orders accepted and submitted.
I will describe their implementations of above described layers in Chapter 4.
In below section, I will show how agents are modelled using object-oriented
paradigm.
3.3.5 Conceptual Design
I present the UML class diagram of two types of traders, DA trader and CDA
trader. The traders are designed according to IIKB architecture where the
behavioural aspects of the trader are modelled using Strategy pattern [159].
Each behavioural sublayer implements a functionality which then passed on
to the next layer. First, let us look at Figure 3.15 to illustrate the static
relationship of implementations of sublayers in behavioural layer to the DA
trader. DA trader compounds 2 sublayers: option pricing and quantity models.
We can see that the option pricing itself is connected to the realization of the
underlying market. This includes asset pricing and risk-free rate models which
are used by the option pricing model to compute the option price. Asset
prices and risk-free interest rates are returned in the form of a Series object.
Series object is a table with time and some value columns. It can also include
multiple columns for the values of interest. For example, in case of asset prices
series, this involves a table with time and the asset price for given time. Based
on the simulation of the underlying market, option pricing model computes
the option price and returns this value to the trader. The trader then inputs
the value to the quantity model which determines whether to sell or buy the
option, and in which quantities. These two pieces of information are assembled
into an order which is submitted to a direct DA.
It can be seen that LMSR option pricing model involves the inventory to price
options. Some other option pricing methods also include private parameters
such as risk-averseness, liquidity, etc that should be initialized before use. I
will talk about these parameters in detail in Chapter 4 while discussing the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.16: UML class diagram of CDA trader
The CDA trader is similar to DA trader, but it also implements the additional
proxy trading algorithm behavioural sublayer. Figure 3.16 shows UML class
diagram of the CDA trader where all the related classes shared with DA trader
are omitted, except the new sublayer for the implementations of proxy trad-
ing algorithms. We can see that each implementation of the proxy trading
algorithm can have different private parameters to generate bid and ask prices
around evaluated option price. CDA trader has updateOption method which
is called every trading day to use the assigned option pricing model that returns
the evaluated option price. Then CDA trader calls updateAlgorithm method
to update his current bid and ask with the new option price and with the latest
information from the CDA. I will explain the details of the implementation of
these algorithms in Chapter 4.
3.4 Double Auctions
In this section, I consider simulation models for 2 types of DAs. Namely,
I explain the simulation of direct DA and online DA. I do not consider the
simulation of combinatorial exchange in this research, however I do provide
my remarks on its design in Chapter 7. Each simulation structurally differs
from the other one, and involves different types of trading agents and market
clearing mechanisms. For example, in direct DA, every new trading day is
considered as the new instance of simulation, so everything gets reinitialised.
In online DA, however, agents are initialised once, then they continuously make
decisions on what to order based on day-to-day changes in the market.
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3.4.1 Direct Double Auction Simulation
I construct direct DA for multi-unit bids and asks as part of simulation model.
Simulating direct DA involves one round of trades per day, and this process
repeats until the option expires. Every time the traders are repopulated in
the auction with different configurations and then they submit their truthful
orders to the auction. Direct DA uses surplus maximisation in order to allocate
options to traders, and it computes DSIC prices to clear the market.
The structure of orders submitted may vary on the information included inside
them. It may not necessarily require the traders to submit their price quotes
and quantities for options, but instead require the submission of other impor-
tant parameters that are key in pricing options. For example, the structure
of the order may also include the asset price forecasts ST at time T if the
assumption is that all traders are ZI traders, and they compute the value of
option based on their private forecast. If traders use Black-Scholes formula,
then the parameter which is key for pricing the option is the implied volatility.
Due to revelation principle, if agents can reveal their true option valuations
to the mechanism, they can also reveal the methods they applied to obtain
such valuation. In other words, once agents tell the mechanism what type of
option pricing method they used, and then reveal their estimated parameters
to the mechanism, the mechanism can compute the option prices on their be-
half. I will show how this can be done for ZI traders, as their option pricing
method is deterministic given the forecast of future asset price. Mechanism
can collect these forecasts, find clearing forecasts and compute option prices
based on them, and charge traders for this value. It is described in detail in
Section 5.3.3. But before that, let me explain how the general simulation flow
for direct DA is constructed.
The general flow of the direct DA simulation is described in following Figure
3.17. It starts with opening the trading day, and then initialises option chain
to be traded. It also populates the market with option traders and updates
the asset price for the given day. Once traders see the asset price and compute
their own private valuations of the option, mechanism collects the orders from
traders indicating auction specific data in it. Generally I simulate only call
option, as the price of the put option can be directly computed from given call
option using put-call parity relationship. The order also includes quantity and
quoted price. Negative quantity stands for ask, and positive quantity stands
for bid. But as it was mentioned earlier, depending on the revelation level,
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Figure 3.17: Direct auction simulation flowchart
the orders can also contain additional information such as asset price forecasts
or volatility parameter. Collected orders are then checked for consistency, so
that quoted prices do not exceed the upper and lower bounds of the option
price. Inconsistent orders are rejected, and the remaining ones are used to
find surplus maximising allocation. After solving the surplus maximisation
problem, there will be at most one order with a partially satisfied quantity. If
there is such order, it is rejected, and the new outstanding quantities are filled
by the mechanism. This is possible because options are not commodities,
and can be created at an arbitrary amounts by the mechanism. As it was
mentioned before mechanism is not budget-balanced, and this can result in
additional liabilities for the mechanism. I use rejected maximum bid and
minimum ask to compute the clearing price of the option. Once the option
price is determined, the mechanism closes the trading day and switches to the
next day unless it is the expiration day of the option.
3.4.2 Online Double Auction Simulation
In online DAs, or in my case CDAs, there is no DSIC mechanism because of the
uncertainty in future information or the subsequent actions of other traders.
The markets are vast and agents do not have the computational capacity to
reflect the complexity of each interaction and its corresponding outcome in
one timeline. There is lack of information about the market participants or
the events that may happen in future. There are two major uncertainties with
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Figure 3.18: Online auction simulation flowchart
online DA: a) if there is any order expected to arrive to the market; b) what
information this order is going to bring to the market. Due to these uncer-
tainties, agents cannot have any dominant strategy which would guarantee
the maximised payoff. This has been also mentioned by Gode and Sunder
[72] through considering CDA as a complex game. However there are online
mechanisms that offer BIC prices for traders making them on average better
off if they trade truthfully [131, 61, 132]. However I shall limit my research to
the simulation of only canonical CDAs.
The simulation flow of online DA significantly differs from the simulation of a
direct DA. In this simulation, mechanism first instantiates trading agents and
option chain. Adaptive traders use proxy trading strategies to determine what
bid or ask they should post based on their private belief of the option value.
Because of this continuous nature of the traders in online auction, they are not
reinitialised every trading day. Once the trading day is open, the asset price for
this day is updated and the previously submitted orders are cancelled. This is
because with new information of the asset price, the option value is determined
to change, and the previous orders are considered obsolete. Then the traders
are randomly requested to submit their orders. Likewise to direct DA, orders
are checked for consistency, and rejected if their quotes are found violating the
predefined option bounds. New orders are matched with the existing orders
in the LOB, and if there is a match, these orders are cleared at the middle
price. If the match is not found for the newly submitted order, it is entered
into LOB. Once all traders submit their orders and get cleared if they have
matching ones, the trading day closes. If the option is not expiring, mechanism






















Figure 3.19: UML class diagram of DA mechanism
3.4.3 Conceptual Design
In this section, I describe the UML class diagrams for both mechanisms. I
have described the overall simulation flow of both mechanisms in Figures 3.17
and 3.18. These simulations are implemented as simulateMarket() function
in both mechanisms given below in Figures 3.19 and 3.19. Let us observe the
other methods and attributes involved in both mechanisms.
In DA, DAMechanism has allocate() and price() methods which implement
the allocation rule and pricing rule of the direct DA proposed in Chapter 5.
Given the list of valid orders from trading agents, the mechanism finds the
optimal allocation for these orders. Then it returns a dictionary for each order
indicating if it has been chosen, and if yes, which portion of its requested
quantity is satisfied. It will be shown in Chapter 5 that there is at most
one partially satisfied order. For computed allocation, mechanism returns
clearing bid and ask prices that are DSIC. Also mechanism gives how much of
the trades are covered by the mechanism itself given the allocation and prices
inputted into mechanismPaid() method. This is because the partially satisfied
order is rejected, and exposed matched orders are covered by the mechanism.
Mechanism returns this information in its rejectedEfficiency() method.
Also it can compute the volume of trades in terms of options traded in method
volume().
For each mechanism, there is a mechanism, there is mechanism simulator which
takes option to be traded, list of agents, and the mechanism itself. Besides
implementing simulateMarket() function, it also implements the simulation
of Greeks covered in Section2.1.7. This requires the valid range of a control
parameter to be set, so it can be linearly increased to obtain the sensitivity
of the option price to this change. In CDA mechanism, the transactions hap-
pen continuously until all of the agents submit their orders. Therefore CDA
mechanism should maintain an order book where it stores the outstanding bids





















Figure 3.20: UML class diagram of CDA mechanism
order, and tries to match to the existing ones. If the matching order is found,
it returns the list of matched orders. If there is no order matched, it adds
the order into the order book. Mechanism also keeps the log of the trades
happened so far in tradesHistory property. prices() returns the opening,
closing, highest and lowest prices for the options traded so far. CDASimulator
implements the simulation of the market according to the flow given in Figure
3.18. However unlike DA, the Greeks are not simulated, because CDA traders
use proxy trading algorithms that learn from the orders coming to the market,
so the linear growth of an underlying asset may result traders aligning their
bids and asks for growth, hence bloating the option prices that are used to
measure the sensitivity. Therefore, instead I use closing prices of the options
to solve the analytical formulas for Greeks. Therefore the simulator’s Greeks
methods also require the series of option prices.
3.5 Relevance to Other Models
There have been other models proposed involving multi-agent systems simu-
lating the option market. As regards for the market mechanisms used in my
simulation model, namely both direct and online DAs, I gave their comparison
with the existing implementations in literature in Section 2.2.2. In this sec-
tion, I will compare my simulation model for option pricing as a whole with
two other relevant researches (i.e. Streltchenko [95, 156, 155] and Espinosa
[56, 57]) that propose similar mechanisms facilitating the trade of options. I
have chosen these two research because they are comparatively recent, present
non-trivial approaches and bear some similarities with my simulation model.
Of course, this is not the exhaustive list of researches that propose multi-agent
simulation of derivatives market or financial markets as a whole. There are
many other researches accomplished in this field and I reviewed some of them
in Section 2.2. Some of the most relevant works include Ecca’s model of an
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artificial stock option market [51], Saatcioglu’s design of a financial portal
[143],
Streltchenko et al. proposed a multi-agent simulation model with brokers
as price-setters and investors as price-takers that collectively rebalance their
initially endowed portfolio with financial derivatives to minimise the risk they
are exposed to. The second relevant research in this field is accomplished
by Espinosa who developed a market mechanism that facilitated the trade
of assets and options among multiple agents, but not serve as a platform
for price formation. Unlike Streltchenko’s and my research, the main focus
of Espinosa’s research is not directed at determining the price of an option
contract, as he uses the Black-Scholes formula for this purpose. The main
objective of the research was to build a market mechanism for agents who could
trade options for effectively managing the risk in obtaining necessary resources.
My simulation model bears both similarities and differences with these two
researches. I will describe these aspects in detail for all three components (i.e.
underlying market, agents and option market) of my simulation model.
3.5.1 Underlying Market
As it was mentioned previously, in my simulation model the underlying market
is a stochastic model of an asset price and risk-free rates that are calibrated
to historic data. These prices are not the result of simulated transactions
between agents in a market mechanism. Similarly, Streltchenko describes the
underlying market as a random walk process which runs on its own without
agents being involved in the price formation. In fact, in Streltchenko’s model
there is a specific agent StockBroker who provides the listings of the day’s
price quotes for different assets to trading agents, so they can buy or sell any
of listed assets to StockBroker in unlimited quantities. Streltchenko assumes
that the price the assets are bought and sold is the same, and there is no other
transaction cost involved between traders and StockBroker. Similarly, traders
can borrow money or short sell assets at the same risk-free rate. In my model,
these assumptions also hold, but the agents do not trade any of underlying asset
or risk-free asset with a special broker or mechanism. However, it is assumed
that they could do that, so they use this information in evaluating the risk
associated with buying or selling option. Trading agent’s are thought have
unlimited amount of cash and stock, except if it is an inventory-based trader.
In Streltchenko’s model, investors are the traders with budget-constrains and
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limited portfolio, while brokers have access to unlimited funds and stock.
Although Streltchenko’s model allows multiple assets to be posted into the
market, the experimental setup uses only one type of underlying asset along
with a risk-free investment. This is also true in my simulation model, where
multiplicity of different underlying assets is permissible, but this would also
involve running multiple option markets for each option on different underly-
ing. Streltchenko did not run multi-period simulation of an asset price (only
2-, 3-step discrete random walk), although her model assumes that underlying
market can be discretely simulated for any given time horizon. In my model,
I use continuous and discontinuous stochastic models which are described an-
alytically in terms of few parameters that could be controlled to simulate
different scenarios in the underlying asset market. Continuous and discontin-
uous mean-reverting processes are used to simulate the risk-free interest rates.
These stochastic models can be simulated numerically as well as they can be
calibrated to mimic the possible price trajectory of particular asset or risk-free
interest rate.
In Espinosa’s model, the underlying market is described as Palmer’s simple
economic exchange [128] with one type of good which does not bear any div-
idends. The traded good is indivisible and can be freely traded in unlimited
quantities. This is also true in my simulation model where the underlying
asset is considered indivisible, non-dividend yielding and can be traded in un-
limited quantities. However, in Espinosa’s model, the source of the underlying
asset prices is considered exogenous to the model, and should be provided as
a historic data to run the simulation. In other words, the asset prices change
according to a pre-configured scenario, not as a result of traders’ transactions.
Espinosa’s model describes the discount rate (i.e. reciprocal of risk-free interest
rate) as a constant drawn from [0, 1]. In my model, this is described as either
constant obtained from historic mean of T-Bills, or a mean-reverting stochas-
tic process. Table 3.7 summarises the important characteristics of underlying
market in Streltchenko’s, Espinosa’s and my models.
3.5.2 Trading Agents
In my simulation model, I conceptually broke down agents into 4 layers (i.e.
Information, Inventory, Knowledge and Behavioural layers) to distinguish the








Asset types One Many One
Risk-free investments One One One









Asset price source Mechanism StockBroker Historic data
Risk-free rate source Mechanism StockBroker Historic data
Who trades assets None StockBroker Asset traders,
Option traders
Who lends cash or asset None StockBroker None
Total assets Infinite Infinite Finite




Asset divisibility Indivisible Indivisible Indivisible
Asset yields dividends No Possible No
Agents can affect asset
price
No No No
Agents can affect risk-
free rate
No No No
Table 3.7: Characteristics of Underlying Market in Streltchenko’s, Espinosa’s
and Proposed Models
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architecture has been used to design agents in Vytelingum’s model [161]. How-
ever, in this comparison, I review how agents were designed for an option mar-
ket proposed by Streltchenko and Espinosa. In Streltchenko, there are 3 types
of agents: StockBroker, DerivativeBroker and Investor. StockBroker is
responsible for trading assets to other agents in unlimited quantities. He is
also the sole cash and stock lender. There is only one instance of such agent in
the simulation. In my model, the trading agents do not involve in trades with
assets or cash, although the mechanism provides information about them. So
the mechanism plays the role of StockBroker when it comes to reporting the
new information about asset prices or risk-free interest rates, but not used for
trading them.
In Streltchenko’s model, DerivativeBroker is an agent with an infinite amount
of cash and derivatives, and an agent type who can post limit orders. Hence
multiple DerivativeBrokers can set the price in the market. They either rep-
resent Investor or determine their own bid-ask spread for options according
to the arbitrage-free evaluation of risk. This is described as a LP which min-
imizes the difference between the selected ask price and the future payments
associated with his current liability. Similarly, the bid price for the option
has to maximise the expected cash flow as opposed to the price paid. In other
words, DerivativeBroker has to select optimal set of bids or asks which would
minimize his expected loss and maximize his expected gain. In my simulation
mode, every trading agent can buy or sell option contract in unlimited amounts
if the quantity is not capped by the mechanism. It is also assumed that they
have access to unlimited funds, except inventory-based trader. Also, in my
simulation model, the information-based proxy trading algorithm uses similar
approach as described in Streltchenko’s DerivativeBroker. It also minimises
the potential loss from informed traders, and maximises the potential gain from
noisy traders. However it does this, by determining bid-ask spread around pre-
evaluated option price.
Streltchenko also models another set of agents - Investors as traders with
initial endowment and liabilities. They represent companies such as airline, oil
refineries, etc who enter market with a portfolio of assets and liabilities, and
hedge their exposed risks in this market. Investors have limited budget and
they submit their preferences through DerivativeBrokers. In my simulation
model, traders can directly submit their orders to the market. Also portfolio
holding aspect of the traders are best presented in LMSR method for pricing
options and inventory-based proxy trading algorithm. In first case, traders
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are assumed to own an option portfolio, and they have to price the option
from the perspective of how this new option contributes to their current payoff
structure. In the second case, the inventory-based proxy trading algorithm is
given a portfolio of options and cash, along with pre-computed risk-neutral
price of the option. Hence he has to decide what bid-ask spread he needs
to hold around the given option price, in order not to run short any of his
portfolio inventories. Therefore, agent can shift his bid and ask prices up and
down to stimulate supply and demand in the market. Also Investor has
his own discrete projections on the distribution of asset prices in future, also
referred as scenario tree. Investor finds the minimized expected loss based
on this pre-set distribution. Similarly in my model, risk-neutral agents use
Monte-Carlo simulation to determine such distribution of future asset prices,
and based on this information compute the expected payoff of the option.
In Esponosa’s research 6 types of agents are used, where 2 of them were asset
trading agents, and the remaining 4 are specialized in trading both asset and
options. Agents also maintain inventories on cash, asset and options. Agents
can buy or sell assets, and write or hold multiple types of options with different
strikes and expiration dates. In my simulation model, agents can have multiple
options in their inventory, but they submit their orders to a mechanism which
is specialized to only single type of option, unless it is a combinatorial exchange
(it is not included in my simulation model, but the framework is described in
Chapter 7). One key distinction between the agents in my simulation model
and Espinosa’s model, that in my model, agents’ have heterogeneous beliefs
about the option price, while in Esponosa’s case, all option trading agents
use Black-Scholes pricing model. Thus in Espinosa’s model, agents do not
contribute to the formation of asset or option prices, but only react to the
external changes and employ some trading strategies to manage their risk
associated with market fluctuations.
I briefly describe how option trading agents are implemented in Esponosa’s
model, and draw similarities with the agents proposed in my model. Es-
pinosa’s agents use 2 forecasting models: Simple Moving Average (SMA) and
α-forecasting to predict the future asset prices upon which the agents made
decisions what to buy or sell. Asset trading agents employed 2 strategies: one
is the random buy or sell with quantity equal to one; the other is sell if asset
price is anticipated to fall, and buy if asset price is to rise. In designing option
trading agents, Espinosa uses two types of perceived risk: ρL measures the
probability of making loss for given action, and ρG measures the probability
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of making gain for given action. Agents use one of 4 trading strategies to pick
which action to execute. OTRnd strategy randomly selects the next action of
the agent from list of K actions such as buy/sell asset, hold/write any type of
option listed in the market or pass. In my model, traders only have 2 actions:
hold or write single type of option, and their actions are determined by the
quantity model they use. Random quantity model uniformly draws an integer
from some [−Q,Q] range where Q is the maximum quantity allowed. In linear
quantity model, agent buys if the estimated price of the option is lower than
the risk-neutral price, and vice versa. In Espinosa, OTMinR strategy selects an
action which minimises ρL, while OTMaxW strategy selects an action which max-
imises ρG. Espinosa also proposed OTMix strategy where agent uses OTMinR if
the asset price is predicted to fall, and OTMaxW if the asset price is predicted
to rise. In my model, inventory- or information-base dealers submit option
prices that minimise the loss, and maximise the gain depending on their own
perception of the market.
I summarised the similarities and the differences of trading agents in my model
with Streltchenko’s and Espinosa’s models in Table 3.8.
3.5.3 Option Market
In this section, I describe the similarities and the differences of the actual mech-
anisms used in my simulation model from the ones defined in Streltchenko’s
and Espinosa’s researches. The mechanisms are used as a platform for agents
to trade options, so each mechanism implements certain protocol for agents
which define what actions should be solicited and in which order. Mechanism
also determines the type of the orders it accepts and the rules for matching
and clearing them. In Streltchenko, the mechanism assumes the intercon-
nected network of agents who can interact freely to exchange mutual offers,
and accept/reject them if they comply or not comply with their internal ex-
pectations. In this network, all agents have connection with StockBroker, so
they can trade assets with him. Also all DerivativeBrokers in the market are
connected with each other, while the Investors are only connected to subset
of DerivativeBrokers, and are not connected to other Investors. All the
transactions between agents are visible to concerned parties only. According
1See Table 4.1 for reference.




















































Agents are option price-
setters
Yes Yes No




Budget limit Only GAR trader Only Investor All
Table 3.8: Characteristics of Trading Agents in Streltchenko’s, Espinosa’s and
Proposed Models
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to Streltchenko, this architecture separates transactional issues from the ones
involved in decision making. The simulation runs in discrete steps, so in each
step the agents interact with each other and exchange orders.
Streltchenko’s model is fundamentally different from my model in terms of
the mechanisms used, because I use two market mechanisms direct DAs and
CDAs as a single platform for agents to post and clear their orders, where
in Steltchenko the flow of orders are not centralised to one place. Although
her model is multi-period, the transactions of other agents are still invisible to
agents at any state of the simulation. In my CDA model, the past transactions
are visible to all traders, and they directly affect the future orders of the agents
through a proxy trading algorithm they use. However, in direct DA, agents
submit their corresponding valuations of options in sealed bids and asks, and
obtain a competitive option price in a single round. Unlike Streltchenko’s
model, direct DA produces two prices: one for all buyers, and the other is for
sellers. In Streltchenko, the prices can be unique per each transaction. More-
over, my mechanism is incentive compatible, efficient and individual rational,
while the efficiency of Streltchenko’s model strongly depends on the structure
of the network between agents. The flow of the simulation in Steltchenko’s
model is similar to mine. First agents are instantiated with a portfolio and
some budget-restrictions if applicable, then they submit orders based on their
internal scenario tree on future asset prices. At the end of the simulation, the
derivatives are cleared and the obtained wealth is analysed.
Espinosa’s model of a marketplace is also different from the mechanisms used
in my model. First of all, Espinosa does not require the agents to submit prices,
as the prices are assumed to be known both for assets and the option. Therefore
it does not matter which order is matched to which as long as the quantities
offered and sought are balanced. In other words, Espinosa randomly matches
the orders from different agents until there is no either outstanding ask (in
overdemand) or outstanding bid (in oversupply) left in the market. Espinosa’s
model creates option templates at each step of the simulation with different
type (i.e. call or put), strike, expiration date, but on the same underlying asset,
so the traders can write or hold options complying with these templates. In
my model, each mechanism deals with single type of option (i.e. call option),
with same strike and expiry date. The simulation flow is similar to my model.
First, the mechanism publishes the asset prices and all outstanding options
are cleared. Then market publishes the new set of option templates, and
agents start posting their orders. At the end of the trading day, all orders
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are clears as described above, and mechanism goes to the next trading day.
When simulation ends, the wealth of agents and the overall performance of
the market are analysed. Because mechanism does not produce aggregated
option prices, neither their sensitivity to certain factors, nor their comparison
to risk-neutral valuation is discussed. This part is analysed in more detail in
my model.
I summarised the important characteristics of market mechanisms used in both













Order types Limit order Market and
Limit orders
Market order
Order size per item Multi-unit Multi-unit Single-/Multi-
unit
Atomicity of orders Yes Yes No







Simulation time Option’s lifes-
pan (365 steps)
2-3 steps 109 steps
Option exercise time Once, at the
end
Each step Each step












Table 3.9: Characteristics of Option Market Mechanisms in Streltchenko’s,
Espinosa’s and Proposed Models
3.6 Summary and Contribution
In this chapter, I covered 3 main aspects of my simulation model starting from
the simulation of an underlying market to the simulation of direct and online
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DAs. In the underlying market, I determined the corresponding parameters of
the historic NASDAQ records for GBM and jump-diffusion models and sim-
ulated several instances of them. I also simulated the risk-free interest rates
as mean-reverting processes using Vasicek and Vasicek-Jump models. I found
the corresponding parameters for US 2-year T-Bill returns, which is normally
used as a risk-free investment in practice. I also considered the high-level ar-
chitecture of the trading agents extending IKB framework with an additional
inventory layer and justified its need in option trading. I separated the related
concepts in option trading into 4 layers. I also proposed the conceptual de-
sign of the option traders in UML class diagram following the proposed IIKB
framework. I also presented two simulation models for direct and online DAs
and described their simulation flows. Also I provided the conceptual design of
the mechanisms in UML class diagram and described their main attributes and
methods. Finally, I have compared my simulation model with Streltchenko’s
and Esponosa’s researches that propose option trading simulation platform. I
highlighted the similarities and the differences of my simulation model with






In this chapter, we discuss about the design of trading agents, namely, the
components involved in forming their trading behaviour. I explain how agents
acquire necessary knowledge from the available information in the market.
Then we look into three main modules of behavioural layer of the option trad-
ing agents. Namely, option pricing module, quantity module and proxy trading
algorithms module. I fit these modules into previously defined IIKB frame-
work, and highlight their interactions between different layers of IIKB.
Indeed, trading agents are the main participants of the market who directly
or indirectly influence the prices of options, and therefore it is important to
model every aspect of their trading behaviour. One of the most important
aspects of designing a trading agent is the rationality of agents in making buy-
ing/selling decisions. Designing completely rational and homogeneous agents
would result in, so called, ’no-trade equilibrium’ outcome described by Mil-
grom and Stokey[116]. This theorem states that there must not be any trade
in the market if all of the following assumptions are true:
1. efficient market hypothesis - markets are always in equilibrium state.
2. rationality assumption - there are no noise or non-rational traders
3. full information assumption - all traders have full access to all market
data.
Milgrom and Stokey also state that even if there is a private information about
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the future of an asset price and the informed trader wants to realise profit from
that, it would be a rational decision for an uninformed trader not to partic-
ipate in this deal, because ultimately he is going to lose his money because
there is a rational reason behind the informed trader’s decision. Looking at
this from rational trader’s perspective, the informed trader’s order must bring
new information to the market and may cause corresponding changes in price
quotes. This change in price is not caused by particular trade, but from the
assumption of the rationality of other traders. Rational uninformed trader
can observe the market and assume that the newly arrived order is the result
of a fundamental analysis and an informed decision, so he can simply adjust
his quotes to the latest order arrived and still maintain ’no-trade equilibrium’
because the newly arrived order already bears the all available information
about given stock.
However in this research, I drop some of the assumptions stated above in
order to maintain the heterogeneity of prices and hence facilitate the trade.
For example, I assume that market was not in an equilibrium state in the first
place, and it must converge to an equilibrium price given that agents have
full access to all market information, and they act in their best interest. This
assumption is critical in the simulation of direct DAs, because otherwise the
realised outcome must not result in trade. In online DAs, I consider agents have
bounded rationality, so they make their decisions based on limited information.
For example, they do not take into consideration the actions of other traders
or any other exogenous factors. Also, there is an uncertainty about the future
events and agents need to act based on the currently available information
which could be the risk-neutral behaviour of the agent.
Further in this chapter, I discuss the details of the implementation of trading
agents. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relevant components involved in each layer of
IIKB framework. Behavioural layer involves functional modules such as option
pricing, choosing quantities and proxy trading algorithms. These modules
consist of various implementation of respective functions. In knowledge layer,
I present statistical and other relevant parameters obtained from analysing the
information available. Information layer contains data coming from underlying
market and the simulated mechanism. Finally, in inventory layer, traders keep
their cash, underlying asset and options accounts. I highlight how these inner
components are interrelated with each other while discussing their particular
implementations.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of trading agent components
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For easy referencing of traders used in my mechanisms, I devised a naming
nomenclature for the traders based on their respective trading behaviour. I
use three aspects of the behavioural layer to name them: a) option pricing
method; b) choosing the quantity; and c) proxy trading algorithm to name the
agent. For example, if the agent uses ZI option pricing and ZIP proxy trading
algorithm to submit bids and asks to the market, and picks random integer as
its desired quantity, I name this agent as ZI-RND-ZIP. Table 4.1 summarises
the keywords that are used to define the names of the traders.
Option Pricing Choosing Quantity Proxy Trading Algorithm
ZI - Zero-Intelligence RND-Random Integer ZIP - Zero-Intel. Plus
BS - Black-Scholes LIN- Linear Quantity GD - Gjerstad-Dickhaut
MC - Monte Carlo PORT - Option Portfo-lio GAR - Garman’s Model
VOL - Volatility Surface COP - Copeland-Galai Model
EXP - Exponential
Utility
LMSR - Log Market
Scoring Rule
Table 4.1: Nomenclature for naming agents
I organised this chapter in following way. Section 4.2 describes how agents can
learn implicit information about the market using calibration and Bayesian
learning methods to obtain necessary components of knowledge layer. I dropped
the description of finding the basic statistical parameters such as mean and
standard deviation. Section 4.3 illustrates different methods such as zero-
intelligence, risk-neutral and risk-averse to price options intrinsically. In Sec-
tion 4.4, we discuss how agents choose the quantity to trade. Section 4.5
then provides four algorithms for adaptive traders that bid and ask around
computed option prices. Section 4.6 summarises the key contributions of the
chapter.
4.2 Learning About Markets
In this section, I review how agents can learn about the parameters of their
models from the market data. They use optimisation routines and Bayesian
inference techniques to gain useful knowledge about the markets. All of these
tools are used in agent’s knowledge layer in proposed IIKB model. Agent
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Figure 4.2: Learning About Volatility and Informed Traders
can harness the knowledge to generate bids and asks on various options. For
example, agent can find unknown volatility parameter of Black-Scholes by
solving the equation for given market price of the option. For complex models
which require more information about the global parameters of the market such
as the population of informed traders in the market, agents can use Bayesian
learning technique.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how different components of the trading agent are related
to gathering knowledge about implied volatility and the number of informed
traders. These components are taken from the overall architecture presented
in Figure 4.1. We can see that in order to compute the implied volatility, we
need 3 pieces of information: asset prices, option prices and interest rates. In
order to learn about the informed traders in the market, we need to know
about accepted orders and the option prices. I shall explain each case in detail
in below sections.
4.2.1 Volatility Surface
Pricing options is based on an assumption that the evolution of the underly-
ing asset follows some stochastic process and the value of the option directly
depends on how this stochastic process behaves as the time progresses. Hence,
we need to be able to simulate such stochastic process in order to observe
its behaviour and draw corresponding conclusions on the option price. The
simulation routine might require two sets of parameters as input, which are a)
contractual/market parameters and b) model parameters. Contractual/market
parameters represent the certain aspects of the option such as strike price, ma-
turity date or the market such as risk-free interest rate, the asset price volatility
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etc. Model parameters are subjective to agent’s inner behavioural model that
is used for pricing options.
I show how agents can find out one of the implicit parameters of the asset
market - implied volatility. It can be found by modelling the asset price as a
stochastic process, and then calibrating the value of the volatility parameter
to fit the market data. Calibration is the process of evaluating a parameters
set such that model prices comply with the market prices with minimum dis-
crepancy. In its essence, it is an optimisation problem with an objective to
minimise the distance between factual market price with the model price. The
model used by an agent typically has a set of parameters θ which can be tuned
to find an optimum fit to the current market state.
If the number of parameters is greater than the number of data points that
model has to calibrate to, this is called an over-parametrised calibration model.
This can be a case when there are few illiquid orders or no order at all in
the market for the given option, and agent has more number of parameters
to adjust to his model. This would result in an inconclusive outcome which
cannot have an optimal solution because of an unbounded parameters. In this
situation, agent either needs to somehow fill in the missing data points and
construct an appropriate optimisation problem or make arbitrary assumptions
on certain parameters of the model. On the contrary side of the problem is
the under-parametrised calibration models. This would involve much factual
information available for a relatively simple model with few parameters. The
typical example for this case can be Black-Scholes formula (2.28) where there
is only one free parameter, implied volatility σ that is unknown and should be
adjusted to the market. Volatility cannot be determined as a single numeric
value, because solving Black-Scholes for σ on options with different strikes
and maturity dates would result in different volatilities. Implied volatility is
obtained through numerically solving Black-Scholes formula for unknown σ.
So in other words, implied volatilities of options with similar parameters not
matching one single value suggest the fact that the Black-Scholes model with
only one free parameter is clearly under-parametrised.
In the rest of this section, I explain how I can use different techniques to
obtain more information about the volatility surface of the market which is a
3D graph indicating the respective implied volatility per strike and maturity
date. Volatility surface is a critical instrument for an agent who is willing
to price his options in a risk-neutral way. Therefore it constitutes the major
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Figure 4.3: NASDAQ-100 Volatility Surface on January 2, 2014
part of agent’s knowledge base, because agents will base their private option
valuations on their estimated volatility surfaces.
Implied volatility is normally described as a function of strike K and time t,
or most of the time with more relevant arguments such as moneyness M =
K/S0 and time to maturity normalised to years T . We can obtain the implied
volatility for given quotes from NASDAQ-100 on January 2, 2014 by solving
Black-Scholes for unknown σ and plot a surface graph to see how it changes
for each parameter. Figure 4.3 shows the plot with a risk-free interest rate set
to r = 18% annually and the opening NASDAQ-100 index S0 = $3575.60 on
January 2, 2014.
From Figure 4.3 shows that the implied volatility is not a constant. So I
have to model a volatility function σ(K/S0, T ) which can be further used
to evaluate the price of an option of any moneyness. We can find implied
volatility function σ(K/S0, T ) by numerically solving following equation (4.1)
using Newton’s method, or MATLAB function fzero:
Cmkt(S0, K, T ) = CBS(S0, K, T, r, σ(K/S0, T )) (4.1)
where Cmkt(S0, K, T ) is the option’s factual price, CBS(S0, K, T, r, σ(K/S0, T ))
is Black-Scholes price of the option.
Agent has to find all the values of σ(K§0, T ) which correspond to the mar-
ket data. However the strike prices and maturity dates are not continuously
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defined in the market, and there are significant intervals between different
strikes and maturity dates of options listed in option chain. Normally, the
option chain defines constant intervals ∆K between every strike price and ∆T
between every maturity date. These chain intervals are used to define options
with different strike and maturity date, and the market participants can sub-
mit their orders for these contracts. However sometimes there is no any order
for a particular type of option in the option chain due to the lack of demand or
supply of it. This creates an additional information gap in the grid of strikes
and maturity dates.
In order to resolve the issue of missing option prices, I have to interpolate the
intermediate missing option prices based on the existing ones. Generally there
are two approaches for handling this problem: one is the use of approximation
functions between 2 data points to interpolate the value in between and to
make a continuous smooth transition between discrete data points; or model
volatility surface as a stochastic function with several unknown coefficients θ
and find them using an optimisation routine. I describe both of these methods
which would help us to draw a continuous smooth volatility surface.
In first approach, I use kernel smoothing method to approximate the missing
value in between two data points. The kernel is defined as a function K(x)
which must hold 2 conditions: a) it must integrate to 1 making it an acceptable
PDF; b) its mean must be equal to the sample’s mean. There are multiple
kernel functions which are commonly used in many probability distributions,







In order to smoothly transition over missing data points, the Euclidean dis-
tance of given sample data point Xi from generated data points X0 with an
interval of h(X0) are passed to a kernel function (4.2) to obtain a weighting of
smoothed function Y (X0) for given Xi. I describe the method used for con-
structing the volatility surface proposed by Gatheral [64]. Let us define the
kernel function as follows:






h(X0) is an interval between generated data points.
X0 generated data points
Xi given sample data point
Using Nadaraya-Watson [120, 138] kernel-weighted average function, we can







In implied volatility case, we deal with 2 parameters moneyness M and matu-
rity date T , and because the data points are independently generated for each
parameter, we can simply multiply the kernels of two parameters and make
joint kernel function for both parameters. Then by using (4.4), we can obtain








M0 generated data points of option moneyness
Mi moneyness given by an option chain
T0 generated data points of maturity date
Ti maturity date given by an option chain
σ(Mi, Ti) implied volatility obtained from factual option prices for given
moneyness Mi and maturity date Ti.
In Figure 4.3, I have modelled the volatility surface using approximation for-
mula (4.5). Although the non-parametric approximation methods like I used
may not always produce smooth curves that are differentiable, it is very flexible
to reflect every aspect of the empirical data. It is not restricted to particular
shape and does not require the agent to undertake an estimation of certain pa-
rameters. The first- and second-order derivatives of the volatility surface with
respect to any of the arguments K or T can be computed numerically using
any of well-known finite difference methods. The derivatives of the volatility
surface are key to the evaluation of option’s risk-neutral price, because it pro-
duces an option Greek vega parameter which can be used to model the option’s
price in respect to changes in volatility.
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In order to be able to obtain the derivatives of the volatility surface analytically,
I have to fit the volatility surface into some well-defined mathematical function
with unknown parameters θ. I can use polynomial or exponential functions
with unknown coefficients to represent the overall volatility skew and fit the
coefficients of the model to empirical data. Hirsa et al. [83] suggested following
simple exponential model for determining the volatility surface:
σ(K,T ) = 12(c1e
K/c2 + c3e( −K/c2))eβT (4.6)
where c1, c2, c3 and β are the unknown coefficients (let them denote θ) that
must be fit to the market data.
We will use following optimisation routine for calibrating the unknown parame-
ters of the mathematical model of volatility surface defined in (4.6). The objec-
tive function is the squared difference between model σ(K,T ;θ) parametrised
by coefficients θ = {c1, c2, c3, β} and implied volatility obtained from the mar-
ket data σˆ(K,T ). In a continuous calibration cases, it is important to note
that agents do not expect calibration parameters change dramatically in short
period of time. Therefore agent also imposes a penalty for diverging from pre-
vious parameters θprev. It can be formulated as λ‖θ − θprev‖2 - the squared
norm of the difference between two parameter sets multiplied by λ penalising
factor. Hence the objective function can also include a penalising term for
divergence from previous coefficients.
min
θ
(σ(K,T ;θ)− σˆ(K,T ))2 + λ‖θ − θprev‖2 (4.7)
Above I have shown how risk-neutral agent can construct a knowledge base in
the example of volatility surface from using available market data for options.
I described two different methods that agent use to calibrate parameters of
his model to factual data. Every agent has a model with set of unknowns θ,
and agent’s task before producing option valuations is to match his unknown
parameters correctly to the market data.
4.2.2 Informed Traders
Some agents like information-based agents use Bayesian inference to estimate
the parameters of the probability of certain events in the market. This can be
the probability of the population of certain type of traders in the market, the
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probability if the asset is undervalued or overvalued, the distribution of option
valuations, the distribution of arrival rates of certain orders etc. As in model
calibration, I denote this set of parameters as θ. Unlike model calibration,
in Bayesian inference, parameters are described as distributions. Various esti-
mators can be used to obtain a concrete value for these parameters. Also in
Bayesian inference models parameters obtained as a result of agent’s internal
beliefs and observation of incoming data. The distribution which summarises
agent’s beliefs and observations on parameter θ is referred as posterior distri-
bution. In order to obtain a posterior PDF for possible values of θ, agent needs
to establish initial prior PDF of θ and a corresponding likelihood function for
data X parametrised by θ. The product of prior and likelihood is then divided
by the marginal PDF of the data X which can be found by the law of total
probabilities. This involves the integration of the conditional probabilities over





fΘ|X(θ|x) is the agent’s posterior probability distribution of the parame-
ters of his model for given market data x.
fΘ(θ) is the agent’s prior probability distribution of the parameters of
his model.
fX|Θ(x|θ) is the agent’s likelihood function for a parameter θ.
fX(x) is the marginal probability distribution of agent’s estimates on X.
To simplify things even further, I assume that the parameter set θ consists of a
single variable, and it can be some unknown parameter of Bernoulli, Binomial,
Beta, Normal or Poisson distributions which represents the PMF or PDF of
interested random variable. Depending on particular case, agent can use either
of these distributions to model the random events happening in the market.
For example, if agent is interested in the population of informed traders in the
market, he can try to find out a Bernoulli parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] which represents
the probability of encountering an informed trader in the market. He can
learn about θ through observing the arrival of orders and classifying them to
informed/uninformed orders. The agent can find out if the order came from an
informed trader only after observing the future. In case of options, if agent bids
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$5 for the call option with strike K = $105 and spot price S0 = $100, then the
trader is implicitly expecting the asset price end up at least at $110 at time T if
the risk-free rate r is zero. If the price, indeed, ends up at $110 or above at time
T , then the agent can assume that the bid he filled arrived from an informed
trader. Of course, this is a very naive way of detecting informed traders, and
there could be a bias from liquidity traders who accidentally guessed correct
price for the option, but in order to simplify this process, I use this method
to classify orders into informed/uninformed orders. In this way, agent can
count the number of informed orders arrived so far and denote it with random
variable X. If agent assumes that the arrival of informed/uniformed orders
are i.i.d.and the whole order arrival process simulates the random sample of









N number of orders agent has accepted.
x number of informed orders agent has detected.
θ probability of encountering an informed order.
Binomial likelihood is derived from Binomial distribution which has a discrete
PMF for each case of X out of N orders.
The prior PDF of θ can be modelled as Beta(a, b) distribution which is a
very flexible PDF. It can take the shape of the most of the unimodal PDFs
depending on its positive real parameters a and b. Figure 4.4 shows how it
looks like for different parameters of a and b. Hence I can use it to cover variety
of initial beliefs about the unknown parameter, in my particular case, θ which
represents the proportion of informed traders in the market.






B(a, b) is a beta function which is a normalising factor of the distribution.
The main reason for choosing Beta distribution for representing the prior is
that it is conjugate to Binomial likelihood. This means that the posterior
135
Figure 4.4: Beta Distribution with different values for a and b
distribution is also going to be a Beta distribution, and its parameters are
clearly defined from the parameters of the prior distribution and likelihood.
Although conjugate prior restricts us to use only Beta distribution for the
prior, it provides a closed form solution to a posterior distribution function
and does not require the agent going through the Bayesian inference process
defined in (4.8). The solution is analytically accurate and requires no effort
from the agent to compute the result. I took the posterior distribution formula
for given Binomial likelihood pX|Θ(x|θ) function (4.9) and Beta prior pΘ(θ)
function (4.10) from Gelman’s textbook[65]:
pΘ|X(θ|x) = 1
B(a+ x,N + b− x)θ
a+x−1(1− θ)N+b−x−1 (4.11)
This makes new Bayesian updated θ’s distribution also a Beta distribution
with parameters Beta(a+ x,N + b− x).
Once agent has the posterior distribution of θ for given x, agent can find
out a posterior-predictive distribution of X to compute the expected value of
the random variable X itself. The general formula for posterior-predictive






pX′|Θ(x′|θ) likelihood of having data x′ for given parameter θ
pΘ|X(θ|x) posterior distribution obtained from the given data X.
By using the equation given in (4.12), I can derive posterior-predictive distribu-
tion for Binomial likelihood and Beta prior cases which model the population
of informed traders in the market. The integration of the product of Binomial
likelihood (4.9) and Beta posterior distribution (4.11) over θ would result in






B(x+ a,N − x+ b)
B(a, b) (4.13)
where
N ′ the predictive size of the sample
x′ the predictive number of informed traders
N the obtained size of the sample
x the obtained number of the informed traders
a, b the parameters of the initial Beta prior.
Agent then can use the posterior-predictive distribution to find the expected
number of the informed traders in the market based on the information he
gathered so far. The knowledge about the number of informed traders in
the market can be useful in estimating the probability of encountering an
informed trader θˆ = E[X′|X=x]
N ′ for an arbitrary order. This is a key parameter
for information-based traders using Copeland and Galai’s model [33], Glosten
and Milgrom’s model [70, 71] and Easley and O’Hara’s model [49, 48].
Above I showed that if agent chooses a prior distribution for parameter θ which
is conjugate to the likelihood function, then the posterior distribution is also
defined same as the prior distribution but with different parameters. Hence
the trader can simply obtain the new posterior distribution by plugging in the
data he observed. He can also use this knowledge to estimate the parameter θ
from the posterior-predictive distribution.
However, not all the time, the agent can find a conjugate prior distribution
for his likelihood function. This would mean that the agent has to manually
compute the posterior distribution using the Bayesian inference rule (4.8).
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With posterior distribution on his hand, agent can use various estimators such
as Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) or conditional expectation to determine the
estimated value of θˆ. MAP is good if agent wants to use the most likely value
of θ given the market data x, while conditional expectation would give an
estimate which minimises the squared error between estimated θˆ and the real
θ.
Below formulas show how to compute θˆ using MAP and conditional expecta-
tion. MAP is defined as follows:
θˆ = arg max
θ
fΘ|X(θ|x) (4.14)
And conditional expectation is defined as follows:
θˆ = E[θ|X = x] =
∫
θfΘ|X(θ|x)dθ (4.15)
After obtaining the estimated θˆ, agent can plug this knowledge into his corre-
sponding behavioural model which dictates how bids and asks are submitted
in the market. In my case, agent having the correct probability of encoun-
tering an informed trader and assuming that the informed trader can outrun
him because of the exclusive knowledge, he can set up a corresponding bid/ask
spread to compensate this risk. I show how it is used in Copeland and Galai’s
model [33] later in this chapter.
In this section, I have described how agent can use Bayesian inference tech-
nique to estimate the probability of certain events or conditions in the market
using the empirical data. In particular, I showed how agent can identify the
proportion of informed traders in the market by using Binomial likelihood and
conjugate Beta prior distribution as an initial guess, and obtaining a Beta
posterior adjusted to incoming data. I also showed how agent can draw the
PDF of encountering X ′ informed traders out of N ′ traders given that X out
of N has been already recorded. Of course, agent can use Bayesian inference
for other purposes, with other likelihood functions and conjugate priors such
as Normal or Poisson distributions depending on the nature of the events, but
these events are outside the scope of my thesis. There are well defined for-
mulas for calculating the posterior of such distributions in Bayesian statistics
textbooks such as Gelman [65], etc.
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4.3 Option Pricing
In this section, I specify how agents evaluate option prices based on their
behavioural models. Option pricing is the integral part of behavioural layer of
proposed IIKB model and it is responsible for computing the intrinsic value
of the option to an agent. Agent’s can use different models to price options
starting from zero-intelligence pricing to risk-neutral pricing models. I have
already reviewed most of the arbitrage-free option pricing methods such as
Black-Scholes and Monte Carlo methods in Chapter 2, but in this section I am
also going to introduce several other pricing techniques. Agents have their own
subjective asset valuation schemes that they use to trade assets in the market.
This type of derivative pricing is also referred as indifferent pricing [24] which
must satisfy agent’s utility function in such a way that agent is indifferent to
sell or buy the asset at given price or remain idle. Some of the recent works
in pricing options using indifference schemes are researched by Othman et al.
[42], deMarzo et al. [40], Musiela et al. [118], etc. In this research, I use 2
very simple indifference pricing models: one is standard risk-averse exponential
model and the other is LMSR model inspired by prediction markets [26] and
developed by Othman [126]. Among other option pricing methods, I employ
Monte Carlo pricing methods, especially for determining the price of option
portfolios using a volatility surface.
The main purpose of using different option pricing techniques is to maintain
the liquidity in the market. Agents with different valuations would ensure
that there are overlapping interests in the market which facilitate the trading
process. For example, ZI traders produce most of the unstable prices due to
their randomised nature. But they are mostly used as a forecasting traders
who pick an option portfolio based on their forecast.
Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between various option pricing methods and
the rest of the layers in IIKB framework. For example, delta-hedge pricing
method involves the use of asset and cash accounts in inventory layer. While
LMSR method uses the existing portfolio of options to evaluate the price of
an option. Instead of linking each component inside the module with another
component in different layer, I generalised the relationship as a bold line be-
tween 2 modules. So the bold lines indicate relationship between groups of
components. This would mean that every option pricing method uses knowl-
edge about asset prices and interest rates. Also I have shown the relevance of
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Figure 4.5: Components involved in option pricing
information in order to obtain certain components in the knowledge layer.
Below I describe the implementation of each option pricing method and provide
my simulation results. I discuss the important aspects of each pricing model
and determine the reason behind using them in my proposed mechanisms.
4.3.1 Zero-Intelligence Pricing
As I mentioned earlier, ZI agents are mostly needed to mimic the forecasting
traders and also provide additional liquidity to the market. ZI agents had been
studied first in a CDA environment by Gode and Sunder [74, 72] to measure
how humans and ZI reach equilibrium state in the market. It turned out
that ZI traders with constrained budget may closely replicate rational human
traders in the market. So the results demonstrated that the dominant factor in
obtaining equilibrium prices in the market was not associated with the rational
strategy of its participants, but with the order matching mechanism employed
by the market-maker. Thus ZI agents quickly became common benchmark
model for testing multiple mechanisms in economics, finance and even physical
sciences due to their simplicity and ease of its implementation [98, 1]. ZI
traders are mainly designed to determine the role of the market mechanism
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in forming the prices ignoring the strategic behaviour of the traders. This
would allow market designers to separate which aspects of the resulted price
originated from the mechanism itself, and not from the strategic behaviour of
the traders. Because this research also proposes a DA design for pricing option
portfolios, ZI traders appear to be a natural choice to measure the effect of
proposed mechanisms in determining option prices. The other variations of
noisy traders have been implemented and experimented by Botierslevi et al.
[20] and Friedman [60]. Othman applied noisy traders for pricing options
[42, 126].
In this section, I simulate ZI agents which are adapted to pick option prices
at random constrained to the bounds defined by the option’s intrinsic value. I
have listed these boundaries for call c and put p below:
e−rT max(SˆT −K, 0) ≤ c ≤ e−rT SˆT (4.16)
e−rT max(K − SˆT , 0) ≤ p ≤ e−rTK (4.17)
Thus ZI traders are constrained by above boundaries to prevent generating
absurd option prices that does not conform with their definition. Also the
boundary values are discounted with risk-free interest rate r to conform with
the time value of money. The only unknown SˆT is obtained through randomly
choosing a potential expiration value of the asset price following any of the
above discussed asset pricing processes. Formula given in (3.7) shows us a
clear formulation on how one can generate random expiration prices of ST for
GBM pricing process. For generating jump-diffusion prices at time T , agent
has to use (3.11). I use risk-neutral drift µ = r, and the estimated volatility
of asset prices in simulated experiments. Note that the ZI agents do not use
implied volatility which is obtained by solving Black-Scholes formula. Instead
they use the factual volatility of the asset prices. Once ZI trader computes his
private valuation for the call, he can use put-call parity (2.6) to compute the
value of the put with the same strike and expiration date.
Below is the Table 4.2 showing option prices generated by ZI trader using
GBM and jump-diffusion pricing models. Options expire in one year, and
the annualised risk-free return is set to r = 0.05, and the annual asset price
volatility is set to σ = 0.02. Although the 95% confidence interval for the
asset price at T is 101.12 ≤ ST ≤ 109.24 and the drawn agent prediction is
SˆT = $105.11, the strikes cover even the extremal cases starting from 50 to
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150. This could be the case for jump-diffusion prices where the prices may
vary significantly due to the number of jumps in the past. For example, the
current draw of jump-diffusion price at time T is Sˆ ′T = $113.85 which easily
crosses the confidence boundaries of GBM process with parameters λ = 0.1,
µY = 0.05 and σY = 0.02. This would simulate asset price having an expected
0.05 more jump in return every 10 days on average.
Strikes GBM Calls GBM Puts Jump-Diff Calls Jump-Diff Puts
50.00 53.50 0.00 60.73 0.00
60.00 43.99 0.00 51.22 0.00
70.00 34.47 0.00 41.71 0.00
80.00 24.96 0.00 32.20 0.00
90.00 15.45 0.00 22.68 0.00
100.00 5.94 0.00 13.17 0.00
110.00 0.00 3.57 3.66 0.00
120.00 0.00 13.09 0.00 5.85
130.00 0.00 22.60 0.00 15.37
140.00 0.00 32.11 0.00 24.88
150.00 0.00 41.62 0.00 34.39
Table 4.2: The option prices generated by ZI traders using GBM and Jump-
Diffusion pricing models
In Table 4.3 shows the potential option valuations of ZI traders on NASDAQ-
100 prices using both GBM and jump-diffusion processes. I used 2-year nomi-
nal U.S. Treasury Bill annual rates 1 as risk-free interest rate which on 02.01.2014
was equal to 0.12% to discount the intrinsic option values. I have used al-
ready calibrated daily volatility σ = 0.0088 of the asset and annualised it to
σ = 0.1681. The time parameters was set to T = 16/365. For jump pro-
cess, I re-calibrated NASDAQ parameters with new risk-free interest rate, and
obtained λ = 0.8, µY = −0.004 and σY = 0.0083 and used them to simulate
random jumps in asset pricing process. We can see from the Table 4.3 that this
particular ZI trader underpriced the option compared to market price, while
ZI trader simulating jump-diffusion asset price happened to be within bid-ask
spread of the market. As cautionary note that these are just one instances of
ZI trader simulation, and there is no reason to assume that GBM ZI trader will
always price below the market price. In another instance it could be equally
higher too. Another important aspect of market prices are that puts are priced
positively where their intrinsic values for ZI traders are zero meaning that the
1http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates
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price GBM and jump-diffusion prices predicted are less than strike for calls,
and opposite for puts.
4.3.2 Risk-Neutral Pricing
This type of agents use standard option pricing techniques described in classic
finance literature. The main idea behind pricing derivative products is the
arbitrage free pricing assumption. In this pricing methodology, the expected
future cash flows must be compensated by the price paid today, so that there
is no opportunity to make risk-free profit. I have discussed about arbitrage
free pricing in Chapter 2. I also covered most of the canonical option pricing
methods such as Black-Scholes, Binomial model and Monte-Carlo simulations
in that chapter. Here I simulate the option prices using each of these tech-
niques. Particularly I showed how one can use Black-Scholes framework to
obtain a volatility surface of an underlying earlier in this chapter. Agent use
this surface to compute the risk-free valuation of any option, including the
option portfolios. Volatility pricing method is used to obtain risk-neutral PDF
directly from the market itself. I use Monte-Carlo simulations to approximate
the risk-neutral price of different kinds of options.
Black-Scholes Pricing
The Black-Scholes prices are used as main benchmark pricing to compare the
behaviour of other trading agents in proposed mechanisms. The Black-Scholes
prices can be directly computed from the closed formula given in (2.28) once all
of its parameters are given. As it was mentioned earlier, volatility parameter
is unknown and it changes for every different setting. Agents can simply
use the asset price volatility calibrated from the available sample, or model a
volatility surface from historical option prices and use that implied volatility
to price other options. I assume that the agent knows the volatility of the
asset price, so he can directly plug it into Black-Scholes formula and compute
risk-neutral option prices. For special NASDAQ-100 case I have already found
the calibrated volatility parameters, so I use these parameter settings while
pricing NASDAQ-100 options.
Table 4.4 shows the prices of Black-Scholes (BS) trader for different strikes of





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to 1 year, and risk-free rate is r = 0.05 and volatility 0.02. The virtual asset
price at time t = 0 is equal to S0 = $100.












Table 4.4: The option prices generated by BS traders using closed formula
In Table 4.5, we can see similar comparison of BS trader prices versus the
actual market prices. We can see that BS prices are slightly overprices towards
market prices and the reason for that could be anything starting from the
transaction costs that add-up to the risk-neutral value of the option down to
the complex strategies employed by market participant along with market’s
matching mechanism at that time. Even if it is assumed that all traders use
Black-Scholes pricing, the choice parameters for the formula can be different
which as a result will cause variance in price. In our case, we used U.S.
Treasury Bill rate for risk-free rate and the the GBM calibrated volatility as
we did previously for ZI traders. However the volatility parameter is thought
to be different for each particular case below, because of volatility skew in the
market. But BS trader will hold on to an assumption made by Black-Scholes
on the invariance of volatility of the asset price.
Volatility Pricing
In volatility pricing method, agents harness the information available from the
option market itself to price other types of options such as option portfolios,
etc. They use the volatility surface obtained earlier in this section to find
out about the risk-neutral probability distribution. In Section 4.2.1, I have
described two major ways of obtaining volatility surface from given data, and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in pricing options. The reason why I stressed the importance of obtaining
volatility surface is that it can be used to evaluate the risk-neutral value of
options with different payoff structures. Dupire has developed a methodology
of using volatility surface for finding the risk-neutral value of any option, be it
an exotic one or a bundle of options generating certain income structure [45,
46]. Dupire suggested using the second derivative of call option Cmkt(S0, K, T )
with respect to strike K as the risk-neutral probability density ϕ(K;T ) for
evaluating the expected undiscounted payoff of an option at time T . In a
continuous scenario it is formulated as follows:




Then agent can use this PDF to find the risk-neutral value of any option
with various payoff structures. For that he needs to find the expectation of
the payoff function f(ST ;S0, K) for given maturity price ST which is written
below for any option:
C(S0, K, T ) =
∫ ∞
0
f(ST ;S0, K)ϕ(ST ;T )dST (4.19)
For example, for European call option, we already know its payoff function from
(2.2) which is f(ST ;S0, K) = max(ST − K, 0), so we can use formula (4.19)
to find the risk-neutral value of it. Because for the asset prices below K, the
option’s value is set to zero we can drop that range from the integration space
and start the integration directly from K. This will also take away maximum
function around ST − K and simplify the integration process. Below is the
concrete formula for computing the price of a European call option using the
volatility surface [64]:
C(S0, K, T ) =
∫ ∞
K
(ST −K)ϕ(ST ;T )dST (4.20)
Derman and Kani suggested a numerical way of finding risk-neutral PDF
ϕ(ST ;T ) using the present value of a butterfly call spread (2.35) in the market.
The butterfly call spread must be constructed by selling one OTM call with
strike K + ∆K, one ITM call K −∆K and buying 2 ATM calls at strike K.
Hence we can write its value as follows:
Bmkt = Cmkt(S0, K−∆K,T )−2Cmkt(S0, K, T )+Cmkt(S0, K+∆K,T ) (4.21)
147
If we assume that all traders are risk-neutral, then the price of butterfly call
spread must be equal to the discounted risk-neutral expectation of its payoff
at T . This can be written as:
B0 = EQ0 [e−rTBT ] = e−rTP (K −∆K ≤ ST ≤ K + ∆K)E[BT ] (4.22)
= e−rTϕ(K;T )(2∆K)(∆K2 ) = e
−rTϕ(K;T )(∆K)2
Using Equations (4.21) and (4.22), we can obtain the numerical second-order
differentiation of call price C with respect to strike price K [44, 43]:
ϕ(K;T ) = erT Cmkt(S0, K −∆K,T )− 2Cmkt(S0, K, T ) + Cmkt(S0, K + ∆K,T )(∆K)2
(4.23)
The density function should be multiplied to eliminate the risk-neutral dis-
count factor that market used to price European call options. In this way, we
can numerically determine PDF from obtained volatility surface and use this
knowledge to compute the risk-neutral value of options. I have to note that
the expiration time for all options must be the same to use this PDF. Moreover
option must be exercisable only on maturity date, and its value must depend
on only the spot asset price at time T . For example, options such as Asian or
Barrier options cannot be calculated by using this PDF, because their value
depends on whole history of the stock price upto time T , and not only on the
asset price at time T .
I can summarise the steps of computing the risk-neutral value of the option
using the volatility surface as follows:
1. Construct a volatility surface from available option prices.
2. Use (4.23) to compute risk-neutral PDF ϕ(ST ;T ) for small changes in
strike K. The unavailable price of the call option can be interpolated by
inputting the corresponding approximate of a volatility parameter taken
from the volatility surface into Black-Scholes formula.
3. Find the risk-neutral expectation of the option payoff f(ST ;S0, K) parametrised
by the maturity price of an underlying asset ST using obtained PDF
ϕ(ST ;T ).
I cannot obtain a volatility surface for the virtual asset without simulating
the mechanism, because there is no sample simulation of the bids and asks
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Figure 4.6: NASDAQ-100 call prices for different strikes and maturity dates
on 02.01.2015
generated by volatility (VOL) traders at this stage. Volatility traders base
their option pricing methodology on the realised prices in the mechanism.
I will demonstrate the bids and asks generated by volatility traders while
simulating the actual mechanisms, because volatility trader needs feedback
from the mechanism in order to adjust its σ to the current market value of the
option. However I show how agent can price options using the available data
from historic NASDAQ-100 call prices. As we have already constructed the
volatility surface, and presented it in Figure 4.3, agent use this data to compute
the approximated value of call option for any given strike or expiration time.
Agent can further use the data presented in Figure 4.6 to calculate the risk-
neutral probability ϕ(K;T ), and use it to compute the expected payoff for
options with different payoff structure such as option portfolios. Note that
the payoff of the option must only depend on the maturity price of the asset,
and nothing else. The option portfolios such as butterfly spread mentioned
in Chapter 2 use OTM, ATM and ITM options with the same maturity date.
Therefore their payoff is only dependent on the maturity price of an asset.
Agent can also compute the price of butterfly spread using the available in-
formation from NASDAQ options. Below Figure shows the possible prices for
butterfly spread with different OTM and ITM strikes. The ATM strike $3560
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Figure 4.7: NASDAQ-100 butterfly call spread prices for different OTM and
ITM strikes on 02.01.2014
is chosen as the nearest strike to the spot price of the asset $3563.57.
Monte Carlo Pricing
Monte Carlo methods are excellent tools for pricing derivatives with complex
payoff structure or asset pricing model for which there is no analytical solution.
The core idea behind Monte Carlo pricing is that the option price is equal to its
expected value, and through multiple numerical simulations of its underlying,
agent can obtain the sample of its possible values. It does not require analytical
knowledge of the agent to produce approximately correct risk-neutral prices.
All he needs is sufficient number of simulations to achieve desired accuracy
in estimation. The sample size is the main parameter in computing Monte-
Carlo simulations, as the accuracy of the prices directly depends on how many
instances are used to find the mean value of the option. The 95% confidence
interval for Monte-Carlo computed option price can be related to the sample









where cˆ is the Monte Carlo computed option price, σˆ sample standard devia-
tion, N sample size.
I use the sample size of 10000 which significantly tightens the confidence inter-
val and hence improves the accuracy of agent’s estimate at least 100 times. I
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reviewed Monte Carlo simulation in Chapter 2, and here I simulate the prices
of options with different underlying asset pricing models. Also I will use Monte
Carlo simulations for evaluating the prices of option portfolios commonly used
in option market. The general method that Monte-Carlo agent is going to
follow can be described in following steps:
1. Simulate N underlying asset prices and extract necessary information
which is necessary to compute the value of the option. In our context,
the European option’s value depends only on the maturity price of the
asset ST , this is the only value we need to simulate. But for other cases
such as Asian options, the whole trajectory of the underlying asset is
required to evaluate its price.
2. Compute the intrinsic values of the options based on the simulated asset
prices, and discount them with risk-free rate.
3. Find the mean value of the discounted options’ intrinsic values.
In Table 4.6 displays the results of simulation of a MC (Monte-Carlo) trader
using GBM and jump-diffusion prices of a virtual asset. I have set the pa-
rameters for the simulation as µ = 0.05,σ = 0.02, λ = 0.1, µY = 0.01 and
σY = 0.005. It can be seen that the MC J-D traders prices are slightly higher
than MC GBM because the former expects upward jumps in return with av-
erage magnitude of 1% every 10 days, hence his final asset prices are higher
than those who uses GBM model to simulate prices.
Strikes MC GBM Calls MC GBM Puts MC J-D Calls MC J-D Puts
50.00 52.44 0.00 52.69 0.25
60.00 42.93 0.00 43.18 0.25
70.00 33.42 0.00 33.67 0.25
80.00 23.90 0.00 24.15 0.25
90.00 14.39 0.00 14.65 0.26
100.00 4.88 0.01 5.90 1.02
110.00 0.01 4.64 1.16 5.80
120.00 0.00 14.15 0.11 14.26
130.00 0.00 23.66 0.01 23.67
140.00 0.00 33.17 0.00 33.17
150.00 0.00 42.68 0.00 42.68
Table 4.6: The option prices generated by MC traders using GBM and Jump-
Diffusion asset pricing models
MC traders can also price different portfolios of options such as butterfly call
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spread or bullish spread that we discussed in Chapter 2. Otherwise values of
constituent options are priced separately and added to find the corresponding
option portfolio price. I have simulated the MC trader pricing butterfly call
option using GBM asset price model. Table 4.7 shows the butterfly call prices
for various combinations of strikes computed by MC trader and compares
them with theoretical Black-Scholes prices. Because both Black-Scholes and
MC use GBM as their asset pricing model, the prices are almost the same. The
sample size of 10000 instances has been used to compute Monte Carlo prices.
Simulation tries different OTM and ITM strikes of call option to construct a
Strikes 1 Strikes 2 Strike 3 BS Prices MC Prices
50.00 100.00 150.00 42.677 42.676
60.00 100.00 140.00 33.164 33.163
70.00 100.00 130.00 23.652 23.651
80.00 100.00 120.00 14.140 14.139
90.00 100.00 110.00 4.636 4.636
Table 4.7: The butterfly call prices generated by MC traders using GBM asset
pricing model
butterfly spread. Its price is better visualised using a surface plot given in
Figure 4.8. We can see from the plot that the deeper into the moneyness the
trader goes with his ITM option choice, the higher is the price he is expected
to pay. We can also see that the OTM choice of the butterfly spread does not
affect the final price of the bundle significantly. Although I do not present a
simulation model (I present only the design of such combinatorial exchange) for
pricing option portfolios using a combinatorial exchange, agents can use Monte-
Carlo method to price option portfolios in order to operate in a combinatorial
exchange environment. Monte-carlo simulations for other option portfolios
such as Bullish Spread, Iron Butterfly, etc. are given in Appendix B.
4.3.3 Indifference Pricing
Indifference pricing is a method of pricing derivatives with respect to agent’s
private utility function. This type of pricing method is relative to the agent’s
own portfolio or his subjective opinion in contrast to the market’s objective
arbitrage free pricing methods. The indifference price is the price at which an
agent would have the same expected utility by participating in the trade as
by not participating in it. Usually the indifference price is a bid-ask spread
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Figure 4.8: MC simulated butterfly call spread prices for different OTM and
ITM strikes. ATM strike is 100.
for some agent. One important aspect of indifference pricing is that it allows
agents to be subjective and private about derivative pricing and relates the
risk associated with buying or selling derivatives to agent’s current portfolio
or inner beliefs [24]. This can be justified with the fact that every agent has
his own methods for managing the risk, and certain policies of the institution
that are enforced on him. I will use 2 basic indifference pricing techniques to
compute options prices: one is using risk-averse exponential function and the
other is the cutting edge LMSR method originated from prediction markets.
Exponential Utility
Most traders are more afraid of loosing money, rather than making profit
because of human nature and potential implications of failure. This defines
the rationale behind risk-averseness of trading agents. For this reason, the
utility functions designed to model risk-averseness are concave functions. One
of the commonly used utilities is the exponential utility which is defined below
[24, 4]:




where a is the risk-aversion parameter.
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Figure 4.9: Exponential Utility
Figure 4.9 illustrates the concavity of the utility function. For a very small
risk-aversion coefficient a = 0.001, the agent’s utility grows almost linearly
making him almost risk-neutral to given payoff. However for larger a = 2, it
can be seen that agent’s utility grows slower than the payoff offered for the
option, making him to ask for larger payoffs to compensate the possible losses.
This nicely fits to the behaviour of a risk-averse trader who asks higher prices
for lower risks.
We can see from (4.25) that the higher is the risk-aversion, the less is the utility
of the trader, making him more reluctant to not participate in the trade, even it
has a positive expected payoff. Agents have indifferent prices relative to some
ways of managing the portfolio of assets. In delta hedging method, agent keeps
changing his portfolio by changing the corresponding weights of assets and cash
after selling a derivative such as option. This would help to reduce the cost
of fulfilling his liability if the sold option is exercised. At the maturity day,
agent has a balance consisting of the assets and cash in his inventory. I have
described delta-hedging while explaining Black-Scholes formula and replicating
portfolios in Chapter 2.
For example let us say that agent simulates multiple paths of GBM for under-
lying asset and delta hedges the premium offered for the option c. At option’s
maturity date T agent can check how much his portfolio is worth for each GBM
path by computing the series of final payoffs p. These payoffs are the potential
gains or losses that agent can have if he follows the delta hedging strategy for
received premium c. However, he is reluctant to receive c because his possible
payoffs p may also include losses, and he is afraid of them more than gaining
c in case if the option sold is not exercised. Therefore he needs to charge such
c′ which could make him indifferent on average, so that his utility is zero as if
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he stayed idle. Below equation illustrates the concept mathematically:
E(u(c′erT + p)) = 0 (4.26)
Such c′ can be numerically found using MATLAB’s fzero routine. To sum
up, agent can speculate any strategy, be it delta strategy, gamma strategy,
or just simply placing premium received to risk-free account, to analyse his
potential gains and losses, and then make a risk-averse bid on what to charge
for given option so that on average he as good as if he has never traded.
Table 4.8 highlights how option prices change based on traders risk-averseness
parameter a. As it can be seen, the prices slightly grow as the risk-averseness
of the agent is also growing. Moreover we can see that the risk-averse prices
are slightly higher than the risk-neutral Black-Scholes price. I have simulated
prices using GBM model using parameters annualised µ = 0.05, σ = 0.2, T = 1
and S0 = 100. I also used higher volatility to push the prices up to stress the
difference between traditional risk-neutral valuation and indifference pricing.
Strikes BS Price a=0.06 a=0.50 a=1.00 a=4.00 a=8.00 a=16.00
50.00 52.44 52.44 52.44 52.44 52.44 52.45 52.55
60.00 42.94 42.94 42.94 42.94 42.94 42.95 43.04
70.00 33.54 33.54 33.55 33.55 33.57 33.67 33.96
80.00 24.59 24.59 24.60 24.61 24.79 25.30 25.67
90.00 16.70 16.70 16.72 16.74 16.89 17.11 17.35
100.00 10.45 10.46 10.49 10.52 10.89 11.56 11.97
110.00 6.04 6.05 6.08 6.12 6.46 6.94 7.28
120.00 3.25 3.25 3.27 3.30 3.73 4.30 4.67
130.00 1.64 1.63 1.64 1.66 1.84 2.23 2.58
140.00 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.88 1.21 1.57
150.00 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.43 0.67
Table 4.8: Option prices for different risk-aversion factor a in comparison with
Black-Scholes prices
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule
This pricing rule emerges from the concept of prediction markets which are
the mechanisms developed for aggregating information about uncertain events
from market experts [135]. The market-maker, or commonly referred as in-
formation aggregator in the context of prediction markets, devises a contract
which pays/receives certain amount of money for each possible future outcome.
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For example, the aggregator might be interested in gathering predictions about
the weather for tomorrow, and pay the same amount as the factual tempera-
ture tomorrow. Similarly, in financial markets, the future price of an asset is
uncertain and the European option’s value is directly dependent on this un-
certain value. Hence the aggregator can use an option contract as his main
payoff structure for compensating the predictions on the possible future prices
of an asset. The payoffs on each future price can be defined as the intrinsic
value of the option, (St −K)+ for calls and (K − St)+ for puts.
In prediction markets, the informants are allowed to change the aggregator’s
payoff structure for a corresponding payment. For example, if aggregator is
accepting bets for teams A and B on a football match, and his current payoff
structure is (300,200) meaning that the aggregator has to pay $300 in total if
team A wins, and $200 if team B wins. However one would like to bet on team
A, and he expects to receive $50 if his bet is achieved. The aggregator changes
his payoff structure to (350,200) by accepting the bet, and he also needs to
decide how he can charge the client for accepting his bet. The most common
method for evaluating the cost of accepting the bet in prediction markets,
LMSR, has been developed by Hanson [76, 77] and it found its correspond-
ing applications in a number of companies such as Yahoo!, Microsoft, Inkling
Markets, Consensus Point and Gates Hillman Prediction Market[127]. It is
defined as a cost function for the vector of payoffs x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} on the
probability space of events Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn}:






where b > 0 is a liquidity parameter. The larger values of b produce tighter
bid/ask spreads, but may also incur larger worst-case losses capped by b log(n)
[42]. Follmer and Schied regard LMSR as an entropic risk measure in their
book on stochastic finance [59].
The agent who wishes to change the payoff from x to y has to pay the dif-
ference between the costs C(y) − C(x). In our above example, given that
b = 100, the aggregator accepting bets must charge the client C((350, 200))−
C((300, 200)) ≈ $39 for the bet.
The same principle can be used for the option trader who holds a certain port-
folio of options that generate certain payoffs for different asset price outcomes,
and prices other options from the point of his own payoff structure. The agent
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can virtually simulate buying or selling particular type of option and com-
pute the changes it makes to its payoff structure. For example, let agent take
butterfly call spread with buying ITM call at strike K1 = 80 and OTM call
at K3 = 120, and selling 2 ATM calls at K2 = 100. We can compute his
discounted payoffs for the range of possible prices where the asset price can
end up at time T . Let this payoff structure be x, and it can be depicted as
in Table 4.9. The trader feels bullish and wants to buy one more call option
at strike K4 = 130. This should change his payoff structure to y as shown in
Table 4.10.













Table 4.9: Potential payoffs of the
trader holding butterfly call spread
BEFORE buying call at K4 = 130
















>145 e−rT (St − 130)
Table 4.10: Potential payoffs of the
trader holding butterfly call spread
AFTER buying call at K4 = 130
As it can be seen from tables 4.9 and 4.10, buying a certain type of option
can significantly change the payoff structure of the trader. The agent’s bid for
buying an OTM option at K4 = 130 can be computed from the difference of
his payoff structures C(y)−C(x), and in our particular case is $1.42 given that
the liquidity parameter is b = 2500. We can also compute the Black-Scholes
price of such option given parameters T = 1, r = 0.05, S0 = 100, σ = 0.02 and
it is $2.52. This would mean that the trader places a bid for given OTM option
less than its risk-neutral value. In this scenario, the trader is not supposed to
loose. However if trader decides to sell this OTM option, and computes the
price in similar manner, he will end up with approximately $1.42 (which is close
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to his bid due to tight liquidity parameter b) and may loose money because
he is selling below option’s risk-neutral value. However unlike other option
traders in the market, the LMSR emerges from prediction markets, and it is
designed for gathering information and thus he is more interested in liquidity,
rather than profit. Therefore we can assume that such traders may exist in
the market to improve the liquidity of options. I have simulated the bids and
asks that butterfly call spread holder would use to trade various options in the
market. Table 4.11 shows LMSR trader’s bids and asks for different options
on virtual asset. I have to note that LMSR trader is holding butterfly call
spread which makes positive payoff only when the asset price remains mostly
the same.
We can see in Table 4.11 there is a small spread between bid and ask for
different options, and the overall prices significantly vary from Black-Schole’s
prices. For example, butterfly call spread holder using LMSR would undervalue
the options deep in-the-money, and bid much cheaper price for option with
strike K = 50, it is $45.04 while the risk-neutral price is $52.44. However for
the options in the proximity of ATM, the option prices are highly overpriced,
for example for K = 100 option, LMSR trader’s bid is $10.73, while the risk-
neutral price is only $4.88. This is due to the exponential function intersecting
with the piece-wise payoff function of Black-Scholes. Figure 4.10 illustrates the
bids and asks of LMSR trader holding butterfly call spread. Because b = 2500,
the bid-ask spread for the options are very tight and barely noticeable. Also
the bids and asks for put option do not cross the Black-Scholes price, because
I use put-call parity to compute the put price from given call price. So we can
see that put prices conform with the boundaries of option price.
I have also generated bids and asks for traders holding other option portfolios
such as bullish spread, bearish spread, iron butterfly, etc in Appendix C. I
used liquidity parameter b = 100 to show how it may affect the bid-ask spread
for LMSR trader.
To sum up, the indifference pricing methods like LMSR take into account
the agent’s current possessions in the inventory layer and make option pricing
decisions based on this information as well. This plays well with our proposed
IIKB framework where there is a layer responsible for bookkeeping the agent’s
current inventory levels. Later in the chapter, we will also see how this layer

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.10: Bids and asks of LMSR trader holding butterfly call spread in
comparison with Black-Scholes prices.
4.4 Choosing Quantities
In traditional algorithmic trading with assets, the traders have to decide when
to enter and when to exit the market. Entry and exit is only applicable in
online DAs, because the traders are continuously involved in trading. In direct
DA, I ignore this idea, because traders are re-instantiated every trading day. In
proposed simulation of online DA, I assume that all traders enter the market
every trading day. Traders who do not want to engage in trading submit
orders with zero quantity. This would mean that the traders are inactive at
that position. However if they wish to buy or sell, they order a quantity
other than zero. I assume that the trader opens long position if the option
is underpriced according to his private valuation. Similarly trader takes short
position if the option is overpriced in his view. It is also worth to mention that
the ability of opening and closing market positions are attributed to traders
only and not to dealers. I talk about traders and dealers in more detail in the
next Section 4.5. Unlike traders, dealers always maintain a bid-ask spread for
reasonable amount of options in online DA.
The exit from the market means either closing the market position or exercising
the option on its expiry date. Option ending up in-money is always exercised,
and its value is equal to the payoff it generated on its expiry date. Before
option expiration, trader needs to buy or sell the same number of options to
close his short or long position in the market. For example, if trader holds
call option, he can write call option with the same strike and expiry date in
order to close his market position. Trader closes his current position when he
160
decides to switch his market position from long to short, or vice versa. This
decision is again governed by trader private option valuation method and his
entry decision on particular side of the market.
In this section, I describe how the quantities for options are chosen by traders.
Traders can control their orders to be bids or asks by setting the quantities
either to positive integer or negative integer. If trader sets the quantity to 0,
then it means that he is not interested in buying or selling this option. In
this way, by setting the quantity qj ∈ Z for jth option in the option chain,
trader can express his preference whether he wants to buy or sell particular
type of option, and if yes, in which quantities. I propose 3 main techniques
that determine how traders choose the quantities for the desired options, and
explain the reason behind them.
4.4.1 Random Integers
Agents choose quantities using random integers within reasonable bounds to
define the demand and supply for particular types of options. The main as-
sumption for having this method to determine the quantities is there is an
enormous amount of option contracts varying in their types, underlying asset,
strike price and expiration date in the real life markets, which makes partic-
ular kind of option highly uncompetitive. In fact, if there are d underlying
assets available in the market, and |K| strike prices and |T | expiration dates
in option chain, the total number of options in the market would be equal
to 2 ∗∑di=1 |K|i × |T |i, let alone options that are more exotic than European
ones. Due to this sparse supply and demand on different kinds of option, it
is difficult to observe a continuous interest over longer period of time for any
particular option. We can also see the absence of interest to certain kind of
options in NASDAQ-100 option chain shown in Table 3.6. Therefore I assume
that the supply or demand is not driven by the competing forces of the market,
but rather emerges arbitrarily from the intrinsic needs of traders.
4.4.2 Linear Functions
In this method, agents take linear approach in determining the quantities to
buy or sell from the given option value pˆ. Although in the context of financial
markets, it is less likely to see a linear relationship between option prices and
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Figure 4.11: Bid Price/Black-Scholes Price vs Open Interest of NDX-100 Op-
tions in 2014
the quantities ordered, there is a certain level of rationality in choosing these
quantities. We can compare the posted bid prices to Black-Scholes prices and
observe how the open interest (i.e. outstanding volume) changes based on that.
Figure 4.11 illustrates the scatter plot for the ratio of submitted bid prices and
Black-Scholes prices versus the overall open interest in options. If we compare
the quantities ordered in both undervalued (ratio < 1) and overvalued (ratio >
1) option cases, there is clearly more interest in options if the prices are below
theoretical value. However we can also see that the quantities if the option is
underpriced do not seem to have any linear relationship with the ratio itself.
The difference is only between underpriced and overpriced groups. The red line
in Figure 4.11 shows the linear regression between overpriced and underpriced
bid quantities. We can see that it resembles the monotonically decreasing
nature of the demand curve in classic economical perspective. Therefore agents
can also use linear function to determine the quantity for the options to be
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traded.
Let qa(·) and qb(·) be supply and demand functions of the agent. These func-
tions take option price p as an input, and return an integer indicating the
quantity of the option to be traded. We model supply and demand with fol-
lowing assumptions:
1. Given the option value pˆ (i.e. result of option pricing method), agent
assumes that this price is the true price of the option, and hence it must
be the equilibrium price of the option. This would imply qa(pˆ) = qb(pˆ).
2. qb(·) can be found using linear regression of previously submitted bids
and the outstanding volume as we did in Figure 4.11.
3. pa = 0 ⇒ qa(pa) = 0. Agent has no incentive in supplying options at
zero price, hence the supply is zero too.
Given qb(·) demand function, we can find the analytical formula for qa(·) supply
function. Let qb(pˆ) = qˆ, then from above assumption 1), we can see that
qa(pˆ) = qˆ. From assumption 3) we know that qa(0) = 0. Having 2 points of






Option portfolios and their usage have been extensively covered in Chapter
2. Most of the option portfolios, except calendar option portfolios, are made
up using options with different moneyness to cut the risk of infinite loss, and
take advantage of agent’s future forecast. Option portfolios are traded only in
multi-item multi-unit DAs or combinatorial exchanges where traders submit
their orders for bundles of options. For that purpose, I use traders specifying
their orders in terms of option portfolios. Option portfolio can be represented
as a quantity vector q ∈ Zm where m is the size of the option portfolio.
Although the size of the option portfolio can be arbitrarily extended, most
of the popular option portfolio sizes range from 2 to 4. They classify options
based on two parameters: type (i.e. put/call) and moneyness (i.e. OTM, ATM,
ITM). Hence there are 6 types of options used to build an option portfolio. Of
course, the moneyness of the option can be further extended depending how
close is the strike price to the current spot price. So there could be multiple
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OTMs or ITMs available. Traders may include two OTMs with different strikes
into option portfolio creating combinations such as Condor. However I assume
there are only one OTM and one ITM defined to make an option portfolio.
Hence the traders cannot construct Condor option portfolio from the available
options.
Table 4.12 lists some of the option portfolios commonly used by traders. The
quantity of option type to buy or sell is specified in positive or negative num-
bers respectively. The table also tells about the forecast direction of each
option portfolio, so agents can choose based on their forecast. This is more
applicable to ZI option pricing agents, because their option price depends on
their forecasted asset price Si,T at time T . The strategies are classified as
bullish, bearish and neutral based on the income they generate in case if asset
price ends up in expected place. Bullish traders expect asset price to end up
higher than its current spot price, while bearish expect the opposite. The neu-
tral traders expect asset price remain in its current spot. For example if agent
i’s forecast is in between some S0 −  ≤ Si,T ≤ S0 + , then agent will choose
neutral strategy. If Si,T > S0 + , then agent will choose bullish strategy. And
finally if Si,T < S0 − , the agent will choose bearish strategy.  denotes the
fixed step size in strikes inside the option chain. Also it is worth noting that
I regard option as ATM option if its strike price Kj is in  vicinity of current
asset price S0. By definition of ATM option, its strike price must be equal
to the current asset price, but because there are only discrete Kjs in option
chain, ATM option is the option whose strike is approximately the same as the
spot price. Strike prices beyond (S0 − , S0 + ) are either considered OTM or
ITM.
Traders pick random portfolio among other portfolios with the same direction.
However some option portfolios can be both bullish and bearish, and Long
Straddle option portfolio is one example of this. I assume that both bullish
and bearish traders will be equally interested in this option portfolio. It is
also possible that option portfolio is more bullish, than bearish, or vice versa.
For example, Strip option portfolio generates greater payoff when prices go up.
Therefore there is a biased chance for a bearish trader to choose Strip option
portfolio among other bearish option portfolios because it is less bullish. Let us
name the algorithm for selecting option portfolio as a Strat(S0, Si,T ) function
which returns qi quantities vector for each agent i based on his forecast. Strat
function is defined in listing below 1.
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Name cATM pATM cOTM pOTM cITM pITM Direction
Long Call 1 0 0 0 0 0 bullish
Long Put 0 1 0 0 0 0 bearish
Bull Call
Spread 0 0 -1 0 1 0 bullish
Bear Call
Spread 0 0 1 0 -1 0 bearish
Butterfly
Put Spread 0 -2 0 1 0 1 neutral
Long Call
Ladder -1 0 -1 0 1 1 neutral
Short Call




Ladder 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 neutral
Short Put




terfly -1 -1 1 1 0 0 neutral
Long Strad-




Straddle -1 -1 0 0 0 0 neutral
Long Stran-




Strangle 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 neutral
Strip 1 2 0 0 0 0 bullish >bearish
Strap 2 1 0 0 0 0 bearish >bullish
Table 4.12: Some Option Portfolios
165
Algorithm 1 Option Portfolio Selection
Require: S0, Si,T , 
if S0 −  ≤ Si,T ≤ S0 +  then
return random neutral option portfolio
else if Si,T < S0 −  then
return random bearish option portfolio
else if Si,T > S0 +  then
return random bullish option portfolio
end if
4.5 Proxy Trading Algorithms
In this section, I present the ways how agents can employ proxy trading algo-
rithms in online mechanisms. Proxy trading algorithms take evaluated option
price pˆ along with other specific parameters and generate adaptive bids and
asks around pˆ. I use 2 types of agents: dealers and traders. Dealers are the
agents that are passively involved in trading, as their main concern is market-
making and servicing the traders who wish to buy or sell options. Therefore
they are always forced to maintain both long and short open positions in on-
line DA. Also they are not actively involved in improving their limit orders to
achieve their fast execution, but rather interested in maintaining the liquidity
of the market. It is important that they stay in business as long as they can
without running into loss or failing to fill the orders. I propose 2 kinds of al-
gorithms designed specifically for dealers: one is an Garman’s inventory-based
dealer who sets his bid-ask spread based on the probability of failure for given
rate of order arrivals, and the other one is Copeland-Galai’s information-based
dealer who sets his bid-ask spread based on his belief on the proportion of
informed traders in the market. We look at these two methods in Sections
4.5.1 and 4.5.1.
Traders, on the other hand, are more actively involved in trading process, be-
cause their main objective is to bargain a good price from the online mechanism
and make a profit. So they have the freedom of entering and exiting the mar-
ket when there is a profitable deal. As it was mentioned earlier, traders decide
to enter the market when their option price is above/below the traded option
price, and they decide to exit if they want to change their market position.
Traders constantly update their orders according to the changes in the market
to ensure that they adapt to the trend of the market. This would involve can-
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Figure 4.12: Components involved in proxy trading algorithms
celling the previously submitted orders every trading day and submitting the
new ones with updated quotes. I provide 2 algorithms widely used in CDAs:
one is ZIP which implements a recursive learning function to adjust agent’s
bids/asks to current market quotes, and the other is GD algorithm which finds
an optimal bid-ask spread that maximises the probability of success. These
topics are explained in more detail in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.2.
Figure 4.12 shows the relationship between IIKB layers that are used in order
to run our proposed proxy trading algorithms. Dealer algorithm, Garman’s
model (i.e. inventory-based model), uses the inventory levels in assets and
options, and order arrival rates and option prices to find the optimal bid-ask
spread that could minimise its failure. Another dealer algorithm, Copeland
and Galai model (i.e. information-based model) requires knowledge about
informed traders in order to decide which bid-ask spread to use, so he can
secure himself from definite loss of trading with informed traders. The bold
line between proxy trading algorithms and pieces of information indicates that
every algorithm uses either all or some of the information listed in given group.
Note that agents do not use any proxy algorithm for direct and combinatorial
mechanisms because given that they are DSIC, the best way to submit bids
and asks are submitting them truthfully to the mechanism. Therefore positive
bid-ask spread is unnecessary, and usually the trader’s bid and ask are equal
to his private valuation.
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4.5.1 Dealers
Studying the markets from the perspective of dealers and their private incen-
tives have been pioneered by market microstructure researchers [125]. One of
the main goals of this field is to model the price setting rules that evolve in
markets based on the information available in the market. The market mi-
crostructure theory has an important application in the design and implemen-
tation of new trading algorithms and development of new market regulations.
I extend some of its core methods to option trading while implementing dealer
agents.
I addressed 2 types of dealers: a) inventory-based dealer and b) information-
based dealer. Inventory-based models define trading agents with limited en-
dowment of initial inventory and cash which they need to maintain or increase
by engaging in trading process with other agents. Dealer’s main objectives
are not to run out of stock or cash, and at the same time to make a positive
return [125, 147]. One of the famous examples of such models is Garman’s
one-period model [63] for setting bid and ask prices based on the probability
of running out of cash or stock. In Garman’s model the arrival of orders is
modelled as a Poisson process with varying rate λ(p) which is dependent on
current price. Ask orders rate λa(pa) is monotonically decreasing function be-
cause the higher prices would ratchet up supply, and thus decrease interarrival
time of ask orders. Conversely, bid orders rate λb(pb) is monotonically increas-
ing function, as an increasing prices would result in lower demand, and thus
longer interarrival time for bids. Garman in his model tries to minimise the
probability of running out of cash or inventory, and at the same time maximise
the potential profit through finding the optimal bid-ask spread. Another ex-
ample of inventory-based model is Ho and Stoll’s model which extends Stoll’s
initial idea [154] on optimising exponential utility function to maintain a risk-
averse spread over some time horizon. Ho and Stoll extend Garman’s model
into multi-period level where the dealer’s portfolio value can be modelled as
a Brownian motion. Dealer’s portfolio consists of cash account which subject
to risk free interest return, and the inventory the value of which is computed
using the sum of random short rate changes in stock. One difference between
cash account and inventory position is that dealer uses bid and ask prices to
account the cash outflow and inflow, and use book value of the stock for com-
puting the value of total inventory he holds. Thus the dealers optimization
problem can be formulated as the maximisation of the conditional expected
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utility for bid and ask prices. I highlight the details of the implementation of
Garman’s model for our inventory-based dealer later in this section.
The other category of dealers, information-based dealers, take into account the
market data such as the orders flow, the population of other traders and any
other information that could affect the behaviour of traders in the market. In
contrast to inventory-based dealers, information-based dealers are assumed to
have unlimited budget and stock, and thus they neglect anything but infor-
mation while pricing the assets. In information-based paradigm, the traders
that the dealer will be interacting with can be broken into informed and un-
informed traders. Informed traders have some private information about the
future of asset prices and they can exploit it by either buying or selling the
option. Uninformed traders are simply liquidity traders who have other rea-
sons such as hedging, speculating, etc to participate in the trade. Galai and
Copeland demonstrated how the trader can behave while setting the bid/ask
spread for anonymous traders. In this approach, trader simply tries to max-
imise his profit model which involves the loss from dealing with an informed
trader who will ultimately outperform the market, and the gain that can be
made from dealing with an uninformed trader [33]. In other words, Galai and
Copeland suggested that dealer can balance the gains and losses through set-
ting up a corresponding spread. Of course, dealer has no information about
with whom he is dealing with, but may have a certain prior on the probability
of informed and uninformed traders in the market. Trader uses these proba-
bilities to calculate the corresponding regret-free spreads. On the other hand,
another famous information-based model, Glosten-Milgrom model [71], utilises
the Bayesian learning technique to adjust the new information to the pricing
scheme. I provide the details of the implementation of Copeland-Galai’s dealer
later in this section.
Inventory-based Dealer
In a continuous market where orders are submitted subsequently, the equilib-
rium of supply and demand is unstable and some imbalances may emerge due
to stochastic nature of order arrivals to the market. This temporal imbalance
stresses the uncertainty of maintaining an inventory for the market-making
agent, or dealer. Inventory-based dealer is mostly concerned about maintain-
ing a sufficient stock of options and cash, so he does not run out them at some
point in time. He can control the inflow of bids and asks by setting bid-ask
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spread in such a way that it maximises his profit and at the same time reduces
the probability of failure. The inventory-based dealer can be modelled with
following assumptions:
• Bid and ask orders for each option j arrive independently according to





tively, where λja(pja) is a monotonically decreasing function representing
the intensity of demand for option j directed at dealer, and λjb(p
j
b) is
a monotonically increasing function representing the intensity of supply
for option j towards dealer.
• Dealer cannot produce or borrow cash, options or assets. He is initially
endowed with I(0) = Ic(0) + Ia(0) +∑k+2j=2 Ij(0) worth inventory, where
Ic(0) stands for initial cash, Ia(0) initial assets, Ij(0) option of type j.
• Dealer is said to be broke or failed if he runs out of cash Ic(t) = 0 or any
of the options he is trading with Ij(t) = 0 at some t ≥ 0.
• Options’ intrinsic values, asset price dynamics and all other market in-
formation except dealer’s inventory levels and order arrival rates are
disregarded.
Because the amounts of dealer’s current cash and options determine whether
dealer continues to play in the market or not, we can draw following formulas
for dealer’s cash account Ic(t) and jth option account Ij(t).






















where dN ja(t) ∼ Poisson(λja(pja), dt) and dN jb (t) ∼ Poisson(λjb(pjb), dt) are
Poisson random variables such that dN ja(t), dN
j
b (t) ∈ {0, 1} representing whether
there is an order occurred for option j within an infinitesimal time interval dt
or not.
Let us assume that the inventory dealer sets his bid-ask spread for one type of
option. This also makes notation much more readable. Let this option type be
of jth type. We drop superscript j from every variable, and work with dealer’s
bid price pb and ask price pa for this option j.
The dealer can control the width of his bid-ask spread to optimise his position.
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If he choose very wide bid-ask spread, he risks loosing orders and affect his
potential profit. If the bid-ask spread is very narrow, then the dealer can go
broke or run out of stock due to imbalance between the arrival rates of asks and
bids. In order to solve this issue, let Q(t, k) denote the probability of having k
units of cash at Ic(t) at time t. Then Garman derives the agent’s probability







if λa(pa)pa > λb(pb)pb (4.31)
lim
t→∞Q(t, 0) = 1 otherwise (4.32)
where pˆ can be either the realised price of the option in the market, or dealer’s
private option valuation.
The similar relationship is defined for the options hold by a dealer where R(t, k)








if λb(pb) > λa(pa) (4.33)
lim
t→∞R(t, 0) = 1 otherwise (4.34)
From above equations, we can draw an objective function for the dealer. The
dealer needs to minimise the probability of either running out of cash or inven-
tory. I assume that these two events may happen independently, so agent sums
these two probabilities to make his objective function subject to corresponding











s.t. λa(pa)pa − λb(pb)pb > 0 (4.36)
λb(pb)− λa(pa) ≥ 0 (4.37)
pa, pb, λa(pa), λb(pb) > 0 (4.38)
In the first term of the objective function, we can see that dealer is better
off bidding less because both lambdab(pb) and pb are monotonically increasing
and they are in the numerator of the fraction. From the second term of the










Figure 4.13: Optimal bid-ask spread for Garman’s dealer
price, because λa(pa) is a monotonically decreasing function. But this must
correspond with large enough bid price pb. The objective function subject to
the constrains drawn from (4.31) and (4.33) equations. However we changed
the constraint (4.37), because we assume there could be an equilibrium state
where there is λ∗ such that demand and supply volumes are approximately the
same, so their rate of arrivals is equal to single value.
The relationship between ask and bid prices and their corresponding arrival
rates are illustrated using a chart similar to supply and demand curves from
microeconomics. The dealer is better off maximising the surplus generated
from the bid-ask spread he holds. Figure 4.13 shows this surplus highlighted
using a shaded rectangle.
In order to simulate proposed algorithm, let us set arrival rates them to some
functions, although it is going to be different for each mechanism. Let us
assume that the rates of arrival are linear functions ensuring that λa(·) has
negative slope, and λb(·) has positive slope. When arrival rates are equal, the
inventory of the dealer is in its stable state, so the incoming orders balance each
other. Dealer assumes that the rates of the arrival balance only if the bid and
ask prices are close to pˆ. Hence the arrival rates should satisfy λa(pˆ) = λb(pˆ).
I denote this arrival rate as λˆ. We also know that there won’t be any orders
coming if dealer’s bid is zero. This is because in Section 4.4.2 I have made
an assumption that no one is willing to supply option at zero price. Hence
λb(0) = 0. Also the last assumption about the arrival rates is that they change
at the same rate but in opposite directions. This would mean that the slope
of λb(·) is the negative of the slope of λa(·).
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Using above assumptions, we can construct linear functions to estimate the
optimal bid-ask spread that would minimise dealer’s failure probability based
on our made-up order arrival models. In case if the probabilities are the same
for the range of bid-ask spreads, the dealer would choose the narrowest of them,
so he can provide enough liquidity to the market. Below steps summarise the
approach taken by our inventory-based trader to set a bid-ask spread around
given option price taking into account his inventory levels:
1. Given pˆ and λˆ, agent can find analytical form of λb(·) using 2 data points:





2. Given that arrival rates are symmetrical in opposite directions, agent
linear transform the λb(·) to λa(·):
λa(pa) = λˆ− λˆ
pˆ
pa (4.40)
We can see that above defined arrival functions also intersect at (pˆ, λˆ) giving
the inventory-based dealer the most desired position. Using above defined
linear functions, agent can solve the optimisation problem given in equation
(4.35) and find ask pa and bid pb prices that minimise the probability of failure.
It can be seen from the objective function of the optimisation problem that
the probabilities depend on the inventories Ic(0) cash and Ij(0) option j of
the trader. The higher are the resources of the dealer, the less probable is the
failure. This means that the dealer’s bid-ask spread may change over the course
of the trading day in an online mechanism as he acquires or sells options. In
case if the minimised probabilities are almost the same with tolerable absolute
error, the dealer tends to select the bid and ask prices with the narrowest
possible spread. This facilitates the trade between other traders and improves
the liquidity in the market.
In Figure 4.14, I have simulated the possible cases for Garman’s dealer with
different inventory levels. The vertical axis represents bids, while the horizontal
one is for ask prices. I assume that the option price given to the dealer is pˆ = 5.0
with λˆ = 4 orders arrived at this price. I also used above method to compute
corresponding linear functions for λa(·) and λb(·), and then plotted the color
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Figure 4.14: Dealer’s bid-ask choices based on probability of failure
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map indicating the probabilities of failure for the different combinations of
bid-ask spread. The red area indicates that the dealer will fail almost surely,
because it violates Garman’s constraints (4.36) and (4.37). The bluer the area,
the less is the probability of failure. For example, when dealer has only $1.0
and only one 1 option in his inventory, he is almost destined to fail unless he
bids near zero price, and asks near $ 10 price, stretching his bid-ask spread
to the maximum level for given linear λa(·) and λb(·). However for the dealer
having $625.0 in cash and 625 in units of option a very thin bid-ask spread
such as ($4.95, $5.05) is rather unlikely to result in failure of the dealer.
To sum up, I have used linear functions for λa(·) and λb(·), but in reality these
functions can be different, and not necessarily continuous and well-defined.
This requires thorough calibration of arrival rates into more complex models
which may include stochastic elements as well depending the auction setting.
I will not go beyond the complexity of linear functions to model the arrival
rates in online DAs, and determine the regression line between order arrivals
and submitted bid-ask spreads from simulated mechanism. Also I have pre-
sented a dealer who trades only one type of option, but this is a unrealistic
example. Dealers in the market can trade with every kind of option listed in
the option chain and has to use income generated from all of these options as
his disposable cash. In given example, the cash can only be generated through
the trade of only one option. Moreover in real market situation, dealers can
generate cash from other activities such as borrowing or short selling assets.
Also they can produce options at their own risk and price them corresponding
to their own option valuation method. However in our presented Garman’s
model these capabilities of the dealer are restricted. I use this proxy trading
algorithm for simulating dealers upon option pricing methods discussed earlier,
and use GAR- prefix to denote this method.
Information-based Dealer
In this section, I present another type of dealer who uses information about the
market rather than his available resources. In fact, information-based dealers
usually disregard the responsibilities of the inventory-based model such as
maintaining stock to serve the incoming orders. Information-based dealers
are assumed to be capable of producing infinite amount of options to satisfy
accepted asks, and borrow infinite amount of cash to realise accepted bids.
The key aspect of the information-based dealer is the way how he balances the
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inevitable loss caused by informed traders, or so called insiders, by setting up
a corresponding bid-ask spread. In Section 4.2, I have already reviewed how
agent can find out implicit information such as the proportion of the informed
traders in the market from the incoming orders and other public information
using Bayesian learning technique.
I use Copeland and Galai’s [33, 125] model to implement an information-
based dealers. In this model, the dealer assumes that there are certain number
of speculators in the market who have an insider information which enables
them to estimate the future more accurately. This information is unknown to
other dealers and liquidity traders (i.e. uninformed traders), so they cannot
take advantage from it. However the informed trader possessing the private
information can monetize it by engaging in trade with other traders in the
market. This is the main reason why the information-based dealer has to be
cautious about informed traders in the market, and should be reluctant to trade
with them because ultimately they are going to beat the dealer. However the
orders are anonymous in the market, and the dealer cannot recognise the orders
coming from an informed trader. The dealer’s objective is to find optimal bid-
ask spread that would maximise his profits. Similar to inventory-based dealer,
if he sets too wide bid-ask spread he might loose liquidity traders from whom
he can make profit while shielding himself from informed traders. The optimal
bid-ask spread must attract enough liquidity traders that generate profit to
compensate the loss caused by informed traders. Note that the traders are
anonymous in both cases, so the dealer has no way to distinguish the informed
traders from liquidity ones.
The dealer sets bid-ask spread for limited quantity of options to secure himself
from informed traders. Also the dealer can revise his prices after fulfilling the
order. This is because dealer can update his posterior belief about the true
valuation of the item from the new orders arrived having a prior belief on
the proportion of informed traders in the market. So we can say that each
new order coming into the market reveals the private information about the
option’s true price.
As we have already discussed in Section 4.2.2 of this chapter that trader can
incorporate newly arrived information into his prior belief using Bayesian in-
ference. I showed how dealer can find out the posterior distribution of θ by
simply plugging the variables into Beta posterior distribution given in (4.11).
He can then estimate the value θˆ = E[X′|X=x]
N ′ by using Beta-Binomial distri-
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bution given in (4.13). I have also mentioned how dealer distinguishes the
informed traders from uninformed traders. Dealer takes orders anonymously
from traders, but once the actual price of the asset is realised, he can look
back to the orders he accepted and identify those who correctly ’guessed’ the
true price of the option. I stated that this is a very naive approach, and it
has a bias from other liquidity traders who accidentally submitted the correct
prices. However in order to keep this part simply, I will use this way of identify
the orders for information-based dealer. In long run, this approach is going to
give us a good estimate on which portion of total orders accepted are going
to hit the expected asset price, leaving the real population of informed and
uninformed irrelevant for the dealer.
Once the dealer has θˆ, he can use this probability to compute his expected
payoff. According to Copeland and Galai’s approach, the expected loss from







(pb − p)f(p)dp (4.41)
where f(p) is the PDF of option prices.
In equation (4.41), we can see that the dealer the expected loss from informed
orders involving the sales at price pa for all possible cases above it, and buying
at price pb for all possible cases below it. This is because dealer thinks that
the loss is certain if he accepts an order from informed trader. The main
reason for this is that if the trader is informed and he is engaging in trader
with the dealer, the informed trader certainly knows that the option price is
either underpriced or overpriced, so it is beyond the dealer’s bid-ask spread.
Therefore the rational informed trader would participate in trader with the
dealer only if it is attractive to him.
The most important aspect of the equation (4.41) is the PDF for the option
price. Initially this has been defined for the asset prices by Copeland and
Galai, but in this research, I re-implement it for options. If p were asset
prices, we could use log-normal distribution logN (r, σ√T ) for f(p), so it could
specify the probability of asset prices at time T with risk-neutral measure r and




expected payoff of European call option with strike pa, and
∫ pb
0 (pb − p)f(p)dp
is European put option with strike pb. Together the expected loss of the dealer
from informed traders would be equal to the sum of 2 option prices: one call
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at pa and one put at pb. This also resembles Long Straddle option portfolio
discussed in Chapter 2, although it requires both call and put to have the same
strike price. Below formula shows how the cost of dealer from informed traders
can be computed using the risk-neutral price of the long straddle:
piI = C(T1, pa) + P (T1, pb) (4.42)
where C(T1, pa) is Black-Scholes call price with strike pa and P (T1, pb) is Black-
Scholes put price with strike pb.
However in our current case, we are not dealing with asset prices, but with
option prices. Therefore the informed trader evaluating the option prices, must
virtually create another type of option which takes as an underlying European
option contract itself. This type of option is commonly referred as compound
options, and its payoff involves the value of another option at the time of
expiration. Hence it has 2 expiration times, one for the compound option
itself T1, to enable its holder to buy or sell European option at indicated price,
and the expiration time of the underlying option T2, for which its holder can
buy or sell an asset. It is clear that the expiration time of the compound
option T1 must come first than the expiration time of underlying option T2,
so T1 < T2. Similarly, there are 2 strike prices for compound option, K1 is the
exercise price at which the underlying option is traded at maturity, and K2
is the strike price of an underlying option. In this way, at expiration time T1
trader decides whether to exercise the compound option, and if it is exercised,
the trader will have the right to buy, say, call option at strikeK2 forK1 dollars.
This describes ’Call on Call’ type of compound option. In total, we can have
4 variations of such compound options, define their intrinsic values as follows:
1. Call on Call - CoC(T,K): Right to buy call option C@(T2, K2) at time
T1 at price K1. The bounds of the call on call option are defined as:
max{C(K2, T1)−K1, 0} ≤ CoC(T1, K1) ≤ C(K2, T1) (4.43)
2. Call on Put - CoP (T,K): Right to buy put option P@(T2, K2) at time
T1 at price K2. The bounds of the call on call option are defined as:
max{P (K2, T1)−K1, 0} ≤ CoP (T1, K1) ≤ P (K2, T1) (4.44)
3. Put on Call - PoC(T,K): Right to sell call option C@(T2, K2) at time
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T1 for price K2. The bounds of the call on call option are defined as:
max{K1 − C(K2, T1), 0} ≤ PoC(T1, K1) ≤ C(K2, T1) (4.45)
4. Put on Put - PoP (T,K): Right to sell put option P@(T2, K2) at time
T1 for price K2. The bounds of the call on call option are defined as:
max{K1 − P (K2, T1), 0} ≤ PoP (T1, K1) ≤ P (K2, T1) (4.46)
where C(T,K) denote the market price of European call option with strike K
at time T , and we use P (T,K) for put option.
Geske has derived the risk-neutral valuation of compound options using the
Black-Scholes framework [66, 87]. All 4 variations of compound options have
closed form solutions that return the risk-neutral price for given set of parame-
ters T1, T2, K1, K2 and the rest of the market parameters such as risk-free rate
r, asset spot price S0, asset price volatility σ, etc. Below are these solutions,
as they were written in Geske’s paper [66].
















2. Call on Put: Risk-neutral price for Call on Put option is:
































4. Put on Put: Risk-neutral price for Put on Put option is:










































b2 = b1 − σ
√
T1
T1 and K1 are the expiration time and strike price of compound option
T2 and K2 are the expiration time and strike price of underlying European
option
S0 is the stock price at the time when compound option is issued
S∗T1 is the root asset price which makes the Black-Schole’s value of the
underlying option with parameters (T2, K2) equal to K1 at time T1.
M(a, b, ρ) is standard normal bivariate cumulative distribution for values
a and b, and correlation coefficient ρ.
N(a) is standard normal cumulative distribution for value a.
Hence the total loss from informed traders (4.41) is equal to the cost of straddle
strategy with call and put options, if the asset being traded is an option itself
the value of which is derived from the asset price behaviour. Therefore we
can go one step further, and use call option, without loss of generality, as an
underlying, to construct straddle strategy using compound options. In case of
call option C@(T2, K2), our straddle strategy would look as follows:
picI = CoC(T1, pa) + PoC(T1, pb) (4.52)
where pa is the dealer’s ask price for call option C@(T2, K2) and pb is the
dealer’s bid price for the same option.
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And for put option P@(T2, K2), the straddle with compound options:
pipI = CoP (T1, pa) + PoP (T1, pb) (4.53)
where pa is the dealer’s ask price for put option P@(T2, K2) and pb is the
dealer’s bid price for the same option.
Using formulas (4.52) and (4.53), we can easily compute the expected loss of
the dealer from informed traders for given bid-ask spread on either call or
put option. The rational bidder has to find such bid-ask spread which would
minimise his expected loss, while at the same time increase his profit from
liquidity traders. Let us assume that the dealer wants to know the expected
loss from the informed traders for trading a European call C@(0.5, $105) (i.e
with time to maturity 6 months, and strike $105). Also let us assume that the
dealer finds out the true value of the option only at the maturity of the option,
and not before. In this way, he can clearly know who was the informed trader
and how much loss he made by selling lower or buying higher than given true
price. For sell-side it can be equivalent to the cost of ’Call on Call’ price and for
the buy side it is ’Put on Call’ price. Note that in both cases T1 = T2, meaning
that both compound options are exercisable only at the maturity date of the
underlying option. So T1 is the time when the dealer finds out the true value of
the option, T2 is the underlying option’s expiry date, and they are both equal.
So in order to compute the expected loss from both selling and buying options,
dealer uses the (4.52) formula and computes CoC(0.5, pa) + PoC(0.5, pb) for
different values of pa and pb. I have plotted this in a colour map shown in
Figure 4.15:
One cautionary note for the loss in case pa < pb is that it is equal to infinity
for obvious reasons, although in Figure 4.15 colorbar it looks as if that it is
equal to $10. We can also see in Figure 4.15 that the dealer’s loss is minimised
when his bid-ask spread is wide, while the loss is almost approximately $8.70
if the bid-ask spread is zero at price $10. The dealer needs to minimise his
loss by maintaining wider bid-ask spread as much as possible without loosing
more profit from liquidity traders.
Information-based dealer uses option pricing technique to evaluate the ex-
pected loss from informed traders in underlying market with given parameters,
not the value of the option being traded. Figure 4.15 illustrates the expected
loss for arbitrary bid and ask prices pa and pb. The algorithm chooses such
181
Figure 4.15: Information-based dealer’s expected loss from informed traders
for given bid and ask prices
pa and pb around computed option price pˆ which minimises the expected loss.
But we can see from the Figure 4.15 that maximum pa and minimum pb has
the lowest expected loss. This would mean that the dealer will simply main-
tain the widest possible bid-ask spread in order to avert any other trader from
trading with him.
In contrast to the cost incurred by informed traders, the dealer needs to make
profit too. Otherwise his bid-ask spread is always set to the maximum breadth.
So we can assume that the dealer makes profit by trading options with other
uninformed traders. The gain from trading with the liquidity traders can be
computed given the prior knowledge about the probability distribution of liq-
uidity trader’s actions. Liquidity traders can engage in three types of actions:
1) buying ϕB, 2) selling ϕA or 3) staying silent ϕS, while the probability for the
informed trader’s action is always 1 on either of the actions. This is because
informed traders are rational, and always take action which is most beneficial
to them. Liquidity trader on the other hand, due to the lack of the information
cannot exhibit such rationality. Dealer can find out the PMF of these actions
by observing the orders coming from uninformed traders. For example, dealer
knows how many traders are involved in the market, he can find out if the
order was informed/uninformed after the asset price is realised at time T . He,
of course, knows how many of them were bids, and how many were asks. In
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such way, he can find the PMF from given sample of historic orders: ϕB = NBN ,




Similar to inventory-based dealer, information-based dealer delegates the op-
tion pricing to respective module which decides the true value of the option
for himself. It can be Black-Scholes price or any other pricing method we dis-
cussed in Section 4.3. Let this price be pˆ. Then the dealer can determine his
expected profit from filling uninformed orders:
piU = ϕB(pa − pˆ) + ϕA(pˆ− pb) + ϕS ∗ 0 (4.54)
Note that in equation (4.54), the last term means that the dealer does not make
any profit from silent traders, therefore it is equal to zero. We can combine
equations (4.54) and either (4.52) or (4.53) depending on what is being traded
to one equation which denotes the total expected payoff of information-based
dealer. It is given below:
pi = (1− θ)piU − θpiI (4.55)
I have simulated several occasions of dealer setting bid-ask spreads based on
different beliefs and factors to show what are the important aspects that affect
the width of the spread. In particular, I set the proportion of silent liquidity
traders to ϕS = 0, and ranged ϕB ∈ [0.9, 0.07]. Obviously, we can figure out
by ϕA = 1 − ϕB. I also changed the ratio of informed traders θ from 0.9 to
0.07, and observed how it may affect dealer’s payoff if he sets different bid-ask
spreads. The dealer is given with pˆ = 5 (i.e. evaluated value of the option).
Figure 4.16 illustrates how θ and ϕB may affect the dealer’s expected payoff.
In Figure 4.16, we can see that the payoff of the dealer significantly depends
on θ. When 90% of the traders are informed, the dealer cannot compensate
his loss even if he sets a spread pa = 10 and pb = 0 for the option worth $5.
This tells us that there is an informed traders who knows the fact that the
asset price is going to be above $115 at maturity, and it is very likely that the
dealer will encounter this informed trader and sell call C@(0.6, 105) at cheaper
$10 price. In such case, the dealer’s expected payoff is negative meaning he
will loose about $1 per deal. The loss gets even bigger, once dealer narrows
his bid-ask spread. However, once the ratio of informed traders is below 50%,
there is chance that the dealer can make profit. According to Figure 4.16, the
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Figure 4.16: Information-based dealer’s expected payoff for given bid-ask
spread
optimal ratio of informed traders for the dealer to break even is somewhere
around 0.48.
Once dealer starts to make profit, ϕB becomes an important factor. The
bottom line of color subplots in Figure 4.16 shows that the change in ask
price pa can significantly affect the total expected payoff when there are many
liquidity buyers ϕB = 0.9. It can be also noticed that the change in bid price pb
is less important for dealer’s profit when there are many buyers. It is different
when the proportion of liquidity buyers is less than sellers, and ϕB = 0.07. We
can see now that the payoff is mostly affected by the change in bid price pb, and
the dealer is less sensitive to the changes in ask price pa. Hence, the probability
of liquidity trader’s action is key parameter in optimising the dealer’s payoff.
From Figure 4.16, we can also conclude that the best bid-ask spread in all
cases is the widest one, which is (0,10). However this is not realistic, because
the volume of orders depends directly on the prices set by the dealer. If the
dealer sets too wide bid-ask spread, he might loose the volume from liquidity
traders. The volume from informed traders is assumed to be the same as
from liquidity traders, because by setting higher volume, informed traders
might reveal themselves and can significantly impact the prices. Therefore it
is commonly assumed that the informed traders conceal their orders as if they
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are coming from liquidity traders, and hence set the same average quantity as
the liquidity traders.
Dealer can model the demand and supply functions depending on the condi-
tions of the market, however for the simplicity sake I will use linear function
as I did for inventory-based dealer in Section 4.5.1. The method that I ac-
cepted for modelling the linear supply and demand functions is equivalent to
arrival rate functions in inventory-based trader case. So for this experiment,
I use λa(·) and λb(·) for depicting the order arrivals to buy and sell to the
dealer respectively. We can incorporate these functions with the expected




pi = [(1− θ)piU − θpiI ]ᵀ λ (4.56)
where
λ = (λa(pa), λb(pb))
piU = (ϕB(pa − pˆ), ϕA(pˆ− pb))
piI ∈ {(CoC(T1, pa), PoC(T1, pb)), (CoP (T1, pa), PoP (T1, pb))}
λa(pa) arrival of buy orders at dealer’s ask price pa.
λb(pb) arrival of sell orders at dealer’s bid price pb.
I have simulated the objection function given in (4.56) to see how the arrival
of orders affect the dealer’s expected payoff. We used the same parameters for
the linear arrival functions λa(·) and λb(·) that were defined for the inventory-
based dealer. So the dealer assumes that arrival functions intersect on pˆ and
the equilibrium volume is 4. Second, the dealer assumes that no one sells any
option at zero price, hence making the supply equal to zero. And third, the
demand function λa(·) takes the negated slope of the supply function λb(·).
Figure 4.17 illustrates the results.
Solving (4.56) would give us the optimal bid-ask spread for given option,
and allow the Copeland-Galai dealer to set optimal bid-ask spread based on
his belief in the proportion of informed/uninformed traders, probability of
buy/sell/silent actions of uninformed traders and the actual given option price
pˆ and dealer’s model on supply and demand functions. From Figure 4.17 it can
be seen that such optimum exists for any combination of informed traders and
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Figure 4.17: Information-based dealer’s expected payoff for given bid-ask
spread involving the order arrival functions
buy/sell behaviour of liquidity traders. Moreover we can also notice that this
optimum is uniquely determined for linear arrival functions: λa(·) and λb(·)
which strictly decrease and increase respectively.
In Figure 4.17, it can be noticed that the population of informed traders can
significantly affect the expected income of the dealer as it was shown in Figure
4.16 too. It also stresses that sticking to the maximum bid-ask spread is the
optimal strategy for the dealer in case there are more than 90% informed
traders in the market. However the optimal point shifts downwards as the
number of informed traders decreases, making the optimal bid-ask spread more
narrow. For example, in case if there are only 7% of informed traders in the
market, the dealer is better off with the bid-ask spread of (2,8) for estimated
option price pˆ = 5. On the other hand, the liquidity trader’s buying behaviour
can skew the dealer’s expected payoff range horizontally giving the dealer wider
range of ask prices maintaining approximately the same payoff. Similarly, the
lean on the seller side would increase the range for the potential bid prices for
the dealer.
To conclude, I use information-based dealer which takes Copeland and Galai’s
algorithm as a base for trading options as one of the potential market partic-
ipants in simulated option market environment because it adapts its bid-ask
range based on the beliefs in the population of informed traders, liquidity
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traders’ behaviour and order arrival functions. This is a reasonable model
which allows dealer’s to minimise their potential losses and gain some profit.
I use COP- prefix to denote this proxy trading algorithm.
4.5.2 Traders
In this section, I employ proxy trading algorithms that continuously adapt
to the changes in the market and can be used by traders to update their
orders. These trading methods are mostly used in simulating CDAs due to
their simplicity in implementation, computational tractability and effectiveness
in trading performance.
Zero-Intelligence Plus Trader
One famous example of such algorithm is ZIP developed by Cliff and Bruten in
1997 [29]. Gode and Sander tested random-like Zero Intelligence (ZI) trading
agent which does not take into account any conditions in the market and
does not follow any profit while making offers [74]. He also introduced budget
constraints for ZI trader (i.e. ZIC trader) which prevented the trader from
incurring into loss. ZIC traders randomly pick prices to quote within the range
of minimum allowed bid in the CDA and agents private limit price. Thus ZIC
agents have profit margin determined by the difference between maximum
(if buyer) or minimum (if seller) price the agents can afford and the current
market price. If this difference turns negative agent does not participate in any
trade. Cliff, on the other hand, improved this kind of trader with little more
intelligence toward predicting the future prices. It uses previous prices and its
past experience to forecast the future price. Based on this future price, ZIP
algorithm adapts its internal profit margin to current market trend. Whenever
ZIP buyer receives an offer which is lower than its last order, it will decrease
its profit margin. For ZIP seller if the offer it receives exceeds the price that he
submitted it increases its profit margin. On the other hand, ZIP traders will
also adapt their quotes if the market is highly competitive and their orders are
continuously unsuccessful.
We talked about ZI traders in previous section, and these type of traders which
are normally regarded as noise traders, mostly engage in speculation with the
market. And of course one of such speculation techniques can be described
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using ZIP algorithm. According to this algorithm, trader starts the bidding
process with some arbitrarily low profit margin which he later increases or
decreases based on the events happening in the market. These events include
the successful execution of bids and asks submitted to the market. Let us
denote the last submitted order as s(t), trader’s current bid pb(t), and current
ask pa(t). Then we can describe the ZIP algorithms for generating asks and
bids as follows in Algorithms 2 and 3:
Algorithm 2 ZIP Generation of Asks
Require: s(t)
if s(t) is accepted then
if pa(t) ≤ s(t) then
pa(t+ 1) = increaseAsk(s(t))
end if
if s(t) is bid and pa(t) ≥ s(t) then
pa(t+ 1) = decreaseAsk(s(t))
end if
else if s(t) is ask and pa(t) ≥ s(t) then
pa(t+ 1) = decreaseAsk(s(t))
end if
Algorithm 3 ZIP Generation of Bids
Require: s(t)
if s(t) is accepted then
if pb(t) ≥ s(t) then
pb(t+ 1) = decreaseBid(s(t))
end if
if s(t) is ask and pb(t) ≤ s(t) then
pb(t+ 1) = increaseBid(s(t))
end if
else if s(t) is bid and pb(t) ≤ s(t) then
pb(t+ 1) = increaseBid(s(t))
end if
For decreasing and increasing the prices gradually so they follow the last sub-
mitted order and the estimated price of the option pˆ, I have to implement an
adaptive decrease and increase functions. This can be achieved by using
simple technique implemented by Cliff and Bruten[29] using adaptive profit
margin µ(t) ∈ [0.1, 0.5] between some arbitrary range. In this way the bid or
ask prices pb(t) and pa(t) can be computed using corresponding profit mar-
gins µb(t) and µa(t). Below is the function which ZIP trader computes for
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determining the prices.
pb(t) = pˆ(1 + µb(t)) (4.57)
pa(t) = pˆ(1 + µa(t)) (4.58)
Because the formulas for pb(t) and pa(t) are symmetric, I describe how increase
and decrease operations are done for one of them, namely for the bid. Trader
adapts its margin function to the events happening in the market. Below are
the list of recursive functions that make the profit margin of ZIP trader:
µb(t+ 1) =
pb(t) + Γb(t+ 1)
pˆ
− 1 (4.59)
Γb(t+ 1) = γΓb(t) + (1− γ)∆ Γ(0) = 0 (4.60)
∆ = β(τ − pb(t)) (4.61)
τ = Rs(t) + A (4.62)
where
µb(t), µa(t) are profit margins for both bid and ask. Initial values for
the profit margins are drawn from uniform distribution µb(0), µa(0) ∼
U(0.1, 0.5).
Γ(t) recursively defined autoregressive function which imposes the effect
of previous price on current bid.
∆ variable representing the convergence of current bid to target price τ
through learning coefficient β
τ variable representing the private target price of the trader. It is a
perturbed value drawn from uniformly distributed random variables.
R is relative perturbation factor where R ∼ U(1, 1.05) if target price
should be raised, and R ∼ U(0.95, 1) if dropped. A represents ab-
solute perturbation, where A ∼ U(0, 0.05) if target price should be
raised, and A ∼ U(−0.05, 0) if it should decreased. R and A are ran-
dom variables uniformly distributed in an arbitrary range. The big-
ger the range is, the more volatile the trader prices are. By quick
analysis, we can conclude that the target price may vary within τ ∈
[1.05 ∗ s(t) + 0.05, 0.95 ∗ s(t)− 0.05] based on above given ranges. So it
will not go far from the last order s(t).
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β is the learning coefficient of the trader which affects the speed of con-
vergence with the trader’s private target price τ . It is drawn from
β ∼ U(0.1, 0.5) while initialising the trader.
γ is the momentum coefficient, or the lag effect of the last price on current
price. It is drawn from γ ∼ U(0.2, 0.6).
In order to simulate ZIP trader, it must operate within some mechanism,
because its orders depend on the outcome of the mechanism. I run CDA
in Chapter 6 to observe how option prices adapt to the changes inside the
mechanism using ZIP algorithm.
However, in this section, in order to demonstrate how ZIP trader can adjust his
bids and asks to changing market parameters, I run historic records of option
prices on NASDAQ index as accepted orders. We have to be very careful
while using the term ’historic records of option prices’, because they are not
the actually traded or even quoted prices of the options. It is impossible to find
a certain option contract with a continuous open interest in the market over
the period of long time. This is due to the multiplicity of different variations
of option contracts available in the market, and not everyone willing to take
part in trading each of these contracts in his daily trading routine. Therefore
bids and asks on certain options are occasional, and the data on their real
historical values is very limited. Fortunately, we have talked about volatility
surface in Section 4.2.1, and how we can use it to approximate the option’s
value from given market data using implied volatility parameter discussed in
Section 4.3.2. Hence I use these tools to evaluate the theoretical Black-Scholes
price of the option and make a fixed bid-ask spread around it to simulate the
historical prices of the option.
For example, I took an option contract registered as ’NDX-161216C04320000’,
indicating call expiring on 16 December 2016 with strike $4320, and plotted its
Black-Scholes price between 02.01.2014 and 31.12.2014 based on the implied
volatility obtained from constructing the volatility surfaces for each day of
above period. While plotting the volatility surface, the whole option chain
traded on given day is used. Historical prices of the ’NDX-161216C04320000’
option contract and NASDAQ-100 index itself are listed in Tables A.3 and A.2
in the Appendix A. The risk-free rate is taken from the return of 2-year T-Bill
2 within the same period of time which is listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix
A. A Figure 4.18 shows the fixed bid-ask spread around theoretical historical
2source: http://www.treasury.gov/
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Figure 4.18: Historical prices of NDX-161216C04320000 from 02.01.2014 to
31.12.2014
prices in a shaded area. The historical prices in this case is nothing but Black-
Scholes prices fed with the approximated historical implied volatility.
Next I simulated ZIP trader having Black-Scholes prices as his evaluated pˆ
price, and bids and asks given in Figure 4.18 as accepted bids and asks for
each trading day. ZIP trader takes different values of learning coefficient β
and momentum γ. Figure 4.19 illustrates my results for these settings.
It can be seen from Figure 4.19, the learning coefficient β controls the adaptive
behaviour of the trader to new option price. The higher is the β, the faster
the trader gets adapted to new prices which are in given case Black-Scholes
prices. These prices can be replaced with any option pricing technique we
have discussed in Section 4.3, and ZIP applied upon it. On the other hand,
we can also notice that γ determines the momentum of traders direction. This
highlights the fact that the trader is likely to follow his previous direction,
rather than fully adapting to new price. An example of (β = 0.5, γ = 0.9)
illustrates that trader’s ask price goes beyond the Black-Scholes price once
it starts to grow at the end of the year, and results in a short-term peak in
mid-December 2014. This is the result of the accumulated momentum, and its
significant effect in determining the next ask price.
Because the current ZIP did not interact with above market, it is hard to
evaluate his expected profit, because it depends on whether of his orders have
been cleared by the mechanism. Therefore we could not present the statistics
about its performance based on historic data. I shall provide more details
while simulating ZIP trader in online DAs. I will refer to traders who use ZIP
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Figure 4.19: ZIP bids and asks on NDX-161216C04320000 from 02.01.2014 to
31.12.2014
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proxy algorithm with the prefix ZIP- onwards.
Gjerstad and Dickhaut Trader
Gjerstad and Dickhaut proposed different approach for trading agents which
is based on a belief function that agent develops to estimate if a particular
order is likely to be accepted in the market [69]. It uses Bayes rule for cal-
culating the probability of the success of the order to be submitted. In other
words, the traders build their beliefs based on the frequencies of submitted
bids and asks and the frequencies of the accepted bids and asks succeeded in
transaction. GD strategy also takes into account a memory length for using
only recently occurred data. So GD strategy will always place most likely and
most profitable quotes.
The quotes submitted to the market must be broken into corresponding bins,
so we could compute the histogram for each listed case below.
TA(p) - total number of accepted asks for price p
RA(p) - total number of rejected asks for price p
A(p) - total number of submitted asks for price p
TB(p) - total number of accepted bids for price p
RB(p) - total number of rejected bids for price p
B(p) - total number of submitted bids for price p
In GD algorithm, the probabilities are computed for given price p. However the
option price subjects to change over time as it approaches maturity. Hence the
sample becomes biased towards fixed prices. Therefore instead of keeping the
statistics of TA,RA,A, TB,RB and B for prices, I better do this for the ratios
of submitted bid or ask price with Black-Scholes price. In this way, we can keep
track with constantly changing option prices as they approach maturity, and
at the same time have the posterior probability unbiased towards fixed prices.
So in GD, p stands for the ratio of p/pBS where pBS is the corresponding
Black-Scholes price.
GD algorithm defines formulas for updating the beliefs of sellers and buyers. As
we did for ZIP trader, we will also combine both buying and selling behaviour
into a single trader. Trader’s sell-side belief in the success of his ask price
pa will be measured with posterior PMF fa(pa). For any p′a < pa such that
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p′a is rejected by market-maker, the trader assumes that the ask pa will also
be rejected. And similarly, for any p′a > pa such that p′a is accepted, then pa
should also be accepted. The reason for that is the buyer is always interested
in buying for less, and if his bid is cleared at higher p′a price, it will be surely
cleared at less pa. We can write these rules more formally as given below:
fa(pa|p′a rejected; p′a < pa) = 0 (4.63)
fa(pa|p′a accepted; p′a > pa) = 1 (4.64)
Trader can determine the optimal pa between the lowest rejected and highest
accepted asks by maximising the probability of success based on his posterior












Similarly for buyer-side, we can draw the same rules symmetrically. If p′b such
that p′b > pb is rejected, then the lower bid pb will be rejected too. If p′b such
that p′b < pb is accepted, then the higher bid pb will be accepted too. Formally,
it is as follows:
fb(pb|p′b rejected; p′b > pb) = 0 (4.66)












Of course, above belief functions (4.65) and (4.68) depend on the data that has
been accumulated from past bids and asks. The length of the history data to be
used can define the memory of the trader. Trader can become more myopic by
reducing the number of bids and asks he uses in order to compute his posterior
beliefs. Trader can even fit an approximation function which replicates the last
couple of bids and asks, and use it as one of his belief functions. Gjerstad and
Dickhaut proved that fa(·) and fb(·) functions must be monotonically non-
increasing and non-decreasing respectively. For that purpose, traders can use
a polynomial function with the order of at least 3.
Based on obtained probabilities, we can obtain the expected payoff of the
strategy, by simply finding the optimal bid-ask spread around estimated option
194
price pˆ.
p∗a = arg max
pa∈(pbmin ,pamax )
fa(pa)(pa − pˆ)+ (4.69)
p∗b = arg max
pb∈(pbmin ,pamax )
fb(pb)(pˆ− pb)+ (4.70)
where pˆ is evaluated option price, pbmin is the minimum outstanding bid, and
pamax is the maximum outstanding ask.
Because the algorithm requires direct interaction with the mechanism itself, we
cannot simulate it without running a CDA. Moreover the real life data on intra-
day submissions of bids and asks for options is too limited, or not available
at all. Therefore it is difficult to test the performance of GD algorithm on
trading options separately. I will take more closer look on its performance
while simulating it in online DAs in Chapter 6. I refer to the trader who use
GD algorithm for trading with the prefix GD- later on in this thesis.
There are other improvements of GD algorithm, and one has been proposed
by the original authors. GDX algorithm is the optimization of GD which
performs much faster and uses dynamic programming methods for optimally
using resources available [104, 105]. However they are not used in this paper.
4.6 Summary and Contribution
In this chapter, I have discussed the important aspects of building option
trading agents starting from the simulation of ZI traders to actual trading
algorithms they use in online mechanisms. Also I have covered how agents can
use different option pricing techniques in order to create liquidity in the market
and work around the ’no-trade’ outcome. I have also described how agents
obtain important knowledge about the market using two main techniques: a)
calibration method for determining the implicit volatility in the market, and
b) Bayesian learning in order to use new information to update the agent’s
prior beliefs in the example of informed traders. To sum up, I can summarise
the main contributions of the chapter as follows:
• IIKB Framework - I have extended the existing IKB framework devel-
oped by [160] with an additional layer responsible for inventory-based
agents and demonstrated its importance for LMSR, inventory-based or
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delta-hedging traders. I have explained the modules and their relation-
ship across the elements of the layers while describing the behavioural
layer.
• Volatility Surface - I have proposed an approximation rule for construct-
ing a volatility surface with incomplete data. It used existing market
prices in the option chain to determine the implied volatility for dif-
ferent strikes and expiration dates, and then interpolated the missing
data between existing data points. The interpolated implied volatility is
then used to price options and option portfolios using volatility pricing
technique.
• Zero-Intelligence Option Pricing - Similar to Gode and Sunder’s re-
search [74] in zero-intelligence pricing of assets, I have introduced zero-
intelligence pricing for options which returns random option prices within
the defined bounds of option’s possible intrinsic value. The option prices
are obtained from simulating 2 different asset pricing models till the
date of expiry of the option. This allows us to test ZI traders in different
mechanisms and measure their performance towards established option
pricing rules such as Black-Scholes.
• Indifference Option Pricing - I proposed to use two comparatively new
option pricing techniques as part of option trading agent’s pricing method:
1. the exponential utility which generates risk-averse price based on
agent’s utility indifference to the prices submitted in the market.
This allows agents to exhibit fear of trading at wrong price, and
thus charge more than expected for particular type of options.
2. LMSR based option pricing which is a new option pricing method
proposed by Othman et al. [42]. I incorporated LMSR pricing
rule into portfolio of options while pricing given option contract.
It allows traders holding different option portfolios to price given
option from the perspective of the overall payoff they can get by
selling or buying this option.
• Proxy Trading Algorithms for Options - I have implemented two types
of proxy trading algorithms: one for dealers whose main objective is
to maintain the market without running into loss and one for traders
whose main objective is to get the better deal in the market. I used
two algorithms for each, and adapted some of them uniquely for options.
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Below are the important contributions made to each of them:
1. Garman’s Model - This method involves computing the optimal
bid-ask spread for the dealer based on the probability of failure
given there is a model for the arrival of orders to the bidder and
it depends on the prices submitted by the dealer. I have incor-
porated Garman’s model into proposed IIKB framework. I have
reformulated the Garman’s method into LP for the inventory-based
trader, and provided an example regarding the arrival functions. I
simulated the risk of failure from holding a certain bid-ask spread
based on given example, and presented it as colormap chart. I also
proposed that inventory-based trader picks the narrowest possible
bid-ask spread which has minimum probability of failure.
2. Copeland and Galai’s Model - This method involves setting up bid-
ask spread based on dealer’s belief in the population of informed
traders in the market. I showed how agent can learn about the
population of informed traders using Bayesian technique when the
dealer realises the true intrinsic value of the option at the date of
its expiry. Dealer can induce the posterior probability of accepting
informed orders from this fact. Later, I have introduced Geske’s for-
mulas [66] for pricing compound options to calculate the expected
loss from informed traders, as it has been shown that it simulates
the straddle option portfolio. I used these components to formu-
late an objective function for the information-based dealer. Then
I computed the optimal bid-ask spreads for various proportions of
informed traders in the market. I also took into account different
ratios on buying and selling behaviour of liquidity traders.
3. ZIP and GD Traders - I have stacked up the option pricing mech-
anism on top of well-known proxy trading algorithms such as ZIP
and GD, and explained how they can interact together through
evaluated pˆ option price. I have also simulated ZIP algorithm for
historical prices of the option to see trader’s bid-ask spread adapts
to continuously changing environment under various factors ZIP
trader’s learning and momentum characteristics. ZIP trader had to
adapt its bid-ask spread to the option’s Black-Scholes price pˆ and
market bids and asks. As for GD trader, I used risk-neutral ratio of
the quoted price to compute the probabilities, instead of using the
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actual price as it was initially proposed by Gjerstad and Dickhaut.
Although I use above asset pricing, option pricing and proxy trading techniques
in testing proposed mechanisms in next chapters, I admit that the whole ar-
chitecture should be put to live testing and measured for the performance in
real option markets. However option markets are not very liquid for particu-
lar type of an option, and moreover direct access to the exchange is limited
to brokers only. Hence it is difficult and costly to undertake experiments on
real-time option markets. Moreover above algorithms oversimplify the market
microstructure based on certain assumptions. For example, I simplified the
arrival functions to linear functions whereas in real-world these functions are
not static and continuously take different shapes. The idea of informed traders
in the market is also oversimplification of the market structure where ones hold
valuable insider information and others are simply trading out of their private
interests. This kind of binary classification of traders is inappropriate in real-
life scenarios because information itself is incomplete due to future uncertainty,
and one can only have limited information which can affect the option price to
some extent but not fully predict its true value. To summarise, considering the
said assumptions, described methods employ most of the key aspects of option
trading and covers both classic and cutting-edge methods involved in option
pricing. It uses proxy trading algorithms from the perspective of a dealer and





There has been a growing interest in the research of markets as complex game-
theoretic systems since Myerson coined mechanism design as a framework for
strategic interactions between self-interested agents [119]. A new discipline of
auction theory emerged as a part of mechanism design, and it found its appli-
cations in solving many of well-known problems such as resource allocation,
scheduling, supply chain optimization, operations control and multi-agent sys-
tem implementation [36]. The ultimate goal of any auction is the allocation of
resources to agents through determining their true value otherwise unknown
to the seller or buyer. The space of auction types can be extended way be-
yond its classic format. They may vary in their initial settings, bidding rules,
market clearing methods etc. Parsons describes more than 30 variations of
auctions based on properties such as dimensionality, quantity and heterogene-
ity of traded items; direction, sidedness, openness of accepted bids; and kth
order prices in determining winners[134].
Standard financial theory provides a number of methods for calculating option
prices based on the market performance of an underlying asset. But there
are few models that take into account strategic interactions carried out by
automated agents, and their role in forming the prices. I have designed op-
tion trading agents in previous Chapter 4, and now I am going to use these
automated traders in auction settings set up for different scenarios in both un-
derlying and option markets. I provide a testable environment where various
market mechanisms and trading behaviours can be simulated and analysed.
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In this chapter, I present the design and simulation of a direct Double Auction
(DA) which can be used for trading options. The main aspects of proposed
DA are that it holds Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) and
individual rationality properties, along with approximate efficiency in the allo-
cation of multi-unit orders. The key aspect of the mechanism is that the orders
are considered atomic, which is an important requirement for traders wishing
to take option portfolios. However the mechanism lacks budget-balance and
therefore requires an additional agent who would cover the costs created from
facilitating the truthful trades.
The chapter is organised in following way. In Section 5.2, I start with the
definitions of DSIC mechanisms and other desired properties of the mecha-
nisms. Section 5.3 starts with the idea of McAfee’s DA [113] which matches
single-unit bids and asks with DSIC property and then extends it to multi-unit
DA with atomic orders. Then I follow up with the use of revelation principle
towards certain agents such as ZI traders. I also introduce the idea of simulta-
neous multi-unit DAs for trading option portfolios. In Section 5.4, I define the
main components of the experiments to run, and highlight the main indicators
collected from the simulations. I analyse the allocative efficiency and budget-
balance of the DA from obtained results in different experimental scenarios. I
investigate the analytical parameters of options such as Greeks obtained from
simulation results and compare them with Black-Scholes results. Section 5.5
does the important sanity check on the mechanism’s ability to simulate option
prices when all traders are set to be Black-Scholes traders. In Section 5.6 I
present my important findings from simulating different trading agents in pro-
posed mechanism through analysing the error in efficiency, budget-deficit that
each scenario imposes, along with the key indicators of option pricing method-
ology such as option prices, trade volumes, accepted orders, delta, gamma and
theta. Section 5.7 draws the summary of the chapter by emphasising the key
contributions and suggesting the further improvement that can be done to
proposed methodology.
5.2 DSIC Mechanisms
In designing economic mechanisms, there are two major considerations that
we should take into account: the maximisation of the gains of individuals par-
ticipating in the game, and the maximisation of the social surplus. Most of the
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economic systems such as markets, continuous DAs already accomplish these
goals according to competitive equilibrium result. However the processes that
govern such systems are very complex, and often misunderstood. The traders
employ sophisticated trading strategies to reach the desired efficiency, while ex-
changes have to continuously adjust their policies to meet the market demands
and safeguard them against unpredicted crushes. From game theorist perspec-
tive, we should address these systems by trying to analyse the interactions
and predict the final outcome that is likely to happen if all the participants of
the system keep on to their corresponding strategies. However as I noted ear-
lier, the decision making processes of market participants are extremely hard
to understand and subject to constant change, which makes any attempt to
predict the future hopeless.
However what if we change our perspective by posing different type of ques-
tions such as if we should investigate the game itself and try to improve it by
knowing the preferences of its participants, if we can design such game with-
out knowing the secret preferences of its participants, but guarantee that in
an equilibrium state the desired properties are held. If I apply this thought to
markets, the question is if it is possible to build such markets which are much
simplified for traders to interact with and also hold the desired properties of
currently established economic systems. How economically efficient would be
such mechanism? How computationally feasible is its implementation and op-
eration in real life? Often dubbed as ’inverse game theory’ [148], mechanism
design studies the implementation of protocols for distributed systems, not
necessarily cooperative, to attain specified goals. In other words, it is about
making rules for given game setting in such way that the equilibrium result is
almost the same as the expected result.
Before I start answering the above stated questions, let me define some of the
important concepts that I use throughout this chapter. This involves under-
standing how we can formulate problems correctly so the proposed mechanism
becomes its solution. First let us define what is a game setting for which the
mechanisms are developed.
Definition 5.2.1. Game Setting is described as a setup consisting of N agents,
O outcomes, Θ strategies (i.e. choice of actions) and a utility function ui :
O ×Θ→ R.
Definition 5.2.2. Quasi-linear Game Setting is a game setting where the
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outcome is O = X × Rn and utility function is defined as shown below:
ui(o, θ) = vi(x, θ)− fi(pi) (5.1)
where o = (x, p) is the mechanism outcome, x ∈ X non-monetary outcome,
p ∈ Rn is the monetary outcome, vi : X → R is the valuation function and
fi : R→ R is strictly monotonically increasing function.
Definition 5.2.3. Mechanism for a game setting is generally described as
the set of actions A available to agents, and a mapping function M : A →
Π(O) which turns actions into distribution of outcomes. Mechanism is called
deterministic if there is a bijective relationship between actions and outcomes.
So the job of the mechanism designer is to determine these list of actions
available to agents, and to design a function which would map these actions
into desired outcomes. The mechanism can be implemented using a dominant
strategy equilibrium.
Definition 5.2.4. Dominant strategy implementation is the implementation
of a mechanism which makes the desired outcomes the dominant strategy equi-
librium for participating agents.
In other words, the dominant strategy implementation means that the mecha-
nism provides agents a dominant strategy game and it assumes that the agents
are rational to follow this strategy. Once every agent plays his dominant strat-
egy, this results in dominant strategy equilibrium outcome which is the same
as the desired outcome. This type of mechanisms are also referred as ’strategy-
proof ’ mechanisms.
One type of strategy-proof mechanisms is DSIC mechanism where the truth-
fulness is the dominant strategy for the agent. It emerges from revelation
principle theorem [148] which states that if there is a strategy-proof mecha-
nism, then there is also a strategy-proof and truthful mechanism. The main
idea is that once there is an agent who has private information in his valuation
method vi which he uses to compute his utility for certain outcomes caused
by his corresponding actions, and he has set of actions that are dominant to
him, the agent can truthfully reveal his private information and his valuation
method to the mechanism which would run these dominant actions on his be-
half and reach the same dominant strategy equilibrium. This enables us to
simplify the complex systems where there is a dominant strategy, but it in-
volves series of sophisticated actions to achieve maximised utility. Agents can
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truthfully reveal their private methods to the mechanism, instead of carrying
out those actions themselves.
I review DSIC mechanisms from the perspective of a quasilinear mechanism
where the outcome consists of two types non-monetary and monetary values.
This game setting is incredibly good for viewing DAs as mechanisms. In terms
of DA, the outcome of the mechanism can be viewed as qi the quantity of
goods allocated to agent i and p anonymous clearing prices. The agent i will
buy (sell) the item qi is positive (negative). So the quantities for a pure seller
will be all negative, and for a pure buyer positive. I assume that the valuation
function vi(qi) will also reflect this relationship. Quasilinear utility assumption
also implies that agents are risk-neutral, because his utility changes linearly
for given quantity and price. In other words, agent is indifferent between the
outcomes of 5 and 10 goods allocated to him, or 1000 and 1005 goods allocated
to him. The changes in his utility are exactly the same in both cases, and so
the actual amount of the quantity does not affect his utility. However, risk-
neutrality in the context of option pricing must not be confused, as it involves
pricing options based on risk-free investment rates. Hence I re-formulate the
quasilinear function for DA case:
ui(oi, θi) = vi(qi, θi)− pqi (5.2)
where oi = (qi, p) is the DA outcome, qi is the allocation result for agent i, and
p is the anonymous price, and vi is the valuation function of the agent.
We can also see that the second term of (5.2) pqi satisfies the monotonically in-
creasing requirement of fi function defined for quasilinear utility. Also another
assumption that I introduced into this quasilinear function is the conditional
independence of agent’s utility. This would mean that the agent’s utility ac-
cepts θi instead of θ, meaning that it only depends on the agent’s own choice
of actions, and not the other agents involved in the DA. This would make the
agent’s valuation function vi independent on the actions of the other agents.
Now let us define the DA itself from the perspective of mechanisms.
Definition 5.2.5. Double Auction is a mechanism in a quasilinear setting
which is described as a tuple of three elements:
1. Ai is the set of actions available to the agent i in the form of a bid or
ask defined as a tuple (qˆi, vˆi) where qˆi denotes the declared quantity, and
vˆi the declared price. Negative qˆi implies sell action, and the positive qˆi
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implies the buy action. θi is the particular choice of actions (bids/asks)
that agent submits to the mechanism.
2. χ : A → Q is the allocation rule which maps the agents’ actions to
quantities of goods they are allocated with.
3. ρ : A → R is the payment rule which maps the agents’ actions to the
price they receive/pay for the goods
So the problem of the DA boils down to the generation of an outcome which
determines how many items the traders must buy or sell and at what price
this should happen. The outcome must be the result of the respective bids
and asks of the traders, and should possess certain desired properties that we
talk about later in this chapter.
Definition 5.2.6. Direct Double Auction is a DA where there is a dominant
strategy for each agent, so the choice of his actions is restricted to a single
dominant action which he always uses. As the actions in DA are bids and asks
of the agent, this would mean that agent has only one bid or ask to submit.
Thus the agent has only one bid or ask to submit in direct DA, this must be
the truthful bid or ask based on the revelation principle. In other words, out
of many possible values for (qˆi, vˆi), the agent only chooses the truthful one
making vˆi = vi(qˆi).
Definition 5.2.7. The DA is called efficient if its allocation result q satisfies∑
i vi(qi) ≥
∑
i vi(q′i) for any feasible allocations q and q′ in an equilibrium.
The feasible allocation implies that the mechanism should not allocate more
than offered. Formally this would mean ∑i qi ≥ 0. It can also be seen that
the equilibrium efficiency is measure using the true valuation of the allocation
result, not the declared one.
Definition 5.2.8. The DA is called strongly budget-balanced if its payment
rule satisfies ∑i ρ(θi) = 0 for any equilibrium profile of actions θ. The DA is
called weakly budget-balanced if its payment rule satisfies ∑i ρ(θi) ≥ 0 for any
equilibrium profile of actions θ.
The strong budget-balance of the DA would mean that it does not generate
any income, hence all its collected payments are paid back to participants. The
weaker version of budget-balance states that the mechanism can make profit,
but it should never take loss.
Although budget-balance and efficiency of the mechanism are highly desired
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qualities, they cannot come along with DSIC property according to Green-
Laffont, Hurwicz’s impossibility theorem [75, 90]. The theorem states that
there is no DSIC mechanism which both efficient and weakly budget-balanced
even in a single-unit DA. This would mean that there is no direct DA which
would hold both qualities at the same time. This result has been further gener-
alised by Myerson-Satterthwaite [119] in their theorem which states that there
is not even a BIC DA which simultaneously holds efficiency, weak budget-
balance and ex-interim individual rationality, even for the agents using quasi-
linear utility. BIC is weaker notion of incentive compatibility compared to
DSIC, because it does not guarantee the equilibrium outcome matching the
desired outcome, but it only attains the desired outcome on average. Ex-
interim individual rationality would mean that on average the trader knowing
his own valuation method, but not knowing the valuation methods of other
traders, is not worse off from participating in the market compared to staying
idle. In other words, if trader decides to enter the market, he must not be
charged more than what he quoted. Formally it can be defined as follows:
Ev−i|vi [vi(χ(θi, θ−i))− ρ(θi, θ−i)] ≥ 0 ∀i, vi (5.3)
where θ is the equilibrium profile, v−i valuation of traders other than i. Note
that the results of allocation function χ(θi, ·) = qi and payment function
ρ(θi, ·) = p ∗ qi for particular trader in direct DA.
From equation (5.3) we can see that the quasilinear utility of agent i when
applied both allocation and payment rules of the mechanism must not be less
than zero on average. In terms of options, the notion of individual rationality
of the mechanism must not be confused with the potential loss the trader may
have from buying or selling option contract. This type of loss is incurred by
the uncertainty in the underlying market and has no relation to the mechanism
where the options are traded.
Definition 5.2.9. The direct DA is called tractable if its allocation rule χ(θ)
and payment rule ρ(θ) can be computed in polynomial time.
To sum up this section, we have learned what DSIC mechanism is and how this
notion is translated to the definition of a direct DA. I have also defined key
aspects of DAs such as efficiency, budget-balance and individual rationality.
However the findings of Green-Laffont and Myerson-Satterthwaite have shown
that it is impossible to design a direct DA with these properties. But it should
not ruin our hope in designing a direct DA at least having the approximations
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of these properties with acceptable errors. We shall look at how the direct DA
can be designed, and what would be the worst case error in its efficiency and
budget-balance in the next section.
5.3 Design of Direct Double Auction
As I mentioned earlier in previous chapter, there are two major economic
concerns in developing mechanisms, they are the maximisation of individual
utilities and the social surplus. The question that comes next is how we can
design direct DA which would satisfy these needs. What is involved in design-
ing a direct mechanism in the first place and how should we choose allocation
and payment rules in order build such mechanisms? Myerson and Satterth-
waite proved that there are specific requirements for choosing such functions
in order to make the mechanism DSIC[119]. Here are these requirements:
1. Mechanism must be in a quasilinear game setting
2. Mechanism must not charge or reward the agents for not participating
3. Mechanism must have non-decreasing monotonic allocation rule
The first requirement stems from the definition of DA as a mechanism having
both monetary and non-monetary outcome. The second requirement ensures
that if the agents order is not allocated, he must not be charged or reward
with any payment, so his payment must be equal to zero. The most impor-
tant and the remarkable finding of Myerson and Satterthwaite is the third
requirement which specifically describes what the allocation rule must be cho-
sen. Non-decreasing monotonic allocation rule requires that the buyer (seller)
gets weakly more allocations for higher bid (lower ask).
Hence we know that the allocation rule must be non-decreasingly monotonic,
we can align this aspect with the initially desired property of established mar-
kets - surplus maximisation. This type of mechanisms are generally classified
as Groves mechanisms and formulated as follows:










where hi(vˆ−i) is an arbitrary function which does not depend on agent i’s
declared valuation.
It has been formally proven that surplus maximising allocation rule is non-
decreasingly monotonic [117], but it is also intuitive to see that this is true. In
nutshell, let us assume that the trader gets more allocation q′i > qi for vˆ′i < vˆi.
In this case, the allocation is not surplus maximisation because the result
of equation (5.4) could be improved by giving the q′i to vˆi bid. This would
mean that the surplus maximisation allocation rule can be used to design a
DSIC mechanism. In fact, the whole family of Groves mechanisms are DSIC
mechanisms [117].
Once the concrete implementation of allocation rule of DSIC mechanism is
clarified, the next step is the determination of the payment rule. Fortunately,
for above stated requirements, Myerson’s Lemma [119] defines unique and
explicit formulation of the payment rule that makes the mechanism DSIC.
This payment rule includes the critical values of each agent who has been
allocated with goods. Critical value of an agent is the value that the agent
needs to beat in order to get the good. For example, in terms of single-item
auction, the payment rule corresponds to the second price, because agents
must beat the second price to be the winner of the auction. It can be written
as follows:
Definition 5.3.1. For the mechanism satisfying the above requirements, the








where θi denote the agent i’s order, θ−i the orders of the rest of the agents,
and ∂χi(z,θ−i)
∂z
is the marginal allocation rule for the agent i.
The marginal allocation rule used in equation (5.6) determines some critical
value z at which the allocation of the agent changes from 0 to 1 in a single-unit
DA case. In multi-unit case, there could be many critical values that cause the
allocation monotonically increase from qi to q′i > qi. In this way, Myerson’s
payment rule states that the price agent has to pay must be equal to the sum
of the agent i’s critical values. However the critical values of the agent i are
not dependent on agent i’s own valuation, because they are formed from the
submitted orders of the other agents. This is the main reason why there is no
vi involved in computing the payment for agent i in Groves family of efficient
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mechanisms. However there is still undefined function hi(vˆ−i) to compute the
DSIC payments. In 1971, Clarke proposed the implementation of this function
must be such that the payment paid by the agent i is equal to the social cost
imposed by the agent i to the market [28]. It is evident that if the agent i
is allocated with the good, this would mean that someone else in the market
had to loose this good for this agent i. Thus agent i created a cost to the
mechanism which otherwise would not be the case. The social cost is obtained
by computing the difference between two terms: 1) Clarke tax - social surplus





and 2) the social surplus of the mechanism with agent i’s participation but his
bid not included in it. This gives us the explicit form of the payment rule also








Now we know how to build direct mechanisms based on surplus maximising
allocation rule and VCG payments. This mechanism is also efficient because
it is in the class of Groves mechanisms. However the VCG mechanism does
not hold individual rationality unless two additional assumptions are imposed,
which are also realistically plausible. First is the choice-set monotonicity which
makes an assumption that removing an agent from the mechanism weakly de-
creases the number of possible choices for the remaining agents. In other words,
the entrance of a new agent into the market does not eliminate the potential
matchings between existing agents, but otherwise creates new matchings in-
volving the new agent. Second assumption is the absence of negative external-
ities which means that every agent has non-negative utility for any choice that
mechanism can make without his participation. In the example of DA, this
would mean that agent makes no payment for the allocations of other agents
whether he does not participates in the market or participates but gets zero
allocation. If these assumptions are hold, then VCG mechanism is not only
efficient, but it is also ex-post individually rational.
Also VCGmechanism is not weakly budget-balanced even if above two assump-
tions are true. From (5.8) we can see that the equation can result in negative
payment if the first term (i.e Clarke tax) is greater than the second term. So
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the assumption that must hold for VCG to be weakly budget-balanced is the
no single-agent effect assumption, which states that the Clarke tax must be
weakly greater than maximised surplus without agent i’s valuation. In other
words, this would mean that other traders are weakly better off from the ab-
sence of agent i. Although this assumption holds for single-side auctions, it is
not true for DA because the mechanism has to subsidise the difference between
bids and asks.
However the savvy reader might notice that VCG payments are unique for
each agent i, while the direct DA that I defined earlier uses anonymous prices.
Because the direct DA that I propose is for trading options, and the options
are identical, most intuitively their prices must be the same too when traded
in multiple units. After all, the ultimate goal of the research is to price op-
tions using DAs, and it should be an anonymous price even if the mechanism
is subjected to loose one of its desired properties such as budget-balance. Un-
fortunately, if we wish to preserve the strategy-proofness of the mechanism, we
cannot have fully anonymous prices all the time. In a certain case, the prices
are different towards buyers and sellers. I shall talk about this in next section.
5.3.1 McAfee’s Double Auction
In this section, I review McAfee’s DA and reformulate its allocation rule into
LP problem. This would facilitate the design of proposed multi-unit DA in the
next section. McAfee’s DA is a direct DA which uses surplus maximisation
as its allocation rule. However it makes trade reductions to achieve individual
rationality and weak budget-balance by preserving the strategy-proofness of
the mechanism. Because it can generate positive income, it requires an addi-
tional agent who takes the surplus, but never buys or sells anything. It is also
computationally tractable and approximately efficient. The loss in efficiency
is bounded by 1/min(m,n), the number of buyers and sellers respectively.
McAfee’s DA is designed for single-unit bids and asks. The payment rule
employs both anonymous and bid-ask pricing.
McAfee’s allocation rule [113] (in the context of DAs, i.e. matching rule) can
be written as an order statistics of bids b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥ · · · ≥ b(m) and asks
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a(1) ≤ a(2) ≤ · · · ≤ a(n) matched as k ≤ min(m,n) such that
b(k) ≥ a(k) (5.9)
b(k+1) < a(k+1) (5.10)
.
We can reformulate this rule into a LP problem defined below:







s.t. λi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i (5.12)
qi ∈ {−1, 1} ∀i (5.13)∑
i
qiλi = 0 (5.14)
where represents sell/buy action by trader i, λi is an allocation decision vari-
able.
Theorem 5.3.1. For McAfee’s allocation rule, LP formulation (5.11) is cor-
rect.
Proof. From objective function (5.11), it can be seen that optimiser only finds
efficient trades. Given that the supply and demand is matched in constraint
(5.14), we can assume that the number of trades is k′ = (∑i λi)/2, hence we
have to prove k′ = k. Let’s assume that k′ < k, then it means that there is
b(k′+1) − a(k′+1) > 0 and optimiser could have added this difference to result
greater surplus. So it is not the maximum surplus. Let’s assume that k′ > k,
then it would mean that b(k′)−a(k′) < 0, and optimiser would be better off not
including this match into allocation, as it decreases the objective. Therefore
k′ = k.
McAfee’s pricing rule is applied for one of two cases:
• Anonymous Price: After allocation rule identifies k efficient trades, p0 =
(b(k+1) + a(k+1))/2 is computed from highest rejected bid and lowest re-
jected ask. If p0 ∈ [a(k), b(k)], all k efficient trades are cleared at p0, the
budget is balanced and ex-post individual rationality is hold.
• Two Prices: If p0 /∈ [a(k), b(k)], top k − 1 efficient trades are matched,
210
buyers pay b(k), sellers receive a(k). kth efficient trade is rejected. Mech-
anism makes (k− 1)(b(k)− a(k) profit. Individual rationality is also held,
because · · · ≥ b(k−2) ≥ b(k−1) > a(k) and vice versa for sellers.
The 2-price case can occur when the b(k) = b(k+1), because p0 = (b(k+1) +
a(k+1))/2 > b(k+1) = b(k), and thus k efficient trades cannot be cleared at p0
because it violates the individual rationality of kth trader. Therefore McAfee
mechanism clears the bids with the highest rejected bid, which is kth efficient
bid. This simulates the second-price Vickrey auction for bidders. Similarly
this thought can be applied to seller side as well.
Another important aspect is the tie-breaking for b(k) = b(k+1) where mechanism
has to choose whose bid to include, and whose do not. In McAfee’s DA this
is done through randomization, but in my case the numerical optimiser does
this operation on mechanism’s behalf.
5.3.2 Proposed Multi-Unit Double Auction
In this section, I extend McAfee’s DA to a multi-unit auction but in the process
I have to give up its weakly budget-balanced property and introduce an agent
who has to subsidise the exposed multi-unit bid or ask in order to preserve
strategy-proofness of the mechanism and the atomicity of orders. There have
been a number of multi-unit DA designs proposed previously [86, 102] which
support weak budget-balance property. However these mechanism partially
satisfy the orders to spread the excess demand (supply) to balance supply and
demand. In economics, supply and demand can be balanced using classic Wal-
rasian mechanism which pushes the price of good up and down until demand
equals supply. But this requires the assumption that the law of demand (sup-
ply) (i.e. marginal utility decreases (increases) with every transaction) hold for
every trader. However, because there are combinatorially many possible option
contracts available in the market, the demand and the supply are scattered,
and thus less competitive. I have explained RND-method of choosing quantities
for traders, and this clearly does not conform to the law of demand(supply).
Therefore DSIC version of a Walrasian mechanism (i.e. clinching auction) is
out of consideration for this purpose.
In Huang et al. ’s design [86], multi-unit DA solves a LP for surplus maximising
objective subject to the constraints on no buyer has to buy more than he needs
and no seller has to sell more than he wants. If there is an overdemand, each
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buyer’s demand is diminished evenly to eliminated the excess demand. The
same is applied to sellers if there is oversupply. There are separate clearing
prices for buyer and seller. The least winning bid and the greatest winning
ask are accepted as clearing prices for the rest of winning buyers and sellers
correspondingly and rejected for those buyer and seller who submitted them.
This mechanism is proven to be DSIC, ex-post individual rational, weakly
budget-balanced and asymptotically efficient.
Similarly, in Loertscher et al. ’s [102] mechanism reduces the overdemand
or oversupply through applying different pricing and allocation rules in each
given case. For example, if supply and demand balance then every winning
agent trades the quantity it requested at a reserve price r which is determined
inside the gap between the least winning bid and the greatest winning ask.
If there is overdemand, all winning sellers trade the quantities they posted
at r, but the clearing prices and the quantities for the buyers are discounted
using VCG. The same rule applies if there is an oversupply. This mechanism
is proven to be DSIC, ex-post individual rational, weakly budget-balanced and
asymptotically efficient.
In my design, I propose a multi-unit DA that preserves the atomicity of or-
ders at the expense of budget-balance. The mechanism is said to support the
atomicity of orders only if it either fully satisfies the multi-unit order or fully
rejects it. The key reason for an atomicity of orders in option market is that
it is crucial for the option trader who uses an option portfolio, because option
portfolio determines exactly at which quantity each type of option needs to
be sold or bought. Trader cannot take quantity less than requested, because
the violation of atomicity of orders would result in the distortion of option
portfolio as a whole. This in its effect change the trader’s payoff structure and
may go against his belief in certain future events. Both Huang et al. and Lo-
ertscher et al. provide solutions to cut the overdemand/oversupply in various
ways to preserve the budget-balance, but my proposed mechanism gives up
budget-balance in favour of atomicity of orders. In order to accomplish that,
my mechanism will also have the right to trade with participating agents, and
its trade will be limited to the amount that partially satisfies certain agent’s
winning order.
Now let us extend McAfee’s mechanism to multi-unit mechanism. Then con-
sider multi-unit bid as a tuple bi = (bi, qi) where bi is per unit bid, and qi is
the amount demanded. The same is defined for multi-unit ask. We can split
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this tuple into set of equally-valued single-unit bids bi =
⋃qi
t=1 bi,t. This can be
done to asks as well. Then we have complete set of bids b = ⋃ni=1 bi and asks
a = ⋃ni=1 ai. We can use single-unit McAfee’s mechanism to find the allocation
and payment. However, we can observe below that not all bids/asks can be
fully satisfied.
Lemma 5.3.1. In multi-unit McAfee’s mechanism, there exists at most one
multi-unit bid/ask which is partially satisfied, and the remaining winning bids/asks
are fully satisfied.
Proof. Let us assume that we use McAfee’s matching rule for expanded set of
single-unit bids b and asks a ordered subsequently by its host multi-unit bid
or ask. Then we should have some k such that b(k) ≥ a(k) and b(k+1) < a(k+1)
for their constituent single-unit bids and asks. We can also claim, without loss
of generality, that there exists such a multi-unit bid bi such that two of its bids
b(k), b(k+1) ∈ bi. This would imply that b(k) = b(k+1) because multi-unit bidder
sets single price per unit, and this price is the same for all bids inside multi-
unit bid. However, there cannot be some multi-unit ask aj having asks such
that a(k) = a(k+1), because it contradicts with b(k) ≥ a(k) and b(k+1) < a(k+1).
Hence, a(k) and a(k+1) must belong to different multi-unit asks. It must also
be the case that the multi-unit ask which owns a(k) is fully satisfied, and so
do other preceding winning multi-unit asks. This is also true for all multi-
unit bids preceding the multi-unit bid which owns b(k). We can conclude that
multi-unit bid which owns b(k) is partially satisfied, and it is the only such
multi-unit order among other winning multi-unit orders.
I can formulate an LP problem for for multi-unit bids and asks where λi ∈ [0, 1]
now. So it is not binary any more, and takes any value between 0 and 1. When
it takes 1, the multi-unit bid/ask is fully satisfied, zero means it is rejected.
But when λi ∈ (0, 1), the agent i is partially satisfied.
Definition 5.3.3. For given vectors of valuations and quantities (v, q), allo-






s.t. λi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i (5.16)∑
i
qiλi = 0 (5.17)
qi ∈ Z (5.18)
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where qi represents quantities, vi is the agent’s valuation, λi is an allocation
decision variable.
The solution of above allocation problem can be used to find the volume de-
manded and supplied. Below are the formulas for computing the volumes of








|qi| s.t. qi < 0, λi > 0 (5.20)
Let us denote the number of multi-unit bids matched (both fully and partially)
as K, and for multi-unit asks L. Also Kth multi-unit bid would mean the
lowest bid matched, and Lth multi-unit ask would mean highest ask matched.
I denote their quoted valuations as bK and aL, and quantities as bqK and aqL
respectively. From Lemma 5.3.1, we know that there is at most one λi ∈
(0, 1) exists, so let us denote this as λ∗. It can also be noted that if such λ∗
exists, it either belongs to Kth multi-unit bid, or Lth multi-unit ask. Now
depending on whether λ∗ exists, and if it exists, to whom it is assigned to, we
apply appropriate payment rule. There are 3 cases that can emerge in this
mechanism:
1. No λ∗: This would mean that supply and demand is matched exactly,
hence Va = Vb. In this case, buyers pay at bK+1, sellers receive at
good aL+1. Because bK+1 < aL+1, mechanism subsidises the deficit of
Va(aL+1 − bK+1). Figure 5.1 illustrates supply and demand lines and
corresponding clearing prices for bids and asks. It also shows deficit
mechanism subsidises in blue-shaded A box.
2. λ∗ is assigned to buyer: This means that there is an over-demand, hence
Vb > Va. In this case, mechanism rejects Kth multi-unit bid. If there
is a tie, it is randomly resolved. The remaining K − 1 buyers pay bK
per unit, L sellers receive aL+1 per unit. As the implication of Kth
buyer rejection, a number of sellers at the bottom of the list can be
exposed to Va − Vb + bqK number of goods unmatched. So mechanism
pays out aL+1(Va − Vb + bqK) to them. Because bK < aL+1 and number
of full matches is Vb − bqK , mechanism subsidises in total the deficit
of (Vb − bqK)(aL+1 − bK) + aL+1(Va − Vb + bqK). Figure 5.2 illustrates
the supply and demand lines and corresponding clearing prices for bids
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Figure 5.1: Multi-unit DA pricing rule when supply and demand match
Figure 5.2: Multi-unit DA pricing rule when there is over-demand
and asks. It shows two deficits subsidised by mechanism: A denotes the
deficit from the difference of clearing bid and ask, and B denotes the
deficit created from mechanism buying from exposed asks.
3. λ∗ is assigned to seller: This means that there is an over-supply, hence
Vb < Va. In this case, mechanism rejects Lth multi-unit ask. If there
is a tie, it is randomly resolved. The remaining L − 1 sellers receive aL
per unit, K buyers pay bK+1 per unit. As the implication of Lth seller
rejection, a number of buyers at the bottom of the list can be exposed
to Vb−Va + aqL number of goods unmatched. So mechanism sells out in
total bK+1(Vb−Va+aqL) worth of goods, and generates income. Because
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Figure 5.3: Multi-unit DA pricing rule when there is over-supply
bK+1 < aL and number of full matches is Va−aqL, mechanism subsidises
in total the deficit of (Va−aqL)(aL+1− bK)− bK+1(Vb−Va+aqL). Figure
5.3 illustrates the supply and demand lines and corresponding clearing
prices for bids and asks. It shows one deficit and one gain taken by
mechanism: A denotes the deficit from the difference of clearing bid and
ask, and C denotes the income caused by mechanism selling to exposed
bids.
In above payment rules, mechanism is not only taking loss from clearing bids
and asks at their offsetting prices, but also covering the exposed bids and asks
resulting from the rejection of least efficient traders. Although the first part of
the mechanism’s loss can be insignificant in competitive markets due to narrow
difference between inefficient bid and ask, the second part contributes the large
portion of it, as the mechanism takes the responsibility to cover the exposed
bids or asks. Given that the difference between aL+1 − bK is insignificant, the
worst case budget-deficit for the mechanism is given below:
q¯(K − 1)(aL+1 − bK) + aL+1(q¯ − 1) (5.21)
In worst case budget-deficit scenario, all buyers submit cap quantities q¯, and
Kth multi-unit bid is covered for q¯− 1 of its bid. The mechanism rejects Kth
bid, and leaves q¯ − 1 quantities for matched asks exposed. Mechanism spends
extra aL+1(q¯ − 1) to cover these exposed asks. Hence it is the incentive of the
mechanism to keep q¯ as low possible to minimise its loss. For this purpose, I
shall also empirically analyse the budget-balance of the mechanism in different
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experimental cases in Section 5.6.
Theorem 5.3.2. Proposed multi-unit DA is DSIC and individual rational.
Proof. Proof is done using Vickrey’s argument. Without loss of generality, let
us assume buyer i submits multi-unit bid (bi, qi) and bi > vi.
1. No λ∗: Then the clearing price is bK+1, K buyers trade and there is
no partially satisfied bid. If buyer gets fully satisfied, then bi ≥ bK+1.
So buyer’s utility is vi − bK+1, and in case if it is vi < bK+1 buyer gets
negative utility, while if he posted vi he would not trade and his utility
would be zero. If vi ≥ bK+1, the utility is indifferent to truthful bidding.
If his bid is rejected, buyer is also indifferent, because his utility is zero.
2. λ∗ assigned to buyers: Then the clearing price is bK , K − 1 buyers trade
and there is one partially satisfied bid. If buyer gets fully satisfied, the
above Vickrey’s argument applies for critical bid bK . If buyer gets re-
jected, he is indifferent to truthful bidding. However if buyer is partially
satisfied, then bK = bi > vi, he is rejected and he would be rejected for
submitting vi. So he is indifferent.
3. λ∗ assigned to sellers: Then the clearing price is bK+1, K buyers trade
and there is no partially satisfied bid. The same argument for no λ∗ case
applies here.
In case if bidder submits bi < vi.
1. No λ∗: Then the clearing price is bK+1, K buyers trade and there is no
partially satisfied bid. If buyer gets fully satisfied, then vi > bi ≥ bK+1
and buyer has the same positive utility. If buyer gets rejected, and
vi > bK+1, buyer misses the positive utility, otherwise he is indifferent.
2. λ∗ assigned to buyers: Then the clearing price is bK , K − 1 buyers
trade and there is one partially satisfied bid. If buyer gets fully satisfied,
he is indifferent. If buyer gets rejected, the above Vickrey’s argument
applies for critical bid bK . However if buyer is partially satisfied, then
bK = bi < vi, he is rejected and misses a positive utility.
3. λ∗ assigned to sellers: Then the clearing price is bK+1, K buyers trade
and there is no partially satisfied bid. The same argument for no λ∗ case
applies here.
So there is a dominant strategy for buyer i, and it is bi = vi.
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If rationality of all buyers assumption holds, then the buyer must play his
dominant strategy. I have shown that in this case, buyer’s utility is always
non-negative. Hence, buyer is ex-post individual rational. Same argument
applies to sellers.
Because the mechanism runs only once on a specific trading day, DSIC is
supported only within the span of this trading day. Hence it does not apply for
the series of trading rounds throughout the option’s lifespan. In other words,
each simulation of a trading day is a separate instance of a mechanism with
heterogeneous traders truthfully submitting the results of their evaluations of
option price.
There two ways of looking at the efficiency of the mechanism I proposed.
First way is computing the efficient trades happened within the mechanism.
Because mechanism takes the place of Kth (Lth) rejected partially satisfied
buyer (seller), the efficient trades are not lost. Hence mechanism can be consid-
ered efficient. However there is a partially satisfied bid (ask) rejected from the
trade. In second way of looking at mechanism’s efficiency, we can consider this
rejected partially satisfied bid (ask) as the lost efficiency, because the traders
are not benefiting from it. In this case, at most q¯− 1 units of goods supposed
for trade can be lost. I shall analyse this loss in my experiments.
Unfortunately, proposed multi-unit DA like any other Vickrey mechanism is
highly susceptible for colluding. To show this, we can assume following hypo-
thetical situation. In option pricing, the option’s price is bounded by its intrin-
sic value and the spot price of the underlying asset. Hence any trader valuation
is between [max(S0 − F, 0), S0] for calls, and [max(F − S0, 0), S0] for puts 1.
Consider all K and L traders report minimum possible value max(S0 − F, 0),
however aL+1 = S0. Let us assume that ’λ∗ is assigned to buyers. There are
K − 1 buyers and L sellers who trade successfully. The Kth bid is partially
satisfied, so it is rejected. In this situation, using the formula for worst-case
budget-deficit (5.21), we can compute what mechanism pays out:
q¯(S0−max(S0−F, 0))(K−1)+S0(q¯−1) ≤ q¯S0(K−1)+S0(q¯−1) = S0(q¯K−1)
(5.22)
The result of the equation (5.22) is, indeed, the same as the mechanism’s
efficiency, because all the winning asks are paid at S0, and mechanism received
nothing from buyers. This example shows that the mechanism can be the only
1We changed the strike K to F to avoid confusion with K efficient buyers
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contributor of the efficiency created. There are many known ways of preventing
collusion in Vickrey mechanism, and one simple way of discouraging it can be
the introduction of posted reserve prices on both sides of the market. However I
do not use this rule in my experiments for simplicity reason, because computing
the actual value of the reserve price requires prior information about the type
distribution of traders. In our mechanism, traders use sophisticated option
pricing methods and it is difficult to find the analytical forms of their respective
distributions.
Also it is worthwhile to mention that the proposed mechanism is tractable, be-
cause it uses LP for determining the allocation which is polynomially solvable,
and the payment rule is O(1).
5.3.3 Revelation of ZI Traders
In this section, I propose different allocation and payment rules for ZI traders
who are also considered as forecasting traders. ZI traders simulate the under-
lying market and come up with random path of the asset prices. ZI trader
believes that this asset price path is his forecast, and computes the option’s
intrinsic value based on this information. Once the information about the asset
price is provided, computing the option’s intrinsic value becomes deterministic
and can be safely delegated to some other agent. I have already mentioned in
early sections that any dominant strategy mechanism can be converted to di-
rect mechanism using the revelation principle. So I can also convert proposed
multi-unit DA into a mechanism where ZI trader can truthfully reveal not only
his bid or ask, but his prediction too. In fact, if he reveals his prediction, there
is no need for him to reveal his actual bid or ask quote, other than reporting
the quantity he needed. This significantly simplifies the job of the mechanism
when it comes to pricing different option types such as OTM call or ATM put,
etc. Instead of collecting quotes for each option type separately, mechanism
can simply solicit the predictions, and corresponding quantities for each type
of option. I shall discuss about this in next chapter.
Given that the intrinsic value of the call option is max(S0 − K, 0), and ZI
trader has his prediction of SˆT,i, the value of the option for the trader is
e−rT max(SˆT,i−K, 0). Thus trader can reveal his prediction, and let the mech-
anism to do the evaluation. Also the traders option valuation is linearly in-
creasing for his prediction. Hence the higher is the prediction, the more is the
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option valued by the trader. Combining these facts together, we can formulate
following allocation problem for ZI traders:
Definition 5.3.4. For given vectors of predictions and quantities (v, q) of ZI






s.t. λi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i (5.24)∑
i
qiλi = 0 (5.25)
where qi ∈ Z represents quantities, ST,i is the ZI agent’s prediction, λi is an
allocation decision variable.
As it can be observed from above allocation rule, now mechanism uses pre-
dicted asset price SˆT,i for each agent, instead of the option price. In previous
model, the ZI traders would have submitted 0 if their predictions where below
strike K. Although the price of the option is zero anyway, the predictions be-
low K could be different too, and this information is lost while the option price
is being computed. Now mechanism knows who has the worst and who has
optimistic predictions, and based on this factor it can decide to whom allocate
the option. Of course, sellers expecting the asset price fall are matched with
the buyers expecting the rise in asset price. This is much better perspective of
matching orders, because otherwise sellers would have submitted zero making
them indistinguishable from each other, and most importantly, making buyers
want to freely acquire options in maximum amounts. Above revelation helps
sellers who expect drop in price to generate more profit, even though their
valuation is zero.
To see how the option price is computed from resolved predictions, I use the
same payment rule described for multi-unit DA. After figuring out the clearing
predictions ST,K for buyers, and ST,L for sellers, the option’s intrinsic values for
both are found, and traders are cleared at these computed prices respectively.
The same methodology can be used for other traders such as VOL (i.e. volatil-
ity) trader who uses Black-Scholes method after projecting the volatility sur-
face from market information available. VOL traders can quote their corre-
sponding implied volatilities like ZI traders do their predictions. There is a
monotonically increasing relationship between implied volatility σi of the agent
i and his computed option price. LMSR trader can reveal his portfolio to the
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mechanism, because this is main factor used to price the option. However,
traders like MC and EXP that we proposed in Chapter 4, use an array of
stochastic simulations of asset prices to compute the option prices. So their
pricing methods are not deterministic and the mechanism is unlikely to repli-
cate exactly the same simulation paths used by these traders even if they reveal
their key parameters to the mechanism. I shall provide simulation results for
the revelation of ZI traders later in this chapter.
5.3.4 Parallel Multi-Unit Double Auctions
In this section, I extend multi-unit DA into parallel multi-unit double-auctions
to accommodate multi-unit multi-item bids and asks of traders. This involves
trading different option types in parallel, so the traders can obtain desired
option portfolios through this mechanism. I shall assume that the traders
must indicate the quantities for the exact type of option listed in the option
chain. For example, bearish spread option portfolio requires the trader to buy
one OTM call and sell one ITM call, but it does not specify at which strike price
the OTM and ITM must be. The trader has to choose one of the available
OTMs or ITMs and use it as part of his strategy. This concept is further
generalised to combinatorial exchanges in Chapter 7, where OTM and ITM
options are considered as substitutes and the trader does not need to specify
the strike price of the OTM or ITM option, as the mechanism determine which
OTM or ITM to provide based the traders valuation.
Simultaneous multi-unit DA can be viewed as multi-unit multi-item DA where
traders can disclose their linear valuations of options to market maker where
traders would want to have their orders satisfied fully or nothing. In this setup,
the valuation and the quantities matrices (V,Q) represent the trader prefer-
ences for each option o ∈ G option chain. So let us construct LP allocation
rule for this mechanism:
Definition 5.3.5. For given valuations and quantities (V,Q), allocation rule








s.t. λij ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ G (5.27)∑
i
qijλij = 0, ∀j ∈ G (5.28)
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where λij determines the allocation of each option to each trader.
However it follows from Lemma 5.3.1 that there must be at most G number of
partially satisfied bids/asks. In order to preserve the atomicity of the orders,
mechanism must discard all of the other multi-unit bid/ask of partially satisfied
traders even if they are fully satisfied in other DA. It uses the same pricing
method per DA as it was described previously. So the mechanism has to cover
the exposed bids/asks at its expense. Hence it can also inherit DSIC and
individual rationality from single-item multi-unit DA.
In the example of ZI traders, the mechanism can avoid the complexity of
matching multiple valuations of options in parallel DAs. It can simply use
McAfee’s (5.9) and (5.10) rules, which sorts the buyers and sellers based on
their predictions SˆT,i, and then reject partially satisfied bids/asks for each DA
and globally. Mechanism as usual covers the exposed bids and asks, applies the
same payment rule. I shall provide an experimental results for option portfolio
trading agents using this mechanism.
5.4 Design of Experiments
In this section, I present the structure and parameters of the experiments
that I conduct in order to observe the option prices reported by traders and
the clearing prices that mechanism has chosen. First, I provide the instances
of traders that will be used as the participants of my proposed DA. Then I
talk about the market simulation involving the parameters of the underlying
market simulation. I also provide the instances of options that are priced in
proposed mechanism, and determine the aspects that are analysed for each
market simulation. Finally, I highlight the details of the experiments run for
determining the option Greeks such as delta, gamma and theta.
5.4.1 Traders
We have looked at different ways of obtaining option prices for traders in
Chapter 4, but we are yet to observe how they are going to be used in proposed
mechanism. I have to split the traders into two major categories. The ones
who interact with a multi-unit DA, and trade one type of option there, and the
others as option portfolio traders who submit their preferences to simultaneous
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Risk-neutral traders use VOL (Volatility pricing) and MC (Monte-Carlo) op-
tion pricing methods and their results are compared with BS (Black-Scholes)
prices. MC traders can come in different variations depending on the asset
pricing model they use to simulate the possible trajectories of the underly-
ing market. I use two of the proposed asset pricing method: GBM and JD
models with parameters found earlier. I denote MC trader using GBM asset
pricing model as MC, and the one who uses JD model as MC*. Also all of
the traders can use one of the quantity choosing methods proposed: random
integers (RND) and linear quantities (LIN). The quantities for each trader are
capped at q¯ = 2000, because of the mechanism’s limitation. Also MC traders
can simulate the interest rates using one of three approaches: a) interest rate
is constant, b) interest rate follows Vasicek’s model, c) interest rate follows
Vasicek Jump model. Agents use constant annualised risk-free interest rate
r = 0.12 to simulate the their asset price trajectories. If MC trader uses the
risk-free rate as a stochastic process, then for Vasicek process it uses following
parameters: drift µr = 0.46, volatility σr = 0.09, mean-reversion θ = 0.46
which where found from calibrating to historic US T-Bills in Chapter 3. For
simulating risk-free rates as Vasicek Jump process it uses the same parameters
as Vasicek process, but for jumps: arrival rate λ = 4, mean jump µλ = 0.1 and
jump standard deviation σλ = 0.2. These parameters were arbitrarily set as
they were simulated in earlier chapter.
I run series of experiments with risk-neutral traders, where some cases include
solely the same trader, while others involve mixed traders. This way we can
observe how option prices may change depending on the population of traders
in the market. Table 5.1 shows the instances of risk-neutral traders involved
in each experimental case.
Risk-averse traders involve traders with exponential utility. These type of
traders normally overprice the options when selling, and underprice when buy-
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Experimental Case Traders Population
Monte-Carlo 1 MC-RND 100
Monte-Carlo 2 MC-LIN 100
Monte-Carlo JD 1 MC*-RND 100
Monte-Carlo JD 2 MC*-LIN 100
Volatility 1 VOL-RND 100








Table 5.1: Experiments with Risk-Neutral Traders
ing because of the perceived fear of loosing. Hence, if the market population is
made of only risk-averse traders, there should not be any trade due to missing
match. The risk-aversion of EXP traders depends on parameter a. For each
option setting, there is a threshold for this parameter which sets EXP buyer
and EXP seller submit such orders, so they do not match. From the conducted
experiments, I found out that this parameter is a = 0.03. If a < 0.03, then
EXP sellers and buyers match, and basically simulate MC-RND trader. There-
fore I set the risk-aversion to threshold value. I also use -RND for choosing
quantities.
In order to facilitate trade among risk-averse traders, there should traders who
bid or ask even worse than them. If the market is populated with one of the
risk-neutral traders, say, MC-RND, these traders trade mutually with each
other constituting Black-Scholes prices and leaving most EXP-RND traders
rejected. In other words, because MC-RND submit very small bid-ask spread,
EXP-RND traders cannot beat them and mostly stay out from the trade.
Therefore I use ZI-RND (Zero-Intelligence) traders who provide liquidity for
risk-averse traders and enable them to participate in trade. ZI-RND traders are
meant to produce any possible option price within legitimate range. This is, of
course, provide chance for EXP-RND traders to clear their orders. However it
is important to note that if there are other traders, such as risk-neutral traders
in the market, and they are not less than ZI-RND traders, they take ZI-RND’s
cheap deals because of their competitive orders and leave EXP-RND traders
outside this deal.
Therefore I simulate two experiments involving EXP-RND traders: one with 80
EXP-RND traders and 20 ZI traders, and the other 40 EXP-RND, 40 ZI-RND
and 20 MC-RND. In the first experiment, we observe what prices EXP-RND
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Experimental Case Traders Population










Table 5.2: Experiments with Risk-Averse Traders
traders bid and ask, and how their orders are matched with ZI-RND traders.
The second experiment introduces few MC-RND traders in to the mechanism,
and check how MC-RND traders contribute in bringing down the prices in the
market. Table 5.2 shows the experimental cases using EXP traders.
The portfolio holding traders use LMSR pricing method and as it was said
before their option pricing emerges from the portfolio they already hold. Sim-
ilar to EXP-RND traders, LMSR traders also create a positive bid-ask spread,
which forbids them from trading if the market is uniformly populated with
LMSR traders holding the same portfolio. Therefore LMSR trader should be
also simulated in mixed groups each holding different set of portfolios, and
thus produce different prices. It is also important to note that LMSR trader
unlike other trader are deterministic in their pricing, because the only factor
which affects their pricing decision is their portfolio and fixed range of events
that can occur. Therefore two LMSR traders holding the same portfolio pro-
duce same bids or same asks. To make market more heterogeneous, I use most
of the option portfolios given in Table 4.12to simulate traders from neutral,
non-neutral, bullish and bearish perspectives. The full list of LMSR traders
with the portfolios they hold is given in Table 5.3.
LMSR trader’s bid-ask spread width is determined using his liquidity param-
eter b. After running several experiments with LMSR trader, I found out that
b = 100 provides reasonable range of bids and asks which are likely to match.
LMSR use only -RND method to pick quantities for options. Table 5.4 lists
these experimental scenarios using different LMSR traders together.
And finally, I run all proposed option traders together to observe the market
when the options are priced truly from different perspectives. The traders that
I use for ’Mixed All’ case experiment are shown in Table 5.5. I have included
10 traders for each type of option pricing method proposed, and in total the
trader population is 100. This experiment should mimic the heterogeneity of
trader’s pricing policies, and determine the equilibrium price of options when
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Trader Name Belief Portfolio
LMSR-NEUT1 Neutral Butterfly Call Spread
LMSR-NEUT2 Neutral Iron Butterfly
LMSR-NEUT3 Neutral Long Call Ladder
LMSR-NEUT4 Neutral Short Strangle
LMSR-NON-
NEUT1










LMSR-BULL Bullish Bullish Call Spread
LMSR-BEAR Bearish Bearish Call Spread
Table 5.3: LMSR Traders and their portfolios



















































Table 5.5: Experiment with All Traders - ’Mixed All’
each of the traders are evenly distributed in the market.
Besides the above given traders, I also simulate ZI traders and option portfolio
traders. Because ZI traders submit their predictions instead of the option
prices, the simulation setup involve different settings for these agents. Along
with the option prices, I also plot the traders aggregated forecasts and observe
how they changed based on cases when the traders exhibit bullish, bearish
or neutral forecasts. ZI traders interact with multi-unit DA similar to other
agents. I set at the core of the option portfolio trader - the ZI trader who
choose corresponding option portfolio based on his forecast. Also the structure
of option portfolio bids differ from multi-unit option bids. Such trader needs
simultaneous multi-unit DAs to post his quotes on different types of options.
For that reason, I also run such mechanism and observe how traders taking
different option portfolios collaboratively affect the aggregated predictions by
picking bullish, bearish or neutral portfolios.
5.4.2 Market Simulation
I describe how both underlying and option markets are simulated in proposed
experiments. I simulated the asset prices using GBM with parameters that
I found by calibrating NASDAQ-100 indices. So daily drift is µ = 0.0007,
and volatility is σ = 0.0089. The figure 5.4 shows the instance of simulated
asset prices that I use for all experiments. Using the asset prices given in
Figure 5.4 enables to compare different experimental setups and their impact
on pricing option. It can be seen that the initial asset price is the same as
NASDAQ-100 on 2 January 2014, S0 = $3563.57. And the asset price ends
up at ST = $3597.59 at the end of the year. So it is slightly increased due to
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Figure 5.4: Simulated NASDAQ-100 Indices
Option Type Strike K Maturity Date
T
OTM Call $ 3603.00 1
ATM Call $ 3563.00 1
ITM Call $ 3523.00 1
Table 5.6: Options Traded in DA
small mean drift. This particular instance of asset price is interesting because
it includes dramatic fluctuation near the end of the year. This should enable
us to stress test the option pricing methods that I proposed.
The option market is run using proposed multi-unit DA. I create 100 traders for
each trading day, so they submit their corresponding pricing bids and asks to
the mechanism which then matches them and clears the orders at DSIC prices.
We can observer how different set of traders defined in previous section result
in different option prices. I also analyse three types of options in proposed
mechanism and simulate them separately with given set of traders. Table 5.6
shows these three option that I use in my simulations. It can be seen in Table
5.6, that I use $40 interval between strikes to determine OTM, ATM and
ITM options. Note that OTM Call option ends up out-of-the-money when the
option expires at T = 0, because ST = $3597.59 < $3603.00. In this way, it is
possible to observe if the traders also end up pricing this option at zero price,
because its intrinsic value is, indeed, zero. Also I use only call options for the
simulation, because put prices can be directly computed from the call price
using call-put parity relationship.
Mechanism simulates 365 trading days, going up to the point the option ex-
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pires. For each trading day, I capture key outcomes of the mechanism for
further analysis. This involves the clearing prices, volumes traded and some
other relevant statistics. The mechanism is analysed using following parame-
ters for each trading day.
• Black-Scholes Price: This shows the current Black-Scholes price for com-
parison. In this way, we can see how the option prices differ from theo-
retical price.
• DA Ask Price: The clearing ask price resulted from the trades. This
is the lowest rejected ask according the proposed mechanisms payment
rule.
• DA Bid Price: The clearing bid price resulted from the trades. This
is the highest rejected bid according the proposed mechanisms payment
rule.
• Trade Volume: This shows how many options have been traded, so we
can observe how volumes for ATM, OTM and ITM options differ, and
at which settings these differences happen.
• Efficient Trades Rejected: This gives us an indicator on what proportion
of efficient trades have been rejected by the mechanism due to being
partially satisfied. This parameter can also differ by given mechanism
setting.
• Budget Balance: This is an important figure which describes the gains
and losses of the mechanism from participating in the trading process
in order to cover exposed bids and asks that are resulted from rejecting
efficient trades.
• Min Accepted Ask: This factor shows the lower boundary for all accepted
orders in the mechanism. We shall analyse how this boundary changes
as the option approaches its expiry date.
• Max Accepted Bid: This factor shows the upper boundary for all ac-
cepted orders in the mechanism. We shall analyse how this boundary
changes as the option approaches its expiry date.
• Mean Accepted Order: This factor shows mean price for accepted orders
in the mechanism. Although the mechanism is not cleared at this price, it
can be used for analysing other parameters such as option delta, gamma
and vega.
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From captured details, I plot corresponding charts and analyse the simulation
results. The market prices are plotted as line graph, indicating trading days
on horizontal axis, and the prices on vertical axis. It could be presented as a
candlestick graph like most of the price charts in real markets having ask and
bid prices shown separately, but due to very narrow spread between cleared bid
and ask prices, the candlestick graph looked less comprehensive. I show the
range of accepted orders using shaded area around cleared asset prices. I also
display the volume information parallel to the horizontal timeline axis show
how many option have been traded for each particular day. I shall present the
efficiency error and budget-balance in histograms to observe the magnitude
and the distribution of these parameters for each experimental case.
The experimental setup for simulating the market of ZI traders and conse-
quently the option portfolio traders is different from the previous setting. Be-
cause the prices are compared with the aggregated forecasts, it would be easier
to S0 = 100, so the magnitude of forecasts are clearer. Below Table 5.7 pro-
vides the key parameters that are used to simulate underlying asset market
and simultaneous multi-unit DAs.
Name Value
Initial Asset Price S0 = 100
Strike Price K = 100
Strike Intervals  = 10
Asset Price Volatility σ = 0.05
Risk-free rate r = 0
Time to maturity T = 1
Number of trading days 100
Random Quantities Scaler Range [-15, 15]
Number of agents N = 100
Number of option types G = 3
Table 5.7: Market setup for ZI traders and option portfolio traders
It can be seen from the Table 5.7 that I run 3 simultaneous mechanisms for
calls with different strikes in K ± 10. These mechanisms are used by option
portfolio traders to take their positions based on their beliefs. The increased
trade in OTM options aggregate to higher forecasts, and for ITM, it means
that traders expecting the prices to fall. Along with aggregated forecasts,
I present the corresponding valuations for ATM call and its corresponding
Black-Schole value. I test cases where the ZI traders have different volatility
in simulating the asset prices and where supply and demand are unbalanced.
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These experiments also show the effect of market volume in determining the
option prices.
5.4.3 Greeks Simulation
In Greeks simulations, I analyse the change of option prices generated by the
mechanism with respect to changes in 3 relevant factors such as asset price,
delta and time-to-maturity. These are also called as option’s delta, gamma and
theta. These parameters play key role in risk-neutral pricing of any financial
instrument. For example, option’s delta can be applied in constructing self-
financing portfolios, while gamma is used in making portfolio more stable over
a longer period of time through a gamma-hedging strategy. Theta is also an
important indicator of option’s performance, as it shows how option’s value
decreases as it approaches its maturity. It determines the likelihood of option
ending up in-the-money or out-of-the-money for any given moment of option’s
lifespan. As a results, option price is less likely to change by the end of its
maturity date. This fact should be also observed in the experiments. The
formulas for option’s Greeks analysis are given in Chapter 2, so I do not write
them here.
I shall simulate each Greek parameters with respect to two parameters. In first
case, I change the asset price linearly from $3465 to $3665 covering moneyness
range of all three initialised options listed in Table 5.6. For example, at asset
price $3665 even the initially created OTM (K = 3603.00) option ends up
in-the-money. Also at asset price $3465, even initially declared ITM (K =
3523.00) option is out-of-the-money. So it covers every possible case for all
three options, and let us observe how their Greeks change with the asset prices.
These linearly increasing prices are used as asset prices and traded in proposed
multi-unit DA. Note that the time-to-maturity while changing the asset prices
is fixed at T = 1.
I also run the simulation for Greeks by linearly decreasing the time-to-maturity
parameter, and fixing the asset price at ATM S0 = K. In this way, we can
observe how option Greeks change according to the time from T = 1 to T = 0.
As the option nears its maturity date, Greeks exhibit an interesting behaviour
showing the sensitivity of option price for changes in asset price, delta and
time-to-maturity. For example, delta for OTM approaches zero as the option
nears its maturity, meaning that the slight changes in the asset price are less
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likely to result in option price to change from zero. While for ITM option, the
asset price changes are almost at the same magnitude as the option price when
option is near its maturity date. It is interesting to observe how mechanism is
able to simulate these properties of option pricing.
I present the results of the simulation of Greeks along with theoretical Black-
Scholes Greeks for each type of option. This should enable us to see how these
aspects of option pricing can be different from theoretically computed ones.
It is also important to point out the similarities between two of them, such if
they take similar shapes or not. For example, Black-Schole’s delta for call over
asset prices resembles a sigmoid function between 0 and 1. We should observe
if the mechanism’s results will correspond with such shape.
5.5 Verification of Proposed Mechanism
In this section, I present the first results from the mechanism’s both mar-
ket and Greeks simulations in order to verify if it gives expected results in a
staged environment, or generate absurd option prices. I populate the market
with Black-Scholes (BS-RND) traders with a slight perturbation in their main
parameters such as volatility. This is done in order to facilitate trade, which
otherwise would not happen because every one ends up at the same price. This
insignificant perturbation should facilitate the trade, but also limit the range
of valuations submitted to the mechanism. Also it can be seen from the name
of the trader that he uses random integer to determine the option quantity.
The main goal of simulating such scenario is to see if the cleared prices cor-
respond with Black-Scholes price when all traders are using the same pricing
technique. This is an important factor because it exhibits the several aspects
of the proposed mechanism:
• Efficiency (Unanimity): The prices obtained by the mechanism must be
the overall representation of submitted orders, and when all traders in the
market are BS traders, the price should correspond with Black-Scholes
price. This shows the efficiency of the mechanism, as it represents the
unanimity of quotes.
• Consistency: The prices obtained by the mechanism must also be consis-
tent with option’s definition. This involves option’s final payoff according
to its strike and asset price at expiry date. For example, OTM option
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price should end up at zero at its maturity, because it generates no payoff.
• Robustness: The sensitivity of option prices to changes in asset prices,
delta and time-to-maturity must be consistent when the Greeks are sim-
ulated. This exhibits how option’s delta, gamma and theta correspond
to Black-Schole’s delta, gamma and theta when the mechanism is put
to simulation of one parameters while fixing the others. In the context
of this research, these control factors are the asset prices and time-to-
maturity.
• Budget-Deficit: This also shows the minimal loss the mechanism gen-
erates because all traders are almost unanimous at their bids and asks.
Hence the difference between prices is insignificant and mechanism has
to cover less.
Figure 5.5 shows the option pricing results for 3 options: ATM, OTM and
ITM options in three consecutive charts. The prices are the results of orders
of BS traders cleared by multi-unit DA. They are indicated with red line.
The blue dash line represents the actual Black-Schole price for given option.
Yellow shaded area shows the boundaries of accepted quotes. The lower chart
indicates the volume traded for given date. The blue shade on top of the
volume line denotes the volume of the rejected efficient trade.
We can see in Figure 5.5 that the option prices completely overlap with the
Black-Scholes prices. This is the same for all ATM, OTM and ITM options. We
can also note that the volumes of traded options are the same too. The range
of accepted quotes, however, vary for OTM at the beginning of the option’s
life, but it narrows down at the end of the option’s life. Also we can observe
that the OTM ends up at zero at its maturity, which shows the consistency
of the mechanism as well. ATM and ITM options expire in-the-money, hence
their prices are positive and equal to their corresponding payoffs. Also we
can notice the general pattern of valuations narrowing down to concrete value
once option’s payoff date approaches. Figure 5.6 illustrates the mechanism’s
error in efficiency and the distribution of mechanism’s gain and deficit. We
can see that most of the time, mechanism rejects about 0% to 5% of overall
efficient trades for 100 traders with quantities capped at 2000. This indicator
should go down as the number of traders increase, and the quantity quoted
per each trader decreases. I have talked about this factor while describing the
mechanism. One interesting aspect of error in efficiency is that it is mostly
efficient for OTM option, because the range of accepted orders is wider, hence
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Figure 5.5: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for BS-RND traders
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there are more matching orders and less partially satisfied orders.
Observing the budget balance histogram, we can see that it is evenly dis-
tributed around zero mean. Also because of more efficient trades, less par-
tially satisfied orders and of course lower prices, mechanism has to cover less
deficit resulting from OTM option. Therefore the budget-balance for OTM is
centred around zero, while the budget-balance for ITM and ATM options are
comparatively flatter.
We can also observe the option Greeks in Figure 5.6. As expected, the mecha-
nism is robust for changes in parameters such asset price and time-to-maturity,
because it replicates the same pattern as Black-Scholes does. The sensitivity
of DA simulated option prices on asset prices, or delta, is equal to the same
value obtained through Black-Scholes analytical solution. It can be seen in left
figure, that the option price becomes more sensitive to asset price as the asset
price grows, and the option goes deeper into moneyness, while the sensitivity is
less when option is outside moneyness. This sigmoid-like delta curve becomes
even steeper if the option is near its maturity date. While for ATM option it
is 0.5 of asset price change, the OTM’s delta is nearly zero when it is near its
maturity date. And the opposite is true for the ITM option.
Option’s DA gamma indicates the sensitivity of delta on asset prices, and it
fully corresponds with Black-Scholes analytical gamma. It can be seen that the
delta is at its maxima when the asset price is equal to strike price. The can be
seen from delta chart too, where the delta grows the fastest around its strike.
Also the gamma is more centralised if the option is near its maturity. This is
because delta also become steeper when option approaches its maturity date.
We can see from the right hand gamma chart, the ATM gamma grows upward
as the option approaches its expiry. This is because there is an equal likelihood
that the option can end up in-the-money or out-of-the-money, hence the delta
is uncertain up until the expiry. If option ends up in-the-money, delta jumps to
1, and if out-of-the-money then it drops to zero. This dramatic change in delta,
therefore is described by upward moving gamma. However the gamma for both
ITM and OTM options approaches zero, because there is a least possibility the
option near its maturity may end up in opposite moneyness range.
And finally, option’s theta shows the sensitivity of option price to time-to-
maturity and it also fully complies with Black-Scholes analytical solution. This
is a negative indicator because mostly option looses its value as its payoff
becomes more realistic with the time. We can see in the last pair of charts
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Figure 5.6: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM and
ITM options for BS-RND traders
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of Figure 5.6 that the option price is most sensitive to change in time when
the asset price is equal to its strike. Because this is the very moment which
determines if the option is going to be OTM or ITM onwards, and based on
that fact, the time affects the further changes in option price. It can be seen
that when option is deep out-of-the-money, the change in time has no effect in
option’s price, as it is always zero. However when the option goes deeper in-
the-money, the theta steadily decreases, making the option yielding a payoff
more realistic. Also it should be noted that the theta is more centralised
for option near its maturity, because it is more certain at which side of the
moneyness spectrum the option ends up. We can see in the right hand chart,
that the theta goes down for the ATM option approaching its maturity. This
justifies the point that the option price is more likely to loose lot when it is
still uncertain about its moneyness and it is near its expiry date. However
for OTM and ITM options the near to maturity timeframe is less sensitive,
because there is certainty about option’s moneyness and the payoff it is going
to end up with.
Above presented results prove my point that the proposed mechanism popu-
lated with BS-RND traders can replicate the Black-Scholes formula and its an-
alytical solutions for option’s sensitivity on various factors. This should make
the proposed mechanism reliable ground for testing other types of traders play-
ing in the market, and analysing option prices and Greeks obtained from their
simulation.
5.6 Experimental Results
In this section, I present the important findings from simulation of different
traders in proposed DA. I enclosed all results of the simulation in Appendix
D. Although I reference these results throughout this section, I do not include
all of them into this chapter. I review the results from simulating risk-neutral,
risk-averse, portfolio holding and mixed traders and point out their important
characteristics. I also discuss about the results obtained from simulating ZI




The risk-neutral traders rely on simulating the asset prices using risk-neutral
drift or by solving Black-Scholes formula for implied volatility to price options.
There are two types of risk-neutral traders that I simulated: ones that use
random integer (-RND) to choose the quantity and ones that use linear function
(-LIN). Although the pricing results for both types of risk-neutral traders are
not significantly different from Black-Scholes price and analysis, the volumes
traded for each are intuitively different.
Beside their prices are similar, there are certain differences in the workings of
risk-neutral agents too. For example, VOL-RND trader produces results very
close to Black-Scholes, because it actually uses Black-Scholes formula after
figuring out the implied volatility from the previously traded price. There-
fore there is a very little divergence in quoted prices. Although MC-RND
resulted overall the same price as the VOL-RND and Black-Scholes formula,
the range of accepted orders is wider meaning that there were more surplus,
and hence more potential efficiency lost. Figure D.6 shows that the prices
almost overlap, but the range of accepted orders in yellow shade is compar-
atively wider than in Figure D.2 for VOL-RND traders. Note that in both
cases the range of accepted orders becomes smaller as the option approaches
its maturity. The bigger range of orders produced by MC-RND traders are due
to randomised numerical simulations that each MC-RND trader runs. Figures
D.3 and D.7 show that there is also a difference in efficiency error between
two types of traders. MC-RND traders generate more rejected partial orders
due to the more diversity in their pricing, while VOL-RND efficiency error is
bounded around 2% from overall efficiency. The other Greek indicators as well
as budget-balance appear similar and correspond to Black-Scholes’ analytical
solutions.
However, we can see that MC*-RND traders price options slightly higher than
Black-Scholes price due to potential expected jumps in the asset price. Al-
though there is an analytical solution for such case where the asset price is a
jump-diffusion process, and it is known as Black-Scholes-Merton model [115],
I leave the comparison with this model outside this research scope. Figure
D.10 illustrates this difference in prices. The difference appears to be even
bigger for OTM options. Also we can notice that the range of accepted orders
shifted upwards too along with the DA price. However DA and Black-Scholes
prices converge as they approach maturity. For OTM option, we can see that
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they both end up at zero. We can see in Figure D.11 that the error in ef-
ficiency is also distributed with wider discrepancy, so the mechanism rejects
about 8% of efficient trades partially satisfied due to mismatch in bid and ask
quantities. The key differences are in Greeks. It can be seen in Figure D.11
that the delta is slightly skewed horizontally, which makes already over-priced
options less sensitive to changes in asset price. This can be seen in delta’s
relationship with time to maturity, as the ITM line is less sensitive when the
option approaches maturity, and vice versa OTM is more sensitive. This is be-
cause MC*-RND traders expect jumps and the change of option’s moneyness
is more likely than the asset price was following GBM. Similar differences can
be observed in gamma and theta too.
Another category of risk-neutral traders are the traders that use linear func-
tions for choosing quantities. Figures D.4 and D.5 show how VOL-LIN traders
match their demand and supplies to obtain option prices. Although the prices
are similar to VOL-RND, the error in efficiency is considerably different. The
efficiency error for OTM option is almost evenly spread upto 6%, while for
ITM and ATM options it is either no error or 4% error. Also we can see the
difference in volume, while VOL-LIN traders generate around 60K trade vol-
ume, the result for VOL-RND is more than twice less that amount. It can also
be seen that the volumes either drop or become unstable when the option is
near its maturity and the prices are certain. This is because VOL-LIN traders
on each side of the DA come up with almost the same price, and the same de-
mand and supply. When there is a bid-ask spread, the mechanism clears them
all, if there is no mechanism rejects everything. Therefore the volumes become
so unstable. The Greeks for both VOL-LIN, VOL-RND and Black-Scholes are
the same.
For MC-LIN and MC*-LIN traders presented in Figures D.8, D.9,D.12 and
D.13 the results look similar too. However the volumes and efficiency error
are different. For example, mechanism’s error in efficiency is insignificant for
MC*-LIN traders due to more diverse quotes and bigger volumes. The ATM
and ITM options were traded at higher volumes, but OTM option resulted in
3 times lower volume. This because the MC*-LIN traders’ supply decreases
as the price of the option decreases too, hence there is less options available
for buyers. This also affects the option Greeks. For example, comparing the
deltas, we can see that for MC*-LIN traders, OTM prices are less sensitive to
asset price changes than for MC*-RND traders.
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5.6.2 Risk-Averse Traders
The pricing method of risk-averse traders is fundamentally different from risk-
neutral pricing, because this looks at the option pricing from the perspective
of a risk-averse agent who has more fear in loosing rather than gaining. As
it was said earlier, the utility of this agent is modelled as a concave function
with a parameter a indicating the concavity, or risk-averseness factor, of the
trader. Therefore it is natural for EXP traders to overprice when selling or
underprice when buying the option. Therefore market populated uniformly
with risk averse traders does not produce any trade.
The results of the simulation of EXP-RND traders with ZI-RND trader shown
in Figures D.16and D.17 display higher volatility in prices. We can also see
that the range of accepted orders are considerably bigger which takes its toll on
efficiency loss upto 30% from overall trade. This also affects the distribution
of budget-balance which is in magnitudes higher than what was produced for
risk-neutral traders. This wide acceptance range is caused by ZI-RND traders
posting uncompetitive prices which are then matched with EXP-RND traders.
We can also observe that there is a very small volume for each type of option,
because there are only 20 traders per day. These 20 trades are basically the
matches between all 20 ZI-RND traders and best 20 EXP-RND traders.
The Greeks analysis shows that the OTM and ATM options are highly sensitive
to changes in asset price, while the sensitivity of ITM option price corresponds
with Black-Scholes solution. Also the sensitivity to time-to-maturity is the
same for all options and almost overlap with theoretical solution. The option’s
theta analysis is jagged up due to the volatility of OTM option price. The
deeper OTM is the option, the more likely that its price is zero. However in
proposed scenario there are EXP-RND traders selling deep OTM option for
positive amount, and there are ZI-RND traders who wish to buy it for that
amount. So the deep OTM’s price is not zero, but it emerged from the random
opportunity for EXP-RND trader by ZI-RND trader. This, of course, shows
its impact on determining theta of the option in given experimental case.
In Figures D.18 and D.19, I display another set of results where there is small
portion of risk-neutral traders in the market who are always matched with
some portion of ZI-RND traders. Fortunately, the number of ZI-RND traders
is 40, and VOL-RND traders 20, so this means that 20 trades are matched
between ZI-RND and VOL-RND traders. However the remaining 20 ZI-RND
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trader should be matched with the best 20 EXP-RND traders. This experiment
shows the role of risk-neutral traders in influencing the option prices, and the
mechanism’s efficiency and budget-balance. We can see from the Figure D.18
that the prices are indeed more stable, although the range of accepted order
is almost the same. These are the bids and asks of ZI-RND traders. Also
we can see that the volumes are now increase twice, because there are 40
trades matched. From Figure D.19, it can be observed that the efficiency loss
and budget-balance are also decreased due to VOL-RND traders. The Greeks
show that the sensitivity of the option prices on asset prices are still high on
ATM and OTM option prices, while for ITM it corresponds with Black-Scholes
solution.
5.6.3 Portfolio Holders
Portfolio holders using LMSR traders produce different results depending the
population. As it has been said earlier, if the market is solely populated with
LMSR traders holding the same portfolio, they produce a positive bid-ask
spread and do not match their order. Moreover the prices they bid or ask
would be the same. However if we mix these traders with traders holding
an opposite portfolio, say, LMSR trader with a neutral portfolio is matched
against LMSR trader with a non-neutral portfolio, then there will be a trade in
the market. Therefore I simulate the cases where traders have corresponding
opponents to match their orders.
Figures D.20 and D.21 show the trade between neutral and non-neutral port-
folio holders. It can be seen that the prices are volatile around Black-Scholes
prices. This is explained using the deterministic nature of LMSR traders. The
whole market consists of 2 neutral LMSR traders and 2 non-neutral LMSR
traders who output all together 8 different pricing quotes, 4 for bids and 4 for
asks. We can even see this from the range of accepted orders, which virtually
sticks to the clearing prices. So naturally, one of 4 bids and one of 4 asks is
used as the clearing price for the matched orders. Because mechanism has
very few options to determine the clearing price among mostly homogeneous
quotes, the option price for each trading day differs significantly. Also depend-
ing on the side of the market where the quantities match fully, the mechanism
pushes the clearing price to one bid (ask) further.
In Figure D.20, we can also see that the OTM prices start underpriced, and
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once the option turns ITM when asset price hits above its strike $ 3603.00,
the traders start overpricing it until it ends up OTM again, where the option’s
value is zero. The neutral trader clearly underprice OTM option, and non-
neutral traders match their higher orders with them. Because non-neutral
traders make profit when the asset price moves in either direction, while neutral
traders make loss in that case. However when OTM is near turning ATM, it
becomes profitable for neutral traders so their price is higher. The price stops
from growing upwards when it is not profitable for neutral traders, and it levels
off on top of Black-Scholes price as long as it is ITM.
Figure D.21 shows that the efficiency loss for the trades is about 10%. The
Greeks exhibit more interesting behaviour. Deltas can be seen very steep
compared to Black-Scholes delta, indicating the option price’s volatility per
change in asset price. Delta with respect to time to maturity shows that
change in asset price has no effect on option’s delta for OTM, and bears full
effect for ITM option. This can be interpreted using the determinism of LMSR
traders where option prices maintain certain window of prices on every spot
of option’s life. So even when the option approaches its maturity date, its
price is not around its likely payoff, until the payoff is actually realised. We
can observe the similar behaviour for gamma as well. The theta shows that
the option price looses less than Black-Scholes when asset price is around its
strike. This is because of the balance between neutral and non-neutral traders
who view the option from the perspective of the portfolio they hold.
The similar results have been generated from other experiments with different
populations of LMSR traders. Figures D.22, D.24,D.25, D.26, D.27 and D.23
display my results for the experiments listed in Table 5.4.
5.6.4 Mixed Traders
In this simulation, I run all types of traders introduced previously. All of them
constitute the equal portion of the overall population. Although most of the
results almost overlap with Black-Scholes prices, there are occasional spikes
that happen due to one of the non-traditional traders is allocated with an
option. This is especially evident in OTM option prices shown in Figure D.28.
Also the range of accepted orders is upward shifted denoting that most of the
traders posted higher prices for the option.
Greeks given in Figure D.29 show that the ATM and OTM option prices while
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they are all ITM are less sensitive to changes in asset price from skewed deltas.
This relationship is also shown in gammas. However theta shows that the
option prices are more sensitive to time to maturity throughout the timeline.
As usual, this sensitivity peaks when option is around its strike.
5.6.5 ZI Traders and Option Portfolios
I conducted series of experiments to see how estimated predictions of ZI
traders, and consequently the option prices change in proposed multi-unit DA
and how the choice of option portfolios in simultaneous multi-unit DAs affect
the overall predictions. These experiments are different from previous one be-
cause here I analyse the forecasts given by the traders, and then derive the
option prices. I gave the simulation parameters in Table 5.7, so these parame-
ters are considered as fixed. Also in this experiment I can control the quantity
of the options traders cab bid or ask, so they are not randomly picked. The
main goal of these experiments is to determine how the aggregation of forecast
can be used to derive option prices, and how option the choice option portfolios
affects these predictions.
In first set of experiments with revealed multi-unit DA, ZI simulate asset prices
as GBM, and then use the maturity asset price as his forecast. While simulat-
ing asset prices traders can use the same volatility parameter as in underlying
market, or use their own volatility which is random. The assumption is that
the forecasting agents have their own methodology of forecast, and it might
not necessarily align with the parameters of the underlying market. I create
this diversity through assigning different volatility parameters for each trader.
To sum up, I simulate 4 scenarios for revealed ZI traders:
• V ol = V ol, Supply = Demand : In this setting the asset price volatility,
and the volatility for agents are the same. Also supply and demand
scalers are taken from a random variable b15 ∗ zc where z ∼ N (0, 1).
This balances the supply and demand the market around zero.
• V ol = V ol, Supply > Demand : The same as above, except supply and
demand scalers are taken from b15 ∗ z − 5c where z ∼ N (0, 1). This
balances the market around 5 oversupply.
• V ol = V ol, Supply < Demand : The same as above, except supply and
demand scalers are taken from b15 ∗ z + 5c where z ∼ N (0, 1). This
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balances the market around 5 overdemand.
• V ol 6= V ol, Supply = Demand : The same as above, except implied
volatility of traders differ around real asset price volatility with lognormal
standard deviation of 0.5.
Figure 5.7: DA predictions of ZI traders
In Figure 5.7 we can see estimated predictions change when implied volatility,
supply and demand are different. It illustrates that revealed DA can effec-
tively simulate Black-Scholes prices, as long as the supply and demand are
equal. However we can see that call prices drop blow Black-Scholes model
when the supply exceeds demand, and vice versa. We can also observe that
randomised agents’ volatility around real asset price volatility can better ap-
proximate Black-Scholes option prices due to wider range of orders submitted
to the mechanism.
Another set of experiments reveals the key aspect of simultaneous multi-unit
DA exhibiting the effect of option portfolios on estimated predictions. In this
experiment, I calculate the estimated predictions as weighted average of ag-
gregate predictions obtained for different option types through simultaneously
executed multi-unit DAs. In this set, I consider following cases:
• Balanced Bullish, Bearish and Neutral Traders: In this setup, traders
submit orders for option portfolios with equal distribution.
• More Bullish Traders: Traders use more bullish option portfolios com-
pared to other option portfolios.
• More Bearish Traders: Traders use more bearish option portfolios com-
pared to other option portfolios.
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• More Neutral Traders: Traders use more neutral option portfolios com-
pared to other option portfolios.
Figure 5.8: Simultaneous multi-unit DA predictions of Option Portfolio traders
Figure 5.8 illustrates the estimated predictions obtained from simulating simul-
taneous multi-unit DA where traders use option portfolios to interpret their
predictions. It also shows the corresponding option prices compared to Black-
Scholes model. As it was expected, we can observe that estimated predictions
are higher when traders are more bullish, and lower if they are more bear-
ish. Also we can see that estimated predictions stick up well with the asset
prices when traders are more neutral. This clearly shows that option prices
are affected by the choice of option portfolios in the market, although option
portfolio is not purely a buy/ask order, but it is mixed combination of bids
and asks for particular options.
As we have already mentioned, proposed mechanisms are not budget-balanced
and it is worthwhile to view how they yield loss and profit from covering the
partial bids/asks of rejected traders. Figure 5.9 shows the cumulative cost and
revenue for revealed DA and simultaneous multi-unit DA mechanisms.
It can be seen from the Figure 5.9 that in cases of oversupply in multi-unit DA
or more bullish traders in simultaneous multi-unit DA, the revenue of the mech-
anism is soaring, because there are fewer bids than asks, and the mechanism
always ends up partially satisfying some seller. As a result it rejects that seller,
and takes its role of selling options to exposed bidder. Hence mechanism in-
crease its revenue day after day. The opposite phenomena happens when there
are more bids than asks, and mechanism has to spend money on behalf of re-
jected bidder to buy out exposed asks. Mechanisms are somewhat stabilised
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Figure 5.9: Cost/Revenue for multi-unit DA and CE mechanisms
around zero when the balance of supply and demand is maintained. Also it
is interesting to observe that in simultaneous multi-unit DA, the mechanism
revenue/cost is more volatile and enormous because the volumes of options
traded are at least G times bigger.
5.7 Summary and Contribution
In this chapter, I defined the important properties of DSIC mechanisms and
review McAfee’s DA as a starting point for my design of multi-unit DA. Then I
proposed the design of direct multi-unit DA preserving the atomicity of orders
and simulated previously developed option traders using it. I also suggested
the idea of using revelation principle for ZI option traders to aggregate their
forecasts. Then I used this forecast to select option portfolios and generated
aggregated forecasts in simultaneous DAs. I designed the experiments based
on the characteristics of the option traders. The experiments were also meant
to highlight the important aspects of the option pricing such as Greeks. I also
emphasised the performance of the mechanism through the number of rejected
partial efficient orders and budget-balance. The verification of the mechanism
is achieved through simulating uniform Black-Scholes traders producing the
same results as Black-Scholes’ analytical solution.
I can list the main contributions of the chapter in following list:
• Design of a direct multi-unit DA with atomic orders. I used McAfee’s
single-unit DA to extend the proposed mechanism into multi-unit DA.
This mechanism allows option traders to submit their orders truthfully
knowing that their orders either get fully satisfied or rejected. The atom-
icity of orders is important in the scenario where option trader wants to
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take an option portfolio which dictates the exact amount of option types
he needs to hold or write. I analysed the important properties of pro-
posed mechanism such as efficiency, individual rationality and budget-
balance.
• Design of a revealed multi-unit DA for ZI traders. I suggested the use of
revealed mechanism where ZI traders can post their predictions instead
of their valuations on options. I also mentioned that this mechanism can
be used for BLS traders who reveal their implied volatility instead.
• Design of a simultaneous multi-unit DA for option portfolio traders. I
formulated an allocation rule which replicate running multi-unit DAs. I
also suggested that ZI traders taking option portfolios can submit only
their forecasts, instead of posting the valuation for each option type.
• Verification of results. I tested the mechanism with the traders using
Black-Scholes pricing method with little perturbation to facilitate the
trade, and obtained results close to Black-Scholes analytical result. This
showed several aspects of the mechanism such as efficiency, consistency
and robustness. It also provided an optimistic view on the budget-deficit
that mechanism can run into.
• Simulation of heterogeneous traders in proposed multi-unit DA. Below
is my important findings from the simulation:
– Risk-Neutral Traders: Although most of the prices generated by
risk-neutral traders are similar to Black-Scholes’ solution, the range
of orders accepted in the market exhibit the discrepancies in pric-
ing options. For example, despite MC-RND traders submit wider
range of quotes for the option, they all cleared at near Black-Scholes
price. Moreover, I found that the risk-neutral traders generate least
error in efficiency of the mechanism, and hence keep budget-balance
somehow controlled. The DA clearing prices were close to Black-
Scholes prices regardless of the method of choosing quantities both
random and linear. The only difference in clearing prices was ex-
hibited by MC*-RND traders posting higher option prices, as ex-
pected. However their prices also converged to Black-Scholes price
as the option approached its maturity. I also found that MC*-LIN
traders generate less error in efficiency because of reduced quanti-
ties for winning orders. The Greeks analysis of MC*-LIN traders
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showed that OTM option was less sensitive to changes in asset price,
because of its higher prices.
– Risk-Averse Traders: Simulating EXP-RND traders solely could
not give any results, because of their risk-averseness, sellers always
overprice the option, and buyers always underprice. Hence I used
ZI-RND traders to provide liquidity for EXP-RND traders, as other
traders such as risk-neutral ones would always beat them. This
resulted in volatile prices and enormous range of accepted orders.
The efficiency error constituted almost 30% due to fewer accepted
orders submitted by only 20 ZI-RND traders. Also Greeks analysis
has shown that the ATM and OTM options were highly sensitive to
the changes in asset price due to EXP-RND traders posting lower
prices fearing from option ending up out-of-the-money. The OTM
option’s theta near its maturity was unstable because EXP-RND
trader submits overpriced quote, and ZI-RND trader buys it at that
price, making OTM option’s value positive even if it becomes not
exercisable soon. Introduction of small group of VOL-RND traders
helped to stabilise the market around Black-Scholes price, although
the range of accepted orders remained the same.
– Portfolio Holders: Similar to EXP-RND traders, portfolio holding
LMSR traders cannot trade with each other if they constitute the
only population of the market. Hence LMSR traders with diverse
portfolios have been used to run the simulations. The deterministic
nature of LMSR traders create limited amount of diverse bids and
asks, and therefore mechanism experiences sharp jumps in option
prices. I explained in the example of neutral and non-neutral LMSR
traders that the OTM option prices are initially underpriced, and
when option enters moneyness it becomes overpriced because of
higher likelihood of generating payoff. The Greeks analysis has
shown that the option price is highly sensitive to the changes in
asset price, and due to fixed range of events horizon at any given
time of the option’s life, the delta with respect to time to maturity
is constant for all OTM, ATM and ITM options.
– Mixed Traders: Mixed traders resulted near Black-Scholes prices
with occasional spikes caused by EXP-RND traders. The Greeks
analysis is also approximated to the analytical solution using Black-
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Scholes model.
• Simulation of ZI traders and option portfolio traders for aggregated pre-
dictions. In these series of simulations I used revealed multi-unit DA
for aggregating the predictions of ZI traders, and tested if the derived
option prices simulate Black-Scholes prices. In case of equal supply and
demand, and same volatility parameters, ZI agents aggregated forecasts
aligned with the asset prices and hence gave the Black-Scholes price.
However the overdemand and oversupply resulted in rise and fall in ag-
gregated predictions, and produced lower prices for options. I have also
tested how the choice option portfolios affect the aggregated predictions,
and as expected, bullish traders resulted in higher forecasts, and bear-
ish traders gave lower forecasts. The mechanism’s cumulative budget-
balance appeared to be stable around zero when the supply and demand
are matched, and hence the aggregated forecasts aligned with the current
asset prices.
From above contributions, we can derive the key messages of the chapter as
well as compare them to the previous works done in multi-unit DA design and
option pricing:
• Multi-unit DA, holding DSIC, individual rationality and efficiency and
preserving the atomicity of orders, has to give up budget-balance. This is
because there should be an additional trading agent who supplements the
exposed orders resulted from rejecting partially satisfied order. In such
mechanism, there is at most one partially satisfied order which has to be
rejected to preserve its atomicity. This result compares to the previous
works [86, 102] proposing the design of multi-unit DA and also supporting
the weak budget-balance with asymptotic efficiency. These mechanisms
in contrast do not preserve the atomicity of orders, because the burden
from excess demand or supply needs to be redistributed to affect the
requested quantities of traders. Note that the atomicity of orders has
been chosen as a necessary condition to preserve the quantities required
by an option portfolio.
• Multi-unit DA populated with Black-Scholes traders will result in Black-
Scholes prices. In fact, the simulation results approximate Black-Scholes
prices if all traders use any of the risk-neutral pricing methods described.
This compares with the previous research done in risk-neutral pricing
of options, as it experimentally shows the emergence of Black-Scholes
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prices from the simulation of a market populated with risk-neutral option
pricing traders.
• Multi-unit DA can also be designed for traders with revealed preferences.
For example, ZI option traders can submit their forecasts to the mecha-
nism, rely on the mechanism to allocate, compute option prices internally
and clear the orders using any DSIC mechanism. Simulation results of
ZI traders have shown that the options are overpriced if the aggregated
forecasts in the market are above current spot price. The similar result
is obtained for underpriced options using ZI traders.
• If multiple multi-unit DAs are simulated in parallel for different types of
options, and traders requested to pick option portfolio from these parallel
markets based on their ZI forecast, it resulted in aggregated forecasts
which aligned with the direction of option portfolios chosen by trading
agents. This, in turn, established a relationship between the choices of
option portfolios by traders and their aggregate effect in forming option
prices above (below) risk-neutral prices.
• Different option pricing methodologies such as risk-averse pricing, LMSR
pricing can be mixed along with traditional risk-neutral methods in
multi-unit DA environment in order to obtain option prices representing
the aggregated beliefs of heterogeneous traders in the market. We have
observed that in most cases the resulted option prices are aligned with
Black-Scholes prices with certain level of discrepancies caused by differ-
ences in option pricing methods. Financial analysts can learn about such
discrepancies from risk-neutral prices by hypothesising the population of
traders and their methods of pricing options.
Besides accomplished work, there are several points that can be improved to
make the implementation and the simulation of proposed mechanisms more
applicable in real-life. I listed them below:
• Budget-Balance: In order to make the proposed mechanism practically
applicable, the mechanism needs to be at least weakly budget-balanced.
However if it is budget-balanced then the potential overdemand or over-
supply must be cut at the cost of decreasing the quantities requested.
The mechanism should be improved to coordinate the cut of excess de-
mands and supplies in such way that this does not break the proportions
given in option portfolios requested. For example, if there are paral-
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lel mechanisms running simultaneously for different options, and agent
wants to take Butterfly spread which involves selling 2 ATM calls, and
buying one OTM and one ITM call. So the agent has to participate
3 mechanisms to take Butterfly spread, and the quantities for OTM,
ATM and ITM calls must maintain 1 : −2 : 1 ratio respectively. There
should be a coordinating agents across mechanisms who cuts excess de-
mand/supply in such way that the ratio for each agent is preserved.
• Collusion: The proposed mechanism is susceptible to collusion because
buyers can coordinate themselves to reduce the option price to zero,
while sellers can achieve maximal price. This problem can be mitigated
by introducing reserve prices computed from the prior distribution of
seller or buyer valuations on both sides. In fact my mechanism already
applies the validity check for the option price, so its value has to be not
less than its intrinsic value, and not more than its underlying asset price.
However, mechanism can even narrow down this interval by finding such
reserve prices ra for asks and rb for bids which maximise the expected
utility of sellers and buyers. ra determines the upper-bound for sellers,
and rb determines the lower bound for buyers. In this way, colluders
will have less room to manipulate the option prices, and at least pay the
expected value of the option.
• Extensive analysis of trader performance: I have dropped the extensive
analysis of the trader performance from the scope of this paper. It would
be interesting to observe how each type of trader generates profit from
participating in proposed mechanism or live trading. The traders make
profit from trading and exercising options in the market, and these as-
pects of proposed traders will be extensively studied in future works.
• Extended revealed mechanisms: I have only proposed a revealed multi-
unit DA for ZI traders, but this idea can be extended for other traders as
well. Similarly Black-Scholes trader can quote option prices using implied
volatility, and risk-averse agents can also reveal their expected payoff
along with risk-averseness factor. LMSR trader can further reveal their
current portfolios and the range of events horizon they use to measure
the potential range of payoffs. Involving all these heterogeneous trader
would require design of a hybrid mechanism which accepts these truthful
revelations to find maximised allocation and compute DSIC payments.
• Extended revealed mechanisms for trading option portfolios: I analysed
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the effect of option portfolios on aggregated predictions through which I
derived the option prices. At the core of these idea was ZI trader using
GBM as their forecasting model. However I also proposed option pricing
methods such as risk-neutral, risk-averse or portfolio based pricing, and
they also use certain parameters to obtain their prices. In revealed mech-
anisms, these parameters can be used in choosing corresponding option
portfolios and clearing the simultaneous multi-unit markets by adapted
allocation rules. This type of mechanism generalise the proposed idea of
revealed mechanisms for trading option portfolios.
To sum up, there have been several points proposed to build direct DA for
trading options along with a number of its limitations that could be studied
in future. In general, I have shown that the proposed mechanism can, in most






In this chapter, I present the design and implementation of an online double
auction. I use this mechanism for running the adaptive option trading algo-
rithms that I developed in Chapter 4. I implemented the standard Limit Order
Book (LOB) data structure for simulating the online double auction. As it was
mentioned in Gode and Sunder [74], there are two motivations of using LOB
as a mechanism to simulate markets. First, it is commonly used data struc-
ture in financial exchanges such as NYSE, CBOE and even Bitcoin exchanges.
Secondly, it has been shown in laboratory experiments to yield approximately
the same results as human traders would do in various economic environments.
I would also add the triviality of its implementation and use. The presented
implementation does not include the desired properties of mechanisms such as
DSIC or even BIC and individual rationality. However, as it is common to
most exchanges, the mechanism is efficient and budget-balanced.
Apart from Gode and Sunder’s basic simulation results with CDAs, there
have been a number of other CDA models proposed by many researchers.
Smith et al. [149] proposed a model where orders arrive at random flows with
the same frequency and fixed size. They simulated the prices from different
distributions and analysed the aggregate effect of these orders in the orderbook.
Chiarella and Iori [27] took an agent-based approach in simulating the orders
for the CDA. They used fundamentalist, chartist and ZI traders to generate
the orders, and have shown that the combination of such traders can mimic
the real stock markets. But the core problem with this approach was its
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calibration to the historical prices. I also mentioned about the agent-based
methodologies of Gjerstad and Dickhaut [69], Cliff [29], Cai et al. [23] in
earlier chapters. Osterrieder et al. [103] proposed an approach where the
prices modelled using GBM model and the order arrivals using the Poisson
process the intensity of which depended on the quoted prices. They analysed
the Swiss Exchange (SWX) using this model, and exhibited the relationships
between three variables: time, order price and order size. Although I shall not
model the order arrivals using a Poisson process 1, I use more simplified, but
similar approach. However, similar to Osterrieder, my approach includes the
simulated asset prices using stochastic models which can be easily calibrated
to historical prices. Also I take advantage of an agent-based methodology in
simulating the option market.
It is crucial to evaluate options using the existing mechanisms such as LOB,
because the simulation results would be more likely to mimic the real market.
Also it enables us to try different trading algorithms on a working testbed to
evaluate their performance. Traders can interact live with the mechanism and
observe the current orders to make their trading decisions. I use 4 types of
options trading algorithms, 2 for option dealers, and 2 for option traders. 2
option dealers are Garman’s portfolio-based algorithm and Copeland-Galai’s
information-based algorithm. For option traders, I use ZIP and GD algorithms.
Besides above trading algorithms, I also need auxiliary traders such as informed
trader who computes the option prices based on the information he has on
the expiration price of the asset. I need this type of traders to simulate the
performance of Copeland-Galai’s information-based dealer. Another type of
auxiliary trader is the Monte-Carlo trader who only posts the current Monte-
Carlo simulation result of the option price in online double auction. I need this
trader to verify if the implemented mechanism outputs results that simulate
the Black-Scholes price when all traders post similar orders.
I organised the chapter as follows. Section 6.2 describe the design and imple-
mentation of the LOB. In Section 6.3, I present the experimental cases for the
simulation and explain the reason for conducting them. Section 6.4 provides
the verification results through the simulation of a hypothetical scenario of
Monte-Carlo traders. Section 6.5 provides the experimental results and high-
lights the important findings. Finally, in Section 6.6, I summarise the chapter’s
main results and emphasise its key contributions.
1Information- and inventory-based dealers used in my model actually expect orders ar-










Table 6.1: Limit Order Class
6.2 Design of Online Double Auction
In this section, I explain the inner workings of the mechanism I have developed
including how it solicits orders from traders, how it places orders into corre-
sponding bids or asks lists and how it clears the matched orders. The online
double auction is going to run multiple trading days until the option gets ex-
pired. Also traders are initialised once at the beginning of the simulation, and
then continuously involved in trading process. As it was mentioned in Chap-
ter 2, CDA basically involves 2 types of orders: market order and limit order.
The only difference of the market order from the limit order is that it does not
include the price quote, and submitted by the impatient trader who is willing
to trade immediately. Although such traders may use automated algorithms
to detect when to enter the market, and when to exit, they are not involved in
the actual pricing process, thus they are not the price-setters in the market.
Hence I should omit such traders from the simulation, because the proposed
traders involve the actual option pricing inside their trading algorithm and
adjust their bids and asks to that value accordingly. So all the traders submit
limit orders which get cleared by the mechanism as the crossing limit order
arrives. Table 6.1 illustrates the class structure of the limit order.
I shall drop the word ’limit’ while referring to limit order onwards. It can be
seen from Table 6.1 that the order is multi-unit order. Unlike in direct double
auction where the negative quantities represented asks, and positive number
bids, in online auction the quantity is always a positive number. The side of
the order is indicated separately in a different field. The methods nextOrder()
and prevOrder() are used to maintain the depth of the orderbook, so once
the order gets filled, mechanism knows which one is the next to be filled. Also
it is worth noting that the ’order_id’ gets incremented with the new order,




($5, 20) ($4, 30)
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Table 6.3: LOB after filling the cross-
ing order
The LOB is the data structure where all orders are stored and cleared. It
consists of two sides one for bids, and one for asks. Bids side of the LOB
stores the bids in a descending order by their prices, while the asks side stores
the asks in an ascending order. When the prices are equal, the ’order_id’ is
used to sort the orders giving priority for the earliest order. I refer the top bid
and ask in both sides of LOB, as outstanding bid and ask. For an outstanding
bid ($5, 20) with quote $5 and quantity 20, if a new ask ($4, 30) arrives, this is
called the crossing ask and it gets cleared immediately for the 20 items, leaving
the outstanding ask of ($4, 10) in LOB. This process is illustrated in following
Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The clearing price the mechanism will for the above case
is the average of both quotes, so it is $4.5. If the crossing ask covers multiple
outstanding bids, then based on the bid it is covering the average price is
going to be different. Hence the volume given by the seller is going to impact
the sales prices, and he might have an incentive to split his big volume into
smaller orders with discriminatory prices. This is thoroughly studied in market
impact theory, and one of the common models that are used to understand the
price impact of the volume is given by Kissel [96]. However I do not consider
this factor in given trading algorithms, and simply assume that every trader
expresses the quantities he wants in one order. Using the anonymous price for
both buyer and seller makes the mechanism strongly budget-balanced.
The mechanism implements several lists of orders stored in balanced binary
tree to process asks and bids in computationally efficient way. Order lists are
tagged with the range of prices they contain inside, and the Red-Black (RB)
tree is used to find them. RB tree is self-balancing binary tree that enables
search in O(log n), and on average insertion and removal of nodes in O(1) [34].
I used Python’s open source bintrees 2 implementation for the development of
LOB data structure.
Similar to LOB, order lists also sort bids and asks according to their prices,
2https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bintrees/2.0.2
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Figure 6.1: LOB using Order Tree
and use ’order_id’ as a tie breaker giving priority to the earliest order. The
Figure 6.1 illustrates the structure of the order tree. It can be seen from Figure
6.1 that there are two RB trees involved in building LOB, one for bids and one
for asks. Each RB tree has the balanced list of order lists sorted by their most
outstanding order. Hence at the top of the RB is the most outstanding bids
and asks of the LOB which get cleared first when the crossing order arrives.
Once the top orders list is empty, it is removed from the tree and the next
order list is bubbled upwards. Inside the order list, the orders are structured
as a linked list, so the insertion or removal of a node is a O(1).
After clearing the crossing order, the mechanism generates two objects: trades
and order. The order object is simply the remnant of the original order after
processing. If order is crossing order, and gets fully satisfied, then mechanism
returns nothing. If it gets partially satisfied, then the mechanism returns the
order with a decreased quantity equivalent to the amount which is unsatisfied.
And finally if the order is not cleared, but written in LOB, it gets assigned with
’order_id’, and returned. The trades is an array of transactions happened
after submitting the order. So it includes the IDs of both buyer and seller who
participate in transaction and, the price and the quantity of the transaction.
There could also be multiple transactions as one crossing order can fill many
orders with fewer quantities, or no transactions at all if the submitted order
is not matched. The structure of the trade object is given in Table 6.4.
The mechanism uses process_order() subroutine to process the incoming
orders. It is given in Algorithm 4. The mechanism is continuously connected
to the underlying market and updates the new asset prices every trading day.
Because the underlying market is simulated using the mathematical models
given in Chapter 3, the data arrival to the mechanism happens once every
trading day before the traders start submitting their orders with the new asset







Table 6.4: Trade Class
asset price through computing the new option price of the day. This option
price represented by pˆ is then used to create bid-ask spread around it. This
would also require the mechanism to cancel all the existing bids and asks
from previous day, as they are considered obsolete by all traders. However
the traders are not reinitialised, and all their adapted parameters, portfolios
and cash are preserved, apart from the option price. So every trading day
start with empty LOB. Once the new asset price is announced, the traders
Algorithm 4 Processing Order
Require: order
trades← []
if order is bid then
while there is askList in asksTree do
while there is ask in askList that match order do
if order.quantity ≤ ask.quantity then
decrease ask.quantity by order.quantity and remove ask if empty
else









are randomly solicited for an order. Of course, the first trader who submits
the order has no information about the bids and asks of other traders, hence
he cannot adjust his trading algorithm for the market. So the opening price
usually exhibits the traders internally calculated option price processed by the
initial settings of the trader to create reasonable bid-ask spread. Similarly, the
closing order taken from the last trader summarises all the information coming
from posted orders and reflects the trading day’s final option price. This can
be tricky when there are heterogeneous traders involved in the market, as
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their methods of reflecting the changes in the market are also different, so
they produce different option prices. So for analysis purposes, we can also use
the average of the day’s highest and lowest prices. This should provide better
approximation of an option price for a given day.
Every trading day, the trader submits his order only once when it is requested
by the mechanism. Instead of traders pushing orders to the market through
a Poisson process, I decided to shift this role to the mechanism due to its
simplicity. Mechanism shuﬄes the order of traders to post their bids and asks
everyday, in this way the agents at the bottom of the queue can observe the
arrival of orders and consider it as random process. In other words, the lower
is the agent in the queue, the greater is the number of new orders he observes
before submitting his own. Although order arrivals are not correspond to
Poisson process as it is usually implemented in stock markets, it still mimics the
casual interest in particular type of option out of many variations of available
options in option chain.
The simulation timeline is the same as the option’s expiry time. I normally use
option which expires in one year, so the number of trading days is equal to 365.
On option’s expiry date, the agents will be requested to exercise their options
and evaluate the cash they have made. Those who hold the option receive the
payoff from those who wrote the option. The agents can run into loss due to the
liability they bear for the issued option. This definitely contradicts with the
individual rationality of traders, as their utilities can end-up below zero from
the uncertainty of future prices. However if we consider individual rationality
from the standpoint of sole trading and disregarding the option payoff, then
for each bid or ask submitted by the trader, he is not charged more than
the submitted amount, so the trader is weakly better off participating in the
market.
6.3 Design of Experiments
In section, I describe the experimental cases and provide their important pa-
rameters. The experiments mainly consist of simulating different option trad-
ing agents in online double auction and observing the option prices they gen-
erate. I provide the instances of traders that are used in these experiments,
and determine their fixed parameters. I also emphasise the important aspects
of the traders that will be observed throughout the simulation. Next, I talk
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about the simulation of the market involving the underlying market, and the
main indicators of the market that are of an important concern. Finally, I
describe how I analyse the option Greeks in current setup.
6.3.1 Traders
As I covered in Chapter 4, there are 4 trading algorithms that I use to sim-
ulate option traders. These are 2 dealers: Garman’s portfolio-based dealer,
and Copeland-Galai’s information-based dealer. I have already adapted these
algorithms to option pricing, so they can be used according to this implemen-
tation. I also use the ZIP and GD algorithms as the speculative option trading
behaviour. Besides these proxy trading algorithms, I also need new auxiliary
traders for specific cases. I will use -MC option pricer, and -RND quantity
chooser for all traders. For example, according to the nomenclature declared
in Table 4.1, if I refer to Garman trader, I shall say ’MC-RND-GAR’. This
would mean that the trader uses Monte-Carlo option pricing method, random
integer for choosing option quantity and Garman’s algorithm for proxy trading
in online double auction. However, because I use Monte-Carlo option pricing
method and random quantity chooser, for shortness sake, I only use the last
part of the traders name, which is ’GAR’. The quantities for each order are
capped at q¯ = 2000, so the randomly picks from 1 to 2000 options to bid or to
ask. The MC option pricing method uses the GBM asset pricing model with
NASDAQ calibrated parameters such as r = 0.175, σ = 0.0089, S0 = 3563.57,
and simulates the asset prices till option’s maturity date.
The experiments consider several important properties of traders during sim-
ulation. First, we observe the bid-asks spread of the trader, how it changes
depending on the changes in underlying market, the option market and its
internal state. Then I also present the inventory and cash dynamics of the
traders changing as they participate in market transactions. This shows the
current market position of the trader at given point of the simulation, and the
money he made so far through participating in trades. Traders can profit from
selling and buying options at different times, but the profit generated from
the option payoff considerably greater than speculative profit. Therefore I also
show the distribution of the final balance of options before execution, and then
the profit made after execution.
Now let me first start with auxiliary traders, and then I go on to the instances
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of other traders used in my experiments.
Auxiliary Traders
I need two auxiliary traders for two different cases. First is the verification of
the proposed online double auction to see if it really reflects the agent prices.
And the second is to provide the population of informed traders to the market,
so the belief of the Copeland-Galai trader about the informed traders in the
market is true.
For the verification of the mechanism, I simply strip the trader from its proxy
trading algorithm, and use whatever value it generates using Monte-Carlo
option pricing. In this trader does not create bid-ask spread, but simply posts
his private evaluation of the Monte-Carlo simulation. I shall name such trader
as MC trader. In verification case, I populate the market with MC traders,
and run the simulation. The resulted outcome should approximately replicate
the Black-Scholes prices. Also the option’s sensitivity to the other factors has
to correspond with Black-Scholes analytical solutions. I use 100 MC traders
to populate the online double auction.
The second type of auxiliary trader is an informed trader. This trader does not
use any option pricing method at all. He simply knows the future asset price
at the expiry of the option, and hence can compute the option’s real payoff.
If option is going to end up ITM, the informed trader is better off buying the
option when it is underpriced, and selling the option when it is overpriced. If
the option is going to expire in ATM or OTM, then informed trader is better
off selling it any price greater than zero. So informed trader can take advantage
of the information he knows about the future asset price and make rational
decision. The informed trader uses -RND to pick the quantity of the option he
wishes to sell or buy. I shall refer the informed trader as INF in this chapter.
Speculative Traders
As speculative traders I use ZIP and GD traders. Experiments with these
traders are important because they are the most commonly used trading al-
gorithms in CDAs. I shall test their performance in option markets where
the prices are not only controlled by the orders of these traders, but they
also emerge from the underlying market. Simulating the option market solely
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Experimental Case Traders Population




Table 6.5: Experiments with Speculative Traders
Parameter Name Parameter Value
Learning Coefficient (β) U(0.1, 0.5)
Momentum (γ) U(0, 1)
Initial Bid Margin U(0.1, 0.5)
Initial Ask Margin U(0.1, 0.5)
Relative Downward Perturb.(R−) U(0.95, 1.00)
Relative Upward Perturb.(R+) U(1.00, 1.05)
Absolute Downward Perturb.(A−) U(−0.05, 0)
Absolute Upward Perturb.(A+) U(0, 0.05)
Table 6.6: ZIP Trader Parameters
populated with ZIP traders should realistically replicate the human trading
behaviour, as it combines both the trend following and learning behaviour of
agents. These parameters are set randomly for ZIP traders, so they are truly
heterogeneous in their trading behaviour.
The GD traders, on the other hand, represent other category of speculative
traders who take advantage of the current mood of the market. However GD
traders cannot create the mood in the market by themselves as they simply
rely on others’ decisions in making their own. Therefore I cannot simulate a
market solely populated with GD traders, as it will result in an erratic output
with occasional traders happening due to mere chance. GD traders should
populated with ZIP traders to provide liquidity and facilitate their decision
making. I shall also mix both ZIP and GD traders to observe the option prices
resulted, and to review the performance of each type of agent. In Table 6.5
the different trader scenarios are listed.
As it is known the ZIP traders are defined by a number of parameters such
as β agent’s learning coefficient, γ agent’s momentum from previous orders,
initial bid and ask margins, and τ agents target price perturbation parameters
for decrease and increase (R−, A−) and (R+, A+) respectively. Below Table
6.6 lists how these parameters are populated throughout the simulation where
U(a, b) represents uniform distribution:
The GD traders use the full history of previous trades starting from the first
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trading day till the option’s expiry date. Every GD trader keeps track of the
rejected and accepted orders computing their private price ratio with risk-
neutral price, and based on this information decide which margin to use for
bids and asks. It has been shown that they maximise the probability of their
orders being successful, and if the market mood is more likely to accept lower
bids or higher asks, the GD trader posts such orders. Also as it was men-
tioned before that unlike original GD algorithm which computes the success
probability for raw prices, my GD trader uses the ratio of his private option
price pˆ and the risk-neutral price to compute the probability of the posted
price getting successfully filled. This as explained due to the changing nature
of the option price. In this way, GD algorithm finds the the optimal margin
for evaluated option price which maximises the probability of trade happening
in given mechanism.
Dealers
The dealers are the special types of traders that submit both bid and ask
for the option, and maintain bid-ask spread based on certain factors. Dealers
are less interested in making profit, rather than making the market, so they
cannot trade with each other in the absence of speculative traders. Therefore
I use additional traders in the market to provide liquidity for the dealers. I
populate GAR dealers with different portfolios of option and cash, and then
observe the width of their bid-ask spread as they involve in trading. Although
GAR dealer expects the intensity of the order arrivals depend on the bid and
ask price, my simulation omits this assumption. Dealers cannot calibrate the
intensity of orders from incoming orders due to the specific design of my CDA.
This is because traders are solicited to submit orders at random time by the
mechanism, and they can only submit a single order per trading day. In a real-
life market, traders can submit multiple orders at any time during the day, so
there is a possibility to learn about the intensity of orders directly from the
market. As I mentioned earlier in Section 4.4, this approach would require the
implementation of sophisticated algorithms for traders to decide when to enter
the market, what orders (if multiple) represent traders preferences, how they
are broken down into smaller chunks to minimise the market impact, and what
is the best timing to submit them, and what is the best time to completely exit
the market. These issues require more rigorous research and outside the scope
of my thesis. Therefore, I have to assume that GAR dealer uses hypothetical
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Table 6.7: GAR Dealers and their inventories
linear functions of supply and demand as his model of the intensity of arrivals in
the online double auction. Although this belief is detached from the mechanism
itself, it is reasonable to expect such behaviour in real markets. In other words,
the intensity of ask arrivals is low if the outstanding bid is low, and the intensity
of bid arrivals is low if the outstanding ask is high. Therefore we use standard
linear supply and demand functions as constraints for the GAR’s objective
function which minimises the probability of failure. I assign GAR dealer with
different portfolios of cash and options, and use these instances throughout the
experiments. Table 6.7 lists the GAR dealer instances and their corresponding
portfolios used through the simulation.
It is worth mentioning that the quantities ordered in the online double auction
are capped at 2000, and the average ITM (i.e. the most expensive one) option
price throughout the timeline of the simulating fluctuates between $40 to $80.
Based on these parameters I set up different extremal portfolios for GAR
traders to observe the width of their bid-ask spread. For example, the GAR1
trader has very limited portfolio of $1000 cash, and 100 options, hence in ITM
option market he can only buy at most 20 options, or barely satisfy any ask,
as the quantity requested may exceed 100. In order to safeguard himself from
possible asks, the GAR1 trader has to maintain lowest possible bid, but very
high ask. At the other spectrum of the GAR trader is the GAR6 dealer with
$1M in cash, and 1M options. Hence this dealer can safely submit narrower
bid-ask spread, and engage in trader without fearing to fail. I shall observe
the bid-ask spreads of the GAR trader in comparison to the their portfolio.
The second type of dealers are the information-based COP dealers who adjust
their bid-ask spread to safeguard themselves from the informed traders. As I
said I will use INF traders to simulate the informed trader behaviour. COP
dealer has a special parameter θ indicating the proportion of informed traders
in the market. In practice, this parameter θ is obtained through using Bayesian
learning as it was given in Chapter 4, but for the sake of experiment and
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Table 6.8: COP Dealers and their inventories































Table 6.9: Experiments with Dealers
simplicity, I will manually assign these parameters to COP dealers and observe
their behaviour in choosing bid-ask spread. I listed the COP dealers that
are used in the experiments in Table 6.8. As I did for GAR dealers, I also
simulate different parameters including the extremal cases for COP dealers.
For example, the COP1 trader with θ = 0.01 thinks that there are only 1% of
informed traders in the market, and hence it is less likely he is going to loose
much money from them. So COP1 trader can use narrower bid-ask spread and
freely engage in trading process. However the COP5 trader assumes that 80%
of the market is populated with informed traders, and therefore he needs to
set wider bid-ask spread. I shall observe the dynamics of the bid-ask spreads
for COP traders based on their θ parameter.
Now once I clarified the dealers that are used in experiments, I list the two
experimental cases for each of them. Table 6.9 shows the configuration of
each experiment. It can be seen from the Table 6.9 that the ’COP Dealers’
experiment include 10 INF traders, which constitutes the 10% of the trader







Table 6.10: Experiment with All Traders
Mixed Traders
In this experimental scenario, I use every developed trader and dealer to sim-
ulate the option prices and observe their trading behaviour. It includes ZIP
and GD traders, and all GAR and COP dealers. The main reason to do so is
to maximise the heterogeneity of the traders in the market, and see how the
option prices are affected. It is also interesting to observe the performance
of the traders in such scenario. Table 6.10 illustrates all traders involved in
mixed case:
6.3.2 Market Simulation
In this section, I describe how both underlying and option markets are sim-
ulated in proposed experiments. I already simulated the asset prices using
GBM in Chapter 5, and I use the same asset prices path for consistency. It
calibrated to NASDAQ-100 indices and can be viewed in Figure 5.4. The op-
tion market is run using proposed online double auction. I create 100 traders
at the beginning of the simulation and then continuously solicit orders from
them. I also use the same set of ATM, OTM and ITM options that I used in
Chapter 5. They are displayed in Table 5.6.
Mechanism simulates 365 trading days, going up to the point the option ex-
pires. For each trading day, I capture key outcomes of the mechanism for
further analysis. This involves the opening, closing, high and low prices of the
day, volumes traded and some other relevant indicators. The mechanism is
analysed using following parameters for each trading day.
• Black-Scholes Price: This shows the current Black-Scholes price for com-
parison. In this way, we can see how the option prices differ from theo-
retical price.
• Opening Price: This shows the price resulted from the first trade on a
trading day.
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• Closing Price: This shows the price resulted from the last trade on a
trading day.
• High Price: This shows the highest price resulted from the trade on a
trading day.
• Low Price: This shows the lowest price resulted from the trade on a
trading day.
• Average Price: This shows the average highest and lowest prices of a
trading day. It is used for the analysis of option’s Greek.
• Trade Volume: This shows how many options have been traded on a
trading day.
From captured details, I plot corresponding charts and analyse the simulation
results. The closing prices are plotted as line graph, indicating trading days
on horizontal axis, and the prices on vertical axis. It could be presented as a
candlestick graph like most of the price charts in real markets having ask and
bid prices shown separately, but due to very narrow spread between cleared bid
and ask prices, the candlestick graph looked less comprehensive. The highest
and lowest prices are indicated with a shaded yellow area.
Besides the market prices, I also capture the bid-ask spread of each trader
involved in the market. Below is the list of details that are saved for each
trader for a given trading day.
• Bid Price: This shows the trader’s bid for the option on a given trading
day. It might not be the bid that is submitted to the market, as the
trader may choose to sell an option, and submit ask instead. But every
trader maintains his internal bid for the option on a given trading day.
• Ask Price: This shows the trader’s ask for the option on a given trading
day, not necessarily submitted one according to the case above.
• Cash: This shows the cash account of the trader on a given trading day.
It can also be negative meaning that the trader borrowed cash, and this
is considered as his obligation until the end of the simulation so he can
exercise his options and get a payoff to compensate it.
• Options: This shows the number of options held by the trader on a given
trading day. It can also be negative meaning that the trader wrote the
option to someone else.
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I need this information to observe how the cash and inventories change for
different types of traders, and more importantly, how the portfolio affects the
GAR dealer’s bid-ask spread.
Once the market reaches the option’s expiration date, the options are exercised
and the payoffs are received. So I also summarise this information for each
trader to see how much money in total is made, and what was the trader’s
final portfolio of options. In this way, we can evaluate the performance of each
trader by the amount of cash he made. Also we can plot the distribution of
cash and options for each trader in a histogram to see the overall performance
of the market.
6.3.3 Greeks Simulation
In Greeks simulations, I analyse the sensitivity option prices generated by the
mechanism with respect to changes in 3 relevant factors such as asset price,
delta and time-to-maturity. Namely, they are the option’s delta, gamma and
theta. I have mentioned the importance of these indicators in option pricing
in previous chapters.
I compute each Greeks parameters with respect to two parameters. In first
case, I change the asset price linearly from $3465 to $3665 covering moneyness
range of all three initialised options listed in Table 5.6. However, the way I do
it is a bit different from the one described in Chapter 5. Instead of directly
feeding these linear asset prices into the online mechanism, I use the data
obtained from the simulation of the market to approximate the Greeks. The
main reason for doing this is that the mechanism is continuous and the traders
exhibit continuous interest in the market. The linearly increasing asset prices
would simply adjust all traders to follow the trend, and does not diverge in their
bids and asks preventing the possibility of any trade. Therefore, I compute the
implied volatility from the closing prices of the market, and use its average to
obtain analytical Black-Scholes Greeks of options. I also compute Greeks for
linearly decreasing the time-to-maturity parameter by fixing the asset price
at ATM S0 = K. In this way, we can observe how option Greeks change
according to the time from T = 1 to T = 0. I obtain the Greeks with respect
to the time-to-maturity in the same way I did for the linear asset prices.
I present the results of the simulation of Greeks along with theoretical Black-
Scholes Greeks for each type of option. This should enable us to see how these
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aspects of option pricing can be different from theoretically computed ones.
6.4 Verification of Proposed Mechanism
In this section, I present the first results from the simulation of both market
and Greeks in order to verify if it gives expected results in a hypothetical case
populated with MC traders. This is an important factor because it exhibits
the several aspects of the proposed mechanism:
• Unanimity: The prices obtained by the mechanism must be the overall
representation of submitted orders, and when all traders in the market
are MC traders, the price should correspond with Black-Scholes price.
This shows the unanimity of the mechanism.
• Consistency: The prices obtained by the mechanism must also be consis-
tent with option’s definition. This involves option’s final payoff according
to its strike and asset price at expiry date. For example, OTM option
price should end up at zero at its maturity, because it generates no payoff.
• Robustness: The sensitivity of option prices to changes in asset prices,
delta and time-to-maturity must be consistent when the Greeks are sim-
ulated. This exhibits how option’s delta, gamma and theta correspond
to Black-Scholes delta, gamma and theta when the mechanism is put
to simulation of one parameters while fixing the others. In the context
of this research, these control factors are the asset prices and time-to-
maturity.
Figure 6.2 shows the results obtained from simulating MC traders in proposed
online mechanism. It can be seen that it corresponds with Black-Scholes prices
in all ATM, OTM and ITM option markets. We can see from the high and
low prices in the yellow shaded area that the mechanism does not significantly
vary from the risk-neutral prices. Also we can observe that the OTM ends up
at zero at its maturity, which shows the consistency of the mechanism. ATM
and ITM options expire in-the-money, hence their prices are positive and equal
to their corresponding payoffs.
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Figure 6.2: CDA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for MC traders
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Figure 6.3: CDA inventory distribution and Greeks of ATM, OTM and ITM
options for MC traders
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The option Greeks for the MC traders given in Figure 6.3 show slight diver-
gence in deltas and other parameters. This is due to a numeric error caused by
the approximation of the implied volatility from market prices and using that
in Black-Scholes analytic solution. If fact, this shows that the option prices are
robust to changes in asset prices and time-to-maturity, as they do not diverge
significantly from Black-Scholes analytical solutions.
6.5 Experimental Results
In this section, I present the important findings from simulation of different
traders in proposed online DA. I enclosed all results of the simulation in Ap-
pendix E. I review the results from simulating ZIP, GD, GAR, COP and mixed
traders and point out their important characteristics.
6.5.1 ZIP traders
ZIP traders turned out to be great liquidity providers among other agents,
as they were very likely to adjust quickly their bid-ask upon arrival of new
information. Hence they adjusted their margins to the submitted bids and
asks as soon as they see any success in their execution. Therefore I used ZIP
traders in all other experiments to provide a heterogeneity for other traders.
Figure E.2 shows the simulation results for the market solely populated by
ZIP traders. As it can be noticed, it is very close to Black-Scholes prices in all
cases, although there is slight more volatility at the beginning. The important
thing to notice is the very narrow difference between day’s high and low prices.
It is because ZIP traders continuously adjust their own bids and asks to the
others’ orders, and quickly reach an approximated equilibrium around Black-
Scholes prices. Also we can see that the closing price summarises the day’s
option prices the best because all traders are ZIP traders, and the randomly
chosen last trader is also ZIP trader who actually reflects the day’s trader in
his order.
Another interesting point to observe is the volume goes down as the options
approach their maturity. If we compare this with MC option pricing agents
in direct double auctions (see Figure D.6) where the volumes stayed approx-
imately the same throughout the year, in CDA with ZIP traders the volume
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declined by the time option reached maturity. This is because the option price
converges to its Black-Scholes price as it approaches maturity. In other words,
there is less uncertainty about option’s payoff when it is near its maturity, so
the prices the MC agents come up are nearly the same. In direct DA, they do
not use any profit margins, and post the prices as they are. Therefore agents
have more chances to match, and the prices change accordingly. However in
CDA, ZIP traders maintain margin for MC computed prices. At the beginning
of the option life, there is more uncertainty in pricing, so the bids and asks
overlap making trade higher. But as option nears maturity, MC computed
prices converge Black-Scholes, due to profit margin there is less chance for
bids and ask to match.
Figure E.3 shows the distribution of cash and options among the other traders,
and presents a snapshot on the option Greeks. As it can be seen, the final
payoffs are normally distributed among ZIP traders. This is also true for the
options held by trader at the end of simulation. The other Greek parameters
are slightly diverged from Black-Scholes, but in general they follow the same
pattern. I do not stress on the meaning of the Greeks, as I have explained
what they represent in Chapter D.
As we know, the ZIP traders are defined with two main parameters β and γ,
and the formed one is drawn from U(0.1, 0.5), the latter U(0, 1). I shall consider
the performance of the 4 traders with following configurations: (β1 = 0.1, γ1 =
0.1), (β2 = 0.5, γ2 = 0.1), (β3 = 0.1, γ3 = 0.5) and (β4 = 0.5, γ4 = 0.5). Figures
6.4a,6.4b, 6.4c and 6.4d illustrate the bid-ask spread, cash and options accounts
of ZIP traders with above parameters. It is known that β parameter defines
the trader’s ability to reach his target price τ which is derived from previously
submitted order. The lower is the parameter, the less likely the trader is going
to adapt to other orders in the market. In other words, the trader is less likely
to react to the change in underlying market or the orders submitted within the
mechanism. These prices can be attractive to other ZIP traders with higher
β because such orders might be underpriced, because they dismiss the newly
arrived information. If we compare the Figures 6.4a and 6.4b, we can see that
the trader with β = 0.5 participated less in trades, therefore he bought about
5000 options and spent about $60K on them. However we can see that the
first trader bought 20K options, 4 times more than the previous trader, but
spent about $1M for obtaining them, about 17 times more than the previous
trader. This is because the trader with β = 0.5 was able to quickly adapt his
quote to the latest orders and get better deals.
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(a) ZIP(β1 = 0.1, γ1 = 0.1) Performance (b) ZIP(β2 = 0.5, γ2 = 0.1) Performance
(c) ZIP(β3 = 0.1, γ3 = 0.5) Performance (d) ZIP(β4 = 0.5, γ4 = 0.5) Performance
Figure 6.4: ZIP Trader Performances
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The other factor is the momentum γ where the trade has the tendency to keep
his profit margin less affected with the arrival of new orders. We can see in
Figures 6.4a and 6.4c that the trader with γ = 0.5 spent the same amount of
cash to obtain 10K more options than the one with γ = 0.1. This is because
γ = 0.5 agent was more reluctant to change his profit margin, hence traded
with better prices.
All in all, from results provided, we can see that ZIP algorithm can be used as
a proxy trading algorithm for trading options and its performance depends on
its 2 parameters β and γ. We have seen that the agents with lower β and higher
are more likely to get less attractive deals due to their reluctance to adapt their
price and profit margin quickly to ongoing changes. However, by controlling
these parameters of ZIP traders, we can simulated trading agents with different
behaviour in the market, and somehow replicate its heterogeneity. In next
sections, I use ZIP traders as main liquidity providers in the market due to
their ability to generate randomized bids or asks constrained by their learning
algorithm.
6.5.2 GD Traders
In this section, I present the results of the simulation of GD traders along
with ZIP traders. As said before, GD traders base their decisions from the
performance of other traders, through Bayesian update of the posteriors on
the probability of successful bid or ask. Figure E.4 illustrates the option prices
obtained from this simulation. The option prices are aligned around Black-
Scholes, and the range of orders is not very wide. The interesting results
can be observed in Figure E.5 where the distribution of cash and options are
somewhat segregated into different groups. This is because all GD traders are
somewhat deterministic in their behaviour. There is no random component
in GD trading strategy, apart from their option pricing method. Hence all
GD traders using full history of trades in the market should exhibit almost
the same bids and asks. The only difference is the time when each of the GD
traders submit their bids/asks, as the ones who submit the latest order gets
more complete information about the preferences of others. But from Figure
E.4, we can see that the effect of this difference is not noticeable on the option
prices results.
In my experiment, their bids were considered efficient and purchased by ZIP
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Figure 6.5: GD Trader’s distribution of cash and options in ATM, OTM and
ITM markets
(a) GD Trader 1 Performance (b) GD Trader 2 Performance
Figure 6.6: GD Trader Performances
traders. So in all option markets, GD traders engaged in buying out options.
Of course, in case of ATM and ITM options, this yielded them enormous
profits, while in OTM they lost much money. The distributions of cash and
options for only GD traders are given in Figure 6.5. We can see from the
Figure 6.5 that traders clearly owned options in all cases, and that caused
them enormous profit in ATM and ITM cases, and loss in OTM case.
In order to highlight the similar behaviour of all GD traders, and to view the
dynamics of their bid-ask spreads, cash and options accounts. I picked two
random GD traders for comparison. Figures 6.6a and 6.6b illustrate them.
It can be seen that both of the GD traders are involved in buying options,
and their bid-ask spread is not much different from their actual private option
price. Apparently their bid price was attractive to ZIP traders, so they bought
those options from GD traders.
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To sum up, the key message we can deduce from the simulation is that the
GD algorithm can be used as a proxy trading algorithms for trading options,
although most of their trading strategy is influenced by the behaviour of other
traders. In provided example, the prices were mostly driven by ZIP trader,
and GD traders simply adapted to such these prices. GD traders with full
historical record of orders submitted lower bids which was below the profit
margin of other traders. This led to GD traders purchasing options all the
time, and making profit in case if option ends up ITM.
6.5.3 Garman Dealers
In this section, I present the results of the simulation of 6 GAR dealers along
with 90 ZIP traders. GAR dealers are the agents who make their trading
decisions based on the portfolio they currently hold, therefore their bid-ask
spread directly depend on what they currently have. I simulated extremal
cases where GAR1 trader has incompatible portfolio of cash and options to
trade in the market, and GAR6 has enough portfolio to make an attractive
bid-ask spread.
Figure E.6 illustrates the overall option prices generated from the simulation
of these agents. It can be seen that the closing prices are fluctuating around
Black-Scholes prices with high and low prices being not far from them. The
volume also tends to decrease as the option reaches its maturity for above
stated reasons in ZIP simulation case (i.e. because option prices converge
nearing maturity and traders maintain profit margin). In Figure E.7, we can
see the distribution of cash and options among all traders. Note, that I had
to subtract the initial endowment of the GAR traders to compute their net
performance. It can be seen that the final payoffs are centralised around zero,
which is caused by the majority of ZIP traders. However there is an exceptional
case in OTM market. These are the GAR trader who bought the OTM options
and end up not exercising them. Hence they made a loss for the money they
spent for purchasing the options. The final balances of all 6 GAR traders
displayed in Figure 6.7 shows how they made profit in ATM, ITM markets,
and made loss in OTM markets. In Figure 6.7 we can see that all GAR dealers
incurred loss in OTM market, and profit in ATM and ITM market because of
only buying options. The GAR1 with least portfolio did not even participate
in trade due to its large bid-ask spread. However, in OTM market, when the
option prices approached zero, GAR1 dealer had a chance to buy some options,
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Figure 6.7: GAR Dealer Inventories At Expiry
as they were falling into GAR1’s bid-ask range.
I shall review the dynamics of 4 GAR dealers, namely GAR1, GAR2, GAR3
and GAR5, in setting bid-ask spread, and maintaining portfolio during the
simulation of ATM market. As expected in Figure 6.8a, we can see the GAR1
dealer’s unrealistic bid-ask which bids almost 0 for the option, and asks more
than twice his private price. Naturally, it can be seen from the cash and option
accounts, GAR1 dealer does not trade in ATM market at all, so his balance is
constant. However GAR2 dealer has a realistic portfolio, hence it begins with
moderate bid-ask spread, and starts buying out options, until he realises that
he is becoming low in cash. This forces the GAR2 dealer to widen his bid-ask
spread which makes his bid less competitive. We can also see the changes in the
cash and option account stop changing, once the bid-ask spread is increased.
Another interesting situation is the GAR3 dealers result. Although GAR3
had twice more cash endowment than GAR2, his bid-ask spread becomes even
wider than GAR2 dealer’s spread. At the beginning GAR3 has smaller bid-
ask spread, but with the increase flow of orders, GAR3’s cash falls faster than
GAR2, thus he becomes much lower in cash, and will be forced to make a
wider bid-ask spread. This eventually stops the incoming orders for GAR3.
The most aﬄuent GAR5 is observed to maintain smaller bid-ask spread and it
gets slightly increased until it stops the flow of orders. As predicted, all GAR
dealer correctly reacted to the changes in the portfolio.
We can deduce important characteristics from above simulation. First GAR
proxy trading algorithm can be used for trading options for dealers who have
budget constraints. Due to this fact, it generates conservative bid-ask spread
which gets continuously adjusted to the trades current inventories. We saw
that it stops selling options as soon as it reaches its budget limit by signifi-
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(a) GAR1 Dealer Performance (b) GAR2 Dealer Performance
(c) GAR3 Dealer Performance (d) GAR5 Dealer Performance
Figure 6.8: GAR Dealer Performances
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(a) COP1 Dealer Performance (b) COP3 Dealer Performance
Figure 6.9: COP Dealer Performances
cantly increasing his bid and decreasing his ask. We can also observe that the
evaluated option price is always in the middle of the bid-ask spread.
6.5.4 Copeland-Galai Dealers
In this section, I review the results of the COP dealers simulated together
with INF and ZIP traders. COP dealers set their bid-ask spreads based on
their belief in the proportion of informed traders θ in the market. I set this
parameter to different extremes to see how COP dealers handle the situation.
Figure E.8 illustrates the option prices resulted from the simulation of above
traders. We can see they align with Black-Scholes prices and the high-low
prices are not significantly different from the closing price.
In Figure E.9, we can see the distribution of trader inventories and Greeks
from the market simulation. The results are pretty much the same as in ZIP
trader, but the Greeks are more skewed due to higher implied volatility. Let me
concentrate the attention on 2 COP dealers: COP1 who thinks that there are
only 1% informed dealers in the market, and COP3 who correctly believes that
informed dealers are the 10% of the overall population. Figure 6.9 illustrates
these two dealers. We can see that the COP1 dealer just maintains the fixed
bid-ask spread, setting his current private option price pˆ equal to his bid, and
about twice more for the ask. The width of the bid-ask spread is controlled
by the linear model for expected number of orders to arrive at given price.
Changing the slope of the linear function, or replacing it with less aggressive
order flow model, or even using exponential distribution or Poisson distribution
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changes the width of the bid-ask spread. If we look at the COP3 dealer, we
can see that he shifts his fixed bid-ask spread downward to lower his bid in
order to discourage INF traders selling to him. As it can be seen from the
cash and inventory of the COP3 trader, this significantly deters the trades
until the COP3 trader pushes back his bid to a near pˆ price. The reason for
changing the bid-ask spread upwards, similar to COP1 dealer is that as the
option approaches its maturity, the European Compound option price goes
down. We know from the definition of COP dealers that they use straddle
portfolio made using European Compound options to evaluate the expected
loss from the informed traders. Hence their price goes down, the expected loss
from the informed traders also goes down, replicating the situation as if the
INF traders were in minority.
6.5.5 Mixed Traders
I have simulated all the traders in proposed online double auction to see what
option prices they generate, and what distribution of cash an options the
traders will have. Figure E.10 illustrates the results for the simulation of
ATM, OTM and ITM markets. We can see some spikes caused by GD traders
due to the numerical issue described above. In general, the option prices are
around Black-Scholes. The high and low of the trading day are more volatile
due to the heterogeneity of the traders quoting wider range of prices. The
Figure E.11 illustrates the distribution of trader inventories and the Greeks.
It can be see that the both cash and options are unequally distributed causing
some agents to loose more from buying OTM options, and some to gain more
from selling them.
6.6 Summary and Contribution
This chapter provided a design of a LOB based online double auction. It
used self-balancing binary trees to organise bids and asks. Then we used this
mechanism to simulate various trading algorithms proposed in Chapter 4 and
analysed the option prices along with the performance of the each trader.
Below are the main messages of the chapter:
• Design and Implementation of Online DA: I proposed the design of an
online double auction which uses the LOB to match bids and asks. The
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mechanism uses the fast RB-trees to order the bids and asks in cor-
responding OrderLists. Therefore mechanism spends O(log n) for the
insertion of new orders into LOB, and on average O(1) for matching
them. I verified the mechanism with MC traders to see if they generate
Black-Scholes prices. The mechanism is then used for the simulation of
trading agents.
• Option Trading Agents: I used various option trading methods for pric-
ing option in online double auction environment and provided detailed
analysis of their results. I set the option pricing method for all traders
as Monte-Carlo, and used random integers to pick the quantity. Below
is my key finding from simulating each trading agent:
– ZIP traders: ZIP traders exhibited the trend following behaviour,
and provided a liquidity in the option market. I analyse how their
bids and asks change based on their learning coefficient β and mo-
mentum γ, and has shown that the traders with greater β are capa-
ble of quickly adapting their bids and asks to the changing option
values and other submitted orders. Therefore the final payoffs for
the ZIP trader with higher β were greater than for the one with
the lower β. The option prices generated by ZIP traders were very
close to Black-Scholes prices, as their inventory distribution at the
end of the simulation was centralised at zero.
– GD traders: GD traders were considered as traders whose orders
depend on the behaviour of the other traders, because they used
submitted bids and asks to evaluate the probability of their own
successful orders. All GD traders exhibited a uniform behaviour by
buying out options to make profit in ATM and ITM markets, while
to incur loss in OTMmarket. The overall option prices generated by
GD traders along with ZIP traders corresponded the Black-Scholes
prices.
– Garman dealers: GAR dealers were good at maintaining the inven-
tories, as they directly derived their bid and ask prices from their
inventory levels. GAR dealers with impractically low inventories did
not participate in trade due to their big bid-ask spread. However
GAR dealers with aﬄuent inventories started with narrow bid-ask
spreads until their inventory in cash run low, so they quickly ad-
justed their bid-ask spread to deter the flow of asks lowering their
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cash. GAR dealers made profit from buying ATM and ITM options,
but loss for the same behaviour in OTM market. We have seen that
the GAR dealers yielded the similar to Black-Scholes prices.
– Copeland-Galai dealers: COP dealers were simulated using INF
traders with different beliefs about their proportions in the market.
Although in practice the θ indicating this proportion is obtained
through Bayesian learning method, we fixed these parameters to
see the differences in their behaviour. We have seen that the COP
dealer with lowest belief in INF traders posted his private option
price as his bid, and end up in only buying options from all traders.
However the COP correctly believing that there are 10% INF in
the market, lowered his bid below his private option price until the
expected loss from the informed traders became insignificant. This
is caused by the drop in value of the European Compound option
as its underlying option approaches maturity.
From above results, let me point out the key contributions of the chapter over
previous researches in this area.
• There have been number of CDA designs proposed in literature starting
from simple market design [150] to recently proposed self-evolving CDAs
[105, 104]. Although the design of my CDA is somewhat trivial, it is
driven by the an exogenous source in the form of an underlying market,
it uses efficient RB trees to manage LOB and puts the mechanism in
charge of soliciting orders. It is also relevant to option’s market as it
admits the option price is dependent on its underlying price, and clears
all of its active orders once new information about the asset prices arrive.
Also mechanism is responsible for exercising option upon their maturity,
and compute necessary statistics about the sensitivity of option prices
and the distribution of traders wealth.
• I have used the ZIP algorithm initially proposed by Cliff [29] as a proxy
trading algorithm that uses pre-computed option price as its private
value. This algorithm showed good performance in terms of generating
wealth by trading options, and played a key role in simulating liquidity
traders in option market. I also illustrated that its key parameters such
as β and γ can be tuned to the specifics of the underlying market to
increase its profitability.
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• I have adapted the GD algorithm [69] to options by replacing the price
based probability estimation to ratio-based probability estimation due
to the changing nature of option prices. Because GD algorithm uses
the orders posted by other traders to generate his own orders, it can
be useful algorithm in option markets with heterogeneous traders, as it
aggregates their diverse beliefs and takes advantage of those trades which
are acceptable with his own private valuation.
• Inventory-based Garman’s dealer [63] has been re-purposed for trading
options to model a dealer who could generate bid-ask spread around
pre-computed option prices subject to the limitations in the inventory,
namely in cash and options accounts. This algorithm can be used for
trading options where budget constraints are prevalent, so the trader
significantly changes his bid and ask as soon as his inventory runs low.
• Information-based Copeland-Galai’s dealer [33] has been re-purposed for
trading options using Geske’s formulas [66] and Straddle option portfolio.
This algorithm can be used for trading options where there is a sentiment
that there are informed traders in the option market, hence making it
not efficient. After inferring the percentage of informed traders in the
market as shown in Section 4.2, this algorithm can be used to mitigate
the loss from informed traders.
There are couple of limitations and pitfalls pointed out in the mechanism and
trading algorithms used. First, the mechanism did not simulate the order ar-
rivals as a random process such as Poisson or exponential process. It simply
reshuﬄed the order of traders to submit their orders consecutively for every
trading day. It would be more realistic if traders were modelled with intelli-
gent entry and exit algorithms from the signals in the market. At least the
submission of orders by the traders could be modelled using above mentioned
stochastic models with an intensity being the function of the prices quotes. In
this way, dealers like Garman or Copeland-Galai could correctly calibrate the
arrivals and use them in setting their bid-ask spreads. In this way, the width
of their bid-ask spread would be adapted to the market environment. We have
seen that the bid-ask spread remained almost unchanged for Copeland-Galai
dealer due to the deterministic linear model of order arrivals. Second, the
traders were all submitting only limit orders, and there were no market orders
that could add extra volatility to the market. This is because our assump-
tion of each trader as a price-setter due to the option pricing method in its
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core. The trading algorithms could be enhanced further to submit market
orders once attractive prices are detected in the market. Third, the traders
were using random integers to select the quantities of the options they needed,
where more sophisticated ways of splitting the quantities into smaller chunks






In this chapter, I present potential perspectives that can be implemented in
contemporary financial exchanges, particularly in option market, to advance
the trading of compound contracts such as option portfolios. I use Parkes
et al. [130] Iterative Combinatorial Exchange (ICE) as a reference model
for the design of combinatorial exchange for option portfolios. I apply this
mechanism to the context of option portfolio trading and use its Tree-based
Bidding Language (TBBL) [25] to enable the structured bidding of option
portfolios. I describe the process of bidding and allocating the options to
the winners through solving the Winner Determination Problem (WDP). The
payment rule is defined as a VCG alike scheme named threshold rule which
was described in Chapter2. I do not provide numerical results for the proposed
combinatorial exchange due to the lack of the implementation of agents capable
of trading option portfolios.
I have reviewed the combinatorial auctions and the combinatorial exchanges
in earlier chapters, and emphasised their use in trading packaged goods. Most
of the financial instruments traded in the markets like MBSs and CDOs are
constructed as compound contracts, and were mostly responsible for the crash
of 2008. In the context of options, this would mean the use of option port-
folios. The standard option portfolios such as bullish spread, bearish spread,
butterfly spread, etc can be considered as a separate financial instrument and
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can be traded as a single contract in the market. However in standard finance
these type of contracts are priced from the perspective of arbitrage-free as-
sumption. The price of an option portfolio should not be less or more than the
combination of financial instruments that could replicate its cash flows. For
example, the price of an option itself is derived from the replicated portfolio
of cash and stock, so the same principles work here.
What if the option prices are derived not only from the perspective of arbitrage-
free pricing, but also from the perspective of simulated markets with hetero-
geneous traders? In other words, what if we assume that the option price is
mostly influenced by the price of its replicating portfolio, but there are also
other factors such as market forces which could distort its value to some ex-
tent? These forces could be the frictions of the market, or the diversity of
trader valuations in the market. In Chapters 5 and 6, I proposed how differ-
ent option pricing methods and trading algorithms can be used to price the
individual option in a simulated market environment. If we start holding to
this view, where the option price cannot be simply derived from its replicating
portfolio’s price, then this is also true for the option portfolio which is made
from one’s market positions on different options. In other words, we cannot de-
rive the option portfolio’s price from its constituent option prices. This would
involve its pricing in a combinatorial exchange environment where the options
could be bundled and priced together.
The ICE presented by Parkes et al. is an expressive and a complete mech-
anism stemming from earlier works accomplished in combinatorial auctions
[36] involving such concepts as price discovery and activity rules. Its bidding
language TBBL generalises the expressiveness and completeness of multiple
bidding languages such as OR, XOR, etc proposed earlier for combinatorial auc-
tions [123]. Its efficiency can be asymptotically approximated to the num-
ber of goods or traders participating in the mechanism. Its payment rule is
budget-balanced, and most importantly DSIC and individual rational. How-
ever similar to combinatorial auctions, its WDP is NP-hard as it can be directly
transformed into set packaging problem.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 describe the options from the
new perspective of their substitutability and complementarity for the traders,
and emphasise the need for the combinatorial exchange. In Section 7.3, I
present the design of a combinatorial exchange for option portfolios based on
reference model given by Parkes et al. . I provide the real application scenarios
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for trading option portfolio with the use of TBBL. In Section 7.4 I extend the
existing TBBL to more general perspective where the concepts of valuation
and preferences are separated in the bidding language, and some generic cases
can be reused by the traders and mechanisms to express not only the bids
and asks for particular types of options, but the trader beliefs in a succinct
and complete way. Section 7.5 draws the summary of the chapter, lists the
contributions made and discusses the future works in this field.
7.2 Substitutability and Complementarity of
Options
Normally, the substitutability and complementarity of options are not defined
in financial literature. In a risk-neutral and frictionless world, option is a con-
tract which mimics the payoff function of a delta-hedged portfolio. Therefore
its value is nothing but the value of that replicating portfolio which consists of
cash and assets. As long as the cash and assets are identical and anonymously
priced, the options on top of them can be priced according to the same pa-
rameters which are invariant. This would mean that every option has uniquely
defined price which is risk-neutral compared to the conditions of the underly-
ing market. This would also mean that these prices have nothing to do with
the supply and the demand in the option market itself. Once the supply and
the demand are not involved in pricing the options, the economic concepts
such as cross-demand (cross-supply) elasticity XDE (XSE) which define sub-
stitutability (i.e XDE is positive) and complementarity (i.e. XDE is negative)
of goods are also disregarded in option market. However as I introduced the
market component into the option pricing methodology, and determined the
option prices using the supply and the demand for options, then the ques-
tion of XDE and XSE may naturally arise in studying the substitutability and
complementarity relationships between different options.
For example, let us consider a case where options can be viewed as substitutes.
There is bearish sentiment in underlying market and majority of option traders
wish to take bearish spread which consists of buying one OTM call and selling
one ITM call. However traders have multiple choices for OTM calls with
different strikes. If over-demand is assumed to be the main reason for the rise
of OTM call prices, then for some OTM if the price remains the same, the
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traders would be willing to buy it at cheaper price compared to other OTMs.
This, as a result, would increase the demand for this option. Hence OTM
options are substitutes in bearish spread.
I have presented several commonly used option portfolios in Table 4.12, and
above example is one case where the use of these option portfolios may result in
options being considered as substitutes. Another aspect of goods as substitutes
is the unwillingness of the traders buying two substitute items simultaneously.
Using our previous example, trader willing to take bearish spread does not want
to buy two OTM options, having sold only one ITM. This would distort his op-
tion portfolio and change its payoff function. In given example, trader can have
a valuation as v({OTM1, OTM2}) = v({OTM1})⊕ v({OTM2}), because he
wants to buy only one OTM, so he pays only for one option allocated to him
and takes the second one for free. Let us assume that out of multiple OTMs al-
located to the trader, it is for the cheapest OTM he pays. So his valuation func-
tion is, indeed, v({OTM1, OTM2}) = min[v({OTM1}), v({OTM2})]. This
is definitely smaller than their combined valuation, so according to the defini-
tion of substitutability below (7.1), these two options OTM1 and OTM2 are
substitutable for the trader who wants to take a bear spread.
v({OTM1, OTM2}) ≤ v({OTM1}) + v({OTM2}) (7.1)
In order to understand the complementarity of options, let us consider the
trader who wants to take bull spread. In this case, the trader needs to buy
one ITM call, and sell one OTM call. We know that the ITM costs more than
OTM, so the trader’s linear price of this contract is v({ITM,−OTM}) =
vˆ({ITM}) − vˆ({OTM}) ≥ 01. However the trader is determined to take
bullish spread, and considers no other choice. So this would mean that if the
trader gets allocated with either one of the options, but he is refused for the
other one, his bid for ITM is zero, and ask for OTM is infinity. In other words,
both v({ITM}) = 0 and v({−OTM}) = ∞ is true. Hence we know that
v({ITM})− v({−OTM}) < 0, we can derive an inequality given below which
defines the strong complementarity of goods.
v({ITM,−OTM}) > v({ITM})− v({−OTM}) (7.2)
1Minus sign means short position. vˆ(·) is the intrinsic value of the option for the trader,
not the reported one.
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To sum up, the traders engaging in taking option portfolios may exhibit a val-
uation behaviour which makes OTM options (and ITM options by symmetry)
with different strikes mutually substitutable. Also we have seen that ITM and
OTM options could be complements to each other when they are wanted as an
integral part of an option portfolio. Once we can establish such relationships
between options, there is an immediate necessity for a combinatorial exchange
which can accept such preferences from traders and efficiently allocate them
to winning traders. Below in this chapter, I propose a design of such combina-
torial exchange that can deal with the substitutability and complementarity
of options inside option portfolios.
7.3 Design of Combinatorial Exchange
There are two ways of looking at option market for traders using option port-
folios. First way is looking at the market as a multi-unit multi-item double
auction where traders simply submit their orders for each option separately
and then once their orders satisfied, they hold a certain option portfolio. We
can also consider this case as simultaneous multi-unit double auctions run in
parallel for different types of options. Cramton [36] describes an issue for si-
multaneously ascending auction where traders had an incentive to snipe in
an auction which bid the least price. In order to prevent bidders engaging in
sniping, the auction introduced set of activity rules into its protocol. One of
them was not to allow bidders increase their volumes as the price goes up, as
it contradicts to the law of demand. Not imposing such activity rule would
allow bidders to put a bid with an insignificant volume to stay active in mul-
tiple simultaneous auctions until the last moment when the trader put all his
required volume into the cheapest auction and wins the lot. Once the activity
rules are applied, the mechanism can produce surplus maximised outcome and
hence be efficient.
However, the second way of dealing with option portfolios is matching them as
in a combinatorial exchange. In this way, traders may not reveal their individ-
ual valuations of the options to the mechanism. Also traders are not required
to coordinate their bids and asks in multiple auctions to make sure that their
option portfolio is compiled. In more general perspective, combinatorial ex-
change allows the traders to express much more information other than simple
quotes on options or option portfolios they want. In fact, in combinatorial
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exchange traders can reveal their whole strategy, or bearish or bullish beliefs,
to allow the mechanism to decide which option portfolio one needs in order
to maximise his utility. Although combinatorial exchange so many flexibil-
ities and advantages to traders, it simply shifts these responsibilities to the
mechanism, and makes his problem of finding best allocation result and DSIC
payment rule NP-hard classed problem. As regards the allocation rule, the
simultaneous multi-unit double auctions can provide surplus maximising allo-
cation for combinatorial exchanges when the goods are substitutes. In other
words, when the individual sums of the valuations of goods are not less than
the combined valuation of the goods, then the surplus maximisation of simul-
taneous multi-unit double auctions will always be higher than the one found in
combinatorial exchange for substitutable goods. Roughgarden also mentions
such relationship between combinatorial auctions and simultaneous ascending
auctions in one of his remarkable lectures [141].
However the combinatorial exchange allocation becomes NP-hard when the
goods are complements, and the simulation of parallel multi-unit double auc-
tions cannot produce better surplus maximisation. I mentioned that the op-
tions can be both substitutes and complements depending on the trader’s
strategy in option market. Hence we have to consider case of a combinatorial
exchange which resolve the issue of allocating options through the use of a
bidding language and an appropriate WDP.
In this section, I propose a design of a combinatorial exchange for trading
option portfolios. I use Parkes et al. [130] ICE as a reference model and show
how it can be used to implement a marketplace for option portfolios. I present
the TBBL bidding language, and use it to specify the preferences of option
traders. Then I formulate the WDP and payment rules. Let us specify the
notation I used for denoting traders, options, allocations etc:
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of traders
G = {1, . . . ,m} is the option types listed in the option chain
x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n) is the the limits for traders in selling options. x0i =
(x0i1, . . . , x0im) where x0ij ∈ Z+ is the limit for each trader to sell particular
type of option. This limit can be imposed by the margin account of the
trader, or by the company’s policy, or as we did in previous chapters,
by the mechanism itself. Hence these limits are the quantity cap for the
maximum number of options a trader can sell.
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λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) denotes the change in the allocation of options (i.e. trade),
while each λi = (λi1, . . . , λim) and λij ∈ Z. So λij is the change in agent
i’s jth option account, negative number meaning the sales, and positive
the acquisition.
M = ∑i∈N ∑j∈G x0ij is the maximum number of options that could be
traded in the combinatorial exchange.
7.3.1 Efficient Trades
For each possible trade for the agent i, we can define valuation function
vi(λi) ∈ R which denote how much the trader is willing to pay or receive
for given set of trades in λi. Using our previous example, if the trader wants
bear spread only, then his valuation for OTM options should be vi(λOTM) =
infλij>0,j∈λOTM (vi(λij)), as he considers the OTM options as substitutes. Let
us denote the final position for the trader i as x0i + λi ≥ 0 which would mean
that the agent’s capacity decreases as he sells more options, and it should not
exceed the given cap x0i .
I use the free disposal assumption so vi(λ′i) ≥ vi(λi)→ λ′i ≥ λi, ∀j λ′ij ≥ λij is
true. Also let us denote the overall surplus from the trade as v(λ) = ∑i vi(λi).
Traders use quasi-linear utility to evaluate each trader: ui(λi, p) = vi(λi) − p
where p is the price paid for the trade λi. We know from Chapter 2 that
the quasi-linearity of utilities guarantee that any Pareto improvement to the
allocation maximises the social surplus. So for the given profile of valuations
and caps (v, x0), we can define a Pareto improvement, or an efficient trade as
λ∗ such that





s.t. λij + x0ij ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j (7.4)∑
i
λij = 0, ∀j (7.5)
λij ∈ Z
Constraint (7.4) is used to enforce the cap of the mechanism in the volume of
options traded, and in (7.5) the strict budget-balance is enforced through the
free-disposal assumption. This would mean that the unwanted options could
freely allocated to traders. For example, if the bear spread taker considers
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OTMs as substitutes, and pays only for the cheapest one, in case if the mecha-
nism allocates the trader 2 OTM options, it is acceptable that the trader pays
for only one option, and gets the other one for free.
It can be seen from the formulation of the efficient trade that the mechanism is
aware of the caps for each trader. This is plausible because the traders partici-
pating in derivatives market maintain margin accounts which are continuously
marked to the market by the broker as the market changes. Hence the mech-
anism knows the capacity of each trader to issue options. Let us denote any
feasible set of allocations for given x0 as F(x0), and let the any feasible set of
allocations for trader i as Fi(x0).
In a competitive equilibrium, there is no Pareto improvement possible in given
option allocation λ. Let us define the linear prices pi = (pi1, . . . , pim) where pij
is the price defined for option j ∈ G. These prices are anonymous for every
trader. For the given profile of linear prices pi, and the allocation for the trader
λi, the total amount the trader has to pay or receive from the mechanism must
be equal to ppi = λᵀi pi. Then we can determine the competitive equilibrium
prices for the market as follows:
vi(λi)− ppi(λi) ≥ vi(λ′i)− ppi(λ′i), ∀λ′i ∈ Fi(x0) (7.6)
where λ ∈ F(x0) is a feasible allocation which maximises the overall utility of
the market. It is also said that the trade λ is supported by prices pi.
The pi prices are not always formed from the pool of fully efficient trades, but
they can also use any other feasible allocation to approximate the efficient
trades. Parkes et al. defines the δ-approximate competitive equilibrium as
show below:
vi(λi)− ppi(λi) + δ ≥ vi(λ′i)− ppi(λ′i), ∀λ′i ∈ Fi(x0) (7.7)
Theorem 2 in Parkes et al. [130] states that any feasible trade λ supported by
δ-approximate equilibrium prices pi is a 2 min(M,n/2)δ-approximate efficient
trade. Hence by finding such δ for any given feasible trade λ and the δ-
approximate equilibrium prices pi, we can find the exact approximation of the
efficient trades in the given mechanism.
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Figure 7.1: Bullish spread expressed using TBBL
7.3.2 Bidding Language
TBBL is specifically designed for combinatorial exchanges by Parkes et al.
[25, 130] and it can be used to express option portfolios as combinatorial bids
to the mechanism. This language is fully expressive, and designed to be as
concise and structured as possible. Because it is specifically designed for com-
binatorial exchange, it allows bidders to submit bids and asks simultaneously.
The tree structure is used for expressing bids and asks connected through series
of generalised logical connectives, such as ’interval-choose’ (ICyx) operator. It
specifies at least x and at most y of its child nodes must be satisfied. Hence, all
intermediate nodes in TBBL are ICyx nodes with corresponding price bounds.
ICyx can replicate OR as ICn1 , XOR as IC11 and AND as ICnn . The leaf nodes of
the TBBL are the actual bids or asks on options.
For example, trader is taking bull spread, so he can submit following bid which
generates positive cash flow if price goes up. Figure 7.1 shows how it can be
represented in tree format, where each node has its own value, and plus sign
implies bid, and minus ask. This shows that the trader is willing to buy call
at strike $90 for $10, and (i.e. IC(2, 2)) sell call at strike $110 for $5. We
implicitly assume that the current asset price is S0 = $100, hence first call is
ITM, and the second call is OTM. Similarly, the trader is also indifferent to
buy the same bull spread with puts. Trader states that he wants to sell OTM
put at strike $90 for $5 and buy ITM put at strike $110 for $10. Both spreads
are evaluated at the price of $5 for the trader.
The important aspect of an above bidding structure displayed in Figure 7.1 is
that the trader can express the bull spread both in terms of calls or puts. This
gives him the flexibility in choosing equivalent option portfolios among possible
allocations, and fully express his preferences to the mechanism. This is a great
advantage of a combinatorial exchange over a double auction, because in this
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example bull spread taker can fully reveal his indifference to trading various
sets of options, as long as they make equivalent portfolios and generate the
same payoff. In other words, instead of expressing his quotes to individual
options as it was normally done in double auctions, in combinatorial exchange
the trader is now capable of expressing his entire strategy to the mechanism.
It is important to note that the combinatorial exchange is DSIC 2, and the
traders are always better off revealing their true strategy to the mechanism.
Complete revelation of trader’s strategies consisting of option portfolios also
provides more allocation choices to the mechanism.
Now let us understand the main components of TBBL. Every trader i can
submit bid Ti. Let θ ∈ Ti denote any node in the tree, and vi(θ) ∈ R is the
value of this node for bidder i. A function Leaf(Ti) ⊂ Ti returns all leaves of
bid Ti, and Child(θ) ⊂ Ti returns all child nodes inside node θ. Any node θ is
said to be satisfied by ICyx(θ) if:
• R1: Node θ with ICyx(θ) may be satisfied if only at least x and at most
y of its children are satisfied.
• R2: If some node θ is not satisfied, then none of its children may be
satisfied.
LetG ∈ {1, . . . ,m} represents the options listed in the option chain. Let λi ∈ Z
be the vector representing which option to take and which option to give for
bidder i, or in other words a trade, or an allocation. Then the value vi of the
allocation λi for bid Ti is equal to the sum of all satisfied nodes. In order to
represent satisfaction, let us define sati(θ) ∈ {0, 1} function which represents if
θ ∈ Ti is satisfied. Valid set of solutions for Ti can be derived through applying
R1 and R2 to all internal nodes of Ti, such that θ ∈ {Ti\Leaf(Ti)}. Hence for




sati(θ′) ≤ ysati(θ) (7.8)
Secondly, we also do not want for any given trade λ, the number of options
supplied is less than demanded. So we can write this constraint as follows:
∑
θ∈Leaf(Ti)
sati(θ) ≤ λij,∀j (7.9)
2See Parkes et al. [130] for proof.
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So the rules R1 (7.8) and R2 (7.9) form the validity function valid(Ti, λi) for a
given bid tree Ti and allocation λi. This validity function returns the mapping
for the satisfiability of each node θ in Ti under given λi. Hence we can right
the satisfiability function as sati ∈ valid(Ti, λi).
The valuation of the given tree Ti holds free disposal rule where unsold options
can be freely allocated to any bidder. With given constraints we can formulate
a valuation function for given bid Ti,





s.t. (7.8) (7.9) (7.11)
7.3.3 Winner Determination
I have covered the WDP for combinatorial auctions and combinatorial ex-
changes in Chapter 2 and formulated them in the form of a Integer Linear
Programme (ILP) which can be reduced to NP-hard set packaging problem.
In this section, I define the WDP using the TBBL for a combinatorial ex-
change. This finds the efficient set of allocations λ for the given capacity x0 in
the combinatorial exchange. Let us define T = (T1, . . . , Tn) as the TBBL bids
submitted to the mechanism. Also let us denote the tree node θ ∈ λi if θ ∈ Ti
and it is satisfied by trade λi written as sati(θ) = 1. Then we can formulate
the WDP for the option exchange as shown below:








sati ∈ valid(Ti, λi),∀i (7.13)
sati(θ) ∈ {0, 1}, λij ∈ Z (7.14)
The solution of the above WDP should give the matrix of allocations λ that
maximise the surplus for posted options. The mechanism has to choose the
valid mappings for sati for the nodes of submitted tree bids T and at the same
time maximise the valuations of these nodes.
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7.3.4 Threshold Payments
I have covered the threshold payment rule in Chapter 2, and formulated it as
an optimisation problem (2.67) using the minimisation of the worst difference
in VCG payments and threshold payments. The same payment rule is used
here to make the payments budget-balanced and conform with δ-approximate
equilibrium prices. Let me define the threshold payment rule for the current
case, the equation (7.15) shows its formulation. Also for determining the VCG
discounts let λ∗−i be the combinatorial exchange’s allocation of options where
trader i did not participate.









where ρvcg,i is the VCG payment for the trader i, and ∆vcg,i is called as the
VCG discount for the trader i. Also note that the trader produces a scalar
valuation for the given allocation vector λ∗i , as the trader values the bundle as
a whole. Then we can find such ∆thresh,i which solves the minimisation of the
worst difference between VCG discount and the threshold discount.
∆∗thresh = arg min
∆thresh
 (7.17)
s.t. ∆vcg,i −∆thresh,i ≤  ∀i (7.18)






The solution ∆∗thresh can be used to compute the budget-balanced payments
for traders given formula below:
ρthresh,i = vi(λ∗i )−∆thresh,i (7.21)
To illustrate the combinatorial exchange in option market, consider following
example given in Figure 7.2. There are two traders who submitted their bids
to the combinatorial exchange to take a corresponding position in the option
market. First trader is bullish trader because he is willing to buy a bullish
spread. Although he specified which ITM call he wants, he is indifferent for
the OTM call he wants to sell. So he can sell either call at strike $105 for $4, or
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Figure 7.2: Bullish and Bearish traders’ bids using TBBL
call at strike $110 for $2. Note that here bullish trader is regarding the OTM
calls as substitutes. The second trader is bearish in his belief on asset prices,
so he expects a asset prices to go down, and wants to take a bearish spread.
So he submits one ask for the ITM call, and he is indifferent in buying either
of OTM calls. There are 2 potential matches in given example. In the first
match, bullish trader is going to buy ITM call from bearish trader creating a
surplus of $2, and sell OTM call at strike $105 for $4 to the bearish trader
creating a deficit of $1. In the second case, bullish trader does the same with
the ITM call, but sells OTM call at strike $110 for $2 creating a surplus of
$1. The surplus maximising allocation would choose the second matching, as
it maximises the overall surplus to $3.
Now let us consider the payments paid and received by both traders using
threshold rule. Considering it using VCG scheme, we understand that the
removal of any trader would cause null trade. Hence the VCG discount of
both traders is equal to the surplus made, which is $3. In this way, the bullish
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trader’s total payment to the mechanism is $10− $2− $3 = $5. However the
bearish trader’s total payment to the mechanism is −$8+$3−$3 = −$8, so he
should receive $8 from the mechanism which runs into deficit of $5−$8 = −$3.
But now using the threshold rule, we can find the minimised deviance of the
discounts from the VCG discounts. In this example, the threshold discount is
$1.5. So applying the threshold discount instead of VCG discounts, we get a
payment from bearish trader $10− $2− $1.5 = $6.5 and get a payment from
the bullish trader −$8 + $3 − $1.5 = −$6.5. As it can be seen mechanism
balances the deficit, through decreasing the amount of the VCG discount for
both traders.
7.4 More on TBBL
In this section, I introduce a new version of TBBL where the concepts of
valuation and preferences are separate. Although it is common for existing
bidding languages to combine both concepts into single atomic bid, in option
portfolio market it becomes redundant to provide valuations for the identical
goods appearing in different portfolios. It enforces the consistency of option
prices throughout multiple portfolios. The mechanism can also easily check if
the individual option prices are within their legal bounds. Moreover there is
possibility for the trader just to disclose his belief and the number of options
in his portfolio, and the mechanism can automatically pick the right option
portfolio for him.
The trader sends to the mechanism two pieces of information. First is the list
of his private valuations for the options listed in option chain. The second is
his preference over these options expressed through TBBL. While referencing
the options in the TBBL, the trader does not indicate his valuation, but just
indicate the option type and the strike he wishes to buy or sell. Of course,
this way of bidding the options reveals the individual valuations of options to
the market maker which might not be a desired property of a combinatorial
exchange in general. However this requirement is necessary in option market
because the mechanism should be able to check the consistency of option prices.
Let me list these checks that the mechanism should confirm in order to accept
the traders bid:
1. Option prices have lower and upper bounds given in (2.4) and (2.4), so
they should fall into these ranges.
299
Figure 7.3: Generic 2 option spread using TBBL
2. Put and call prices with the same strike are connected through put-call
parity relationship (2.6), so the trader prices must be consistent with
each other.
3. The deeper the option goes into moneyness, its price should never de-
crease. In other words, if there are two calls with K1 < K2, then the
value of vi(K1) ≥ vi(K2) as the first option is more deeper in moneyness
than the second one.
4. If mechanism can establishing the arbitrage-free bound for option prices
taking into account the frictions of the market, the potential magnitudes
of the asset price rises and falls, then mechanism can also enforce the
arbitrage-free prices of the options on traders.
For above reasons the traders are required to declare their valuations of indi-
vidual options to the mechanism.
On the other hand, the traders can be freed from the burden of building the
TBBL to express their preferences. For instance, consider a bullish trader
who wants to take a bullish spread, but he has not clarified which concrete
ITM call and OTM call he wants to buy and sell. He can submit to the
mechanism following generic TBBL shown in Figure 7.3 along with his option
valuations for each option in the option chain. Hence the trader declares all of
his valuations in one list, and then interprets his generic bullish preference to
the mechanism. The options that the trader would like to use are highlighted
with shaded background in Figure 7.3. Note that the trader did not give his
valuations inside TBBL, but sent them in a separate list.
As we can see from above Figure 7.3, it is the job of the mechanism to decide
which ITM and OTM options to use in order to satisfy trader’s bullish pref-
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erence. The mechanism will choose the options that maximise the allocative
efficiency in the market, and therefore the utility of the trader. The option
trader does not need to employ any algorithm for finding the correct portfolio,
as he only needs to disclose his prediction, or just a belief in the direction of
the asset price future movement, and provide his corresponding valuations for
each option. The mechanism will then find the best allocation for him given
the bids and asks of others.
This generic and declarative approach can be used for other types of options
portfolios which contain more than 2 options. For instance, the neutral option
portfolios such as butterfly, long ladder, etc contain more than 2 options,
and can also be combined into generic format in the same way it was done
with spreads. So the mechanism can store all these generic TBBLs as master
templates and have nomenclature for their naming. The traders in their turn
can provide only the name of the master template which matches with their
preference structure and send it to the mechanism. This definitely simplifies
the communication between the trader and the mechanism, and helps the
trader to express more about his belief through very limited traffic.
7.5 Summary and Contribution
In this chapter, I reviewed the potential perspectives for the option market
using the combinatorial exchanges and pointed out their role in pricing com-
pound products. Once option is priced not only using the parameters of its
underlying market, but also the forces in the option market itself, then the
back my argument. I also provided couple of scenarios where the options can
be considered as substitutes and compliments for the traders. I can list the
contributions of the chapter below:
• Substitutability and Complementarity of Options: I described the pos-
sible cases where the substitutability and complementarity relationship
between different options may emerge. I have shown that in spread-
based option portfolios, the OTMs (also ITMs) are substitutes among
each other, as the trader can choose any of the OTM to form, for exam-
ple, a bullish spread. Also I have shown that OTM is the complement
for the ITM in a spread-based option portfolio, as the trader is only
interested in having both of his orders on ITM and OTM satisfied si-
multaneously, so he does not accept the case where only one of them is
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satisfied by the mechanism.
• Design of Combinatorial Exchange: I used the Parkes et al. ’s ICE design
as the main reference model, and have shown its potential application to
the option market through several examples. I also gave insight on rep-
resenting different option portfolios using TBBL, and formulated WDP
and budget-balanced payment rule for their pricing. The proposed com-
binatorial exchange also holds an approximate efficiency measured by
2 min(M,n/2)δ error, individual rationality and most importantly DSIC
properties.
• Declarative TBBL: I also presented the further improvements that can
be done to the proposed mechanism by changing the structure of TBBL.
In particular, I suggested to separate valuations from the preferences,
and pointed out its important in option market case. I also introduced a
generic class of TBBLs that could be used to represent any kind of option
portfolio with no specification on the strike prices of OTMs and ITMs.
These classes of generic TBBLs can be predefined and repetitively used
by the mechanism to communicate the trader’s preferences in a succinct
and complete way.
Beyond the made contributions, there are still many aspects of the research
that are at its early stages. To my current knowledge, there are only couple of
solid combinatorial exchange designs have been proposed so far, and none of
them are continuous. Online models of the combinatorial exchanges can emerge
from the online double auctions holding BIC that have been recently developed.
Also, there is no trading algorithm that has been developed for a continuous
trading in a combinatorial exchange. In the context of option trading, this
would involve the different ways of selecting the option portfolios based on
the conditions of the option market. The traders would have to evaluate
not only the option price and the quantity, but also the future predictions
of asset prices, and their use in compiling the option portfolios. The traders
would have to target the outstanding combinatorial bids in online exchange
to learn more about the preferences of other traders and construct their own
to meet the demands and make profit. Indeed, bidding languages provide lot
more information about the particular trader’s preferences, and this can be
harnessed to build more advanced market mechanisms in future.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Works
In this chapter, I summarise the main findings of the research. Then I sum-
marise the contributions by providing the answers to the research questions
posed at the beginning of the thesis. I also list the current limitations and
drawbacks of the work. I shall briefly discuss about the potential application
domains of the research. Then I propose my future works aimed at tackling
the presented issues, improving the current results and extending this research
to new frontiers.
8.1 Research Findings
In this work, I introduced a new simulated market component into the existing
option pricing methodology. The title of this thesis suggests that the options
are priced ’via’ double auctions, hence the main concern of the research was
not abandoning the existing methodologies, but putting them into a market
environment in order to obtain competitive option prices. We have seen differ-
ent option pricing methods starting from classic Black-Scholes methodology,
to numerical Monte-Carlo pricing. I have used the indifference option pricing
methods to reflect the risk-averseness of traders to potential loss. Also I used
cutting-edge LMSR option pricing methodology and adopted it for pricing the
options from the perspective of an option portfolio holder. These diverse op-
tion pricing methodologies are then channelled into a direct double auction to
obtain the corresponding option prices and to test their sensitivity to changes
in the different parameters of the underlying market. In the process, I de-
signed the direct double auction which enables the satisfaction of multi-unit
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and atomic orders at the cost of budget-balance. This proposed mechanism
holds the desired properties such as efficiency, individual rationality and DSIC.
Most of the obtained option prices were close to the Black-Scholes theoretical
price, but we learned more about the important factors that form these prices
in the market. Few of these influencing factors were the range of accepted
orders, the proportions of traders, the volume of trades, the efficiency and the
budget-balance of the mechanism as well as the parameters of the underlying
market and options themselves. I can summarise the results for simulation of
different trading agents in the list below:
• Risk-Neutral Traders: The risk-neutral traders included volatility-based
traders and Monte-Carlo traders. Their results were very similar to the
analytical prices generated using Black-Scholes given that their beliefs
aligned with the parameters of set in Black-Scholes formula. The option
pricing results were similar for both random and linear methods of choos-
ing supply and demand, although for the former case the mechanism’s
relative efficiency error was skewed to %2, while the latter case exhib-
ited two peaks one in %0, and the other is in %3.5. The budget-balance
was centralised around 0 in both cases. Another important finding was
that the range of accepted orders decreased as the option approached its
maturity date. This was explained by the option’s payoff becoming less
uncertain as it neared its maturity date. We have also seen that the op-
tion price sensitivity was similar to its theoretic values. For risk-neutral
traders, the only exception was the Monte-Carlo trader simulating the
asset prices according to jump-diffusion process (MON*). In this case,
MON* traders slightly overpriced the ATM and OTM options due to po-
tential upward jumps they expected. This difference was not significant
for ITM options because the expectation of both MON* and the other
risk-neutral traders was the same that the given ITM option ends up in-
the-money. MON* prices also converged with Black-Scholes prices as the
option approached its maturity. One finding for such traders was that
the mechanism was almost fully efficient due to wider range of orders
submitted. We have seen that the option prices were less sensitive to
the changes in the underlying market for MON*. Mixing all risk-neutral
traders together resulted in prices close to analytical ones in ATM and
ITM markets, however the OTM options were slightly overpriced due to
the higher accepted bids submitted by MON* traders.
• Risk-Averse Traders: In risk-averse traders, I have simulated traders
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with an exponential utility who exhibited risk-averseness in selling and
buying options. This would mean that they deliberately overprice asks,
and underprice bids. The market fully populated with risk-averse traders
would not result any trade as depending on their risk-averseness factor
the chances that they match their bids asks were exponentially decreas-
ing. I found out that the threshold risk-averseness parameter is a = 0.03,
as for the lower risk-averseness, the orders match, and for the higher not.
Simulating the risk-averse traders with equal number of risk-neutral ones
would not generate any information about risk-averse traders, because
they could not beat the bids and asks posted by risk-neutral traders,
and therefore do not trade. In order to provide liquidity, I simulated the
risk-averse traders with zero-intelligence traders who could post random
price for the option with in its valid range. This resulted option prices
aggregated around Black-Scholes option prices, but the range of accepted
order varied from 0 to even 3 times more than the theoretical price. The
volatility was higher for ITM options. The option’s Greek analysis has
shown that the ATM and the OTM options were more sensitive to the
changes in the asset prices, compared to the ITM option. I have simu-
lated the mixed market of risk-averse, risk-neutral and zero-intelligence
traders, where the risk-neutral traders were made deliberately less to give
an opportunity for trader to risk-averse traders. The results were more
smoothed and less volatile compared to the only risk-averse traders case.
However the sensitivity of option prices to the changes in the asset price
were similar.
• Portfolio Holders: The portfolio holders were simulated using LMSR
option pricing method where the traders had to price options based on
their current portfolios. I have included LMSR traders with neutral,
non-neutral, bullish and bearish portfolios. Due to the determinism in
computing the option payoffs among LMSR traders, the resulted range
of prices were not big. Actually, for each LMSR trader with distinct
portfolio, it gave one bid and one ask price of the option. For example,
simulating 2 neutral and 2 non-neutral LMSR traders resulted the overall
of 8 distinct quotes from which the mechanism had to choose the winning
prices. Few number of diverse quotes caused discrete jumps in option
prices, although they were fluctuating around theoretical prices. I also
found out that when the liquidity parameter of LMSR traders is set to
b = 100, the traders produce reasonable range of bids and asks that
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match. Let me point out the findings from each scenario simulated for
LMSR traders:
– Neutral and Non-Neutral Portfolio Holders: Initially, all options
were underpriced, and as the option approached its maturity date,
they crossed the theoretical price. The range of fluctuations did not
diminish even if the option approached its maturity date. This was
especially vivid for OTM options, where the neutral portfolio hold-
ers sold underpriced options to non-neutral portfolio holders, and
when the OTM became ATM it was the non-neutral traders sell-
ing to neutral until the option’s maturity. I found out that as the
OTM option approaches maturity, the differences in pricing this op-
tion increase, hence there is more volatility involved. These are the
differences in prices between neutral trader who view OTMs less
profitable, and the non-neutrals who view them potentially prof-
itable. From Greeks analysis, we have seen that the option prices
are very sensitive to the changes in asset prices.
– All Portfolio Holders: Similar to above case, the prices were initially
underpriced, and as the option approached its maturity, the prices
were approximated along theoretical price. However, in contrast
to the previous case, the volatility started to decrease when option
neared its maturity. This is because there were more prices available
to the mechanism to choose, and consequently the range of accepted
orders was bigger too. I found out that the OTM prices were still
overpriced after they turn ITM. Greeks analysis has shown similar
results as it was for the previous case.
– More Bullish Portfolio Holders: The behaviour of the bullish portfo-
lio holders was similar to previous simulations. Although the range
of accepted orders was slightly smaller, there was less volatility in
the prices. This would suggest that the prices of other traders were
close to the ones submitted by bullish portfolio holders. Greeks
analysis was similar to the previous results.
– More Bearish Portfolio Holders: The bearish portfolio holders un-
derpriced all options because when the expectation is the decrease
in asset prices, even the ITM calls appear worth less from bearish
perspective. However the prices converge to the theoretical price
in both ATM and ITM markets as the option approaches maturity,
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while the OTM options are exhibited the similar trajectory as in
other experiments ending up overpriced near maturity. Also the
options were more sensitive to the changes in asset prices compared
to other results. For example, the gamma of the ATM option has
peaked at 0.28, while in previous results it was around 0.22.
• Mixed All Traders: In this experiment, I ran all developed option pricing
methods in a direct double auction. The results were similar to theoret-
ical prices, although the range of accepted order were wide enough even
before the option’s maturity. The prices were more volatile for the OTM
options compared to ATM and ITM options. The option’s sensitivity
to the changes in the asset prices was asymmetric. The option prices
were less sensitive when they are in an OTM range, and the sensitivity
became higher when the option went into the ITM range.
• Zero Intelligence Traders and Their Aggregated Forecasts: In this series
of experiments, I ran the ZI traders with different forecasts in a revealed
mechanism. I controlled the quantities of options traded by ZI traders,
and observed how they affect their aggregated forecasts. The experiment
has shown that the aggregated forecasts were higher than the current as-
set prices when there was more demand for the call option. The opposite
was true for when there was more supply. The asset prices and the fore-
casts aligned over the same trajectory when there was balance between
supply and demand. I also used the forecasts of ZI traders to select option
portfolios and traded them in a simultaneously run revealed mechanisms.
It turned out that when the bullish portfolios are selected more, the ag-
gregate forecasts were higher than the current asset prices, and vice versa
when the majority of selected portfolios were bearish. When all option
portfolios selected equally, the forecasted prices were similar to the asset
prices.
Besides aggregating the different option pricing methodologies in a direct dou-
ble auction, I also tested the proxy trading algorithms based on the Monte-
Carlo option price in an online double auction. The other option pricing
methodologies could also be used along with proxy trading algorithms, but
because of the space limitation of this work, I dropped other pricing method-
ologies from the experiments. For the online double auction, I developed a
LOB data structure in Python using the self-balancing binary trees. Then I
funnelled the proxy trading algorithms into the mechanism, and obtained the
307
option prices emerging from the continuous interaction of traders in the mar-
ket. In this case, I used novel adaptations of Garman’s and Copeland-Galai’s
dealership models which based their bid-ask spreads based on inventory and
information respectively. I also adapted commonly known trading algorithms
such as GD and ZIP to trade as a proxy algorithm for the option pricing
methodology, and tested them for their performances. Below are my findings
for each case:
• ZIP Traders: The ZIP traders provided a great liquidity to the mar-
ket and exhibited very flexible behaviour. The closing option prices were
volatile but approximated the theoretical prices. The range of day’s high
and low prices were very narrow. The payoffs as well as the number of
options held by ZIP traders were normally distributed around zero. I
simulated ZIP traders with different learning coefficients β and momen-
tum γ. When β = 0.1, trader quotes were less flexible to the changes
in option’s value, and thus they ended up buying options at higher, and
selling at lower prices. For γ = 0.1 the bid and ask margins remained al-
most the same as it was set initially, as they were slow to adjust them to
the changing prices. These facts together also affected the ZIP trader’s
final payoff to be lower compared to other traders with higher β and γ.
For ZIP traders with higher β and γ, the margins were flexible to the
changes in markets and thus the bid-ask spreads were wider. This gave
them an advantage in taking better deals from the mechanism, hence
they bought at cheaper prices, and sold at higher prices. This, of course,
increased their final payoff.
• GD Traders: GD traders were built to optimise the probability of suc-
cessful order submitted to the mechanism and their prior is determined
by the set of all historical orders submitted to the mechanism. Hence
GD traders do not form their own prices, but learn from the experi-
ence of other traders and submit corresponding orders. For this reason,
GD traders could not be simulated alone, and had to be mixed with
ZIP traders to facilitate the trading process. The final results were the
approximation of a theoretical prices, however there were numerical arte-
facts caused by the optimiser. The range of accepted prices were also
very tight. However the interesting finding was that the distribution of
payoffs and options were polarised with ZIP traders mostly taking short
position and GD trader taking long position in the market. It happened
because GD bid prices were attractive to ZIP traders. This resulted in
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an enormous profit from buying out ATM and ITM calls for GD traders,
but incurred loss in OTM market.
• Garman Dealers: In this model, I endowed the GAR dealers with differ-
ent amounts of cash and options, and then observed how their bid-ask
spreads change based on what their inventory level. I simulated the
GAR dealers along with ZIP traders. GAR dealer gave impractical bid-
ask spreads when their portfolios were incapable of satisfying majority of
potential orders in the market, so it made near zero price for the bid, and
almost 3 times more than the market price for the ask. This definitely
kept out the poorest GAR dealer from any trade in the market what-
soever. GAR dealer with enough portfolio gave very attractive bid-ask
spreads and continuously participated in trade until either his cash or
option inventories run low. In that case, GAR dealer chose to increase
his bid-ask spread and stopped the aggressive flow of unbalanced or-
ders. In one situation, GAR dealer with more cash made a wider bid-ask
spread compared to the one with less cash after spending some time in
the market. This was caused by tight bid-ask spread the aﬄuent GAR
dealer posted at the beginning of the simulation to attract more orders
and cause imbalance in inventories faster than the one who started with
moderate bid-ask spread. In my simulation, the aﬄuent GAR trader
engaged in buying options, thus he quickly became low in cash, and was
forced to take wider bid-ask spread. As the consequence of only buy-
ing behaviour GAR traders made profit in ITM and ATM markets, but
incurred loss in OTM market.
• Copeland-Galai Dealers: The COP dealers used the expected loss from
the informed traders as the main characteristic to determine their bids
and asks. I simulated the COP dealers along with informed traders and
ZIP traders, and the obtained option prices which corresponded with
theoretical price. Also the final payoffs were normally distributed. The
interesting finding about COP dealers was that they kept the width of the
bid-ask spread constant throughout the simulation timeline. This was
because of the linear order arrivals model used to predict the order arrival
rates per given bid or ask. I reviewed two COP dealer performances one
with belief of only %1 informed traders, and the other one correctly
believed that they were %10 of market population. The former trader
declared his private option valuation as his bid, and actively bought out
options for such an attractive quote. The latter dealer feared more from
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potential loss incurred by informed traders, so he lowered his bid, while
at the same time resulting to lower his ask proportionally. The bid price
started to rise back to the private valuation of the trader as the option
approached its maturity, and the expected loss from the informed traders
became less.
• Mixed Traders: The overall results from the simulation mixed traders
approximated the theoretical option prices well, although the range of
accepted orders were wider due to heterogeneity of all traders. It also
exhibited the numerical error spikes caused by GD traders. The distri-
bution of payoffs and options were unequal, and scattered over different
ranges, proving that some type of traders made more profit compared to
other traders. It was noticed that the ones who made the most profit
were those who kept either buying or selling an option with no change
in strategy.
8.2 Addressing the Research Questions
In this section, I provide my conclusions to the questions posed in Chapter 1
based on the accomplished research. By answering these questions, I also em-
phasise the contributions made. Below are the questions and my conclusions:
1. Can European options be priced via double auctions?
From the accomplished research, we have seen that the simulated op-
tion prices were very close to the theoretical Black-Scholes prices when
the traders were using similar option pricing methodologies. But at the
same time, this gave us an important insight into the market condi-
tions and the traders that resulted these option prices. After trying
multiple option pricing methodologies and proxy trading algorithms in
direct and online double auctions respectively, we have observed option
prices with different volatilities, slightly underpriced or overpriced values,
with smaller or greater ranges of accepted orders, with certain sensitivity
to the changes in the underlying market, with corresponding volume of
trades, etc. I have explained when and how particular cases emerge while
presenting my results. All of this information would not be available if
the options were priced analytically. Therefore it would be correct to
propose that pricing options via double auctions can not only simulate
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the Black-Scholes prices, but also may produce slightly different results
with the different traders, and more importantly, it can provide more
detailed description of the market state that formed these prices. Hence
financial analysts and researcher can learn more about the evolution of
option prices by incorporating the double auction mechanism into the
option pricing methodology, which is, of course, course cannot be done
using traditional mathematical approaches. Also it is impossible to rep-
resent the complex behaviour and the heterogeneity of this behaviour
using standard approaches, other than modelling them with agents and
simulating them in a virtual option market.
2. What are the important components involved in pricing European option
via double auctions?
I have reviewed the existing option pricing methodologies, and deter-
mined the key components that are required to model the pricing of
options via double auctions. I classified them into three groups: un-
derlying market, option traders and option markets. In first underlying
market component, I implemented different asset pricing and interest-
rate pricing models and calibrated them to the real underlying market
parameters. These models included GBM and jump-diffusion model for
asset prices, and Vasicek and Vasicek-Jump model for interest-rates. The
second set of components were the option traders, which by themselves
consisted of multiple layers. I have specified the role of each layer, and
provided a conceptual design of trading agents supporting modularity of
algorithms for pricing options, choosing quantities and trading options.
The final component was the market mechanism itself, which collected
the heterogeneous orders from the traders and cleared them to obtain
useful information about market conditions. I have provided the simu-
lation flow of such mechanisms and constructed their conceptual design
in UML.
3. What types of trading agents involved in option market and how are they
designed for double auctions?
The trading agents for the double auction were designed using IIKB ar-
chitecture where the important tasks were allocated to multiple layers.
The Information layer was responsible to collect historical data from
both underlying market and the mechanism. The Information layer was
responsible for storing the inventory of the trader at given time. In
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Knowledge layer, traders computed the aggregated knowledge from the
available information. This also included learning from new information
about the informed traders, and continuously calibrating the indicators
such as implied volatility from the option prices in the market. The be-
havioural layer of the agent determined the agent’s type, and it decided
how to price the option, how to pick the quantities and what proxy trad-
ing algorithm to use. The traders were classified by the option pricing
methodologies they used into ZI, Risk-Neutral, Risk-Averse and Portfo-
lio Holding traders, and by the proxy trading algorithm they use into 2
groups: Dealers and Speculative Traders.
4. How is the direct double auction designed for trading options, and what
is learned from its simulation?
I took McAfee’s direct double auction as the basis for designing the di-
rect multi-unit double auction with atomic orders. The mechanism is
built using Grove’s argument on efficient mechanisms, Myerson’s argu-
ment on monotonicity of an allocation rule the Vickery’s argument on
DSIC payments. It uses a surplus maximising allocation rule, and rejects
the partially satisfied multi-unit bids or asks. The mechanism uses the
rejected bids and asks to determine the clearing price of the mechanism.
Any budget-deficit or the exposed asks or bids resulted from the rejection
of efficient trades are covered by the mechanism. I have mentioned the
key findings from the simulation of this mechanism with different agents
in Section 8.1 of this chapter.
5. How is the online double auction designed for trading options, and what
is learned from its simulation?
I used LOB implementation of the online double auction and developed
it using RB binary trees. It was linked to the underlying market and at
the beginning of every trading day, the participants were informed with
the new asset prices, and the previously submitted orders are truncated.
Instead of enabling traders with sophisticated entry or exit strategies
to trigger the submission of orders, I took more simplified approach by
enabling the mechanism randomly solicit the traders for their orders. The
mechanism accepted multi-unit orders and cleared them as soon as they
match the existing orders in LOB. The online double auction produced
opening, closing, high and low option prices per trading day, of which the
closing price gave the good summary of the day’s option price. I listed
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the key finding learned from the simulation of online double auction with
different proxy trading algorithms in Section 8.1 of this chapter.
6. What are the benefits of using combinatorial exchanges for pricing option
portfolios?
The main benefit of using combinatorial exchanges is that the traders
can fully reveal their preferences on bundles of goods to the mechanism
which holds DSIC property in more structured and comprehensive way
using bidding languages. This enables pricing option portfolios and other
compound financial products also involving the substitutability and com-
plementarity relationship between its constituent components. I have
shown that these relationships exist among options when the traders
engage in taking option portfolios. I also proposed a combinatorial ex-
change design for trading option portfolios, and illustrated a generic class
of 2-item spreads in TBBL, to simplify the communication between the
traders and the mechanism. The traders can only submit their full valu-
ations and express what type of portfolio they want, and the mechanism
using its pre-defined class of generic TBBLs can formulate a structured
bid and clear his order. Although it is computationally hard mechanism
to run, this is a fundamentally different and more compound approach
at pricing bundles of products, particularly, the option portfolios.
8.3 Current Limitations
In this section, I provide the limitations and the drawbacks of my work. First of
all, some of the limitations basically arise from the time and scope restrictions
of my research, and can be resolved given enough time and effort. The other
limitations were proven to be practically impossible to handle, and one of
them is the impossibility of having efficient, budget-balanced and individual
rational mechanism along with BIC property. Another one is the complexity
of a combinatorial exchange allocation problem which belongs to the NP-hard
class. Below is the limitations that can be improved in future:
• Budget-Deficiency: The proposed direct double auction is not budget-
balanced at the expense of the atomicity of orders. The weakly budget-
balanced double auction would spread the excess demand or supply
evenly among traders forcing them to decrease the number of options
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they bid or ask for. However we said that in the case of traders taking
option portfolios from multiple double auctions run in parallel, this could
result in distortion of the portfolios. I suggested to fix the quantities to
certain size, and request traders to split their orders into smaller chunks.
This would reduce to the McAfee’s single-unit double auction with all its
properties. Another approach suggested is to coordinate the fulfilment
of portfolios among multiple traders in such way that the mechanism
can counterbalance the excess of supplies and demands in different mar-
kets by substituting one with the others. Of course, in this approach all
OTMs (ITMs) are considered as substitutes.
• Collusion: The direct double auction is susceptible to collusion, and
there are cases where it can be exploited to buy options at zero price,
and sell them at maximum price. In order to resolve this issue, the
double auction must adopt reserve prices for both bids and asks, hence
setting the acceptable bid-ask spread for future bids and asks. This
acceptable bid-ask spread may be computed using the distribution of
historical valuations of traders, and through maximising the expected
revenue for given reserve price. In theory, this is usually referred as
optimal auctions, and these concepts apply here while determining the
reserve prices.
• No Online Incentive Compatibility: The proposed online double auction
is not DSIC, and not even BIC. There are multiple suggestions that guar-
antee the incentive compatibility in online double auctions. Sandholm et
al. [19] and Parkes et al. [131] provide interesting methods of allocating
goods in online double auctions where the orders are cleared within a
specified time frame, and the traders make bounded-rational decisions
within this time frame.
• No Algorithmic Or Probabilistic Entry/Exit: The submission of orders
by traders is not controlled by any algorithm or probabilistic process,
but explicitly solicited by the mechanism in random order. The submis-
sion of orders can be approximated into a corresponding Poisson process
with intensity as function of last quoted price. Indeed, both Garman
and Copeland-Galai dealers expect such behaviour from the mechanism.
However I have modelled the order arrival intensity as a linear func-
tion for both dealers. In practice, this intensity function should be cal-
ibrated to the market accordingly, and the orders should be submitted
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according to a Possion process. Another perspective in improving this
behaviour is the submission of orders according to some algorithm. One
such algorithm is trend-following algorithm which initiates trade when
the short-term moving average crosses the long-term moving average.
• Limited Option Pricing, Quantity Models and Proxy Trading Algorithms:
Although I included the key option pricing methodologies into the scope
of this research, these are not an exhaustive list of the methodologies
available. For example, there are other risk-neutral models such as the
Black-Scholes-Merton model which prices options from the perspective
of discontinuous asset prices, or the Heston model which simulates the
asset prices with a stochastic volatility model. The indifference pricing
methodologies involve various utility functions other than exponential,
some involve the stochastic volatility, risk-measure and market frictions.
The quantity models provided can also be extended into a more sophisti-
cated ways of picking the right amount to trade depending on the given
strategy. There are also many other trading algorithms such as Kaplan
strategy, Roth-Erev, Time-Weighted Moving Average, Volume-Weighted
Moving Average, and so forth.
• Only European Options: Along with American options, there are many
other exotic types of options such as Asian, Bermudan, Binary, Bar-
rier, Basket, Swaption, etc that are not included into the scope of this
research. Basically, one can engineer any sort of a financial derivative
similar to exotic options, and price them using Monte-Carlo simulation.
The results can be further enhanced and enriched if heterogeneous pric-
ing methodologies are channelled through a double auction.
8.4 Application Domains
The outcome of my research will enable financial analysts and researchers to
better understand the formation of option prices in a simulated market envi-
ronment, to undertake complex analysis of option prices by running various
scenarios in underlying markets, to evaluate the performance of different trad-
ing algorithms, to observe the impact of different market clearing rules on
option prices and to better understand the role of option portfolios in deter-
mining option prices. This research can also find its applications in pricing
compound financial products such as MBSs, CDOs and other portfolios in a
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combinatorial exchange environment. For example, traders using the Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to compile a diversified portfolio of assets
can post their orders on them as bundle to the exchange, and the mechanism
can find the DSIC prices for give portfolio. The compilation of MBSs and
CDOs contracts would require more expressive bidding languages to express
the structure of the payable tranches and the combinations of constituent as-
sets.
Auctions are also used beyond their direct and natural applications. For exam-
ple, a good application for the proposed double auction can be the organisation
of a prediction market where information about some uncertain event can be
solicited from experts for a certain reward in the future [26, 135]. Experts can
post their predictions in the form of options, and the mechanism can collect
the aggregate forecast for the event. This can be applied to sports betting,
presidential elections, or even the possible outcomes of wars.
Auctions have also practically proven applications in ranking search words
[141], supply chain and network flow formation, optimisation and computation
of a price of anarchy [162], grid resource allocation or sensor networks [56].
One example of using double auctions for allocating ad slots can be the double
auction between content providers and the advertisers freely selling and buying
the ad locations (or search positions) in a truthful mechanism.
8.5 Future Work
In the future prospects of the research, I shall put my efforts at tackling the
limitations stated above. In particular, I would like to concentrate my further
research in studying the combinatorial exchanges and their applications into
financial markets. I have listed the topics that I will be working in future:
• Bidding Languages: The design and implementation of bidding languages
for expressing the trader preferences on portfolios of assets based on their
key indicators such as beta, alpha, Shapley ratio, etc. Also enabling the
interpretation of compound financial derivatives through the use of bid-
ding languages which are sufficient and succinct to reveal the trader’s
true intentions and methodology of constructing these financial instru-
ments in a DSIC environment. I will develop specific bidding languages
for certain financial instruments and formulate a corresponding WDP for
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them.
• Combinatorial Trading Algorithms: The design, implementation and
simulation of adaptive trading algorithms not only for single asset, but for
multiple assets also involving their complementarity and substitutability
aspects. Although the CAPM is the great way of constructing diversified
portfolios, it does take into consideration the trader’s private preferences
in building such portfolios. The trading algorithms should be developed
from the perspective of combinatorial exchanges, so the traders can pro-
vide their own pricing results for any given bundle of assets. In case of
financial derivatives, not only the traders use their private estimations
of risk for the given contract, but also determine the optimal combina-
tions of such contracts that can hedge their risk on one hand, and also
yield desired profit on the other hand. Instead of using standardised
compound derivatives that are commonly traded in exchanges, the com-
binatorial trading algorithms should be able to construct such contracts
on the fly and trade them truthfully in the combinatorial exchange. The
development and analysis of such algorithms would be one of the key
areas of my future research.
• Applications of Truthful Mechanisms in Finance: The design, implemen-
tation and simulation of truthful mechanisms for determining the prices
of commonly traded financial securities and derivatives. This frees the
traders from strategising their trading behaviour, and consequently sim-
plifies their interaction with the mechanism. Using such mechanisms can
produce honest prices of the assets and financial derivatives practically
achieving the same efficiency as in currently established market, and thus
prevent the emergence of potential bubbles in the market, and glitches
in trading algorithms. I will extensively research such mechanisms in fu-
ture, not only with the use of existing trading algorithms, but also with
human traders to compare the results and to find similarities in their
behaviour.
• Applications of Combinatorial Exchanges in Finance: Although combi-
natorial exchange problem belongs to the NP-Hard class and it is im-
practical to implement such mechanism in a high-frequency financial ex-
changes, fast and specialised approximation algorithms can be found to
clear the combinatorial bids and asks in real time. The approximation
of mechanisms has been extensively studied by Hartline [79, 78], and I
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hope I can apply some of these approximation results to concrete cases






Table A.1: Various US T-Bill daily returns for the period from 2014-01-02 to
2014-12-31
Date 3 Mo 1 Yr 2 Yr 5 Yr 10 Yr 30 Yr
2014-01-02 0.07 0.13 0.39 1.72 3.00 3.92
2014-01-03 0.07 0.13 0.41 1.73 3.01 3.93
2014-01-06 0.05 0.12 0.40 1.70 2.98 3.90
2014-01-07 0.04 0.13 0.40 1.69 2.96 3.88
2014-01-08 0.05 0.13 0.43 1.77 3.01 3.90
2014-01-09 0.04 0.13 0.44 1.75 2.97 3.88
2014-01-10 0.05 0.12 0.39 1.64 2.88 3.80
2014-01-13 0.03 0.11 0.39 1.60 2.84 3.77
2014-01-14 0.04 0.11 0.39 1.65 2.88 3.80
2014-01-15 0.04 0.13 0.41 1.68 2.90 3.81
2014-01-16 0.04 0.11 0.41 1.66 2.86 3.77
2014-01-17 0.05 0.11 0.40 1.64 2.84 3.75
2014-01-21 0.04 0.12 0.40 1.67 2.85 3.74
2014-01-22 0.04 0.11 0.44 1.72 2.87 3.75
2014-01-23 0.04 0.11 0.39 1.62 2.79 3.68
2014-01-24 0.04 0.11 0.37 1.58 2.75 3.64
2014-01-27 0.05 0.11 0.37 1.61 2.78 3.67
2014-01-28 0.05 0.11 0.38 1.59 2.77 3.68
2014-01-29 0.04 0.11 0.36 1.52 2.69 3.62
2014-01-30 0.02 0.10 0.36 1.55 2.72 3.65
2014-01-31 0.02 0.10 0.34 1.49 2.67 3.61
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Date 3 Mo 1 Yr 2 Yr 5 Yr 10 Yr 30 Yr
2014-02-03 0.05 0.11 0.30 1.44 2.61 3.55
2014-02-04 0.06 0.12 0.31 1.46 2.64 3.59
2014-02-05 0.07 0.12 0.32 1.50 2.70 3.66
2014-02-06 0.07 0.13 0.33 1.52 2.73 3.67
2014-02-07 0.08 0.12 0.30 1.47 2.71 3.67
2014-02-10 0.07 0.12 0.32 1.48 2.70 3.66
2014-02-11 0.05 0.12 0.35 1.54 2.75 3.69
2014-02-12 0.05 0.12 0.35 1.59 2.80 3.72
2014-02-13 0.03 0.12 0.32 1.51 2.73 3.70
2014-02-14 0.02 0.11 0.32 1.53 2.75 3.69
2014-02-18 0.05 0.12 0.31 1.50 2.71 3.68
2014-02-19 0.06 0.11 0.33 1.53 2.73 3.71
2014-02-20 0.05 0.12 0.34 1.57 2.76 3.73
2014-02-21 0.05 0.12 0.33 1.56 2.73 3.69
2014-02-24 0.05 0.11 0.35 1.57 2.75 3.70
2014-02-25 0.05 0.11 0.34 1.53 2.70 3.66
2014-02-26 0.05 0.11 0.33 1.50 2.67 3.63
2014-02-27 0.04 0.11 0.33 1.49 2.65 3.60
2014-02-28 0.05 0.12 0.33 1.51 2.66 3.59
2014-03-03 0.05 0.12 0.32 1.46 2.60 3.55
2014-03-04 0.05 0.12 0.33 1.54 2.70 3.64
2014-03-05 0.06 0.13 0.33 1.54 2.70 3.64
2014-03-06 0.05 0.12 0.37 1.57 2.74 3.68
2014-03-07 0.06 0.13 0.38 1.65 2.80 3.72
2014-03-10 0.05 0.12 0.37 1.64 2.79 3.73
2014-03-11 0.05 0.13 0.37 1.62 2.77 3.70
2014-03-12 0.05 0.12 0.37 1.59 2.73 3.66
2014-03-13 0.05 0.12 0.34 1.53 2.66 3.60
2014-03-14 0.05 0.12 0.36 1.55 2.65 3.59
2014-03-17 0.06 0.13 0.38 1.58 2.70 3.63
2014-03-18 0.05 0.13 0.36 1.56 2.68 3.62
2014-03-19 0.06 0.15 0.47 1.75 2.78 3.66
2014-03-20 0.06 0.14 0.45 1.73 2.79 3.67
2014-03-21 0.06 0.14 0.45 1.73 2.75 3.61
2014-03-24 0.06 0.14 0.47 1.76 2.74 3.57
continued on next page
321
continued from previous page
Date 3 Mo 1 Yr 2 Yr 5 Yr 10 Yr 30 Yr
2014-03-25 0.05 0.13 0.47 1.76 2.75 3.59
2014-03-26 0.05 0.12 0.45 1.70 2.71 3.55
2014-03-27 0.04 0.12 0.45 1.70 2.69 3.52
2014-03-28 0.04 0.13 0.45 1.74 2.73 3.55
2014-03-31 0.05 0.13 0.44 1.73 2.73 3.56
2014-04-01 0.04 0.13 0.44 1.74 2.77 3.60
2014-04-02 0.02 0.12 0.47 1.80 2.82 3.65
2014-04-03 0.02 0.11 0.46 1.79 2.80 3.62
2014-04-04 0.03 0.11 0.43 1.71 2.74 3.59
2014-04-07 0.03 0.11 0.41 1.68 2.71 3.56
2014-04-08 0.03 0.11 0.40 1.67 2.69 3.54
2014-04-09 0.04 0.10 0.37 1.65 2.71 3.57
2014-04-10 0.04 0.09 0.37 1.59 2.65 3.52
2014-04-11 0.04 0.09 0.37 1.58 2.63 3.48
2014-04-14 0.04 0.10 0.37 1.61 2.65 3.48
2014-04-15 0.04 0.11 0.39 1.63 2.64 3.46
2014-04-16 0.04 0.11 0.39 1.67 2.65 3.45
2014-04-17 0.03 0.11 0.43 1.75 2.73 3.52
2014-04-21 0.04 0.11 0.42 1.74 2.73 3.52
2014-04-22 0.03 0.11 0.45 1.76 2.73 3.50
2014-04-23 0.02 0.11 0.43 1.73 2.70 3.47
2014-04-24 0.01 0.10 0.43 1.74 2.70 3.46
2014-04-25 0.03 0.11 0.43 1.72 2.68 3.45
2014-04-28 0.03 0.10 0.44 1.73 2.70 3.47
2014-04-29 0.02 0.11 0.44 1.74 2.71 3.49
2014-04-30 0.03 0.11 0.42 1.69 2.67 3.47
2014-05-01 0.03 0.10 0.41 1.66 2.63 3.41
2014-05-02 0.02 0.10 0.42 1.67 2.60 3.37
2014-05-05 0.03 0.11 0.43 1.68 2.63 3.41
2014-05-06 0.03 0.10 0.43 1.68 2.61 3.38
2014-05-07 0.03 0.10 0.41 1.65 2.62 3.40
2014-05-08 0.03 0.10 0.40 1.63 2.61 3.45
2014-05-09 0.03 0.10 0.40 1.63 2.62 3.47
2014-05-12 0.03 0.09 0.41 1.67 2.66 3.49
2014-05-13 0.03 0.10 0.39 1.62 2.61 3.45
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2014-05-14 0.03 0.10 0.39 1.57 2.54 3.37
2014-05-15 0.03 0.09 0.38 1.55 2.50 3.33
2014-05-16 0.03 0.09 0.38 1.56 2.52 3.34
2014-05-19 0.03 0.09 0.36 1.56 2.54 3.39
2014-05-20 0.03 0.09 0.35 1.53 2.52 3.38
2014-05-21 0.04 0.09 0.37 1.55 2.54 3.42
2014-05-22 0.03 0.09 0.37 1.57 2.56 3.43
2014-05-23 0.04 0.10 0.37 1.55 2.54 3.40
2014-05-27 0.04 0.09 0.39 1.56 2.52 3.37
2014-05-28 0.04 0.10 0.37 1.50 2.44 3.29
2014-05-29 0.04 0.10 0.37 1.52 2.45 3.31
2014-05-30 0.04 0.10 0.37 1.54 2.48 3.33
2014-06-02 0.04 0.10 0.39 1.60 2.54 3.38
2014-06-03 0.04 0.10 0.41 1.65 2.60 3.43
2014-06-04 0.04 0.10 0.41 1.65 2.61 3.45
2014-06-05 0.04 0.10 0.40 1.63 2.59 3.44
2014-06-06 0.04 0.11 0.41 1.66 2.60 3.44
2014-06-09 0.04 0.11 0.43 1.69 2.62 3.45
2014-06-10 0.04 0.11 0.45 1.71 2.64 3.47
2014-06-11 0.04 0.11 0.44 1.70 2.65 3.47
2014-06-12 0.04 0.10 0.42 1.66 2.58 3.41
2014-06-13 0.04 0.11 0.45 1.70 2.60 3.41
2014-06-16 0.04 0.11 0.49 1.71 2.61 3.40
2014-06-17 0.04 0.11 0.51 1.77 2.66 3.44
2014-06-18 0.03 0.10 0.48 1.71 2.61 3.43
2014-06-19 0.02 0.09 0.48 1.71 2.64 3.47
2014-06-20 0.02 0.09 0.50 1.71 2.63 3.44
2014-06-23 0.03 0.10 0.48 1.72 2.63 3.45
2014-06-24 0.03 0.12 0.49 1.70 2.59 3.41
2014-06-25 0.03 0.11 0.48 1.68 2.57 3.38
2014-06-26 0.04 0.11 0.46 1.64 2.53 3.35
2014-06-27 0.03 0.10 0.45 1.64 2.54 3.36
2014-06-30 0.04 0.11 0.47 1.62 2.53 3.34
2014-07-01 0.02 0.11 0.47 1.66 2.58 3.40
2014-07-02 0.02 0.12 0.49 1.71 2.64 3.46
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2014-07-03 0.01 0.11 0.52 1.74 2.65 3.47
2014-07-07 0.04 0.12 0.52 1.74 2.63 3.44
2014-07-08 0.03 0.11 0.51 1.70 2.58 3.38
2014-07-09 0.03 0.11 0.51 1.68 2.57 3.37
2014-07-10 0.02 0.10 0.46 1.66 2.55 3.38
2014-07-11 0.02 0.11 0.48 1.65 2.53 3.34
2014-07-14 0.03 0.11 0.48 1.68 2.55 3.36
2014-07-15 0.02 0.11 0.49 1.70 2.56 3.37
2014-07-16 0.02 0.11 0.50 1.71 2.55 3.35
2014-07-17 0.02 0.10 0.47 1.65 2.47 3.27
2014-07-18 0.02 0.10 0.51 1.69 2.50 3.29
2014-07-21 0.03 0.11 0.51 1.70 2.49 3.26
2014-07-22 0.03 0.11 0.49 1.68 2.48 3.25
2014-07-23 0.03 0.11 0.50 1.67 2.48 3.26
2014-07-24 0.03 0.11 0.53 1.72 2.52 3.30
2014-07-25 0.03 0.11 0.53 1.69 2.48 3.24
2014-07-28 0.04 0.11 0.54 1.73 2.50 3.26
2014-07-29 0.02 0.12 0.54 1.70 2.47 3.22
2014-07-30 0.04 0.13 0.56 1.77 2.57 3.31
2014-07-31 0.03 0.12 0.53 1.76 2.58 3.32
2014-08-01 0.03 0.13 0.47 1.67 2.52 3.29
2014-08-04 0.04 0.12 0.47 1.66 2.51 3.30
2014-08-05 0.03 0.12 0.47 1.66 2.49 3.28
2014-08-06 0.03 0.11 0.48 1.66 2.49 3.27
2014-08-07 0.03 0.11 0.44 1.60 2.43 3.23
2014-08-08 0.03 0.10 0.45 1.62 2.44 3.23
2014-08-11 0.04 0.10 0.47 1.62 2.44 3.24
2014-08-12 0.03 0.10 0.45 1.63 2.46 3.27
2014-08-13 0.04 0.10 0.43 1.59 2.43 3.24
2014-08-14 0.04 0.10 0.42 1.58 2.40 3.20
2014-08-15 0.03 0.09 0.42 1.55 2.34 3.13
2014-08-18 0.03 0.10 0.44 1.58 2.39 3.20
2014-08-19 0.03 0.11 0.46 1.59 2.40 3.21
2014-08-20 0.04 0.12 0.49 1.65 2.43 3.22
2014-08-21 0.02 0.10 0.49 1.64 2.41 3.19
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2014-08-22 0.03 0.10 0.53 1.68 2.40 3.16
2014-08-25 0.04 0.11 0.53 1.69 2.39 3.13
2014-08-26 0.03 0.12 0.52 1.68 2.39 3.15
2014-08-27 0.04 0.11 0.51 1.65 2.37 3.11
2014-08-28 0.03 0.11 0.50 1.63 2.34 3.08
2014-08-29 0.03 0.09 0.48 1.63 2.35 3.09
2014-09-02 0.03 0.10 0.53 1.69 2.42 3.17
2014-09-03 0.03 0.11 0.52 1.69 2.41 3.15
2014-09-04 0.03 0.10 0.54 1.71 2.45 3.21
2014-09-05 0.03 0.10 0.52 1.69 2.46 3.23
2014-09-08 0.02 0.10 0.54 1.72 2.48 3.23
2014-09-09 0.02 0.11 0.56 1.76 2.50 3.23
2014-09-10 0.02 0.11 0.58 1.79 2.54 3.26
2014-09-11 0.02 0.11 0.58 1.79 2.54 3.27
2014-09-12 0.02 0.11 0.58 1.83 2.62 3.35
2014-09-15 0.02 0.11 0.58 1.80 2.60 3.34
2014-09-16 0.02 0.13 0.55 1.78 2.60 3.36
2014-09-17 0.02 0.12 0.59 1.82 2.62 3.37
2014-09-18 0.02 0.12 0.59 1.85 2.63 3.36
2014-09-19 0.02 0.11 0.59 1.83 2.59 3.29
2014-09-22 0.01 0.10 0.58 1.80 2.57 3.28
2014-09-23 0.01 0.10 0.57 1.78 2.54 3.25
2014-09-24 0.02 0.11 0.59 1.82 2.57 3.28
2014-09-25 0.01 0.10 0.56 1.75 2.52 3.22
2014-09-26 0.01 0.11 0.59 1.80 2.54 3.22
2014-09-29 0.02 0.11 0.58 1.77 2.50 3.18
2014-09-30 0.02 0.13 0.58 1.78 2.52 3.21
2014-10-01 0.02 0.10 0.53 1.69 2.42 3.12
2014-10-02 0.01 0.10 0.53 1.70 2.44 3.15
2014-10-03 0.01 0.11 0.57 1.73 2.45 3.13
2014-10-06 0.02 0.11 0.54 1.70 2.43 3.12
2014-10-07 0.02 0.10 0.52 1.64 2.36 3.06
2014-10-08 0.01 0.10 0.46 1.57 2.35 3.07
2014-10-09 0.01 0.10 0.46 1.58 2.34 3.07
2014-10-10 0.01 0.10 0.45 1.55 2.31 3.03
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2014-10-14 0.02 0.09 0.39 1.45 2.21 2.95
2014-10-15 0.02 0.10 0.34 1.37 2.15 2.92
2014-10-16 0.03 0.10 0.35 1.39 2.17 2.94
2014-10-17 0.02 0.11 0.39 1.44 2.22 2.98
2014-10-20 0.02 0.10 0.37 1.41 2.20 2.96
2014-10-21 0.02 0.10 0.38 1.44 2.23 3.00
2014-10-22 0.02 0.11 0.41 1.46 2.25 3.01
2014-10-23 0.01 0.11 0.41 1.52 2.29 3.05
2014-10-24 0.01 0.11 0.41 1.52 2.29 3.05
2014-10-27 0.02 0.11 0.41 1.51 2.27 3.04
2014-10-28 0.02 0.11 0.42 1.53 2.30 3.06
2014-10-29 0.03 0.11 0.48 1.61 2.34 3.06
2014-10-30 0.01 0.11 0.48 1.58 2.32 3.04
2014-10-31 0.01 0.11 0.50 1.62 2.35 3.07
2014-11-03 0.02 0.12 0.52 1.63 2.36 3.07
2014-11-04 0.03 0.11 0.52 1.63 2.35 3.05
2014-11-05 0.03 0.11 0.52 1.63 2.36 3.06
2014-11-06 0.03 0.12 0.54 1.67 2.39 3.09
2014-11-07 0.03 0.12 0.51 1.60 2.32 3.04
2014-11-10 0.02 0.13 0.55 1.65 2.38 3.09
2014-11-12 0.02 0.14 0.55 1.65 2.37 3.09
2014-11-13 0.02 0.15 0.53 1.64 2.35 3.08
2014-11-14 0.02 0.15 0.54 1.62 2.32 3.04
2014-11-17 0.03 0.15 0.54 1.64 2.34 3.06
2014-11-18 0.02 0.14 0.53 1.63 2.32 3.05
2014-11-19 0.01 0.15 0.54 1.66 2.36 3.08
2014-11-20 0.02 0.14 0.53 1.64 2.34 3.05
2014-11-21 0.01 0.14 0.53 1.63 2.31 3.02
2014-11-24 0.02 0.14 0.53 1.62 2.30 3.01
2014-11-25 0.02 0.14 0.51 1.58 2.27 2.97
2014-11-26 0.02 0.14 0.53 1.56 2.24 2.95
2014-11-28 0.02 0.13 0.47 1.49 2.18 2.89
2014-12-01 0.03 0.13 0.49 1.52 2.22 2.95
2014-12-02 0.03 0.14 0.55 1.59 2.28 3.00
2014-12-03 0.01 0.15 0.57 1.61 2.29 2.99
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2014-12-04 0.02 0.14 0.55 1.59 2.25 2.94
2014-12-05 0.02 0.18 0.65 1.69 2.31 2.97
2014-12-08 0.03 0.18 0.64 1.67 2.26 2.90
2014-12-09 0.04 0.23 0.64 1.63 2.22 2.87
2014-12-10 0.03 0.21 0.59 1.58 2.18 2.83
2014-12-11 0.03 0.21 0.62 1.62 2.19 2.84
2014-12-12 0.02 0.19 0.56 1.53 2.10 2.75
2014-12-15 0.04 0.22 0.60 1.58 2.12 2.74
2014-12-16 0.03 0.21 0.58 1.53 2.07 2.69
2014-12-17 0.03 0.23 0.62 1.61 2.14 2.74
2014-12-18 0.04 0.25 0.67 1.68 2.22 2.82
2014-12-19 0.04 0.26 0.67 1.66 2.17 2.77
2014-12-22 0.05 0.28 0.71 1.67 2.17 2.75
2014-12-23 0.03 0.26 0.73 1.76 2.26 2.85
2014-12-24 0.01 0.26 0.73 1.76 2.27 2.83
2014-12-26 0.01 0.26 0.73 1.75 2.25 2.81
2014-12-29 0.03 0.25 0.72 1.72 2.22 2.78
2014-12-30 0.03 0.23 0.69 1.68 2.20 2.76
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Table A.2: NASDAQ-100 indices for the period from 02-01-2014 to 31-12-2014
Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj. Close
2014-01-02 3575.60 3577.03 3553.65 3563.57 1,738,820,000 3563.57
2014-01-03 3564.94 3567.51 3537.61 3538.73 1,667,480,000 3538.73
2014-01-06 3539.02 3542.52 3512.45 3526.96 2,292,840,000 3526.96
2014-01-07 3539.29 3562.99 3535.50 3557.85 2,278,220,000 3557.85
2014-01-08 3558.30 3575.15 3551.12 3567.54 2,345,220,000 3567.54
2014-01-09 3576.33 3579.40 3541.81 3552.58 2,214,770,000 3552.58
2014-01-10 3565.68 3568.47 3536.45 3565.08 2,143,070,000 3565.08
2014-01-13 3559.39 3572.40 3499.37 3512.80 2,322,240,000 3512.80
2014-01-14 3526.20 3581.60 3525.47 3580.65 2,034,180,000 3580.65
2014-01-15 3593.81 3615.70 3592.62 3609.84 2,101,870,000 3609.84
2014-01-16 3605.43 3614.66 3599.87 3611.29 2,005,850,000 3611.29
2014-01-17 3597.41 3608.72 3580.39 3591.25 2,150,370,000 3591.25
2014-01-21 3611.63 3617.70 3586.05 3617.70 2,034,030,000 3617.70
2014-01-22 3623.31 3634.65 3615.48 3627.72 2,026,910,000 3627.72
2014-01-23 3612.53 3613.88 3588.83 3613.76 2,191,980,000 3613.76
2014-01-24 3596.93 3601.00 3541.38 3541.48 2,489,470,000 3541.48
2014-01-27 3543.50 3548.48 3482.89 3509.02 2,398,280,000 3509.02
2014-01-28 3484.39 3509.80 3483.71 3505.72 2,091,180,000 3505.72
2014-01-29 3472.42 3500.82 3461.64 3467.82 2,231,850,000 3467.82
2014-01-30 3514.25 3544.21 3508.01 3532.41 2,168,410,000 3532.41
2014-01-31 3488.37 3539.44 3488.04 3521.92 2,300,570,000 3521.92
2014-02-03 3524.23 3533.48 3433.64 3440.50 2,617,030,000 3440.50
2014-02-04 3460.13 3480.74 3449.19 3470.20 2,173,360,000 3470.20
2014-02-05 3457.04 3469.35 3418.88 3454.90 2,168,360,000 3454.90
2014-02-06 3465.83 3502.52 3465.42 3497.60 1,942,700,000 3497.60
2014-02-07 3522.33 3563.14 3508.83 3561.91 2,055,850,000 3561.91
2014-02-10 3558.59 3582.84 3557.78 3582.11 1,811,970,000 3582.11
2014-02-11 3587.58 3628.59 3585.08 3621.72 1,993,950,000 3621.72
2014-02-12 3626.14 3635.92 3618.06 3627.36 2,035,890,000 3627.36
2014-02-13 3601.75 3659.56 3600.86 3659.56 2,249,990,000 3659.56
2014-02-14 3652.88 3671.04 3643.79 3663.88 1,881,510,000 3663.88
2014-02-18 3668.99 3685.18 3658.64 3679.43 1,886,210,000 3679.43
2014-02-19 3668.72 3679.69 3646.13 3652.85 1,956,720,000 3652.85
2014-02-20 3654.85 3676.89 3640.63 3671.93 1,992,780,000 3671.93
continued on next page
328
continued from previous page
Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj. Close
2014-02-21 3683.42 3687.16 3661.46 3662.60 2,138,250,000 3662.60
2014-02-24 3670.07 3701.27 3668.34 3685.81 2,161,300,000 3685.81
2014-02-25 3689.68 3697.60 3669.53 3679.14 2,137,150,000 3679.14
2014-02-26 3691.84 3702.09 3663.75 3676.60 2,108,270,000 3676.60
2014-02-27 3678.31 3704.65 3672.64 3699.80 2,049,160,000 3699.80
2014-02-28 3703.48 3722.38 3664.83 3696.10 2,617,730,000 3696.10
2014-03-03 3657.32 3678.38 3637.67 3668.37 2,077,500,000 3668.37
2014-03-04 3710.19 3723.00 3706.82 3719.93 2,477,850,000 3719.93
2014-03-05 3721.53 3732.98 3715.38 3727.19 2,215,980,000 3727.19
2014-03-06 3735.85 3738.32 3709.41 3720.93 2,136,260,000 3720.93
2014-03-07 3736.93 3737.36 3686.94 3703.40 2,175,560,000 3703.40
2014-03-10 3702.14 3709.78 3683.97 3706.34 2,111,610,000 3706.34
2014-03-11 3715.89 3725.71 3681.37 3691.50 2,477,780,000 3691.50
2014-03-12 3678.36 3707.20 3661.87 3707.06 2,131,880,000 3707.06
2014-03-13 3719.36 3720.62 3636.79 3651.49 2,383,600,000 3651.49
2014-03-14 3643.21 3656.94 3626.86 3627.87 2,196,890,000 3627.87
2014-03-17 3653.19 3678.32 3651.14 3662.51 1,810,410,000 3662.51
2014-03-18 3667.40 3708.26 3664.79 3706.62 1,962,890,000 3706.62
2014-03-19 3705.51 3709.01 3661.06 3682.74 1,992,750,000 3682.74
2014-03-20 3675.62 3705.31 3665.83 3693.97 1,847,270,000 3693.97
2014-03-21 3711.47 3717.36 3643.35 3653.07 3,245,740,000 3653.07
2014-03-24 3665.38 3665.58 3585.15 3617.39 2,434,650,000 3617.39
2014-03-25 3640.26 3659.59 3600.65 3629.73 2,270,760,000 3629.73
2014-03-26 3645.73 3654.69 3582.84 3582.89 2,455,460,000 3582.89
2014-03-27 3578.54 3594.08 3543.07 3563.13 2,270,650,000 3563.13
2014-03-28 3576.18 3609.08 3560.58 3571.49 2,029,840,000 3571.49
2014-03-31 3598.08 3618.42 3593.70 3595.74 2,090,850,000 3595.74
2014-04-01 3615.91 3659.16 3614.16 3658.40 2,153,130,000 3658.40
2014-04-02 3670.33 3676.36 3649.79 3665.99 2,187,100,000 3665.99
2014-04-03 3670.43 3675.70 3617.41 3637.58 2,067,370,000 3637.58
2014-04-04 3659.92 3663.78 3532.28 3539.38 2,621,270,000 3539.38
2014-04-07 3522.21 3551.21 3482.75 3507.75 2,554,680,000 3507.75
2014-04-08 3511.82 3543.98 3499.00 3538.23 2,198,900,000 3538.23
2014-04-09 3552.07 3602.35 3544.09 3600.44 1,957,560,000 3600.44
2014-04-10 3597.58 3599.64 3479.15 3487.76 2,421,210,000 3487.76
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2014-04-11 3453.24 3502.33 3440.55 3446.85 2,264,480,000 3446.85
2014-04-14 3479.66 3493.17 3443.26 3474.63 1,890,480,000 3474.63
2014-04-15 3484.29 3505.67 3414.11 3487.85 2,413,110,000 3487.85
2014-04-16 3517.50 3533.09 3489.29 3533.09 1,863,110,000 3533.09
2014-04-17 3526.57 3551.02 3511.27 3534.53 1,954,720,000 3534.53
2014-04-21 3543.65 3559.95 3525.59 3559.95 1,544,440,000 3559.95
2014-04-22 3570.51 3596.92 3566.87 3588.81 1,875,930,000 3588.81
2014-04-23 3587.65 3588.05 3555.19 3557.04 1,794,760,000 3557.04
2014-04-24 3609.83 3613.20 3552.93 3591.03 2,130,870,000 3591.03
2014-04-25 3569.92 3573.95 3525.60 3533.10 2,087,140,000 3533.10
2014-04-28 3546.96 3570.11 3489.60 3545.03 2,348,320,000 3545.03
2014-04-29 3557.77 3579.03 3538.24 3573.99 1,911,240,000 3573.99
2014-04-30 3556.00 3585.50 3548.11 3582.02 2,151,400,000 3582.02
2014-05-01 3589.66 3613.03 3580.02 3594.36 2,077,040,000 3594.36
2014-05-02 3608.84 3611.56 3578.53 3587.64 1,844,790,000 3587.64
2014-05-05 3566.26 3605.26 3556.40 3605.09 1,561,170,000 3605.09
2014-05-06 3598.27 3599.65 3556.10 3556.51 1,850,610,000 3556.51
2014-05-07 3561.47 3567.55 3506.35 3546.47 2,486,030,000 3546.47
2014-05-08 3533.39 3583.64 3524.85 3540.42 2,411,940,000 3540.42
2014-05-09 3537.68 3556.35 3516.24 3555.70 1,976,160,000 3555.70
2014-05-12 3574.24 3613.37 3572.69 3612.73 1,880,020,000 3612.73
2014-05-13 3614.91 3625.77 3605.78 3611.13 1,923,480,000 3611.13
2014-05-14 3603.58 3614.63 3585.68 3593.25 1,764,430,000 3593.25
2014-05-15 3594.59 3598.34 3542.63 3565.17 2,083,030,000 3565.17
2014-05-16 3568.20 3590.41 3545.63 3587.20 1,741,070,000 3587.20
2014-05-19 3577.85 3618.96 3572.28 3615.62 1,601,400,000 3615.62
2014-05-20 3612.86 3624.60 3585.88 3600.31 1,797,910,000 3600.31
2014-05-21 3605.79 3636.47 3605.51 3635.61 1,703,500,000 3635.61
2014-05-22 3639.49 3660.59 3633.85 3650.86 1,835,810,000 3650.86
2014-05-23 3656.27 3678.17 3646.23 3677.33 1,536,610,000 3677.33
2014-05-27 3693.18 3723.07 3691.09 3723.07 1,812,330,000 3723.07
2014-05-28 3720.89 3726.72 3708.65 3712.26 1,785,140,000 3712.26
2014-05-29 3723.27 3735.72 3717.66 3735.72 1,714,000,000 3735.72
2014-05-30 3738.71 3741.57 3716.09 3736.82 1,903,660,000 3736.82
2014-06-02 3740.71 3740.71 3707.89 3732.96 1,631,310,000 3732.96
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2014-06-03 3719.17 3735.97 3715.46 3730.07 1,718,640,000 3730.07
2014-06-04 3720.00 3750.01 3715.24 3743.59 1,610,090,000 3743.59
2014-06-05 3748.36 3782.00 3735.19 3776.95 1,926,750,000 3776.95
2014-06-06 3792.42 3795.14 3782.12 3794.57 1,616,650,000 3794.57
2014-06-09 3795.85 3804.04 3783.90 3795.74 1,783,060,000 3795.74
2014-06-10 3790.48 3802.46 3786.56 3800.86 1,787,120,000 3800.86
2014-06-11 3789.41 3803.95 3783.61 3797.85 1,778,460,000 3797.85
2014-06-12 3790.59 3794.99 3751.69 3763.80 1,908,190,000 3763.80
2014-06-13 3782.84 3784.84 3759.87 3775.56 1,754,560,000 3775.56
2014-06-16 3768.37 3789.93 3761.42 3779.93 1,675,120,000 3779.93
2014-06-17 3775.73 3790.92 3769.94 3781.32 1,814,360,000 3781.32
2014-06-18 3786.19 3807.49 3764.53 3804.61 1,860,660,000 3804.61
2014-06-19 3808.76 3811.24 3783.30 3800.80 1,845,460,000 3800.80
2014-06-20 3803.10 3807.92 3794.51 3802.64 2,721,380,000 3802.64
2014-06-23 3802.25 3806.19 3794.85 3805.31 1,712,930,000 3805.31
2014-06-24 3807.49 3837.17 3791.12 3799.53 2,014,700,000 3799.53
2014-06-25 3794.84 3831.85 3792.31 3827.33 1,722,820,000 3827.33
2014-06-26 3826.70 3827.70 3798.63 3826.91 1,554,070,000 3826.91
2014-06-27 3825.02 3844.89 3823.21 3844.44 3,964,930,000 3844.44
2014-06-30 3844.45 3860.65 3841.70 3849.48 1,848,110,000 3849.48
2014-07-01 3864.14 3902.93 3863.81 3894.33 1,942,550,000 3894.33
2014-07-02 3895.18 3904.35 3890.77 3899.27 1,599,480,000 3899.27
2014-07-03 3911.11 3923.15 3901.33 3923.01 1,001,730,000 3923.01
2014-07-07 3917.89 3923.92 3904.67 3910.71 1,691,390,000 3910.71
2014-07-08 3903.37 3906.22 3848.18 3864.07 2,221,820,000 3864.07
2014-07-09 3873.17 3896.38 3863.20 3892.91 1,736,960,000 3892.91
2014-07-10 3837.29 3895.72 3837.16 3880.04 1,682,920,000 3880.04
2014-07-11 3888.76 3905.40 3879.40 3904.58 1,511,250,000 3904.58
2014-07-14 3923.60 3937.73 3916.53 3929.46 1,579,660,000 3929.46
2014-07-15 3934.79 3940.55 3887.50 3914.46 1,772,030,000 3914.46
2014-07-16 3943.60 3947.49 3927.01 3932.33 2,059,340,000 3932.33
2014-07-17 3921.87 3933.88 3866.22 3878.01 2,055,240,000 3878.01
2014-07-18 3899.38 3942.15 3894.56 3939.89 1,823,580,000 3939.89
2014-07-21 3933.11 3941.93 3917.74 3934.14 1,557,820,000 3934.14
2014-07-22 3950.83 3966.10 3949.09 3961.62 1,724,440,000 3961.62
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2014-07-23 3974.66 3990.64 3967.96 3986.19 1,909,810,000 3986.19
2014-07-24 3994.18 3997.50 3975.66 3983.19 1,935,090,000 3983.19
2014-07-25 3959.35 3970.44 3945.05 3965.17 1,711,430,000 3965.17
2014-07-28 3966.31 3977.00 3936.72 3967.24 1,783,250,000 3967.24
2014-07-29 3974.06 3983.42 3957.22 3959.03 2,090,810,000 3959.03
2014-07-30 3982.10 3989.00 3960.29 3976.07 1,872,430,000 3976.07
2014-07-31 3938.31 3948.90 3889.10 3892.50 2,273,380,000 3892.50
2014-08-01 3886.10 3908.21 3855.35 3879.67 2,050,340,000 3879.67
2014-08-04 3890.63 3922.25 3875.10 3908.77 1,677,400,000 3908.77
2014-08-05 3891.13 3901.17 3858.65 3874.94 1,916,180,000 3874.94
2014-08-06 3851.44 3896.65 3849.45 3874.27 1,819,310,000 3874.27
2014-08-07 3889.69 3895.74 3845.20 3857.94 1,866,330,000 3857.94
2014-08-08 3864.09 3890.63 3848.49 3888.09 1,759,060,000 3888.09
2014-08-11 3899.98 3921.19 3899.37 3910.46 1,537,880,000 3910.46
2014-08-12 3904.45 3916.73 3887.58 3905.23 1,560,220,000 3905.23
2014-08-13 3924.47 3949.69 3921.44 3949.20 1,611,690,000 3949.20
2014-08-14 3953.27 3969.24 3949.08 3969.11 1,549,820,000 3969.11
2014-08-15 3993.00 3997.08 3951.25 3987.51 1,799,460,000 3987.51
2014-08-18 4007.19 4022.48 4003.46 4020.50 1,571,100,000 4020.50
2014-08-19 4025.51 4041.50 4024.17 4040.13 1,556,560,000 4040.13
2014-08-20 4032.91 4046.97 4032.20 4040.71 1,502,030,000 4040.71
2014-08-21 4041.00 4048.95 4035.75 4047.03 1,421,730,000 4047.03
2014-08-22 4052.14 4060.90 4040.22 4052.75 1,311,810,000 4052.75
2014-08-25 4073.48 4079.52 4058.60 4067.48 1,384,620,000 4067.48
2014-08-26 4073.05 4076.54 4062.73 4071.67 1,469,620,000 4071.67
2014-08-27 4073.40 4078.19 4064.07 4073.18 1,389,470,000 4073.18
2014-08-28 4059.37 4072.29 4054.61 4066.27 1,309,580,000 4066.27
2014-08-29 4081.02 4082.97 4062.18 4082.56 1,352,830,000 4082.56
2014-09-02 4093.12 4095.87 4078.19 4095.81 1,859,080,000 4095.81
2014-09-03 4103.97 4104.43 4063.49 4070.96 1,897,450,000 4070.96
2014-09-04 4078.82 4100.78 4056.53 4066.13 1,728,700,000 4066.13
2014-09-05 4067.37 4089.98 4051.75 4089.92 1,641,830,000 4089.92
2014-09-08 4086.52 4105.50 4076.63 4095.47 1,670,210,000 4095.47
2014-09-09 4094.02 4110.86 4053.11 4061.88 1,956,550,000 4061.88
2014-09-10 4063.85 4095.91 4054.61 4094.97 1,808,650,000 4094.97
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2014-09-11 4077.69 4092.79 4060.92 4092.65 1,704,850,000 4092.65
2014-09-12 4087.17 4089.62 4057.53 4069.23 1,784,180,000 4069.23
2014-09-15 4070.20 4070.82 4018.30 4029.89 1,940,520,000 4029.89
2014-09-16 4012.53 4073.14 4009.98 4067.27 1,879,350,000 4067.27
2014-09-17 4066.76 4090.95 4048.58 4073.57 1,796,710,000 4073.57
2014-09-18 4084.51 4103.42 4080.82 4103.08 1,774,840,000 4103.08
2014-09-19 4113.02 4118.91 4084.45 4100.09 3,178,490,000 4100.09
2014-09-22 4091.87 4092.14 4044.99 4061.23 1,881,520,000 4061.23
2014-09-23 4045.67 4069.21 4043.26 4051.57 1,847,730,000 4051.57
2014-09-24 4055.42 4096.27 4041.72 4094.31 1,765,260,000 4094.31
2014-09-25 4079.37 4087.19 4007.63 4007.82 1,939,610,000 4007.82
2014-09-26 4016.97 4057.47 4015.02 4053.72 1,637,480,000 4053.72
2014-09-29 4009.66 4056.43 4008.58 4047.18 1,737,750,000 4047.18
2014-09-30 4054.86 4070.44 4031.70 4049.45 2,200,380,000 4049.45
2014-10-01 4043.33 4043.44 3972.91 3984.74 2,312,630,000 3984.74
2014-10-02 3984.80 3996.75 3934.94 3985.87 2,165,500,000 3985.87
2014-10-03 4004.75 4040.56 3995.81 4027.31 2,765,750,000 4027.31
2014-10-06 4041.40 4046.71 4004.21 4016.27 2,467,830,000 4016.27
2014-10-07 3999.25 4007.94 3958.44 3958.59 2,111,360,000 3958.59
2014-10-08 3960.79 4048.79 3938.16 4041.12 2,451,630,000 4041.12
2014-10-09 4031.62 4040.54 3965.37 3969.32 2,264,220,000 3969.32
2014-10-10 3946.32 3969.48 3870.86 3870.86 2,765,750,000 3870.86
2014-10-13 3866.89 3893.66 3807.89 3808.00 2,467,830,000 3808.00
2014-10-14 3837.22 3860.04 3801.16 3810.45 2,496,120,000 3810.45
2014-10-15 3738.72 3801.42 3700.23 3785.97 3,058,740,000 3785.97
2014-10-16 3706.70 3795.08 3704.83 3765.28 2,591,940,000 3765.28
2014-10-17 3815.72 3848.98 3791.16 3815.47 2,260,070,000 3815.47
2014-10-20 3813.60 3872.36 3804.97 3870.08 1,717,370,000 3870.08
2014-10-21 3916.65 3971.40 3908.83 3971.39 1,997,580,000 3971.39
2014-10-22 3980.49 3988.40 3947.98 3949.59 1,967,020,000 3949.59
2014-10-23 3989.86 4032.22 3984.15 4012.27 1,952,380,000 4012.27
2014-10-24 4019.84 4045.19 4003.43 4042.02 1,754,300,000 4042.02
2014-10-27 4031.88 4052.50 4019.23 4046.02 1,585,580,000 4046.02
2014-10-28 4063.07 4107.19 4062.21 4106.63 1,966,920,000 4106.63
2014-10-29 4091.62 4104.06 4062.49 4090.55 2,184,050,000 4090.55
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2014-10-30 4074.26 4109.06 4064.45 4100.64 2,034,960,000 4100.64
2014-10-31 4168.50 4170.87 4143.20 4158.21 2,424,360,000 4158.21
2014-11-03 4160.60 4179.36 4156.79 4169.28 2,033,000,000 4169.28
2014-11-04 4154.88 4165.05 4126.72 4156.23 1,939,320,000 4156.23
2014-11-05 4179.23 4179.93 4140.21 4153.27 2,001,870,000 4153.27
2014-11-06 4147.31 4165.77 4133.98 4164.08 1,986,820,000 4164.08
2014-11-07 4170.46 4171.13 4139.46 4160.50 1,978,830,000 4160.50
2014-11-10 4162.59 4179.98 4151.48 4175.95 1,830,010,000 4175.95
2014-11-11 4173.61 4187.31 4165.25 4187.16 1,663,690,000 4187.16
2014-11-12 4174.47 4199.19 4173.02 4195.40 1,773,060,000 4195.40
2014-11-13 4202.77 4228.68 4194.33 4213.48 1,857,580,000 4213.48
2014-11-14 4214.97 4225.18 4198.59 4224.99 1,739,950,000 4224.99
2014-11-17 4215.29 4225.48 4194.18 4213.79 1,695,070,000 4213.79
2014-11-18 4215.18 4248.19 4214.32 4242.19 1,655,760,000 4242.19
2014-11-19 4233.71 4235.84 4204.16 4222.66 1,641,560,000 4222.66
2014-11-20 4204.54 4245.17 4202.36 4242.09 1,667,330,000 4242.09
2014-11-21 4284.41 4285.27 4237.38 4251.32 1,854,340,000 4251.32
2014-11-24 4262.09 4285.00 4258.41 4284.32 1,568,130,000 4284.32
2014-11-25 4290.68 4302.44 4279.90 4288.23 1,720,140,000 4288.23
2014-11-26 4291.87 4319.41 4289.51 4317.99 1,362,930,000 4317.99
2014-11-28 4330.96 4347.09 4326.21 4337.79 998,600,000 4337.79
2014-12-01 4323.95 4332.55 4274.68 4287.81 1,893,600,000 4287.81
2014-12-02 4291.33 4312.92 4283.89 4305.96 1,839,170,000 4305.96
2014-12-03 4312.17 4319.02 4287.04 4312.93 1,734,510,000 4312.93
2014-12-04 4309.48 4327.55 4293.94 4311.93 1,724,090,000 4311.93
2014-12-05 4318.28 4324.42 4302.04 4311.57 1,767,100,000 4311.57
2014-12-08 4301.27 4320.08 4259.01 4278.34 1,966,770,000 4278.34
2014-12-09 4228.21 4297.73 4216.87 4294.67 1,950,330,000 4294.67
2014-12-10 4284.50 4297.00 4218.85 4224.87 1,850,810,000 4224.87
2014-12-11 4241.69 4296.81 4238.29 4246.48 1,873,050,000 4246.48
2014-12-12 4207.61 4254.43 4199.28 4199.28 1,888,870,000 4199.28
2014-12-15 4224.17 4236.06 4145.01 4157.41 2,143,610,000 4157.41
2014-12-16 4122.23 4190.42 4089.19 4089.60 2,231,670,000 4089.60
2014-12-17 4095.75 4175.97 4089.09 4165.10 2,279,930,000 4165.10
2014-12-18 4230.35 4267.77 4213.21 4267.77 2,172,260,000 4267.77
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2014-12-19 4272.75 4300.40 4258.33 4281.78 3,287,920,000 4281.78
2014-12-22 4271.87 4295.27 4270.54 4293.67 1,720,070,000 4293.67
2014-12-23 4308.95 4309.03 4274.51 4279.30 1,590,820,000 4279.30
2014-12-24 4283.19 4298.87 4281.80 4283.10 729,750,000 4283.10
2014-12-26 4295.72 4322.45 4294.80 4314.09 930,220,000 4314.09
2014-12-29 4309.70 4321.20 4306.67 4312.64 1,227,740,000 4312.64
2014-12-30 4301.14 4309.13 4277.75 4282.35 1,269,200,000 4282.35
2014-12-31 4294.88 4307.01 4233.71 4236.28 1,515,600,000 4236.28
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Table A.3: Bids, asks and Black-Scholes prices of ’NDX-161216C04320000’
option contract with strike $4320 and expiration date 2016-12-16, during the
period from 2014-01-02 to 2014-12-31. Bids, asks and other greeks are inferred
from the historical volatility surface.
Date Bid Ask BS price σ ∆ ρ θ ν T
2014-01-02 201.00 212.70 206.47 0.18 0.34 29.16 -0.20 22.46 2.96
2014-01-03 183.80 199.70 186.30 0.18 0.32 27.75 -0.19 21.84 2.95
2014-01-06 175.30 190.40 177.56 0.18 0.31 27.02 -0.18 21.51 2.95
2014-01-07 184.90 196.90 185.42 0.18 0.32 27.99 -0.18 21.95 2.94
2014-01-08 187.70 199.40 188.02 0.18 0.32 28.28 -0.19 22.09 2.94
2014-01-10 178.50 192.80 181.00 0.17 0.32 27.74 -0.18 21.84 2.93
2014-01-13 162.20 176.50 165.03 0.17 0.30 25.82 -0.17 20.95 2.93
2014-01-14 181.10 195.30 183.51 0.17 0.32 28.07 -0.18 22.00 2.92
2014-01-15 192.70 206.50 194.74 0.17 0.33 29.18 -0.19 22.49 2.92
2014-01-16 195.20 200.20 192.85 0.17 0.33 29.10 -0.19 22.45 2.92
2014-01-17 184.10 198.50 186.57 0.17 0.32 28.35 -0.18 22.13 2.92
2014-01-21 191.50 207.50 194.65 0.17 0.33 29.17 -0.19 22.49 2.90
2014-01-22 196.80 212.30 207.24 0.18 0.34 29.89 -0.20 22.80 2.90
2014-01-23 190.80 206.20 193.68 0.17 0.33 28.99 -0.19 22.41 2.90
2014-01-24 179.70 191.90 181.32 0.18 0.32 26.91 -0.18 21.48 2.90
2014-01-27 167.40 181.40 170.15 0.18 0.30 25.66 -0.18 20.90 2.89
2014-01-28 166.40 180.20 169.08 0.18 0.30 25.52 -0.18 20.83 2.88
2014-01-29 158.00 170.90 160.41 0.18 0.29 24.36 -0.18 20.26 2.88
2014-01-30 171.40 184.80 179.28 0.18 0.29 24.36 -0.18 20.26 2.88
2014-01-31 164.70 179.80 168.00 0.17 0.30 25.69 -0.18 20.92 2.88
2014-02-03 145.60 160.30 149.12 0.18 0.28 23.15 -0.17 19.65 2.87
2014-02-04 148.00 163.30 151.73 0.17 0.28 23.78 -0.17 19.98 2.87
2014-02-05 147.40 159.90 149.81 0.18 0.28 23.38 -0.17 19.78 2.86
2014-02-06 155.20 170.30 158.72 0.17 0.29 24.60 -0.17 20.40 2.86
2014-02-07 170.50 184.00 172.91 0.17 0.31 26.53 -0.18 21.33 2.86
2014-02-10 174.70 187.70 176.78 0.17 0.32 27.04 -0.18 21.57 2.85
2014-02-11 184.80 200.10 187.83 0.17 0.33 28.35 -0.19 22.16 2.85
2014-02-12 190.10 204.70 193.07 0.17 0.33 28.64 -0.19 22.29 2.84
2014-02-13 198.50 214.50 208.17 0.17 0.35 29.88 -0.20 22.81 2.84
2014-02-14 200.00 215.90 208.17 0.17 0.35 29.94 -0.20 22.84 2.84
2014-02-18 203.40 223.50 208.15 0.17 0.35 30.18 -0.20 22.94 2.83
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2014-02-19 197.30 212.90 208.25 0.18 0.34 29.55 -0.20 22.68 2.82
2014-02-20 200.80 220.70 207.37 0.17 0.35 30.02 -0.20 22.88 2.82
2014-02-21 201.20 220.70 207.40 0.17 0.35 29.78 -0.20 22.78 2.82
2014-02-24 203.30 223.40 207.35 0.17 0.35 30.21 -0.20 22.96 2.81
2014-02-25 202.10 222.00 207.37 0.17 0.35 30.03 -0.20 22.88 2.81
2014-02-26 200.10 220.70 207.38 0.17 0.35 29.94 -0.20 22.85 2.81
2014-02-27 205.10 226.00 207.30 0.17 0.35 30.45 -0.20 23.05 2.80
2014-02-28 208.00 228.00 207.32 0.17 0.35 30.33 -0.20 23.01 2.80
2014-03-03 200.00 216.00 207.44 0.17 0.35 29.61 -0.20 22.72 2.79
2014-03-04 215.20 234.60 219.92 0.17 0.36 31.23 -0.20 23.37 2.79
2014-03-05 218.80 238.60 223.68 0.17 0.37 31.51 -0.20 23.47 2.79
2014-03-06 216.10 236.50 221.34 0.17 0.36 31.24 -0.20 23.37 2.78
2014-03-07 209.70 227.80 207.41 0.17 0.35 30.28 -0.20 22.99 2.78
2014-03-10 212.00 230.50 207.43 0.17 0.35 30.26 -0.20 22.99 2.77
2014-03-11 208.10 227.90 207.49 0.17 0.35 29.89 -0.20 22.84 2.77
2014-03-12 211.90 231.60 207.43 0.17 0.35 30.22 -0.20 22.97 2.77
2014-03-13 200.00 215.10 206.83 0.18 0.35 29.00 -0.20 22.47 2.76
2014-03-14 195.30 206.30 195.61 0.18 0.34 28.02 -0.20 22.06 2.76
2014-03-17 200.90 214.10 206.84 0.18 0.35 29.13 -0.20 22.53 2.75
2014-03-18 208.10 227.00 206.66 0.17 0.35 30.09 -0.20 22.92 2.75
2014-03-19 202.80 223.30 206.79 0.17 0.35 29.51 -0.20 22.69 2.75
2014-03-20 205.90 225.70 206.76 0.17 0.35 29.74 -0.20 22.78 2.75
2014-03-21 192.30 208.10 195.01 0.17 0.34 28.33 -0.20 22.20 2.74
2014-03-24 180.50 192.50 181.58 0.17 0.32 26.91 -0.19 21.58 2.73
2014-03-25 178.70 194.10 181.45 0.17 0.33 27.13 -0.19 21.68 2.73
2014-03-26 162.50 178.30 165.76 0.17 0.31 25.41 -0.18 20.88 2.73
2014-03-27 158.00 173.30 160.46 0.17 0.30 24.83 -0.18 20.61 2.73
2014-03-28 157.80 171.60 159.51 0.17 0.30 24.91 -0.18 20.65 2.72
2014-03-31 161.30 175.30 163.01 0.17 0.31 25.48 -0.18 20.92 2.72
2014-04-01 177.80 192.10 179.25 0.17 0.33 27.53 -0.19 21.86 2.71
2014-04-02 178.90 193.20 180.33 0.16 0.33 27.71 -0.19 21.94 2.71
2014-04-03 170.20 182.70 171.66 0.16 0.32 26.58 -0.18 21.44 2.71
2014-04-04 147.00 158.80 148.67 0.17 0.29 23.46 -0.17 19.94 2.70
2014-04-07 138.10 149.40 139.73 0.17 0.28 22.33 -0.17 19.35 2.70
2014-04-08 144.10 156.50 146.13 0.17 0.29 23.20 -0.17 19.81 2.69
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2014-04-09 159.10 169.70 159.90 0.17 0.30 25.08 -0.18 20.75 2.69
2014-04-10 130.00 142.10 132.19 0.17 0.27 21.47 -0.16 18.90 2.69
2014-04-11 119.10 131.90 121.88 0.17 0.25 20.15 -0.16 18.16 2.68
2014-04-14 124.90 136.80 127.12 0.17 0.26 20.85 -0.16 18.57 2.68
2014-04-15 130.70 144.00 133.51 0.17 0.27 21.44 -0.17 18.89 2.67
2014-04-16 134.30 149.40 137.84 0.16 0.28 22.43 -0.17 19.43 2.67
2014-04-17 139.00 153.60 141.07 0.17 0.28 22.79 -0.17 19.62 2.67
2014-04-21 143.50 158.10 145.46 0.16 0.29 23.39 -0.17 19.94 2.66
2014-04-22 150.80 165.60 152.65 0.16 0.30 24.30 -0.18 20.39 2.65
2014-04-23 141.10 152.40 141.48 0.16 0.29 23.06 -0.17 19.77 2.65
2014-04-24 148.60 161.70 149.64 0.16 0.30 24.13 -0.18 20.31 2.65
2014-04-25 131.30 145.50 133.36 0.16 0.28 22.11 -0.17 19.28 2.65
2014-04-28 134.20 148.20 136.12 0.16 0.28 22.41 -0.17 19.44 2.64
2014-04-29 141.30 153.90 142.33 0.16 0.29 23.26 -0.17 19.89 2.64
2014-04-30 142.50 157.10 144.47 0.16 0.29 23.51 -0.17 20.01 2.63
2014-05-01 143.50 154.30 143.53 0.16 0.29 23.66 -0.17 20.09 2.63
2014-05-02 142.80 155.10 143.61 0.16 0.29 23.51 -0.17 20.02 2.63
2014-05-05 145.20 155.90 145.16 0.16 0.29 23.85 -0.17 20.19 2.62
2014-05-06 135.00 147.50 136.19 0.16 0.28 22.41 -0.17 19.46 2.62
2014-05-07 132.10 143.20 132.69 0.16 0.28 22.00 -0.17 19.25 2.61
2014-05-08 129.20 140.10 130.33 0.16 0.27 21.64 -0.16 19.06 2.61
2014-05-09 128.00 138.80 129.05 0.16 0.27 21.80 -0.16 19.14 2.61
2014-05-12 144.90 155.00 145.24 0.16 0.29 23.73 -0.17 20.14 2.60
2014-05-13 146.90 161.70 149.55 0.16 0.30 23.91 -0.18 20.24 2.60
2014-05-14 137.80 148.80 138.74 0.16 0.29 22.94 -0.17 19.75 2.59
2014-05-15 131.40 143.20 132.91 0.16 0.28 22.06 -0.17 19.30 2.59
2014-05-16 135.70 146.80 136.75 0.16 0.28 22.66 -0.17 19.61 2.59
2014-05-19 138.20 152.40 140.69 0.16 0.29 23.34 -0.17 19.96 2.58
2014-05-20 131.60 143.50 133.09 0.16 0.28 22.57 -0.17 19.57 2.58
2014-05-21 135.70 149.00 137.72 0.15 0.29 23.49 -0.17 20.04 2.58
2014-05-22 140.10 153.10 141.88 0.15 0.30 24.01 -0.17 20.30 2.57
2014-05-23 145.70 158.20 147.07 0.15 0.30 24.81 -0.17 20.69 2.57
2014-05-27 159.90 173.60 161.57 0.15 0.32 26.44 -0.18 21.44 2.56
2014-05-28 156.80 171.00 158.78 0.15 0.32 26.03 -0.18 21.26 2.56
2014-05-29 161.00 175.30 162.91 0.15 0.33 26.73 -0.18 21.57 2.55
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2014-05-30 161.50 176.40 163.71 0.15 0.33 26.77 -0.18 21.59 2.55
2014-06-02 163.20 176.80 164.82 0.15 0.33 26.64 -0.18 21.54 2.54
2014-06-03 161.90 177.60 164.61 0.15 0.33 26.53 -0.18 21.49 2.54
2014-06-04 166.50 182.00 169.03 0.15 0.33 27.02 -0.19 21.70 2.54
2014-06-05 177.30 190.20 177.60 0.15 0.34 28.25 -0.19 22.22 2.53
2014-06-06 182.70 196.50 183.31 0.15 0.35 28.89 -0.19 22.48 2.53
2014-06-09 183.00 199.00 184.74 0.15 0.35 28.88 -0.19 22.47 2.52
2014-06-10 184.30 199.70 185.73 0.15 0.35 29.01 -0.19 22.53 2.52
2014-06-11 184.10 199.40 185.51 0.15 0.35 28.90 -0.19 22.48 2.52
2014-06-12 175.10 191.10 177.80 0.15 0.34 27.63 -0.19 21.97 2.52
2014-06-13 176.90 192.90 179.54 0.15 0.34 27.95 -0.19 22.10 2.51
2014-06-16 176.80 192.40 179.27 0.15 0.34 27.95 -0.19 22.10 2.50
2014-06-17 176.00 192.50 178.93 0.15 0.34 27.93 -0.19 22.10 2.50
2014-06-18 185.50 198.90 186.72 0.15 0.35 28.79 -0.19 22.44 2.50
2014-06-19 181.00 195.20 181.99 0.15 0.35 28.56 -0.19 22.35 2.50
2014-06-20 183.10 197.10 183.97 0.15 0.35 28.65 -0.19 22.39 2.49
2014-06-23 179.80 195.80 181.73 0.15 0.35 28.53 -0.19 22.34 2.48
2014-06-24 178.50 194.50 180.47 0.15 0.35 28.30 -0.19 22.25 2.48
2014-06-25 187.00 203.00 188.76 0.15 0.36 29.30 -0.20 22.64 2.48
2014-06-26 187.30 200.70 187.77 0.15 0.36 29.21 -0.20 22.61 2.48
2014-06-27 192.90 206.90 193.55 0.15 0.37 29.85 -0.20 22.85 2.47
2014-06-30 195.50 209.60 195.35 0.15 0.37 29.95 -0.20 22.88 2.47
2014-07-01 208.00 226.80 210.71 0.15 0.39 31.66 -0.20 23.48 2.46
2014-07-02 207.50 226.40 210.27 0.15 0.39 31.74 -0.20 23.51 2.46
2014-07-03 218.80 237.30 221.17 0.15 0.40 32.72 -0.21 23.83 2.46
2014-07-07 213.70 233.50 216.88 0.15 0.39 32.08 -0.21 23.62 2.45
2014-07-08 201.00 222.00 195.40 0.15 0.37 30.05 -0.20 22.91 2.44
2014-07-09 209.50 229.60 212.97 0.15 0.39 31.39 -0.21 23.38 2.44
2014-07-10 204.90 225.90 209.68 0.15 0.38 30.80 -0.21 23.18 2.44
2014-07-11 213.00 233.60 217.41 0.15 0.39 31.68 -0.21 23.48 2.44
2014-07-14 222.80 242.70 226.73 0.15 0.40 32.54 -0.21 23.76 2.43
2014-07-15 218.80 238.00 222.50 0.15 0.40 31.96 -0.21 23.57 2.42
2014-07-16 229.50 248.90 233.16 0.16 0.40 32.71 -0.22 23.81 2.42
2014-07-17 214.40 233.70 218.36 0.16 0.39 30.76 -0.21 23.16 2.42
2014-07-18 229.80 249.90 233.78 0.15 0.41 32.87 -0.22 23.85 2.42
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2014-07-21 229.60 248.80 233.20 0.16 0.40 32.57 -0.22 23.75 2.41
2014-07-22 236.30 256.90 240.43 0.15 0.41 33.52 -0.22 24.04 2.41
2014-07-23 255.60 272.20 257.54 0.16 0.43 34.59 -0.23 24.35 2.40
2014-07-24 256.10 276.10 259.78 0.16 0.43 34.50 -0.23 24.32 2.40
2014-07-25 252.50 272.00 256.04 0.16 0.42 33.84 -0.23 24.13 2.40
2014-07-28 256.90 277.00 260.77 0.16 0.42 33.87 -0.23 24.13 2.39
2014-07-29 256.40 276.50 260.31 0.16 0.42 33.58 -0.23 24.04 2.39
2014-07-30 262.00 282.30 265.95 0.16 0.43 34.14 -0.24 24.20 2.38
2014-07-31 238.60 259.50 243.38 0.17 0.40 31.28 -0.23 23.32 2.38
2014-08-01 230.70 250.60 235.08 0.17 0.40 30.71 -0.23 23.12 2.38
2014-08-04 239.90 258.90 243.70 0.17 0.41 31.58 -0.23 23.41 2.37
2014-08-05 234.60 254.10 238.84 0.17 0.40 30.53 -0.23 23.06 2.37
2014-08-06 235.60 256.10 240.34 0.17 0.40 30.51 -0.23 23.05 2.36
2014-08-07 231.40 251.40 235.99 0.17 0.39 29.96 -0.23 22.86 2.36
2014-08-08 240.30 261.10 245.13 0.17 0.40 30.91 -0.24 23.18 2.36
2014-08-11 247.10 266.80 251.29 0.17 0.41 31.52 -0.24 23.38 2.35
2014-08-12 244.80 263.40 248.50 0.17 0.41 31.28 -0.24 23.30 2.35
2014-08-13 260.10 276.50 262.44 0.17 0.42 32.73 -0.24 23.75 2.35
2014-08-14 266.30 281.10 267.72 0.17 0.43 33.36 -0.24 23.93 2.34
2014-08-15 273.50 288.60 274.94 0.17 0.44 33.98 -0.24 24.11 2.34
2014-08-18 281.50 299.60 284.31 0.16 0.45 34.99 -0.24 24.37 2.33
2014-08-19 290.50 308.00 292.90 0.16 0.45 35.67 -0.25 24.53 2.33
2014-08-20 292.00 311.20 295.26 0.17 0.45 35.67 -0.25 24.53 2.33
2014-08-21 293.40 313.80 297.23 0.17 0.46 35.85 -0.25 24.57 2.32
2014-08-22 300.10 320.80 304.04 0.17 0.46 36.06 -0.25 24.61 2.32
2014-08-25 304.70 324.70 308.24 0.17 0.47 36.44 -0.25 24.69 2.31
2014-08-26 307.30 328.30 311.33 0.17 0.47 36.56 -0.25 24.71 2.31
2014-08-27 305.50 326.00 309.28 0.17 0.47 36.55 -0.25 24.70 2.31
2014-08-28 304.70 325.00 308.43 0.17 0.46 36.27 -0.25 24.63 2.30
2014-08-29 311.70 332.00 315.34 0.17 0.47 36.81 -0.26 24.75 2.30
2014-09-02 316.80 337.80 320.81 0.17 0.48 37.10 -0.26 24.79 2.29
2014-09-03 310.10 331.00 314.22 0.17 0.47 36.20 -0.26 24.59 2.29
2014-09-04 304.80 325.40 308.84 0.17 0.46 35.95 -0.26 24.53 2.28
2014-09-05 312.50 332.20 315.97 0.17 0.47 36.74 -0.26 24.70 2.28
2014-09-08 315.70 335.40 319.18 0.17 0.48 36.81 -0.26 24.70 2.27
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2014-09-09 302.30 322.60 306.30 0.17 0.46 35.57 -0.26 24.42 2.27
2014-09-10 316.10 338.10 320.78 0.17 0.48 36.71 -0.26 24.66 2.27
2014-09-11 315.10 335.30 318.92 0.17 0.47 36.57 -0.26 24.63 2.27
2014-09-12 306.50 327.10 310.70 0.17 0.47 35.71 -0.26 24.43 2.26
2014-09-15 291.40 311.60 295.68 0.17 0.45 34.21 -0.26 24.06 2.25
2014-09-16 308.50 328.90 312.67 0.17 0.47 35.48 -0.26 24.36 2.25
2014-09-17 309.40 329.80 313.56 0.17 0.47 35.65 -0.26 24.39 2.25
2014-09-18 325.70 345.80 329.55 0.17 0.48 36.65 -0.27 24.61 2.25
2014-09-19 324.00 344.00 327.81 0.17 0.48 36.50 -0.27 24.57 2.24
2014-09-22 305.50 325.30 309.48 0.17 0.46 35.00 -0.26 24.22 2.24
2014-09-23 303.50 318.50 305.15 0.17 0.46 34.62 -0.26 24.13 2.23
2014-09-24 323.80 338.80 325.22 0.17 0.48 36.07 -0.27 24.45 2.23
2014-09-25 291.60 306.60 293.51 0.17 0.45 33.11 -0.26 23.73 2.23
2014-09-26 308.40 323.40 310.07 0.17 0.46 34.60 -0.27 24.11 2.22
2014-09-29 303.00 324.10 307.79 0.17 0.46 34.25 -0.27 24.01 2.22
2014-09-30 315.00 330.00 316.74 0.18 0.46 34.35 -0.27 24.03 2.21
2014-10-01 289.20 304.20 291.28 0.18 0.44 32.19 -0.27 23.46 2.21
2014-10-02 288.50 303.50 292.01 0.18 0.44 32.06 -0.27 23.42 2.21
2014-10-03 304.40 319.40 307.75 0.18 0.45 33.36 -0.27 23.77 2.21
2014-10-06 296.50 311.50 299.93 0.18 0.45 32.83 -0.27 23.62 2.20
2014-10-07 271.50 292.20 278.00 0.18 0.43 30.93 -0.26 23.07 2.19
2014-10-08 297.60 318.00 303.64 0.17 0.45 33.50 -0.27 23.78 2.19
2014-10-09 274.50 294.30 279.17 0.18 0.43 31.28 -0.26 23.17 2.19
2014-10-10 239.50 256.20 243.16 0.18 0.40 28.11 -0.25 22.13 2.19
2014-10-14 235.70 255.70 241.26 0.19 0.39 26.59 -0.26 21.56 2.18
2014-10-15 211.80 232.20 217.75 0.18 0.37 25.44 -0.25 21.10 2.17
2014-10-16 202.20 226.20 210.07 0.18 0.36 24.77 -0.25 20.81 2.17
2014-10-17 227.40 249.30 233.96 0.19 0.38 26.41 -0.26 21.49 2.17
2014-10-20 243.20 262.10 248.04 0.18 0.40 27.83 -0.26 22.02 2.16
2014-10-21 277.80 298.50 283.05 0.18 0.43 30.90 -0.27 23.02 2.16
2014-10-22 275.70 295.40 280.57 0.18 0.43 30.26 -0.27 22.82 2.15
2014-10-23 302.70 317.70 304.92 0.18 0.45 32.18 -0.28 23.38 2.15
2014-10-24 313.20 328.20 315.28 0.18 0.46 33.07 -0.28 23.60 2.15
2014-10-27 313.80 332.10 317.56 0.18 0.46 33.07 -0.28 23.59 2.14
2014-10-28 332.60 352.10 336.67 0.18 0.48 34.95 -0.28 24.02 2.14
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2014-10-29 328.50 347.80 332.57 0.18 0.48 34.39 -0.28 23.89 2.13
2014-10-30 331.90 353.10 336.87 0.18 0.48 34.67 -0.28 23.95 2.13
2014-10-31 359.70 381.70 364.79 0.18 0.50 36.51 -0.29 24.30 2.13
2014-11-03 368.80 390.80 373.88 0.18 0.51 36.72 -0.29 24.32 2.12
2014-11-04 362.40 384.30 367.51 0.18 0.50 36.25 -0.29 24.23 2.12
2014-11-05 362.60 384.40 367.70 0.18 0.50 36.11 -0.30 24.19 2.12
2014-11-06 369.90 390.70 373.70 0.18 0.51 36.47 -0.30 24.25 2.11
2014-11-07 361.20 381.60 364.82 0.18 0.50 36.30 -0.29 24.22 2.11
2014-11-10 363.90 383.90 367.31 0.18 0.51 36.67 -0.29 24.25 2.10
2014-11-12 372.20 390.10 374.47 0.18 0.51 37.21 -0.29 24.33 2.10
2014-11-13 380.10 399.30 383.72 0.18 0.52 37.69 -0.29 24.39 2.09
2014-11-14 384.20 404.20 388.16 0.18 0.52 38.02 -0.29 24.43 2.09
2014-11-17 378.10 397.60 381.94 0.18 0.52 37.50 -0.29 24.33 2.08
2014-11-18 400.50 414.10 401.26 0.18 0.53 38.35 -0.30 24.43 2.08
2014-11-19 393.10 408.10 394.68 0.18 0.52 37.66 -0.30 24.33 2.08
2014-11-20 404.30 419.30 404.21 0.18 0.53 38.35 -0.30 24.41 2.07
2014-11-21 412.10 425.70 411.27 0.18 0.54 38.57 -0.31 24.43 2.07
2014-11-24 426.80 441.80 426.52 0.18 0.55 39.48 -0.31 24.50 2.06
2014-11-25 426.70 444.00 427.55 0.18 0.55 39.56 -0.31 24.50 2.06
2014-11-26 444.60 460.60 444.63 0.18 0.56 40.44 -0.31 24.56 2.06
2014-11-28 464.70 477.40 463.00 0.18 0.57 40.85 -0.32 24.57 2.05
2014-12-01 440.70 455.70 440.55 0.19 0.55 39.10 -0.32 24.39 2.04
2014-12-02 447.90 462.90 447.67 0.19 0.56 39.63 -0.32 24.42 2.04
2014-12-03 452.60 467.60 452.35 0.19 0.56 39.78 -0.32 24.43 2.04
2014-12-04 450.90 465.90 449.85 0.18 0.56 39.77 -0.32 24.41 2.04
2014-12-05 452.50 466.20 447.67 0.18 0.56 39.72 -0.32 24.40 2.03
2014-12-08 440.00 455.00 439.28 0.19 0.55 38.45 -0.33 24.24 2.02
2014-12-09 449.50 462.40 447.86 0.19 0.55 38.89 -0.33 24.27 2.02
2014-12-10 409.50 433.00 413.39 0.19 0.53 36.72 -0.32 24.01 2.02
2014-12-11 416.50 440.10 420.32 0.19 0.54 37.35 -0.32 24.08 2.02
2014-12-12 398.70 421.30 402.32 0.19 0.52 35.85 -0.32 23.86 2.01
2014-12-15 385.40 400.20 385.45 0.19 0.51 34.45 -0.33 23.60 2.01
2014-12-16 357.00 372.00 357.58 0.20 0.49 32.43 -0.32 23.18 2.00
2014-12-17 390.50 405.50 390.65 0.19 0.51 34.58 -0.33 23.61 2.00
2014-12-18 438.00 455.10 438.61 0.19 0.55 37.56 -0.33 24.04 2.00
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2014-12-19 451.10 465.60 448.16 0.19 0.55 37.90 -0.33 24.06 1.99
2014-12-22 459.90 474.90 459.38 0.20 0.56 38.04 -0.34 24.04 1.99
2014-12-23 458.40 472.60 457.63 0.20 0.55 37.52 -0.34 23.98 1.98
2014-12-24 460.10 475.10 459.73 0.20 0.55 37.57 -0.34 23.97 1.98
2014-12-26 475.60 490.60 475.08 0.20 0.56 38.36 -0.35 24.03 1.98
2014-12-29 472.20 487.20 471.75 0.20 0.56 38.18 -0.35 23.98 1.97
2014-12-30 454.00 469.00 448.41 0.19 0.55 37.33 -0.34 23.88 1.96
2014-12-31 429.60 444.60 429.63 0.20 0.54 35.92 -0.34 23.70 1.96
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Appendix B
Monte Carlo Prices for Option
Portfolios
Name cATM pATM cOTM pOTM cITM pITM
Short Call -1 0 0 0 0 0
Long Call 1 0 0 0 0 0
Long Put 0 1 0 0 0 0
Short Put 0 -1 0 0 0 0
Bull Call Spread 0 0 -1 0 1 0
Bull Put Spread 0 0 0 1 0 -1
Bear Call Spread 0 0 1 0 -1 0
Bear Put Spread 0 0 0 -1 0 1
Butterfly Call Spread -2 0 1 0 1 0
Butterfly Put Spread 0 -2 0 1 0 1
Long Call Ladder -1 0 -1 0 1 0
Short Call Ladder 1 0 1 0 -1 0
Long Put Ladder 0 -1 0 -1 0 1
Short Put Ladder 0 1 0 1 0 -1
Iron Butterfly -1 -1 1 1 0 0
Long Straddle 1 1 0 0 0 0
Short Straddle -1 -1 0 0 0 0
Long Strangle 0 0 1 1 0 0
Short Strangle 0 0 -1 -1 0 0
Strip 1 2 0 0 0 0
Strap 2 1 0 0 0 0
Table B.1: Option Portfolios (a.k.a. Option Trading Strategies)
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(a) Butterfly Call Spread prices for differ-
ent OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is
100.
(b) Butterfly Put Spread prices for differ-
ent OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is
100.
(c) Bullish Call Spread prices for different
OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is 100.
(d) Bearish Call Spread prices for different
OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is 100.
Figure B.1: Option Portfolio prices for different strikes
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(a) Iron Butterfly prices for different OTM
put and OTM call strikes. ATM strike is
100.
(b) Long Call Ladder prices for different
OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is 100.
(c) Short Call Ladder prices for different
OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is 100.
(d) Short Strangle prices for different
OTM and ITM strikes. ATM strike is 100.
Figure B.2: Option Portfolio prices for different strikes
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Appendix C
Bids and asks of LMSR traders
holding different option
portfolios
Below we list bids and asks of LMSR trader holding different option portfolios
in comparison with Black-Scholes prices. We set the liquidity parameter to
b = 100.
Figure C.1: Short Call
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Figure C.2: Long Call
Figure C.3: Short Put
Figure C.4: Long Put
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Figure C.5: Bullish Call/Put Spread
Figure C.6: Bearish Call/Put Spread
Figure C.7: Butterfly Call/Put Spread
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Figure C.8: Long Call/Put Ladder
Figure C.9: Short Call/Put Ladder
Figure C.10: Iron Butterfly
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Figure C.11: Long Strangle
Figure C.12: Short Strangle
Figure C.13: Long Straddle
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Direct DA Simulation Results
Option Pricing Choosing Quantity
ZI - Zero-Intelligence RND-Random Integer
BS - Black-Scholes LIN- Linear Quantity
MC - Monte Carlo using GBM Model
MC* - Monte Carlo using JD Model
VOL - Volatility Surface
EXP - Exponential Utility
LMSR - Log Market Scoring Rule
Table D.1: Nomenclature for naming agents
Figure D.1: Simulated NASDAQ-100 Indices
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Figure D.2: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for VOL-RND traders
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Figure D.3: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for VOL-RND traders
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Figure D.4: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for VOL-LIN traders
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Figure D.5: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for VOL-LIN traders
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Figure D.6: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for MC-RND traders
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Figure D.7: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for MC-RND traders
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Figure D.8: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for MC-LIN traders
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Figure D.9: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for MC-LIN traders
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Figure D.10: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for MC*-RND traders
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Figure D.11: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for MC*-RND traders
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Figure D.12: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for MC*-LIN traders
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Figure D.13: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for MC*-LIN traders
365
Figure D.14: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for Mixed Risk Neu-
tral
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Figure D.15: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for Mixed Risk Neutral
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Figure D.16: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for EXP-RND and
ZI-RND traders
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Figure D.17: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for EXP-RND and ZI-RND traders
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Figure D.18: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for EXP-RND, ZI-
RND and VOL-RND traders
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Figure D.19: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for EXP-RND, ZI-RND and VOL-RND traders
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Figure D.20: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for LMSR Neutral
and Non-Neutral traders
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Figure D.21: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for LMSR Neutral and Non-Neutral traders
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Figure D.22: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for LMSR All traders
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Figure D.23: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for LMSR All traders
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Figure D.24: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for LMSR More Bull
traders
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Figure D.25: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for LMSR More Bull traders
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Figure D.26: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for LMSR More Bear
traders
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Figure D.27: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for LMSR More Bear traders
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Figure D.28: DA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for Mixed All traders
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Figure D.29: DA efficiency error, budget-balance and Greeks of ATM, OTM
and ITM options for Mixed All traders
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Appendix E
Online DA Simulation Results
Trading Algorithms
ZIP - Zero Intelligence Plus
GD - Gjerstad-Dickhaut
GAR - Garman’s Inventory-based Model
COP - Copeland-Galai Information-based Model
INF - Informed Trader
MC - Monte-Carlo trader
Table E.1: Nomenclature for naming agents
Figure E.1: Simulated NASDAQ-100 Indices
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Figure E.2: CDA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for ZIP traders
383
Figure E.3: CDA inventory distribution and Greeks of ATM, OTM and ITM
options for ZIP traders
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Figure E.4: CDA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for ZIP and GD
traders
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Figure E.5: CDA inventory distribution and Greeks of ATM, OTM and ITM
options for ZIP and GD traders
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Figure E.6: CDA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for GAR and ZIP
traders
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Figure E.7: CDA inventory distribution and Greeks of ATM, OTM and ITM
options for GAR and ZIP traders
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Figure E.8: CDA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for COP, INF and
ZIP traders
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Figure E.9: CDA inventory distribution and Greeks of ATM, OTM and ITM
options for COP, INF and ZIP traders
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Figure E.10: CDA prices of ATM, OTM and ITM options for mixed traders
391
Figure E.11: CDA inventory distribution and Greeks of ATM, OTM and ITM
options for mixed traders
392
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